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ABSTRACT 
The international community has witnessed many human rights violations which 
have also constituted violations of international humanitarian law throughout the twentieth 
century. Two of the worst violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law 
occurred in the territories of the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda in the last decade of the 
twentieth century. The large scale of killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence, 
"ethnic cleansing", genocide and other types of crimes committed in these two regions of 
the world impelled the international community to bring those responsible of such crimes to 
justice. On this ground, the UN Security Council established the ICTY and the ICTR acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in 1993 and in 1994 respectively. 
The establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR was innovative in character since 
being established by the Security Council on behalf of the entire international community. 
This development also paved the way for the establishment of the ICC in 1998. 
Despite the fact that there are many problems deriving from the different legal 
systems being used around the world, one of the main issues is the scope of the substantive 
law (subject-matter jurisdiction) of the international criminal tribunals or courts. In this 
sense, the international criminal institutions should normally apply the customary rules of 
international humanitarian law. In accordance with this body of law, the ad hoc tribunals 
interpret and apply the customary rules of international humanitarian law in relation to their 
substantive laws. In this context, the interpretation and application of the rules governing 
individual criminal responsibility, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity by the 
ad hoc tribunals should be considered as a significant contribution to international 
humanitarian law on the ground that the elements of international crimes and their 
substantive contents are clarified by means of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. For these 
reasons, there cannot be any doubt that the practice of the ad hoc tribunals will create an 
immense precedential value for the ICC in its future work on the basis that the regulation of 
the ICC Statute is, mutadis mutandis, similar to the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, 
and that it is regarded as reflecting the customary international humanitarian law rules in 
relation to these international crimes. 
This study examines the international humanitarian law rules and their application 
by the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the substantive laws of the ICTY and the ICTR. The 
practice of the ICTY and the ICTR and their contribution to international humanitarian law 
and possible impact on the ICC are indicated in light of the decisions rendered by the ad 
hoc tribunals and of the latest international humanitarian law instruments such as the 1996 
ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the ICC Statute. 
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THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
International human rights law and international humanitarian law are both part of 
international law. Although there are significant differences between two branches of 
international law, they are interrelated in protecting the rights of individuals. As far as the 
concept of international humanitarian law is concerned one of the main purposes of this 
branch is to enforce -in addition to State responsibility- individual criminal responsibility 
through either domestic courts or international tribunals (or courts, ad hoc or permanent). ' 
Due to national courts are not adequate in this respect, the establishment of 
international criminal institutions are inescapable. The international community was faced 
with the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and at Tokyo after the Second 
World War. 2 The practice of the International Military Tribunals has played the key role in 
applying customary international law and conventional law rules, which were accepted by 
'For differences and similarities between international human rights and international humanitarian law, 
see Vinuesa, R., E., "Interface, Correspondence and Convergence of Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law", (1998) 1 YIHL pp. 69-110.; Eide, A., "The Laws of Mar and Human Rights- 
Differences and Convergences", in C. Swinarski (ed. ), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian 
Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet, Geneva, The Hague: International Committee of 
the Red Cross, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1984), pp. 675-697.; Robertson, A., H., "Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights", in C. Swinarski (cd. ), pp. 793-802.; For the concept of international humanitarian 
law, see McCoubrey, H., International Humanitarian Law Modern Developments in the Limitation of 
Warfare, Second Edition, Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate, Dartmouth, (1998).; 
McCoubrey, H., and White, N., D., International Law and Armed Conflict, Aldershot, Brookfield USA, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney: Dartmouth, (1992), pp. 257-278. 
2See infra Chap. 1, note 1. 
1 
the international community before the alleged crimes committed in the Second World War, 
and for the first time in its history the international community witnessed the categorisation 
of international crimes such as crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The acceptance of international crimes either under conventional or customary 
law rules and the possibility of enforcing individual criminal responsibility through 
international organisations demonstrated the desirability of the establishment of an 
international criminal court. The main reason for this was the widespread and systematic 
violations of international human rights and of international humanitarian law during the 
twentieth century. In 1993 and 1994, the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (the 
ICTY)3 and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for the Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January and 31 December 
1994 (the ICTR) 4 by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a 
measure to protect international peace and security and the practice of these ad hoc 
tribunals proved that individual criminal responsibility was enforceable at the international 
level for the crimes which are all concern to the international community. 
Despite the fact that there are many problems deriving from the different legal 
systems being used around the world, one of the main issues is the limitation of the 
substantive law (subject-matter jurisdiction) of the international criminal tribunals or courts. 
One solution to this problem is the ruling that the international criminal institutions should 
apply the customary rules of international humanitarian law. This was the approach taken 
by the Commentary (the Secretary-General's Reports to the ICTY Statute. However, this 
way of regulation may not be sufficient or may create many problems in practice. In this 
sense, some reasons can be indicated as follows: 
3See infra Chap. 1, note 2. 
4See infra Chap. 1, note 4. 
5Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN. 
Doc. No. S/25704 & Add. 1 (1993). "... the international tribunal should apply rules of international 
humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law... " (par. 34 emphasis added). 
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Firstly, although some practice can be found at the national level international 
customary or conventional law rules have not been applied by a truly established 
international criminal organisation. 
Secondly, although the nature of crimes remain the same, the way of committing 
crimes, targeting civilians and civilian objects or property have remarkably changed since 
the Second World War. For example, rape as a crime was accepted in international 
customary and conventional law rules and in the CCL No. 10 for Germany under the 
concept of crimes against humanity, but the commission of this crime, as the international 
community faced in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda and Kosovo, makes rape as a 
weapon or destroying an ethnic, religious, racial or national group within the meaning of 
the Genocide Convention. 
On this ground, the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR plays a central role for 
interpreting and applying the rules of international humanitarian law in accordance with the 
necessity of the recent events occurred around the world. There cannot be any doubt that 
the practice of the ad hoc tribunals will contribute to international humanitarian and human 
rights law in a positive way, and most importantly, it will have an immense precedential 
value for the ICC when it becomes in operation. The main reason why the practice of the 
ad hoc tribunals will create a precedential value for the ICC lies on the fact that the ICTY 
and the ICTR have to apply the customary rules of international humanitarian law as far as 
the substantive law of the International Tribunal (in particular, the rules governing war 
crimes, the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity) are concerned. In the same 
vein, the regulation of the ICC Statute is, mutatis mzitandis, similar to the Statutes of the 
ICTY and the ICTR in this regard, and it is considered as reflecting the customary 
international humanitarian law with regard to these international crimes. In this sense, the 
ad hoc tribunals and the ICC are established to implement the customary rules of 
international law at the international level for the crimes which are all concern to the 
international community. Of course, the Judgements rendered by the ICTY and the ICTR 
will not have a binding effect on the ICC, but they will constitute invaluable sources of 
guidance for the ICC. In this study, the use of the phrase "precedential value" should be 
understood in this context, not in any other literal meaning. 
For the reasons indicated above, the aim of this study is to examine the international 
humanitarian law rules and their application by the ad hoc tribunals in relation to the 
3 
substantive law of the ICTY and the ICTR. In this sense, the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals and their contribution to international humanitarian law and impact on the ICC 
will be discussed. 
In accordance with this purpose, the study is divided into two parts: Under Part 1 
(comprising Chapters 1-2) the legality of the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals and of 
the ICC is examined. 
Chapter 1 specifically deals with the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR. The 
situations which lead the UN Security Council to establish such tribunals are briefly 
explained, and the legality and the competence of the Security Council to create these 
international criminal organisations are discussed in light of the theory and of the practice 
of the ICTY. Due to its importance (being the first truly established an international 
criminal tribunal in the history of human beings), the view taken by the Trial and Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY is discussed in detail. 
Chapter 2 looks at the background of the creation of the ICC. The reasons for 
including this as a separate Chapter is first to indicate the impact of the ad hoc tribunals on 
the establishment of the ICC and its Statute, and secondly, to refer the regulations of the 
Statute of the ICC in the following Chapters in order to address differences and similarities 
between the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. This Chapter also examines the obstacles to 
create an international criminal court that made the international community not to have 
such a court for centuries under the practice of the International Tribunals. 
Part 2 (comprising Chapters 3-6) represents the core of this study and deals with 
the substantive law of the ad hoc tribunals consisting of individual criminal responsibility, 
war crimes, the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity. 
Chapter 3 examines first the concept of individual criminal responsibility in 
international law since it is crucial with regard to enforce the rules of international 
humanitarian law. Then, the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR and their contribution to 
international humanitarian law and impact on the ICC is discussed in light of the 
Judgements rendered by the ad hoc tribunals and of the latest developments in international 
humanitarian law such as the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security 
of Mankind and of the ICC Statute. 
Chapters 4-6 deal with the international crimes, war crimes (the grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocol I to thereto on the one 
4 
hand, and violations of the laws or customs of war on the other hand), the crime of 
genocide, and crimes against humanity, respectively. In this context, theory, the practice of 
the ad hoc tribunals with regard to interpreting and applying the elements of international 
crimes and the substantive contents of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 
are discussed in detail. The approach taken by the ICTY and the ICTR in this regard and its 
significance in international humanitarian law, -in particular, creating a precedential value 
for the ICC- are indicated in light of the 1996 ILC Draft Code and of the ICC Statute. 




THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TIIE AD HOC TRIBUNALS (THE ICTY AND THE 
ICTR) AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (THE ICC) 
CHAPTER 1 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ICTY AND THE ICTR 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
As is well known, in 1945 and 1946 after the Second World War, the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg (the Nuremberg Tribunal) and the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East (the Tokyo Tribunal) were established by the Allied Powers to prosecute 
German and Japanese war criminals. ' In 1993 and 1994 for the first time since the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the international community created two further international 
criminal tribunals to try individuals charged with violations of international humanitarian 
law. The first is the ICTY which was established by UN Security Council Resolution 827 of 
' The United Kingdom, France, the United States and the Soviet Union were the Allied Powers in the 
Second World War. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, 8 August 1945 (hereinafter the London Agreement), 59 Stat. 1544,82 U. N. T. S. 279 that 
includes the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the basic principles of the trial. However, the Tokyo 
Tribunal was not established by conclusion of a treaty. See Special Proclamation by the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, Establishment of an International Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 
1946, T. I. A. S. No. 1589.4 Bevans 20.; In international law, there are a number of work considering the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. Some of them can be indicated as follows: Conot, R., Justice at 
Nuremberg, New York: Harper and Row, (1983).; Taylor, T., The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, New 
York: Knopf, (1992).; Brackman, A., The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes 
Trials, Morrow, (1987).; Wright, Q., "The Lou, of the Nuremberg Trial", (1947) 41 AJIL p. 38.; Wright, 
Q., "Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment", (1948) 42 AJIL p. 405.; Schick, F., B., "The 
Nuremberg Trial and the International Lai, of the Future", (1947) 41 AJIL p. 770.; Kuhn, A., K., 
"International Criminal Jurisdiction ", (1947) 41 AJIL p. 430.; Finch, G., A., "The Nuremberg Trial and 
International Lau, ", (1947) 41 AJIL p. 20.; Ehard, H., "The Nuremberg Trial Against the Major War 
Criminals and International Lau, ", (1949) 43 AJIL p. 223.; Clark, R., S., "Nuremberg and Tokyo in 
Contemporary Perspectice ", in T. L. H. McCormack and G. J. Simpson (eds. ), The Law of War Crimes 
National and International Approaches, The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, (1997), p. 
171.; Chancy, K., R., "Pitfalls and Imperatives: , Ipplving the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War 
Crimes Trials", (1995) 14 Dick. J. Int. 'l L. p. 57. 
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May 19932 "to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991". 3 The 
second is the ICTR which was set up again by the Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 
November 19944 "to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible 
for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between I January 
1994 and 31 December 1994". 5 
In contrast to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, 6 the Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
Tribunals were established by the Security Council on behalf of the entire international 
community in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 7 For this reason, 
these two tribunals can be seen as the first truly established international criminal tribunals 
for the prosecution of those persons who are responsible for serious violations of 
international human rights law and of international humanitarian law. ' 
In this Chapter, before examining the legality of the establishment of the ICTY and 
the ICTR in light of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, the legal and factual conditions 
which led the UN Security Council to establish international criminal tribunals in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda will be briefly explained below. 
1.2. THE SITUATIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA 
In the last decade of the twentieth century, the international community witnessed two 
major human rights tragedies; one of them in the heart of Europe (in the former 
Yugoslavia) and the other one is in the central African State of Rwanda. As will be seen in 
detail in the following sections, the types of crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia 
included genocide, torture, rape or other forms of sexual assaults as a means of an 
2 Adopted unanimously by the Security Council at its 3217 meeting, on 25 May 1993. SC. Res. 827, U. N. SCOR, 48th Year, 1993 SC. Res & Dec. At 29, U. N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993). 3 Art. 1 of the ICTY Statute. " Adopted by a vote 13-1-1 by the Security Council at its 3453d meeting, on 8 November 1994. S. C. Res. 955, U. N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453 meeting at 1, U. N. Doc. S/Res/955(1994). 5 Art. I of the ICTR Statute. 6 Some scholars accept the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals as "Victors' courts". In this context, see Minear, R., H., Victors' Justice the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, (1971).; Rubin, A., P., "International Crime and Punishment ", (1993) 33 Nat. Int. p. 73. 7 Greenwood, C., "The International Tribunal for formner Yugoslavia", (1993) 69,4 Int. All. p. 641.; Scharf, M., P.. "Have We Really Learned the Lessons of Nuremberg? ", (1995) 149 Mil. L. Rev. p. 66. 8 Meron, T., "IVar Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law", (1994) 88 AJIL p. 78. 
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instrument of war and a practice of ethnic cleansing, mistreatment of civilian prisoners, 
destruction of personal, historical and cultural public property, forceful displacement of 
civil population, attacks on schools, hospitals etc. Similarly, in Rwanda, hundreds of 
thousands of people have faced with the same forms of ill treatment in violation of human 
rights and of international humanitarian law. 
1.2.1. The Former Yugoslavia 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which was situated in Balkan Peninsula, 
consisted of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Macedonia), and two autonomous regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina). The ethnic and 
religious structure of the republics of the former Yugoslavia is one of the most complex in 
the world. 9 In this context, before the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Slovenia was comprised of 90 percent ethnic Slovenes and 10 percent ethnic 
minorities of Serbs, Croats and Hungarians. Croatia was comprised of 85 percent ethnic 
Croats and 11.5 percent ethnic Serbs, who are predominantly inhabited in Krajina and 
Petrinja. Two-thirds of the population of Serbia are ethnic Serbs. This includes Kosovo 
with, at that time a 91 percent ethnic Albanian population, and Vojvodina with a 19 percent 
ethnic Hungarian population, and which were formerly autonomous regions that were 
incorporated into Serbia in September 1990. Bosnia-Herzegovina has 40 percent Muslims, 
32 percent Serbs and 18 percent Croats. Montenegro has two-thirds of its population as 
Montenegrins and minority Muslims and Albanians. Macedonia consists of 67 percent 
Macedonians, 20 percent Albanians and other minorities. '0 
Prior to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, there was relatively few 
manifestations of ethnic problems in this part of Europe. " Formally, the dissolution of the 
former Yugoslavia began on 25 June 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia declared their 
9 For the ethnic structure of the republics of the former Yugoslavia and its effect on the dissolution, see 
Glenny, M., The Fall of Yugoslavia the Third Balkan War, Penguin Books, (1992).; Duncan, W., R., 
"Yugoslavia's Break-up", in W. Raymond Duncan and G. Paul Holman, Jr. (eds. ), Ethnic Nationalism and 
Regional Conflict The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview 
Press, (1994), pp. 19-33. 
10 Weller, M., "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia", (1992) 86 AJIL p. 569. 
" Morris, V., and Scharf, M., P., An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Vol. 1, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1995, p. 18. 
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independence from the Yugoslavian Federation, following their own Assemblies' 
resolutions on 20 February 1991 and 21 February 1991 respectively. 12 This had been 
preceded a referendum in Slovenia on 23 December 1990 in which 88.5 percent of the 
Slovenes voted in favour of independence from Yugoslavia. 13 The ethnic Serbs in Slovenia 
and Croatia responded by declaring their own autonomous regions: On 13 August 1991, 
the Serbs in Slovenia declared a "Serbian Autonomous Region of Western Slovenia". In 
Croatia, this ethnic group had shown their intention to do the same in a referendum held on 
12 May 1991 in which they manifested their wish to remain a part of Yugoslavian 
Federation. " 
The process of disintegration in the former Yugoslavia eventually descended into a 
series of military clashes which gave rise to some of the worst human rights violations yet 
seen. The parties involved in the conflict were varied and the place of the conflict changed 
at various times from Slovenia to Croatia and lastly to Bosnia-Herzegovina. 15 
Generally speaking, the military conflicts in the former Yugoslavia involved three 
phases: 16 
The first phase involved the conflict in Slovenia and it began when Slovenia 
declared its independence from the former Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991. The warring 
factions in this conflict were the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), Slovenia Territorial 
Defence Forces and local Slovenian Police, and this phase lasted for a few weeks in June 
and July 1991. " 
The second phase involved the conflict in Croatia and started before that Republic 
formally declared its independence on 25 July 1991. It involved on the one hand the JNA, 
Serb militia in Krajina and in eastern and western Slavonia, special forces from Serbia, local 
special forces, and Serb police and armed civilians; on the other hand the newly formed 
Croatian Army, the Croatian National Guard, local militia special forces, local Croatian 
Police and armed civilians. Although the JNA officially withdrew from Croatia in 
12 Keesing's Record of World Events, 1991, p. 28204. 
13 Weller, p. 569.; Keesing's, 1990. p. 37924. 
14 Keesing's, 1991, pp. 38204,38375. 
15 Bassiouni , M., 
C., and Manikas, P., The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, (1996), p. 39. 
16 The Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 
(1992), paras. 110-113. (hereinafter Final Report). 
17 Final Report, par. 111. 
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November 1991, it continued to support the newly formed, self-declared "Serb Republic of 
Krajina" army. 18 
The third and last phase of the conflict was in Bosnia-Herzegovina and began 
following its declaration of independence on 6 March 1992. The conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was the most terrible one and involved the following warring factions; 
Croatian and Bosnian Government forces, Bosnian Government and Serbian forces, and 
Croatian and Serbian forces. The Croatian Army, local Croatian police, volunteer civilians 
and "special forces" supported the Croatian Defence Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
fighting between the Bosnian Government and JNA lasted from April to June 1992 when 
the JNA "officially" withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina, leaving behind JNA Serbian 
troops and their military equipment. '9 In addition to the regular armies of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia20 (FRY), Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were three 
additional armies taking part in the conflict, namely, the Bosnian -Serb Army, the Serbian 
Army of Croatia and the Croatian Defence Council. 21 
While the conflict was continuing in the former Yugoslavia, four Yugoslav republics 
-Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia- sought recognition as independent 
States by the international community. 22 On 15 January 1992 the European Community 
(EC) recognised Slovenia and Croatia both of which fulfilled the requirements of the 
Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of new States in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Community. 23 These two countries 
were firstly recognised by Germany on 23 December 1991.24 On 6 April 1992, the EC 
'8Ibid. par. 112. 
191bid par. 113. 
20 The Federal Assembly adopted the constitution of a new Yugoslav State -the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia- consisting of two republics Serbia (including its autonomous regions of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina) and Montenegro on 27 March 1992. 
21 Bassiouni and Manikas, p. 41.; Final Report, par. 118. 
22 Rich, R., "Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union", (1993) 4 EJIL p. 
36.; Turk, D., "Recognition of States: A Comment", (1993) 4 EJIL p. 66.; For the British policy on 
recognition of new States (the Baltic States and the Republics of the Former Yugoslavia) see Warbrick, C., 
"Recognition of States", (1992) 41 ICLQ p. 473.; and also see the same author "Recognition of States Part 
2", (1993) 42 ICLQ p. 433. 
23 The texts of the Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and 
in the Soviet Union (16 December 1991) and Declaration on Yugoslavia (Extraordinary EPC Ministerial 
Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991) are available in (1993) 4 EJIL pp. 72,73 respectively. The 
Guidelines reprinted in (1992) 31 ILM p. 1486.; In this context, see Opinions of the Arbitration 
Commission of the International Conference on Yugoslm, ia, (as also known the Badinter Commission, 
because of the name of its president-Mr. Badinter-), in (1993)4 EJIL p. 74., reprinted in (1992) 31 ILM p. 
1494.; Rich, p. 49.; Weller, p. i86.; Warbrick (1992), p. 477. 
24 Weller, p. 588. 
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officially recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina. 25 The United States' recognition followed this on 
7 April 1992. At the same time Slovenia and Croatia were also recognised by the United 
States. 26 All three States were accepted as membership in the United Nations on 22 May 
1992.27 The recognition of Macedonia was problematic in the EC, because of the Greek 
position arguing that the name "Macedonia" implied the northern part of Greece - also 
known as Macedonia- would be subject of territorial claims. 28 
During the period of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the most shocking 
human rights violations, and violations of the laws of war took place in the heart of Europe. 
Although all conflicts involved atrocities, the quantity of the killing, rape and other forms of 
sexual assaults, "ethnic cleansing" and other types of crimes committed in the former 
Yugoslavia impelled the international community to seek to bring to account those 
responsible as an element of its attempts to restore international peace. 29 In the meantime, 
the sources of information relating to the human rights violations were numerous. In this 
sense, some non-governmental organisations (NGO's) such as Amnesty International, 30 
Helsinki Watch, 31 some the intergovernmental process of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 32 the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
25 Rich, p. 50.; Weller, p. 593. 
26 Warbrick (1993), p. 435.; Rich, p. 50. 
27 Final Report, note 21. 
28 Weller, p. 594.; Rich, p. 51.; As a result of the widespread recognition of these republics by the 
international community and also the adoption of the new Yugoslav State as the FRY on 27 April 1992 by 
the Federal Assembly confirmed the existence and independence of these four republics of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
29 Greenwood, p. 642. 
30 Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: "You hati, e no place here": Abuses in Bosnian Serb 
Controlled Areas, Al Index EUR 63/11/94 (This report concerns abuses in Bosnian Serb controlled towns 
such as Banja Luka, Prijedor, Bosanska Gradiska, Maliovljani and others).; Amnesty International, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina: Living for the day -Forcible expulsions from Bijeljina and Janja, Al Index EUR 63/22/94 
(This document is relied largely on interviews with displaced persons in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 
October 1994).; Amnesty International, Further Reports of Torture and Deliberate and Arbitrary Killings 
in Mar Zones, (March 1992).; Amnesty International. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human 
Rights, (1992). 
31 Helsinki Watch, Report on IVar Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (August 1992).; Helsinki Watch, Abuses 
Continue in the Former Yugoslavia: Serbia, Alontenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, (July 1993). 
32 Report of CSCEAMission to Inspect Places of Detention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (29 August-4 September 
1992). 
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(UNHRC), 33 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 34 and the European 
Community, 35 and as an individual State the United States, 36 produced a great deal of 
documents demonstrating the widespread extend of violations of human rights and of 
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. Among the information sources, 
the most detailed and valuable was the Final Report of the Commission of Experts with its 
Annexes. 37 As will be seen below, the Commission of Experts was established pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) by the Secretary-General to examine and analyse 
the information submitted by States and international humanitarian organisations in 
accordance with resolution 771 (1991) and also to investigate violations of international 
33 On behalf of the UNHRC Mr. Tadcusz Marowiccki, Special Rapportcour of the Commission on Human 
Rights, submitted a series of reports concerning the alleged violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law: Report on the Situation o/Human Rights in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia 
Submitted by Afr. Tadeusz Alazou'iecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights Pursuant 
to Paragraph 14 of Commission Resolution 1992IS-1/1 ofAugust 1992, (hereinafter Periodic Report of the 
Special Rapporteour) U. N. Doc. S/24516 (1992).; U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1994/3 (1993) (First Periodic Report 
of the Special Rapporteour).; U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1994/4 (1993) (Second Periodic Report of the Special 
Rapporteour).; U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1994/6 (1993) (Third Periodic Report of the Special Rapporteour).; 
U. N. Doc. E/EN. 4/1994/8 (1993) (Fourth Periodic Report of the Special Rapporteour).; U. N. Doc. 
E/CN. 4/1994/47 (1993) (Fifth Periodic Report of the Special Rapporteour).; U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1994/110 
(1994) (Sixth Periodic Report of the Special Rapporteour).; U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/4 (1994) (Seventh 
Periodic Report of the Special Rapporteour).; U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/10 (1994) (Eight Periodic Report of 
the Special Rapporteour).; U. N. Doc. A/49/641 (U. N. Doc. S/1994/1252) (1994) (Ninth Periodic Report of 
the Special Rapporteour).; U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/57 (1995) (Tenth Periodic Report of the Special 
Rapporteouº). 
34 Sommaruga, C., The President of the ICRC. Saving Lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (October 1992). 
33 European Community Investigative Afission Into the Treatment of Afuslim ! Nomen in the Former 
Yugoslavia: Report to European Community Foreign Alinisters, U. N. Doc. S/25240, (3 February 1993). 
36 The United States has submitted the most valuable information available and in its reports has depended 
upon to the extent possible eyewitness accounts. The estimated dates of the events, grave breaches of the 
fourth Geneva Convention, abuse of civilians in detention centers, deliberate attacks on non-combatants, 
wanton devastation and destruction of property, other, including mass forcible expulsion and deportation of 
civilians, are indicated at the left side of the report. These reports are: First Report on the War Crimes in 
the Former Yugoslavia Submission of Information to the United Nations Security Council in Accordance 
with Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992), (22 September 1992).; Second Report on War Crimes in the 
Former Yugoslavia Supplemental United States Submission of Information to the United Nations Security 
Council in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of'Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph I of Resolution 780 
(1990), (22 October 1992).; Third Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, (6 November 1992).; 
Fourth Report on 1-Var Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, (7 December 1992).; Sixth Report on War Crimes 
in the Former Yugoslavia, (I Alarch 1993).; Seventh Report on IVar Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, (12 
April 1993).; Eight Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, (16 June 1993). 
" The Final Report includes twelve annexes about 3.200 pages of detailed information and analysis.; 
Before the Final Report, the Commission of Experts had submitted two more reports: Interim Report of the 
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U. N. Doc. 
S/25274, (hereinafter Interim Report).; Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant 
to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U. N. Doc. S/26545. (hereinafter Second Interim Report). 
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humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It provided much 
evidence relating to crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. 38 
From the point of view of this study, a brief look at the crimes committed in the 
former Yugoslavia is important since it explains why it was considered necessary to 
establish the ICTY. The concept of "ethnic cleansing"39 is the major character of the crimes 
committed in the said area of the world. The term "ethnic cleansing" in the context of the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, means "rendering an area ethnically homogenous by 
using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area". 40 It "has 
been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra judicial 
executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, 
forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military 
attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of 
property" . 
41 All parties involved in the conflicts have committed grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity; however, 
although the Serbs and Croats have practised these crimes as a part of a policy of "ethnic 
cleansing", Bosnian Muslims have not committed these crimes in the same way. The 
number of violations by the Bosnians is significantly less than the other violations 
committed by the Serbs and Croats. 42 Rape and other forms of sexual assault, 43 mass 
38 "The [F]inal [R]eport of the Commission includes .... substantive 
findings on alleged crimes of "ethnic 
cleansing", genocide and other massive violations of elementary dictates of humanity, rape and sexual 
assault and destruction of cultural property committed in various parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina". (Letter 
dated 24 Afgv 1994 fron, the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council transmitting the 
Final Report of the Commission of Experts). 
39 Kresock, D., M., ""Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The Legal Foundations of Foreign Intervention ", 
(1994) 27 Corn. Int. '1 L. J. pp. 221-225.; For the analysed meaning of this term, see Pctrovic, D., "Ethnic 
Cleansing - An Attempt at. 4-fethodologv" (1994) 5 EJIL pp. 342-359.; and also see Cigar, N., Genocide in 
Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing", College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, (1995).; 
Scharf, M., P., Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial Since 
Nuremberg, Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, (1997), pp. 29-30. 
40 Interim Report, par. 55.; Final Report, par. 129. 
41 Interim Report, par. 56.; Final Report, par. 129. 
42 Final Report, par. 148. 
"' Ibid, paras. 232-253.; "The Commission has information indicating that girls as young as 7 years old and 
women as old as 65 have been raped while in captivity. The group most targeted for rape, however, is 
young women between the ages of 13 and 35. Mothers of young children are often raped in front of their 
children and are threatened with the death of their children if they do not submit to being raped. ... There have also been instances of sexual abuses of men as w ell as castration and mutiliation of male sexual 
organs" (par. 230, (o)). 
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graves, 44 the shelling of cities, 45 detention camps, 46 and the prevention of humanitarian 
aid 4' are just a few examples of the facts underpinning the "ethnic cleansing" campaign 
conducted by the Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia. 
The conflict described above lasted from 1991 to the end of 1995. Eventually on 14 
December 1995, the representatives of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic 
of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed the Dayton Peace Agreement48 at 
the Paris Peace Conference. The Dayton Peace Agreement accepted the ICTY as an 
"essential aspect" of peace implementation. 49 It is also important to note that the 
ratification of the Agreement by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was its first official 
recognition of the ICTY. 50 
1.2.2. Rwanda 
In 1994, the international community witnessed one of the worst violations of human rights 
and of international humanitarian law in the central African State of Rwanda. In Rwanda, a 
number of massacres have been committed during the course of the last 45 years, 
especially, "the years 1959,1963,1966,1990,1991,1992 and 1993 were marked by 
massacres in Rwanda". " The last and worst in this series of massacres was started on 6 
April 1994, following the death of the President of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, and the 
President of Burundi, Cyprion Ntyamira, in an air crash in Kigali, the capital city of 
44 Ibid paras. 254-284.; "As of 31 March 1994, the Commission received information leading to the 
identification of 187 mass grave sites... 143 are located in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 44 are in Croatia" 
(par. 256). "The number of bodies... ranges from 3 persons to 5.000 persons" (par. 257).; Bassiouni and 
Manikas, pp. 56-57. 
45 Bassiouni and Manikas, pp. 57-59. 
46 "The Commission received information concerning a total of 715 camps... 237 were operated by 
Bosnian Serbs and the former Republic of Yugoslavia; 89 were operated by the Government and army of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; 77 were operated by Bosnian Croats, the Government of Croatia, the Croatian 
Army and the Croatian Defence Council; 4 were operated jointly by the Bosnian Government and Bosnian 
Croats; and 308 camps for which it is not known with certainty under whose effective control they were" 
(Final Report, paras. 216-217). 
17 Final Report, paras. 67-71.; Bassiouni and Manikas, pp. 61-62. 
48 U. N. Doc. S/1995/999 (1995).; reprinted in (1996) 35 ILM p. 89.; The representatives of the three 
Republics had initialled the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Annexes thereto on 21 November 1995 after the peace talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, 
Ohio. (Akhavan, P., "The Yugoslav Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Agreement and Beyond", 
(1996) 18 HRQ p. 274. 
49 Akhavan, p. 260. 
50Ibid. p. 274. 
51 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 
(1994), U. N. Doc. S/1994/1405. (hereinafter Final Report for Rwanda), par. 55. 
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Rwanda. 52 This event triggered a planned, systematic, widespread human rights violations, 
crimes against humanity and genocide against the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus by 
other members of the Hutu ethnic group. 53 
During the period from 6 April 1994 to 18 July 1994, an estimated 500.000 civilians 
were killed in Rwanda. 54 The warring factions in this civil war were the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) which was a Tutsi rebel force and came from Uganda, and Hutu extremists. 
The crimes committed in Rwanda were all planned, systematic and atrocitious. 55 A great 
deal of evidence pointed to this: The speech of Leon Mugesera in 1992, an official in the 
period of President Habyarimara, calling upon "Hutus to kill Tutsis and to dump their 
bodies in the rivers of Rwanda", 56 the racist campaign against Tutsi ethnic group by the 
media belonging to the Government especially by Radio Rwanda and Radio-Television 
Libre des Mille Collinres (RTLM), 57 the distribution of arms to the civilian population and 
the training camp for Hutu militia" give some indication of the preparation and planning of 
the violence. 
While the conflict was continuing, the attempts of the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) were not enough to bring an end to the civil war between 
52 Shraga, D., and Zacklin. R.. "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda", (1996) 7 EJIL p. 502.; 
Sunga, L., S., "The First Indictments of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ", (1997) 18 Hum. 
Rts. L. J. p. 331.; Dzubow, J., A., "The International Response to the Civil Thar in Rwanda", (1994) 8 Ge. 
Imm. L. J. p. 515. 
53 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Air. Francis Deng, submitted Pursuant to 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/95, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/50/Add. 4 (16 February 1995) 
par. 1.; Final Report for Rwanda, par. 56.; Before the conflict, the Rwanda population was consisting of 
approximately 84 percent Hutus. 14 percent Tutsi and 2 percent other, (Final Report for Rwanda, par. 59). 
54 Final Report for Rwanda, par. 57.; According to the Report of the Special Rapporteour, the number of 
murdered civilians was close to one million. (Report on the Situation of Hunan Rights in Rwanda 
Submitted by Mr. R., Degni-Segui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under 
Paragraph 20 of Commission Resolution E/CM4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/7 (28 
June 1994) par. 24.; In this context also see Morris, V., and Scharf, M., P., The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, Vol. 1. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, (1998), 
(hereinafter the ICTR), pp. 53-59.; For a sociological view, see Diessenbacher, H., "Explaining the 
Genocide in Rwanda", (1995) 52 L. &S. pp. 58-88. 
ss U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/7, par. 25.; For the examples showing that the massacres are systematic and 
atrocitious, see the same report paras. 27-28. "Generally, the victims are attacked with machetes, axes, 
cudgels, clubs, sticks or iron bars. The killers sometimes go so far as to cut off their fingers, hands, arms 
and legs one after another before cutting off their heads or splitting their skulls", (par. 28). 
56 Final Report for Rwanda, par. 63. 
5' Ibid. par. 64.; U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/7, par. 26.; For the activities of the RTLM, see Report on the 
Situation of Ifuman Rights in Rwanda submitted by Afr. R., Degni-Segui, Special Rapporteour of the 
Commission on Hwnan Rights, under Paragraph 20 of Resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, U. N. Doc. 
E/CN. 4/1995/12 (12 August 1994). paras. 19-20. 
58 Final Report for Rwanda. par. 65.; U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/7, par. 26. 
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the RPF and the forces of the Government of Rwanda. The civil war in Rwanda was ended 
by the RPF's unilateral declaration of a cease-fire on 18 July 1994.59 
Despite the fact that there was ample evidence that acts of genocide had taken place 
in Rwanda, the Security Council followed the same approach (as will be seen in detail 
below) with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. After a series of resolutions, it requested 
the Secretary-General to establish an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and 
analyse information and also to provide evidence relating to the violations of international 
humanitarian law and particularly, the crime of genocide perpetrated in Rwanda. 60 In a 
short period, the Commission of Experts submitted its Interim Report to the Security 
Council on 1 October 1994.61 Relying on this report and the Special Rapportezir's Reports 
of the Commission on Human Rights, the UN Security Council established the ICTR by its 
Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994.62 
1.3. TIIE ESTABLISHMENT OF TIIE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS 
Although the Security Council sometimes had not paid a sufficient degree of attention to 
the violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, it adopted a 
number of strongly worded resolutions during the conflicts. For example, in its Resolutions 
752 (15 May 1992) and 757 (30 May 1992), the Security Council urged all parties involved 
in the conflicts to refrain from mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians and 
changing the ethnic composition of the population. In the preamble to Resolution 771 (13 
59 Johnson, L., D., "The International Tribunal for Ruanda", (1996) 67 Rev. Int. Dr. P. pp. 211,213. 
60 S. C. Res. 935 (1 July 1994). 
61 Preliminary Report of the commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
935 (1994), U. N. Doc. S/1994/l 125.; The Final Report was submitted by a letter dated 9 December 1994 
from the Secretary-General to the Security Council. In its report, the Commission of Experts concluded that 
there is a great deal of evidence proving that "acts of genocide against the Tutsi group were perpetrated by 
Hutu elements in a concerted, planned, systematic and methodical way", (par. 183). The Commission of 
Experts has also concluded that individuals from both sides to the conflict committed crimes against 
humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law during the period from 6 April 1994 to 
15 July 1994, (paras. 181-182).; and also in this context, for the constituent elements of genocide such as 
the discovery of mass graves, the existence of evidence and proof showing that the genocide of the Tutsi 
ethnic group was planned and identification of persons responsible for the genocide, see Report on the 
Situation of Human Rights in R)randa Submitted by AIr. R., Degni-Segui, Special Rapporteour of the 
Commission on Human Rights, under Paragraph 20 of Resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, U. N. Doc. 
E/CN. 4/1995/70 (11 November 1994), paras. 6-14. 
62 Supra note 4. 
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August 1992), it expressed "grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of 
international humanitarian law" and especially concerned with abuses of civilians in 
detention centres and attacks on civilians, hospitals, ambulances. The same resolution and 
Resolution 779 (1992) expressed the concern over the "wanton devastation and destruction 
of property". Resolution 787 (1992) was concerned with attacks and acts of harassment 
against the delivery of humanitarian aid. In 1993 and following years, resolutions like 819 
(1993), 824 (1993), 836 (1993) were all explaining the concern over the atrocities 
including mortar attacks on public places in Sarejevo, the siege of many Muslims by the 
Serbs in Srebrenica, Bihac, Gorazde, Tuzla etc. and attacks on the cities declared as "safe 
areas" by the Security Council such as Srebrenica and Mostar. 
According to resolutions, the practice of the Security Council in relation to the 
establishment of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia can be summarised in four steps: 
"condemnation; publication; investigation; and, by establishing the tribunal, punishment". 63 
As a first step, the Security Council by its Resolution 764 of 13 July 1992 
condemned atrocities perpetrated by the parties to the conflict as violations of international 
humanitarian law and reaffirmed that all parties must comply with international 
humanitarian law, especially the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and confirmed 
"that persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions 
are individually responsible in respect of such breaches". 64 
Secondly, the Security Council adopted Resolution 771, on 13 August 1992, 
demanding the immediate cessation of all breaches of international humanitarian law and 
calling upon States and international humanitarian organisations to submit substantiated 
information concerning violations of international humanitarian law to the Council. 61 
Thirdly, the Security Council, by its Resolution 780 (1992), requested the 
Secretary-General to establish an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyse 
the information submitted in accordance with Resolution 771. And also according to this 
resolution, the Commission of Fxperls had authority to obtain information as a result of its 
63 O'Brien, J., C., "The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the 
Former Yugoslavia", (1993) 87 AJIL p. 640. 
64 S. C. Res. 764 (1992). adopted by the Security Council at its 3093rd meeting, on 13 July 1992., U. N. Doc. 
S/RES/764 (1992). 
65 S. C. Res. 771 (1992), adopted by the Security Council at its 3106th meeting, on 13 August 1992., U. N. 
Doc. S/RES/771 (1992).; O'Brien. p. 641. 
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own investigations or efforts. 66 Pursuant to Resolution 780 (1992), the Secretary-General 
established the Commission of Experts consisting of five members. 67 In a short time, the 
Commission of Experts submitted its first Interim Report, on 10 February 1993, concluding 
that "it would be for the Security Council or another competent organ of the United 
Nations to establish such a tribunal in relation to events in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia. The Commission observes that such a decision would be consistent with the 
direction of its work". 68 
As a fourth and final step, the Security Council adopted Resolution 808 of 22 
February 1993 deciding, in principle, to set up an international tribunal "for the prosecution 
of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991". 69 This resolution also requested the 
Secretary-General to submit "a report on all aspects of this matter, including specific 
proposals and where appropriate options for the effective and expeditious implementation 
of the decision... taking into account suggestions put forward in this regard by Member 
States". Pursuant to Resolution 808, the Secretary-General prepared a report including a 
draft Statute of the Tribunal. 70 Following the Report of the Secretary-General, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993 establishing the Tribunal" and 
approved the draft Statute submitted by the Secretary-General, without change. 
As will be discussed below, the Security Council set up the Tribunal pursuant to 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to restore international peace and security. In 
this regard, there have been a number of arguments relating to the Security Council's 
66 S. C. Res. 780 (1992), adopted by the Security Council at its 3119th meeting, on 6 October 1992., 
U. N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992). 
67 The Chairman: Professor Frits Kalshovcn (Ncthcrlads), The Members: Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni 
(Egypt), Mr. William J. Fenrick (Canada), Judge Kcba Mbaye (Senegal) and Professor Torkel Opsahl 
(Norway). (Interim Report. par. 2).; For the Commission's mandate and composition, the methods used to 
collect evidence and the Commission's findings, see Bassiouni, M., C., "The Commission of Experts 
Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia", (1994) 5 Crim. L. F. p. 279. 
68 Interim Report, par. 74. 
69 S. C. Res. 808 (1993), adopted by the Security Council at its 3175th meeting, on 22 February 1993., U. N. 
Doc. S/RES/808 (1993). 
70 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
including the Draft Statute of the Tribunal, U. N. Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993). (hereinafter Secretary- 
General's Report). 
" S. C. Res. 827 (1993), adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting, on 25 May 1993., U. N. 
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
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actions, in particular, the legality of the establishment and the competence of the Security 
Council, the sovereign rights of States were main issues which need to be considered. 
Lastly, in this context, it can be concluded that the practice of the Security Council 
in relation to the establishment of the ICTY created "a model for responses to violations of 
'2 international humanitarian law". The Rwanda case and the establishment of the Rwanda 
Tribunal, again by the Security Council, is the best example proving this conclusion. As 
indicated earlier, the Security Council has followed the same approach to set up the ICTR. 
1.3.1. The Legality of the Establishment and Competence of the Security Council 
As indicated earlier, the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were established 
by the Security Council Resolutions 827 (1993) and 955 (1994) respectively, acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. This attempt, creating an international criminal tribunal, was innovative in nature. 
For this reason, a number of legal issues concerning, particularly, the legality of the 
establishment of these Tribunals and the Security Council's competence in this regard need 
to be examined. In order to be credible and effective the Tribunal had to be brought into 
being by a method firmly based in law. " 
1.3.1.1. The Legal Basis for the Establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal 
In the field of law, regarding the establishment of an ad hoc or permanent international 
tribunal, four different methods are available: (a) an international treaty, (b) a General 
Assembly Resolution, (c) a Security Council Resolution, and (d) creating an international 
tribunal by means of amending the UN Charter (in this way the Tribunal would be similar to 
the International Court of Justice, Cj, ). 74 In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the first 
72 O'Brien, p. 644. 
73 Greenwood, p. 641. 
74 Blakesley, C., L., "Comparing the Ad Hoc Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanitarian Law in the Former 
Yugoslavia & The Project for an International Criminal Court, Prepared by the International Law 
Commission", (1996) 67 Rev. Int. D. P. p. 141. 
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three methods were considered7' and the Tribunal was established by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
1.3.1.1.1. An International Treaty 
The classic way of establishing an international tribunal, in the normal course of events, is 
the conclusion of a treaty. 76 The treaty based establishment has some important advantages 
with regard to giving an opportunity to States to examine and elaborate the issues relating 
to the establishment of the tribunal and also it allows States to exercise their sovereign will 
in the negotiation and conclusion of the treaty. Above all the sovereign will of States is 
reflected in the fact that a tribunal created by means of a treaty would only have jurisdiction 
over states party to the instrument. " Although this approach is preferable, in the context of 
the former Yugoslavia, its advantages may become disadvantages in terms of the required 
time for the negotiation, conclusion of the treaty and the sufficient number of ratifications 
for its entry into force. Moreover, if the interested States do not ratify and become a party 
to the treaty, the tribunal would be pointless, since for the effectiveness of the tribunal, the 
States concerned must be parties to the treaty. 73 
1.3.1.1.2. A General Assembly Resolution 
The second method for the establishment of an international tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia was to create the tribunal by means of a General Assembly Resolution. As has 
been indicated in Article 7 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly is one of the principal 
organs of the United Nations, and its functions and powers are regulated in Articles 10-17 
of the UN Charter. According to Articles 10 and 11, the General Assembly has an authority 
to discuss any questions or matters within the scope of the UN Charter, and to make 
75 Kolodkin, R., A., "An Ad Hoc International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia", (1994) 5 Crim. L. F. p. 385. 
76 Secretarv-General's Report, par. 19.; Kolodkin, p. 385. 
" Secretary-General 's Report, par. 19. 
78Ibid par. 20.; Morris and Scharf, p. 40.; Kolodkin, p. 387.; Szasz, P., C., "The Proposed War Crimes 
Tribunal for Ex-Yugoslavia ", (1993) 25 N. Y. Univ. J. Int. 'I L. & Pol. p. 411. 
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recommendations to the Member States of the United Nations or to the Security Council. 79 
In this regard, the General Assembly "may discuss any questions relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security", 80 and decisions with respect to the 
maintenance of international peace and security has to be taken by a two-thirds majority of 
the members present and voting, it is accepted as an important question in the UN 
Charter. 8' 
From the point of view of the establishment of the Tribunal, accepting the 
involvement of the General Assembly, in drafting or reviewing the Statute of the Tribunal 
would have been time consuming and would have been difficult to reconcile with the 
urgency of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, as expressed by the Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993). 82 On the other hand, the establishment of the Tribunal might not 
have been in consistent with Articles 10-17, regulating the functions and powers of the 
General Assembly, in terms of taking necessary measures to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. According to Article 24 (1) of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security", and in this regard, it can decide what sort of measures 
will be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. 83 Relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly is merely authorised 
to make recommendations under Articles 10,11,13 and 14 of the UN Charter. In other 
words, the Charter does not give any authority to the General Assembly to make binding 
decisions in the field of maintaining international peace and security, thus, adopting a 
statute for an ad hoc tribunal, making it obligatory for States to cooperate with this tribunal 
79 Article 10 of the UN Charter provides: "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters 
within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for 
in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members 
of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters". 
Article I1 (1) of the UN Charter provides: "The General Assembly may consider the general principles 
of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing 
disarmament and the regulations of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such 
principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both". 
8° Art. 11 (2) of the UN Charter. Article 12 of the Charter is an exception to the functions and powers of 
the General Assembly. It states that "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or 
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any 
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests". 
81 Art. 18 (2) of the UN Charter. 
82 Secretary-General 's Report, par. 21. 
83 Art. 39 of the UN Charter. 
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and making orders and decisions of the tribunal binding on States cannot be justified by 
relying on the establishment of the tribunal by means of a General Assembly Resolution. 84 
1.3.1.1.3. A Security Council Resolution 
The third way to establish an international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia case was the 
adoption of its Statute by a Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter concerning "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, 
and Acts of Aggression". As mentioned above, according to Article 24 (1) of the UN 
Charter, the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security" and it acts on behalf of Member States. For discharging its 
duties, the Security Council has to act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of 
the United Nations. Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII give necessary power to the Security 
Council for the discharge of these duties. " Article 39 of the UN Charter, under Chapter 
VII, gives power to the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace and security, and to take necessary measures "in accordance with Article 41 and 42 
[of the UN Charter] to maintain or restore international peace and security". 86 Articles 41 
and 42 of the Charter allow the Security Council to undertake actions in order to give 
effect to its decisions. ' Lastly, so as to perform its functions, the Security Council can 
establish subsidiary organs, acting under the Charter of the United Nations. 88 As a result of 
84 Kolodkin, pp. 388-390.; Morris and Scharf, pp. 40-41. 
83 Art. 24 (2) of the UN Charter. The purposes and principles of the United Nations are laid down in 
Chapter I of the UN Charter (Articles 1-2). 
86 Article 39 of the UN Charter provides: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security". 
87 Article 41 of the UN Charter provides: "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. ... These may 
include complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations". 
Article 42 of the UN Charter provides: "Should the Security Council that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the United 
Nations". 
88 Article 29 of the UN Charter states: "The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it 
deems necessary for the performance of its functions". Article 7 (2) of the Charter is also related to 
subsidiary organs. 
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these legal regulations, an international criminal tribunal, created by means of a Security 
Council Resolution, can be seen as "a product of the combination of these powers". 89 
1.3.1.2. The Justification of the Security Council's Action 
In light of this explanation, the Security Council was considered to be the most appropriate 
competent body to establish an international criminal tribunal. This is because "widespread 
violations of international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, including reports of mass killings and the continuance of the practice of 
"ethnic cleansing", ... constitute[d] a threat to 
international peace and security". 90 In order 
to put an end to violations of international humanitarian law and to take necessary measures 
to bring the perpetrators of such crimes to justice, the establishment of the tribunal could be 
the best way to achieve this purpose and to contribute to the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 91 As has been indicated in the Secretary-General's Report, the 
establishment of the tribunal was a measure taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 92 
Until the establishment of the Tribunal, the Security Council had taken different measures 
in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter. For example, Resolution 713 (1991) 
imposed a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries for weapons and military 
equipment to Yugoslavia". 9' The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established by 
89 Bassiouni and Manikas. p. 239. 
90 S. C. Res. 808 (1993).; S. C. Res. 827 (1993) also again expresses that the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia constitutes a threat to international peace and security.; Supra notes, 30-36.; Meron, T. "The 
Normative Impact on International Lair of the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia", in T. 
Meron, War Crimes Law Cones of Age Essaus, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1998), p. 211. 
91 S. C. Res. 808 (1993).; S. C. Res. 827 (1993).; Akhavan, P., "Punishing War Crimes in the Former 
Yugoslavia: .4 
Critical Juncture for the Nerv World Order", (1993) 15 l-IRQ pp. 278-279.; See for the 
opposite view, Khan, S., A., "If'ar Crimes ii'ithout Punishment", N. Y. Times, (8 February 1994) at A23. 
(Expressing that the Tribunal is only "a convenient way to quiet human rights activists and other 
supporters of the Bosnians", in Burns, P., "An International Criminal Tribunal: The Difficult Union of 
Principle and Politics", (1994) 5 Crim. L. F. p. 375. 
92 Secretary-General's Report, par. 28.; "[T]he establishment of the Tribunal should undoubtedly be 
regarded as a measure designed to promote peace by meting out justice in a manner conducive to the full 
establishment of healthy and cooperative relations among the various national and ethnic groups in the 
former Yugoslavia". (The Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Lmv Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, (14 November 1994), (hereinafter Annual Report of the International 
Tribunal, 1994), par. 17.; Akhavan, "Punishing [Par Crimes.... ", p. 279. 
93 S. C. Res. 713 (1991), reprinted in (1992) 31 ILM p. 1431. 
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Resolution 743 (1992). 94 Resolution 757 (1992) permitted to use of force against Bosnian 
Serbs. 93 
Moreover, the "use of force is allowed as a "measure" under Article 42, a fortiori, 
the creation of an ad hoc international criminal court should also be allowed"96 and it can 
be justified as "a judicial response to the demands posed by the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia, where appalling war crimes and crimes against humanity are reported to have 
been perpetrated on a large scale: these are the two classes of offences the Tribunal has 
been created to try". 97 In addition, while justifying the establishment of the Tribunal by 
means of a Security Council Resolution, it should not be forgotten that both Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda were exceptional cases" needing an effective and expeditious measure to 
maintain international peace and security. The only way for being effective and expeditious 
in the case of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda could be the establishment of the Tribunal as 
a means of Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, and this decision could have a binding effect on all States. 99 
The establishment of the Tribunal as a judicial organ by the United Nations (as a 
means of Security Council Resolution) was unprecedented in the international judicial field. 
The International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo were created in very 
different circumstances11. and both of them were generally accepted as victor's courts or 
justice. 10' In this sense, being the first international criminal tribunal created by an 
international organisation, some arguments with regard to its legal basis and effectiveness 
arose. 1°2 In this regard, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia argued that the Security 
Council does not have a right to establish an international tribunal under Chapter VII of the 
94 S. C. Res. 743 (1992), reprinted in (1992) 31 ILM p. 1447. 
95 S. C. Res. 757 (1992), reprinted in (1992) 31 ILM p. 1453. 
96 Blakesley, C.. L., "Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal", (1994) 18 Flet. F. 
W. Aff. pp. 85-86.; Blakesley, C., L., "Comparing... ", p. 142.; Gallant, K., S., "Securing the Presence of 
Defendants before the International Tribunal for the Fortner Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition", 
(1994) 5 Crim. L. F. p. 557. (indicating that, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council 
can "take a wide range of military and nonmilitary measures to restore and maintain international peace 
and security". p. 561). 
97 Annual Report of the International Tribunal 1994, par. 4.; Ambos, K., "Establishing an International 
Criminal Court and an Inlernational Criminal Code, Observations from an International Criminal Law 
Viewpoint", (1996) 7 EJIL p. 522. 
98 Ambos, p. 522.; Morris and Scharf, p. 42.; Morris and Scharf, the ICTR, p. 102. 
99 Secretary-General's Report, par. 23,; McGoldrick, D., and Warbrick, C., "International Criminal Lativ", 
(1995) 44 ICLQ p. 468.; Morris and Scharf, p. 42.; Morris and Scharf, the ICTR, p. 102. 
10° Annual Report of the International Tribunal 1994, par. 3. 
101 See supra note 6. 
102 Annual Report of the International Tribunal 1994, par. 5. 
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UN Charter and emphasised that an international tribunal cannot be created as a subsidiary 
organ of any body. 103 This argument was made before the establishment of the Tribunal and 
it has no basis in international law because of the following reasons: Firstly, as mentioned 
above, under the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had 
accepted the Tribunal as an "essential aspect" of the peace implementation 104 and she was a 
party to this Agreement. Secondly, the Tribunal is a completely separate body from the ICJ 
which is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations under Article 92 of the UN 
Charter, although the Tribunal is also based in The Hague. 1°5 Because the ICJ does not 
have a jurisdiction to deal with charges against individuals, 106 the Tribunal had to be 
established by the United Nations as a subsidiary organ within the meaning of Article 7 (2) 
of the UN Charter. Thirdly, it is contrary to Resolution 827 (1993), adopted unanimously 
by the Security Council, and representing nearly the all States of the world. 107 Finally, it is 
against the past practice of the Security Council. This is because the Security Council has 
adopted a series of resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Some of these resolutions created 
subsidiary organs for different purposes. Resolution 687 (1991) concerning the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraq was the best example. 1°8 
In light of this explanation, it can be concluded that the Security Council appeared 
the most appropriate body to create the international criminal tribunals in the special 
circumstances of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. The aims of these Tribunals are "to do justice, to deter further crimes, 
103 Letter dated 19 Alav 1993 from the Permanent A/ission of Yugoslavia to the Secretary-General, U. N. 
Doc. S/25801 (1993).; For a Serbian view relating to the establishment of the Tribunal by the Security 
Council, see Cotic, D.. "Introduction ", (1994) 5 Crim. L. F. p. 223.: For the criticism of the legality of the 
establishment of the ICTY see infra pages under the heading of "The Practice of the ICTY". 
104 Supra note, 49. 
los Greenwood, p. 641. 
106 See Chapter 2 (Art. 34-38, regulating the competence of the ICJ) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. In this context, see also the case brought by Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia: Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Judgement, (Bosnia - Herzegovina v. 
Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro]), (11 July 1996), (1996) ICJ Rep. p. 595. (Deciding that "on the basis 
of Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, it has 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute", par. 47 (2). 
107 Morris and Scharf, p. 47. 
108 Secretary-General's Report. paras. 24,27.; According to Resolution 687 (1991), the Security Council 
established a Boundary Demarcation Commission, a Compensation Commission and a Special 
Commission. Although, these are not pure judicial organs, they may be accepted, especially the 
Compensation Commission, as a quasi-legal in nature. 
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and to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace". 109 The creation of the 
Tribunals should be seen as a contemporary example of the application of international 
humanitarian law for enforcing individual responsibility when the violations of international 
humanitarian law and of international human rights law occurred and also it creates a model 
for the future. 10 
1.4. THE PRACTICE OF THE ICTY 
The decisions of the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Dzisko Tadic (in relation to the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal)"' have a 
significant place in international humanitarian law on the ground that they provide the 
109 Beresford, S., "The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: the First Four Years", 
(1999) 9 Otago L. Rev. p. 578.; Tomuschat, C., "International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of 
Nuremberg Confirmed", (1994) 5 Crim. L. F. pp. 241-242.; Annual Report of the International Tribunal 
1994, par. 11.; "Some apprehensions were expressed lest the establishment of the Tribunal might 
jeopardize the peace process. In fact, the Tribunal will contribute to the peace process by creating 
conditions rendering a return to normality less difficult. How could one hope to restore the rule of law and 
the development of stable, constructive and healthy relations among ethnic groups, within or between 
independent States, if the culprits are allowed to go unpunished? Those who have suffered, directly or 
indirectly, from their crimes are unlikely to forgive or set aside their deep resentment. How could a woman, 
who had been raped by servicemen from a different ethnic group, or a civilian whose parents or children 
had been killed in cold blood quell their desire for vengeance if they knew that the authors of these crimes 
were left unpunished and allowed to move around freely, possibly in the same town where their appalling 
actions had been perpetrated'? The only civilised alternative to this desire for revenge is to render justice: to 
conduct a fair trial by a truly independent and impartial tribunal and to punish those found guilty. If no fair 
trial is held, feelings of hatred and resentment seething below the surface will, sooner or later, erupt and 
lead to renewed violence". (Annual Report of the International Tribunal 1994, par. 15). 
110 Blakesley, "Obstacles... ", p. 86.; O'Brien, p. 658.; "Of course, it is for the Security Council, and only 
the Security Council, to decide when special circumstances exist under Chapter VII of the Charter which 
warrant the establishment of a penal institution competent to try large-scale breaches of human rights. It is 
an undeniable fact that the creation of the Tribunal has set a momentous precedent, one that, hopefully, the 
world community will take up in the future whenever a need arises to mete out international justice in a 
fully impartial way. To those who criticise the "selective approach" of the Security Council, one should 
point out that the establishment of the Tribunal is a welcome step that can bear fruit in the future by 
providing a model that might be adopted in other situations. It is well known that, in the international 
community, progress takes place in a different way from that in municipal legal systems: often new legal 
institutions are created not in the light of and as a result of a complex and all-embracing design but under 
the pressure of specific circumstances. ... 
Whenever new institutions are set up which turn out to be useful 
and productive, they may have a snowballing effect". (Annual Report of the International Tribunal 1994, 
par. 47). 
111 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Decision on the Defence Itlotion, Jurisdiction of the Tribunal), Trial 
Chamber, Case No: IT-94-1-T, (10 August 1995), (hereinafter Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision).; 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Decision on the Defence Alotion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), 
Appeals Chamber, Case No: IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995), (hereinafter Tadic Case, Jurisdiction 
Decision). 
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foundations for the other cases which will be tried and concluded by the ICTY and the 
ICTR. 12 
The approach taken by the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 
with regard to its establishment is equally valid for the ICTR since both ad hoc tribunals 
were established by the Security Council and they share the same Appeals Chamber. For 
this reason, in this part of the study, the practice of the ICTY will be examined in detail. 
Additionaly, in the practice of the ICTR, there is no judgement rendered in an appeal stage 
concerning its establishment. In this sense, the only decision of the ICTR, rendered by Trial 
Chamber, can be found in the case of Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi in which the decision of 
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY is regarded as providing a persuasive authority on 
challenges to jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the ICTR. 13 
Before the trial of Tadic began, the defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal on three different grounds: (a) the legality of the establishment of the Tribunal, (b) 
the primacy of the Tribunal over national courts, and (c) the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal. "' 
In this part of the study, the legality of the establishment of the Tribunal in light of 
the decisions of the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber will be examined. The 
defendant's second and third ground of challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal will be 
discussed in related Chapters. 
1.4.1. In the Trial Chamber 
In the case of Prosecutor r. Tadic, the defence motions (paras. 1-4) argued that the 
establishment of the Tribunal was not lawful, because the UN Security Council is not 
competent to do so according to the UN Charter. To support this view the defence argued 
"Z Greenwood, C., "International Humanitarian Laie and the Tadic Case", (1996) 7 EJIL p. 265.; Alvarez, 
J., E., "Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic Case", (1996) 7 EJIL p. 245. 
13 Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanvabashi, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Trial Chamber, 
Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, (18 June 1997), (hereinafter Kanvabashi Case, Jurisdiction Decision). The full 
text of this decision is available in (1997) 18 Hum. Rts. L. J. pp. 343-347. In its decision the Trial Chamber 
of the ICTR states: "The Trial Chamber respects the persuasive authority of the decision of the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and has taken careful note of 
the decision rendered by the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case". (par. 8).: In this context, also see Morris 
and Scharf, the ICTR. pp. 110-115.; Morris. V., Case Note with Commentary by V. Morris, (1998) 92 
AJIL pp. 66-70. 
114 Defence Alotions, (Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, Principle of Ne-Bis-in-Ideur, Form of the Indictment), 
Dusko Tadic, Case No: IT-94-1-T, (23 June 1995). (hereinafter Defence Afotions). 
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that such a tribunal should have been created either by an international treaty so as to be in 
compliance with the principle of the sovereignty of States as the practice in international 
law, or by a General Assembly Resolution since the General Assembly was the only organ 
representing the international community according to the defence. "5 
1.4.1.1. The Matter of Judicial Review of the Security Council Powers 
By disputing the legality of the establishment of the International Tribunal, the defence 
questioned the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. As rightly concluded by the Trial Chamber, the 
validity of the creation of the International Tribunal was not a matter of jurisdiction and 
rather it was the issue of the lawfulness of its establishment involving the judicial review of 
the powers of the Security Council especially in relation to whether there was a threat to 
international peace and security, and the measures to be employed. 1' 
Having indicated that the "International Tribunal is not a constitutional court set up 
to scrutinise the actions of organs of the United Nations", '" it held that the Tribunal is "a 
criminal tribunal with clearly defined powers, involving a quite specific and limited criminal 
jurisdiction. If it is to confine its adjudications to those specific limits, it will have no 
authority to investigate the legality of its creation by the Security Council". "' The same 
view was also taken by the Prosecutor, in his response to the Defence's Motions"9 by 
referring to the Statute of the ICTY which clearly defines the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the ICTY. According to Articles 2-5 of the ICTY Statute, the Tribunal can just deal with 
crimes which are serious violations of humanitarian law, and it cannot extend its 
competence to "disputes concerning the general interpretation of the Charter and in 
particular, the right to review the powers of the Security Council". 120 
Although the Trial Chamber held that it has no authority to decide the legality of the 
acts of the Security Council concerning the establishment of the Tribunal, it made some 
15 Defence Motions, paras. 1-2. 
116 Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 3-4. 
117 Ibid. par. 5. 
"$ Ibid paras, 5,8. " The competence of the International Tribunal is precise and narrowly defined; as 
described in Article I of its Statute, it is to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, subject to spatial and temporal limits, and to do so in accordance with the 
Statute. That is the full extent of the competence of the International Tribunal" (par. 8). 
119 Prosecutor's Response to the Defence's A1otions filed on 23 June 1995, Dusko Tadic, Case No: IT-94- 
1-T. (hereinafter Prosecutor's Response). 
120 Prosecutor's Response, p. 10. 
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comments on the accused's contentions that "the establishment of the International 
Tribunal by the Security Council was beyond power and an ill-founded political action, not 
reasonably aimed at restoring and maintaining peace and that the International Tribunal is 
not duly established by law", 121 since it is the first time the international community has 
created a court having criminal jurisdiction over individuals, and the establishment of this 
Tribunal has spawned the creation of another ad hoc Tribunal for Rwanda, and also both of 
these Tribunals represent a crucial step for the establishment of a permanent international 
criminal court. 122 
While the Trial Chamber decided that it could not scrutinise or review the actions 
taken by the Security Council the Chamber depended upon the provisions which the 
Security Council has broad discretion in exercising its authority under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter123 and in this context, there are just few limitations deriving from Article 24 (2) 
of the Charter stating that "... the Security Council shall act in accordance with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations". To support its view, the Chamber cited a 
number of decisions of the ICJ proving that the Security Council's powers are mainly on its 
own discretion and not reviewable. 124 Although the ICJ is the principal organ of the UN 
according to Article 92 of the UN Charter, it has no power to review the Security Council 
powers especially with respect to the Chapter VII decisions. In the Namibia Advisory 
Opinion, the ICJ decided that "[u]ndoubtedly the Court does not possess powers of judicial 
review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs 
121 Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 6. 
122 Ibid. par. 6. 
'23 Ibid. par. 7. 
124 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, (1962), ICJ Rep. p. 151. (the Expenses Advisory Opinion), 
"Proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate authority to interpret the Charter 
in the International Court of Justice were not accepted. ... 
As anticipated in 1945, therefore, each organ 
must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction" (p. 168). 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-[Vest 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (the Namibia Advisory Opinion), (1971) 
ICJ Rep. p. 16. 
Case Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Lib va v. U. S. ), (the Lockerbie Case), (1992) ICJ Rep. p. 114, "While the 
Court has the vocation of applying international law as a universal law, operating both within and outside 
of the United Nations, it is bound to respect, as part of that law, the binding decisions of the Security 
Council", (the separate opinion of Judge Manfred Lachs. p. 138.; and also see the dissenting opinion of 
judge Weeramantry, but not in dissent from other members of the Court in this regard p. 160).; For the 
criticism of this case see, Franck, T., M., `The "Powers ofAppreciation ". Who is the Ultimate Guardian of 
UN Legality", (1992) 86 AJIL p. 519.; Brownlie, I., "The Decisions of Political Organs of the United 
Nations and the Rule of Lan", in R. St. J. Macdonald (ed. ), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, Dordrect, 
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concerned". 125 In order to have a such kind of power there must be a clear and explicit 
provision authorising judicial review, and implied powers cannot be accepted in this 
respect. 126 Neither the UN Charter nor the Court's Statute provide the ICJ with express 
authority to review the exercise of Security Council powers. ' 27 Even though it is clear that 
the ICJ does not play a direct role as an organ of judicial review, in two ways the Court can 
pronounce on the legality of resolutions of the Security Council in the cases of an inter- 
State dispute and an Advisory Opinion request. 121 In both cases, there are many difficulties 
in bringing the case before the ICJ; for example, a request for an advisory opinion requires 
the support of a majority of the Council or a two-thirds majority of the Assembly. 129Even if 
these means are accepted as a sort of judicial review, the ICJ will continue to engage in 
these types of "judicial review" and it will not extend its judicial findings to that some 
particular Security Council resolution or action is legally invalid or "null and void". "o 
On the other hand, the Security Council has primary responsibility for the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. In this context, particularly 
the decisions taken by the Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter need to be 
implemented by all members as soon as possible, and if members had a right to challenge 
those decisions and fail to implement them, the Security Council would face some problems 
to discharge its duties. ''' Moreover, the Council enjoys a wide discretion in determining 
whether a Chapter VII situation has occurred or not. In nature, the decisions of the 
Security Council taken under Chapter VII are political judgements and its members are 
well-qualified in this field. For this reason, it would be wrong to give any power to any 
' 25Namibia Advisory Opinion, (1971) ICJ Rep. p. 45., par. 89. 
'26Skubiszewski, K., "The International Court of Justice and the Security Council", in Vaughan Lowe & 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice (eds. ). Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice (Essays in Honour of Sir 
Robert Jennings), Cambridge: Grotius Publications, (1996) p. 623. 
127Gowlland-Debbas, V., "The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security 
Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case", (1994) 88 AJIL p. 664.; Skubiszewski, p. 623.; Watson, G., R., 
"Constitutionalism, Judicial Review. and the World Court", (1993)34 Harv. Int. 'I L. J. pp. 2,4-8.; The 
proposals for the UN to establish an Arbitral Tribunal or a Commission of Jurists or a Chapter VII 
Consultation Committe to review the legality of the Security Council resolutions prove that the ICJ does not 
have any authority in this regard. For the explanation see Bowett, D., "The Impact of Security Council 
Decisions on Dispute Settlement Procedures". (1994) 5 EJIL p. 99.; and Reisman, W., M., "The 
Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations". (1993) 87 AJIL p. 99.; For the opposite view see, Graefrath, 
B., "Leave to the Court 11 hat Belongs to the Court the Libyan Case", (1993) 4 EJIL p. 184. According to 
this author, the ICJ has a power to review the legality of Security Council resolutions, and in the UN 
Charter, there is no provision preventing the ICJ from exercising such power (p. 200). 
'28Bowett, pp. 97-98.101. 
'29Jbid p. 98. 
13°Alvarez, J., E., "Judging the Security Council', (1996) 90 AJIL p. 4. 
"'Bowett, p. 90,; Gowlland-Dcbbas, p. 670. 
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court to review the legality of the resolutions of the Council. "' The most recent example 
demonstrating this fact is the decision of the Trial Chamber of the ICTY. Despite the fact 
that the Trial Chamber indicated that the Chamber was not the place to judge the 
appropriateness of the acts of the Security Council, it held that in the case of former 
Yugoslavia, "the Security Council did not act arbitrarilys133 and "the validity of the decision 
of the Security Council .... rests on 
its finding that the events in the former Yugoslavia 
constituted a threat to the peace. This finding is necessarily fact-based and raises political, 
non justiciable issues". 114 
Even if it is accepted that the decisions of the Security Council taken in accordance 
with Chapter VII situations can be reviewed by an international organisation (court or 
tribunal), the place for this must be the ICJ, not the ICTY which has a limited jurisdiction in 
respect to serious violations of international humanitarian law and its jurisdiction cannot be 
extended to the review of the Security Council's powers. For aforementioned reasons, the 
ICTY cannot have a right of judicial review over the exercise of Security Council powers 
and in this sense "it is difficult to see how the powers of the ICTY would exceed those of 
the International Court of Justice, which has declared itself incompetent to review the 
exercise of Security Council powers", '3S although it is the principal judicial organ of the 
UN under Article 92 of the UN Charter. 
1.4.1.2. The Matter of Ad Hoc Tribunals as a Measure under Article 41 of the UN 
Charter 
As mentioned above, according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council 
enjoys a wide discretion in determining the specific measures to be adopted. 136 In this 
respect, the defence argued that the creation of the International Tribunal was not a 
measure in compliance with Article 41 of the Charter since the examples included in that 
132Bowett, p. 94.; Hcrdcgcn, M., "The "Conslilutionalization" of the UN Security System" (1994) 27 Van. 
J. Int. '1 L. pp. 146,148.; Separate Opinion of Judge Li on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction in the case of Prosecutor v. Tadic (2 October 1995), IT-94-1-AR72, (hereinafter Separate 
Opinion of Judge Li), par. 3. 
133 Trial Chamber, Tactic Case, par. 16. 
134Ibid par. 24. 
35Prosecutor, s Response, p. 11. 
136 See supra pp. 21-26.; Prosecutor's Response, p. 14. 
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Article deal with economic and political measures, not a judicial in character. 137 However, 
Article 41 contains just an illustrative list of measures and it is not limited to economic and 
political measures. Except for involving the use of armed force, other measures which are 
"fact-based, policy determinations that make this issue non justiciable" can be adopted by 
the Security Council. "' 
Moreover, the defence argued that the International Tribunal was not an 
appropriate measure under Article 41 and it could not possibly contribute the restoration of 
peace in the former Yugoslavia and contented that it would frustrate the peace process. 139 
Against this, it was argued that in the case of former Yugoslavia, the punishment of serious 
violations of international humanitarian law is an essential element to deter further crimes, 
and to restore peace. '40 Impunity for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
can create an obstacle to achieve a lasting peace and can encourage further crimes against 
humanity, genocide etc.. '4' 
1.4.1.3. The Matter of Characterisation of Armed Conflict (International or Non- 
International) 
The defence also contended that the Security Council's action was not a measure within the 
scope of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, due to the conflict in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia was not an international armed conflict. 142 As will be seen in relation to the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal in detail later, the conflict in the former 
137 Defence Itlotions, par. 3.2.1. 
138 Trial Chamber, Tactic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 28.; Prosecutor's Response, p. 14. 
'39 Defence Motions, par. 3.2.2. 
140 Prosecutor's Response, p. 22.; Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 30-31. 
141 "The lack of an effective international response to counter the policy of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by 
Serb forces from the beginning of the war created the precedent of impunity which has allowed them to 
continue and which has encouraged Croat forces to adopt the same policy". (Mazowiecki, T., Second 
Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights, in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U. N. Doc. 
E/CN. 4/1994/4, (19 May 1993). par. 43).; Annual Report of the International Tribunal 1994, par. 11 
(supra note. 109).; The situation in Kosovo in 1998-1999 proves this reality. Although the Tribunal is 
effective and renders judgements, the major responsible leaders such as Karadzic and Milosevic could not 
be brought to the Hague. If the major perpetrators of crimes had been tried and punished until now, the 
Serbs could not have attacked on Kosovo in 1998-1999. 
142 Defence Alotions, par. 3.1.1. 
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Yugoslavia was an international armed conflict in nature. '43 Despite the fact that there 
existed an international armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, this was not an obligatory 
requirement for the Security Council to take necessary action under Chapter VII as long as 
it deems that there is a "threat to international peace and security" and further, Article 41 
does not refer to an international armed conflict, it refers to "threats to international peace 
and security". 144 Such a threat can occur whether an armed conflict is an international 
character or not. Being an international armed conflict cannot be a pre-condition for the 
Security Council and Chapter VII situations. In the practice, the Security Council has taken 
necessary measures even in internal armed conflicts such as in Rwanda, 145 Somalia 146 and 
Haiti. 147 
1.4.1.4. The Matter of Creation of Ad Hoc Tribunals as a Subsidiary Organ 
One of the arguments in the defence motions was also that an international criminal court 
cannot be established as a subsidiary organ by the Security Council and such a tribunal 
cannot be an independent and impartial body since it was created by a political body (the 
Security Council). ` 
As is well-known, the six principal organs of the UN, the General Assembly, the 
Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, 
143 Meron, pp. 81-82.; "... the character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned, combined with 
the web of agreements on humanitarian law that the parties have concluded among themselves, justifies the 
Commission's approach in applying the law applicable in international armed conflicts to the entirety of 
the armed conflicts in the territory, of the former Yugoslavia". (Final Report, par. 44, Interim Report, par. 
45).; "The disintegration of a federal State, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, is often at first a civil 
conflict. However, as the respective States of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared their 
independence, received international recognition and were admitted to membership in the United Nations, 
the conflict with respect to each of these States became an international conflict. ... this multi-party conflict 
became or ceased to be a conflict of an international character must be determined by a review of legally 
relevant facts". (Final Report, paras. 306-307).; and also see, in this context, "Amicus Curiae Brief 
Presented by the Government of the United States ofAmerica", (25 July 1995), Dusko Tadic, Case No: IT- 
94-1-T, (hereinafterAmicus Curiae), pp. 26-35. 
144 Prosecutor's Response, p. 16.; Amicus Curiae, p. 7.; This argument that the nature of armed conflict 
and the establishment of an international criminal tribunal by the Security Council is particularly 
significanf for the Rwanda case. This is because the Rwandan conflict was an internal armed conflict, and 
it was considered by the Security Council as constituting a threat to international peace and security. On 
this ground, the ICTR was established by the Security Council. In this context, how the Trial Chamber of 
the ICTR treated this issue, see Trial Chamber, Kanvabashi Case, Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 19-24. 
145 S. C. Res. 955, U. N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
146 S. C. Res. 923, U. N. Doc. S/RES/923 (1994). 
147 S. C. Res. 841, U. N. Doc. S/RES/841 (1993). 
148 Defence !1 lotions, par. 3.5. 
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the ICJ and the Secretariat (Art. 7(1) of the UN Charter), do have a power to establish 
subsidiary organs to perform their duties in accordance with the Charter (Art. 7(2) of the 
UN Charter). In addition to this general authority, Articles 22,29 and 68 give a kind of 
special authority to the General Assembly, the Security Council and the ECOSOC, 
respectively. In this context, the difference between the general authority and specific 
authority to set up subsidiary organs must be indicated. According to the specific authority, 
Articles 22,29 and 68, the principal organ can only establish subsidiary organs in order to 
perform its functions, while the general authority to establish subsidiary organs, Art. 7 (2), 
is not subject to such a functional limitation. In this case, subsidiary organs are created to 
perform some functions that the principal organ cannot itself perform. '49 To execute their 
duties, Article 7 (2) of the Charter gives more authority than specific authorities to the 
principal organs. However, to establish such a subsidiary organ, the relevant principal organ 
has to possess an express or implied power under the Charter. By means of this legal 
regulation, in the cases of a principal organ that has no competence to perform certain 
functions, the establishment of subsidiary organs can help the principal organ to discharge 
its duties effectively. ' S0 
The most recent example of the use of the general authority to set up subsidiary 
organs to perform functions that the principal organ cannot itself perform is the 
establishment of the ICTY. 'S' It is clear that under Article 24 (1), the Security Council has 
the primary responsibility to maintain or restore international peace and security, and 
according to Chapter VII, so as to perform its duties the Security Council can employ the 
necessary measures which are suitable for the situation. In this sense, the Security Council 
has a power to establish the ICTY which performs purely judicial function -the prosecution 
of violators of international humanitarian law - which the Council cannot itself perform 
under the Charter in order to maintain international peace and security. 152 There is nothing 
149Sarooshi, D., "The Legal Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary Organs", (1996) 67 BYIL 
pp. 422-423,425 
iSOSarooshi, p. 427. 
15'The establishment of the ICTR is also another example of this type of creation of subsidiary organs. 
'52Sarooshi, pp. 428-430.; "The establishment of the International Tribunal by the security Council does not 
signify, however, that the Security Council has delegated to it some of its own functions or the exercise of 
some of its own powers. Nor does it mean, in reverse, that the Security Council was usurping for itself part 
of a judicial function which does not belong to it but to other organs of the United Nations according to the 
Charter. The Security Council has resorted to the establishment of a judicial organ in the form of an 
international criminal tribunal as an instnunent for the exercise of its own principal function of 
maintenance of peace and security, i. e., as a measure contributing to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace in the former Yugoslavia". (Appeals Chamber, Todic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 38). 
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which precludes the Security Council from establishing an ad hoc subsidiary organ which 
has a judicial character under Article 7 (2) for maintaining international peace and security, 
as far as understood from the interpretation of Article 7 (2) and the whole UN Charter. 's3 
As indicated above, the Security Council, while establishing the ICTY, could not have been 
acting under Article 29 of the Charter, since the Council is not delegating to the ICTY its 
own functions to be performed. In this respect, the opinion of the UN Secretary-General 
pertaining to the establishment of the ICTY is not in compliance with this legal ground 
since in his report he stated that it was "a subsidiary organ within the terms of Article 29 of 
the Charter, but one of a judicial nature". 154 If the legal base were accepted as Article 29, 
the ICTY would be performing just some functions which the Council can perform. 155 It is 
clear that this sort of Tribunal cannot be regarded as an independent, impartial Tribunal, in 
other words, it cannot be accepted as a subsidiary organ that performs purely judicial 
function. As referred to above, the creation of the Tribunal was a measure under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter and it was an ad hoc subsidiary judicial organ. In this sense, the 
argument in relation to the Tribunal's establishment by a political body, in this case the 
Security Council, which was made by the defence has no basis. This is because, all over the 
world, criminal courts are created by legislatures, which are completely political bodies. '56 
Moreover, in the Effect ofAu'ards Case, 157 the ICJ specifically held that a political organ of 
the UN, in that case the General Assembly, had the power to set up a judicial body. `S' The 
Trial Chamber, in its decision depended upon this case and decided that "[i]f the General 
Assembly has the authority to create a subsidiary judicial body, then surely the Security 
Council can create such a body in the exercise of its wide discretion to act under Chapter 
VII". 159 In respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security 
Council must have the authority to establish subsidiary organs as the Council has the 
primary responsibility in this field of international law, the General Assembly can play a 
'33"A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose". (Art. 31 (1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969). 
54Secretarv-General 's Report, par. 28. 
'"Sarooshi, p. 431. 
'm Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 32. 
157 Effect of Aiiwards of Compensation A/ade by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. (1954) ICJ 
Rep. p. 47. 
158 Effect ofAiiwards, p. 56-61. 
159 Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 35. 
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secondary role for the maintenance of international peace and security. 160 In this context, 
the other argument that the Tribunal should have been established by the General 
Assembly"' finds its response here. In addition, the involvement of the General Assembly 
was impractical and it was not an appropriate measure for the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia. 162 
In this respect, one more point should be emphasised: that the establishment of the 
Tribunal as a subsidiary judicial organ by the Security Council cannot have any effect on its 
independence and impartiality since the Statute of the ICTY consists of provisions which 
guarantee its independence and impartiality. In determining those characteristic, the 
constitution of the Tribunal plays a central role. As rightly decided by the Trial Chamber 
"[t]he question whether a court is independent and impartial depends not upon the body 
that creates it but upon its constitution, its judges and the way in which they function". '63 
When the Statute of the ICTY and Rules of Procedure and Evidence are examined, it is 
clearly understood that those rules attempt to guarantee a fair trial for an accused. In the 
Statute of the ICTY, Articles 13 (1) regulating qualifications and election of judges and 16 
(2) regulating the Prosecutor are just few examples of this. 164 Similarly, in the case of Effect 
of Awards, the ICJ had relied on the provisions of the constituent instrument of the UN 
Administrative Tribunal established by the General Assembly so as to determine the 
independent and impartial nature of a subsidiary judicial organ, and in this case the Court 
held that "examination of the relevant provisions of the Statute shows that the Tribunal is 
established, not as an advisory organ or a mere subordinate committee of the General 
Assembly, but as an independent and truly judicial body pronouncing final judgements 
without appeal within the limited field of its functions". 163 The Trial Chamber in its decision 
followed the ICJ in this regard. 166 At this point, it can be concluded that the practice of the 
160Sarooshi, pp. 458-462. 
161 Defence Motions, par. 2. 
162 Trial Chamber, Todic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 38.; For the reasons see pp. 20-22. 
163 Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 32. 
164 Article 13 (1) of the ICTY states: "The judges shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and 
integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest 
judicial offices".; and also see Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence regulating the 
disqualification of judges. 
Article 16 (2) of the ICTY states: "The Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the 
International Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any 
other source". 
165 Effect of. 4wards, p. 53. 
166 Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 32. 
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ICJ and the International Tribunal has created an international customary law rule, which is 
the examination of the constituent element of the Tribunal, with respect to the question 
whether a subsidiary judicial organ is an independent and impartial or not. In addition, the 
establishment of the ICTY under Article 7 (2) of the Charter in compliance with Chapter 
VII to determine individual criminal responsibility for violations of international 
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia gives it a degree of independence to perform 
judicial functions which the Council does not possess and it prevents the Council from 
interfering and reviewing the decisions of the ICTY. 167 This fact demonstrates that the 
ICTY "is "subsidiary" in name only and can render final judgments that even the Council is 
not authorised to disturb -and that in turn can disturb the Council by suggesting limits on its 
powers". 168 
1.4.1.5. The Matter of Protection of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law 
In the Tadic Case, the defence also contended that the Security Council cannot be involved 
in the protection of humanitarian and human rights law, the power to deal with human 
rights having been delegated to the General Assembly, the ECOSOC, the Trusteeship 
Council and to their subsidiary organs by Articles 1 (4), 13 (1), 55,62 (2) and 76 (c) of the 
Charter. The involvement of the Security Council in international humanitarian law, which 
is a neutral body of law is unfortunate since the Tribunal cannot function as a neutral 
body. 169 The defence moreover contended that the Security Council does not have any 
authority over individuals, and "[t]he attribution of jurisdiction over individuals to the 
Tribunal is not consistent with the Charter", since it is States which can create threats to 
the international peace and security, not individuals. 170 
Against these arguments, as mentioned earlier, serious violations of international 
humanitarian and of human rights law constituted a threat to international peace and 
security. "' The maintenance or restoration of international peace and security is the duty of 
167Sarooshi, pp. 453-454.; "This organ [the ICTY] .... 
have to perform its functions independently of 
political considerations; it would not be subject to the authority or control of the Security Council with 
regard to the performance of its judicial functions". (Secretary-General 's Report, par. 28). 
168Alvarez, "Judging... ". p. 11, 
'69 Defence A/otions, paras. 3.4.1,3.4.2.. 3.4.3., 3.4.4. 
170 Defence Alotions, par. 3.7. 
"' For the explanation see, pp. 22-23.; and supra notes 30-36. 
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the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Given this ground, the 
protection of humanitarian and human rights law should be seen as a legitimate area of 
Security Council action, 172 and the past practice of the Security Council proves this 
reality. "' In relation to the argument that the Security Council has no power to attribute 
jurisdiction over individuals through the creation of a tribunal having criminal jurisdiction 
has no basis in international law. Criminal responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law is a well-established customary international law principle. "a 
As decided by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg "[c]rimes against 
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced". 171 
In this sense, there is no doubt that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia constituted a 
threat to international peace and security and a great number of violations of international 
humanitarian law committed by individuals on behalf of their States' policy. The principle 
of State sovereignty cannot be interpreted as to give impunity to those individuals who 
have committed such kinds of crimes under international law. Otherwise, international 
criminal law and the principle of individual criminal responsibility that is a basic expression 
of the enforcement of the laws of war will be pointless. On this ground, the establishment 
of the Tribunal to prosecute individuals responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law by means of the Security Council "was both appropriate and necessary ... 
to act on individuals in order to address the threat to the peace". 176 
172 Prosecutor's Response, p. 23. 
173 For the Rwanda, Somalia and Haiti cases. see, supra notes 145-147. 
174 Prosecutor's Response. p. 24.; For the concept of individual criminal responsibility in international law, 
the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and their contribution to international humanitarian law and impact on 
the ICC, see infra Chap. 3. 
175 In (1949) 22 IMT (International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg. Reported in Trial of the Major 
War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal) p. 466. In M. C. Bassiouni, Crimes Against 
Humanity in International Criminal Law, Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1992), 
p. 207. iýb Trial Chamber, Tactic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 36. The past practice of the Security Council 
proves that the Security Council has authority over individuals in respect to serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. In its decision, the Trial Chamber quoted resolutions 731 and 748 of the 
Security Council and held that; "resolutions 731 and 748, the Security Council required the Libyan 
Government to surrender the two Libyan nationals who were accused of the Lockerbie bombing and 
imposed mandatory commercial and diplomatic sanctions to obtain Libya's compliance with its decision, it 
was, in substance, acting upon individuals, seeking the extradition and trial of those Libyan nationals". 
(par. 36).; For the treatment of this issue by the Trial Chamber of the ICTR, see Trial Chamber, 
Kanyabashi Case, Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 28-29. 
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1.4.2. In the Appeals Chamber 
The defence filed a notice of (interlocutory) appeal against the decision of the Trial 
Chamber to dismiss the defence motion on jurisdiction. The defence (appellant) again 
repeated its arguments based on three grounds: (a) the Tribunal has not been established by 
law; (b) primary jurisdiction of the Tribunal over competent domestic courts was 
improperly granted; and (c) the Tribunal lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over charges 
which have been brought against the accused in the indictment. ' 77 In this part of the study, 
the first contention of the defence will be examined, in particular, the approach taken by the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal will be analysed. 
1.4.2.1. The Principle of Competence de /a Competence 
Although, the results both in the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber hardly differ, the 
handling of defence assertions by the Chambers has been very interesting in many aspects. 
Despite the fact that the Trial Chamber made a distinction between the jurisdiction and the 
establishment of the Tribunal, 178 the Appeals Chamber followed a completely different 
approach. It did not accept the contention that the establishment of the Tribunal is distinct 
from its jurisdiction, as had the Trial Chamber, and commented that such a distinction 
"implies a narrow concept of jurisdiction reduced to pleas based on the limits of its scope in 
time and space and as to persons and subject-matter (rationae temporis, loci, personae and 
materiae)". 19 According to the Appeals Chamber, a narrow concept of jurisdiction may 
exist in a domestic law context, but not in international law, due to, in the international 
field, there being no integrated judicial system and "every tribunal is a self-contained system 
(unless otherwise provided)". 180 The Appeals Chamber did accept the interpretation of the 
jurisdiction made by the Trial Chamber, '' since it consists of merely "original", "primary" 
or "substantive" jurisdiction, however "it does not include the "incidental" or "inherent" 
'" Defence's Brief to Support the Notice o/Appeal (Jurisdiction of the Tribunal), Dusko Tadic, Case No: 
IT-94-1-T, (25 August 1995). (hereinafter Defence's Brief), par. 1.1. 
178 Supra note 116. 
179 Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 10. 
180 Ibid par. 11. 
181 Supra notes 118,119. 
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jurisdiction which derives automatically from the exercise of the judicial function". "' In this 
regard, the Chamber made a distinction between "primary", "original" or "substantive" 
jurisdiction and "incidental" or "inherent" jurisdiction and it regarded the legality of the 
establishment of the International Tribunal in the second category and accepted this 
argument in the context of jurisdictional matters. 193 
Having accepted that the establishment of the Tribunal is a jurisdictional matter, the 
Chamber decided that in international law, every judicial or arbitral tribunal has 
"jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction" (this principle is also known as "Konmpetenz- 
Kompetenz" in German or "la competence de la competence" in French) and it is a 
fundamental part of the incidental or inherent jurisdiction. ' 94 This principle is necessary for 
the exercise of the judicial function and does not have to be provided in the Statute of the 
Tribunal. To support this view, the Chamber cited some international legal precedents in 
this regard. '85 As it is well-known, the jurisdictional powers of a tribunal, in this case, the 
examination of the legality of the establishment of the Tribunal, can be limited by a 
provision in the constitutive instrument of such tribunal. In this respect, the Chamber took 
the view that it can be limited "only to the extent to which such limitation does not 
jeopardise its" "judicial character". '86 In the case of the International Tribunal, the Statute 
of the International Tribunal does not include any provision limiting its inherent or 
incidental jurisdiction and it has to exercise its "competence de la competence" to 
determine its jurisdiction. 187 
In respect of the decision of the Trial Chamber that the Tribunal cannot scrutinise 
the actions of the Security Council, 'x' the Appeals Chamber held that: "this is beside the 
point. The question before the Appeals Chamber is whether the International Tribunal, in 
exercising this "incidental" jurisdiction, can examine the legality of its establishment by the 
182 Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 14. 
1831bid. par. 18. 
'84 ]bid par. 18. 
18S Nottebohul Case (Leichenstein v. Guatemala), (1953) ICJ Rep. p. 7, at 119.; Dissenting opinion of Judge 
Cordova in the Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation upon 
Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Advisory 
Opinion) (1956) ICJ Rep. p. 77, at 163.; Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 18. 
186 Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 11,19. 
187Ibid par. 19. 
188 Supra note 117. 
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Security Council, solely for the purpose of ascertaining its own "primary" jurisdiction over 
the case before it". "9 
From the point of view of international law, the view taken by the Appeals Chamber 
pertaining to the establishment of the ICTY by means of a Security Council resolution 
reflects an "interventionist approach" and its interpretation of the principle of competence 
de la competence constitutes an unprecedented broad approach in the practice of 
international courts or tribunals. '90 The decision of the Appeals Chamber, by depending on 
the principle of competence de la competence reviews or examines the legality of the 
resolution of the Security Council in relation to the establishment of the ICTY. As referred 
to above, although the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN, it has no such a 
power. 19' Under these circumstances, how can the decision of the Appeals Chamber which 
reviews the Security Council resolution by relying on the doctrine of competence de la 
competence be justified? As a well-established principle, the concept of competence de la 
competence192 only allows a court or a tribunal to examine and determine its own 
jurisdiction, and this cannot be extended to the review of the Security Council resolution 
and the appropriateness of it, in this case the resolution establishing the ICTY. The Statute 
of the ICTY and the UN Charter have never given an authority to the ICTY for the 
examination of the legality of the Security Council resolutions, and thus, the decision held 
by the Appeals Chamber must be regarded as "ultra vires and unlawful". 193 If it is accepted 
that a court can review the legality of the resolutions of the Security Council, it must be the 
ICJ not the ICTY. 194 
1.4.2.2. The Matter of "Political Questions" and "Non-Justiciable" Disputes 
189 Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 20. 
190 Fox, H., "The Objection to Transfer of Criminal Jurisdiction to the UN Tribunal', (1997) 46 ICLQ pp. 
435-436. 
19' See supra notes 124-127. 
192 Cheng, B., General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Cambridge: 
Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, (1994), pp. 275-278.; Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. 
Guatemala). (1953) ICJ Rep. p. 7. at 119.: For a detailed study, see Shihata, I., F., I., The Power of the 
International Court to Determine Its Own Jurisdiction (Competence de la Competence), The Hague: 
Martins Nijhoff (1965). 
193 Separate Opinion ofJudge Li, par. 2. 194 See supra p. 31. 
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Contrary to the decision of the Trial Chamber with respect to political questions and non- 
justiciable issues, 195 the Appeals Chamber took the view that the doctrines of "political 
questions" and "non justiciable disputes" were just "remnants of the reservations of 
"sovereignty", "national honour", etc. in very old arbitration treaties" and they have a very 
limited role in contemporary international law. 196 According to the Chamber, the issue is an 
interpretation of an international treaty, the UN Charter, and in this case, the opinion of the 
ICJ in the Certain Expenses of the United Nations197 should be applied almost literally to 
the present case. 19' The ICJ declared in its advisory opinion that: "The Court, however, 
cannot attribute a political character to a request which invites it to undertake an essentially 
judicial task, namely, the interpretation of a treaty provision". 199 
In this context, the approach taken by the Appeals Chamber should be seen as not 
in compliance with the UN Charter and international law practice and creates some 
controversy. This is because the establishment of the Tribunal depends on the Security 
Council's findings which the situation in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to 
international peace and security. 200 The decision of the Security Council was taken in 
accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the UN Charter under Chapter VII. According to 
this Chapter, the Security Council enjoys a wide discretion power in determining whether 
there is a threat to the peace or not, and if so which types of measures will be employed. 
These matters are political in nature and the Council is a political organ and its members are 
well-qualified in this field, whereas the Judges of the ICTY have little or no experience in 
political field of international law. 201 Moreover, it would be very wrong to give a power to 
any court or tribunal for reviewing the resolutions taken, in particular, under Chapter VII 
situations by the Security Council. 202 For the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the 
Appeals Chamber, in this respect, "seems to be imprudent and worthless both in fact and in 
law" 203 
195 Supra note 134. 
196 Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 24. 
19' Certain Expenses of the United Nations, (1962) ICJ Rep. p. 151. 
'" Appeals Chamber. Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 24. 
'99 Certain Expenses, (1962) ICJ Rep. p. 155. 
200 For the explanation, see supra pp. 22-23.; Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 24. 
201 Separate Opinion of Judge Li, par. 3. 
202 Bowett, p. 94. 
203 Separate Opinion of Judge Li, par. 3. 
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1.4.2.3. The Matter of the Legality of and Appropriateness of the ICTY as a Measure 
The appellant did not repeat his argument with respect to the Security Council's power to 
determine whether the situation in the former Yugoslavia created a threat to international 
peace and security, and the power of the Security Council to address to such threats, and 
has acknowledged the authority of the Security Council in this regard, however he 
continued to contest the legality and appropriateness of the measures adopted by the 
Council. 204 In contrast to the defence argument, the Appeals Chamber took the same 
opinion with the Trial Chamber and decided that under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the 
"Security Council has a broad discretion in deciding on the course of action and evaluating 
the appropriateness of the measures to be taken", 205 and the establishment of the Tribunal 
was a measure under Chapter VII (in particular Article 41) so as to contribute to 
restoration and maintenance of peace. 206 
1.4.2.4. The Matter of Established by Law 
Lastly, the appellant in the Tadic Case challenged the establishment of the Tribunal by 
contending that it has not been established by law. 207 By this, the appellant meant that the 
establishment of this ad hoc tribunal was not "the result of a decision making process under 
democratic control, necessary to create a judicial organisation in a democratic society, but 
rather the result of a mere executive order". 208 This argument seems to rely on the 
contention that even if the Security Council were the appropriate body to create a tribunal, 
it would not be justified in setting up the Tribunal due to its decision not being subject to 
"democratic control" and not meeting the "requirements for the establishment of a tribunal 
by law". 209 It is clear that the source of these argument derives from Article 14 of the UN 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR) which provides that: "In the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit 
law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
204 Defence's Brief paras. 5.1., 5.2.. 5.3., 5.5.. 5.6. 
tos Appeals Chamber, Tactic Case, Jurisdiclinn Decision, par. 31. 
206 Ibid. paras. 32-40. 




impartial tribunal established by law". 210 The concept of establishment by law is one of the 
most important principle in the national and international law systems and in the opinion of 
the Appeals Chamber, it can be interpreted as consisting of three possible meanings. 
The first possible meaning of the concept of establishment by law is to mean that 
the establishment by a "legislature" not by an "executive order" as supported by the 
appellant and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 21 ' However, the 
Chamber rejected this meaning on the ground that a division of powers like legislative, 
executive and judicial powers in which is applied to municipal systems cannot be applied to 
the international setting, nor particularly "to the setting of an international organisation 
such as the United Nations" and in the United Nations system, this type of division of 
powers are not clear enough. 212 
The second possible meaning of the principle is that the establishment of an 
international tribunal "by a body which, though not a Parliament, has a limited power to 
take binding decisions". As well understood from the opinion of the Chamber, the Security 
Council, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, can take binding decisions by means of 
Article 25 of the Charter and by relying on Chapter VII, the Council has a power to create 
the Tribunal as a measure to restore and maintain international peace and security, 
moreover, the establishment of the Tribunal was approved by the UN General Assembly, 
and also this body elected the Judges of the Tribunal and approved its budget. 213 
The third possible meaning of the concept "established by law" means that "its 
establishment must be in accordance with the rule of law". In this sense, the Appeals 
Chamber decided that if the principle of "established by law" means the establishment in 
accordance with the rule of law, a tribunal "must be established in accordance with the 
proper international standards; it must provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice and 
even-handedness, in full conformity with internationally recognised human rights 
210 Art. 14 (1) of the ICCPR. Similar provisions can be found in Article 6 (1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), (4 November 1950) and in Article 8 (1) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR), (22 November 1969). 
Article 6 (1) of the ECHR states: "In the determinations of his civil right and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law". 
Article 8 (1) of the ACHR states: "Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and 
within a reasonable time. by a competent. independent and impartial tribunal, previously established by 
law". 
21 Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 43. 
212 Ibid. par. 43. 
213Ibid par. 44. 
44 
instruments". 214 The Chamber has favoured this interpretation of the concept of established 
by law, and held that the Tribunal was created in accordance with the rule of law, Article 
21 of its Statute, which was almost the same with Article 14 of the ICCPR, guaranteed the 
fair trial for the accused and Article 13 (1) ensured the impartiality, integrity and 
competence of Judges . 
215 As far as the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
the International Tribunal are concerned, the Tribunal fulfils all requirements in order to 
2'6 provide a fair trial and necessary elements of the principle of "established by law". 
1.5. CONCLUSIONS 
As have been indicated above, there is no doubt about the situations in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda constituted threats to international peace and security. In the last 
decade of the twentieth century, the international community witnessed the worst violations 
of human rights and of international humanitarian law in these two regions of the world. 
The large scale of killings, rape and other forms of sexual assaults, "ethnic cleansing", 
genocide and other types of crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda 
impelled the international community to bring those responsible of such crimes to justice. 
To achieve this purpose and to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the only way was to establish an international criminal tribunal by means of a 
Security Council Resolution which was in compliance with the urgency of the situations of 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. On this background, the UN Security Council 
established the ICTY and the ICTR acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter "to do 
justice, to deter further crimes, and to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace". 21 
In contrast to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR were 
established neither by the victors as a "victor's court or justice" nor by the parties involved 
in the conflict, but rather by the UN Security Council on behalf of the entire international 
community in order to protect international peace and security. For this reason, the 
214 Ibid. par. 45. 
21S Ibid. par. 46. 
216 Ibid. par. 47. 
217 Supra notc 109. 
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establishment of these Tribunals was innovative in character and some questions arisen in 
relation to their creations by the UN Security Council. 
As can be predicted, in the first case of the ICTY (Tadic Case), the defence 
challenged the legality of the establishment of the International Tribunal, on the ground of 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as mentioned in detail above, the Trial Chamber refused the 
jurisdictional challenge of the defence by deciding that "the validity of the creation of the 
International Tribunal is not truly a matter of jurisdiction but rather of the lawfulness of its 
creation, involving scrutiny of the powers of the Security Council and of the manner of 
their exercise. 218 However, the Appeals Chamber did not accept the decision of the Trial 
Chamber with respect to the creation of the Tribunal can be regarded as a separate concept 
from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and it took "a more interventionist approach" and "it 
interpreted in an unprecedentedly broad manner the principle of competence de la 
competence"219 (emphasis added). Under this principle, the examination of the 
establishment of the Tribunal is a part of jurisdiction ("incidental" or "inherent" jurisdiction) 
and every international tribunal or court do have a right to examine its creation as a part of 
its jurisdiction. 
From the point of view of international law, the decision held by the Appeals 
Chamber under the principle of competence de la competence should be regarded as 
reviewing the legality of the Security Council Resolution and the establishment of the 
Tribunal. This principle merely allows the Tribunal to examine and determine its own 
jurisdiction and it cannot be extended to the examination of the competence and 
appropriateness of the Security Council Resolution establishing the Tribunal. 22' As rightly 
held by the Trial Chamber and supported by the Prosecutor's Response to the Defence 
Motions and Judge Li, in his separate opinion in the Appeals Chamber, the International 
Tribunal does not have any power to review its creation by the Security Council and its 
power as indicated in Article I of its Statute limited to "prosecute persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute", and also 
Articles 2-5 of the Statute of the Tribunal regulating the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
218 Trial Chamber, Tactic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 4.; and also see paras. 5,8,40, and the 
explanation made under the heading of "In the Trial Chamber" above. 
219 Fox, pp. 435-436-see the explanation made under the heading of In the Appeals Chamber" above. 
220 Separate Opinion ofJuc/ge Li, par. 2. 
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Tribunal together with Article 1 cannot be interpreted as giving the Tribunal competence to 
review the acts of the Security Council in respect to the establishment of the Tribunal. 22' 
Moreover, although, the ICJ is the principal organ of the UN under Article 92 of the UN 
Charter, it does not have any such kind of competence. In this sense, how can it be justified 
that the International Tribunal which has a limited jurisdiction can review the Security 
Council Resolutions in relation to its creation? On the other hand, as discussed earlier, the 
UN Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security". 222 Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives power to the Security Council to 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace and security, and to take necessary 
measures "in accordance with Article 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace 
and security". 223 So as to perform its functions, the Security Council can establish 
subsidiary organs . 
224 In light of this legal base, the International Tribunal were created as a 
measure by the Security Council. While this background is in front of the international 
community, acceptance of the examination of the legality of the Tribunal's creation by the 
International Tribunal must be regarded as not in compliance with the principles of 
international law. Furthermore, whether a threat exists to international peace and security 
and what sort of measures to be employed are political questions. This field of international 
law is the legitimate area of the UN Security Council and its members are well-qualified in 
this area. The Judges of the Tribunal have little or no experience in international political 
affairs, thus the review of the Security Council Resolution in this regard "seems to be 
imprudent and worthless both in fact and in law". 225 
For the reasons explained above, the approach taken by the Trial Chamber and 
supported by Judge Li in the Appeals Chamber seems to be more consonant with the 
international legal regulations. Although the Trial Chamber decided that it has no authority 
to review the acts of the Security Council with respect to its creation, it commented on the 
arguments made by the defence for the following reasons: Firstly, for the first time in 
international law, the international community has created such a tribunal having criminal 
jurisdiction over individuals. Secondly, the International Tribunal for Rwanda followed the 
same approach as the Yugoslavia Tribunal. Thirdly, the establishment of the ICTY and the 
221 See, supra notes 117-120,135. 
222 Art. 24 (1) of the UN Charter. 
223 Art. 39 of the UN Charter. 
224 Arts. 7 (2) and 29 of the UN Charter. 
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ICTR represented a crucial step for the establishment of a permanent international criminal 
court. In this context, in particular, the last reason is so significant on the ground that 
despite the fact that these Tribunals are created for the purpose of prosecuting violations of 
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, they affected 
positively the establishment of the permanent international criminal court. 
In conclusion, the establishment of the International Tribunals must be regarded as a 
contemporary example of the application of international humanitarian law for enforcing 
individual responsibility when the violations of international humanitarian and international 
human rights law occurred. 226 Additionally, it should also be noted that the establishment of 
the ICTY and the ICTR has played a central role for the establishment of an international 
criminal court which should be considered as one of the major achievements of the 
international community before the new millennium. In this sense, the approach taken by 
the international community, just before the end of the twentieth century, should be 
perceived as violations of fundamental human rights will not be tolerated in the new 
millennium. 
226 Supra note 110. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CREATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
2.1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
One of the most serious defects to enforce the rules of law is the lack of an international 
criminal court to try individuals charged with the violations of international humanitarian 
law. The only way for the enforcement of international humanitarian law is the prosecution 
and punishment of individuals who are responsible for violations of international 
humanitarian law either through a created international criminal court or domestic courts. 
The need for such a court has been accepted and discussed by international scholars for 
almost 100 years. ' 
2.1.1. Before the World War I 
The idea of creating an international criminal court goes back to the First Hague 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899 which includes 
provisions establishing "The Permanent Court of Arbitration". 2 However, it has never been 
effective due to States parties to the Convention were unwilling to surrender a part of their 
sovereignty to such an arbitration court? In addition to the emergence of the concept of 
setting up an international criminal court, the most important contribution of the First 
'Bridge, J., W., "The Case for an International Court of Criminal Justice and the Formulation of 
International Criminal Law", in Mark W. Janis (ed. ), International Courts for the Twenty-First Century, 
Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1992), p. 221.; Cassese, A., "On the Current 
Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law", 
(1998) 9 EJIL p. 4.; Gianaris, W., N., "The New World Order and the Need for an International Criminal 
Court", (1992/1993) 16 Ford. Int. 'l L. J. p. 88. In particular, for the problems an international criminal 
court would address, see pp. 109-111.; Kutner, L., "Politicide the Necessity of an International Court of 
Criminal Justice", (1972) 2 Denv. J. Int. 'l L. & Pol'y p. 55. 
2Arts. 20-29. Hague Peace Conference, Final Act, Conventions and Declarations, and the text of 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (29 July 1899) are available in Benjamin B. 
Ferencz, An International Criminal Court -A Step Toward World Peace, A Documentary History and 
Analysis, Vol. I, London, Rome, New York: Oceana Publications (1980), p. 103. 
3Ferencz, pp. 8-9. 
Hague Conference was the Convention regulating the Rules of the Laws and Customs of 
` War on Land. 
In 1907, in the Second Hague Conference, The Prize Court Convention' was signed 
by thirty-nine States. This Convention could be accepted as a major step toward the 
development of the rule of international law since providing the establishment of the first 
organised international court, which the human being has ever seen in the history of 
international law, but no State has ratified the Convention6 and the idea that the creation of 
an international court remained an aspiration, not a reality. 
2.1.2. After the First World War 
After the First World War, the concept of creating an international criminal court to bring 
to justice individuals, including State officials, responsible for violations of the laws or 
customs of war was discussed and a number of proposals were made at this point. In 
particular, the "Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on 
Enforcement of Penalties" recommended the establishment of a "high tribunal composed of 
judges drawn from many nations". ' Consistent with the Commission Report, the Treaty of 
Versailles signed by Germany on 26 June 1919 included Article 227 that provided for the 
establishment of such tribunal to try the ex-German emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, for the 
supreme offence against the peace, and Article 228 provided the prosecution of German 
officers and soldiers those who committed war crimes. However, this tribunal could not be 
established. 8 
Between the two world wars, several attempts were made to create an international 
criminal tribunal or court. One of them was in 1920 when the Council of the League of 
Nations appointed an Advisory Committee of Jurists to set up a plan for the establishment 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice which also "be competent to try crimes 
constituting a breach of international public order or against the universal law of nations", 
but this recommendation was rejected by the Assembly of the League of Nations as being 
4Ibid. p. 9. 
S'Me Second Hague Conference, Final Act and Draft Convention Relative to the Creation of an 
International Prize Court are available in Ferencz, Vol. I, pp. 123-163. 
6Ferencz, Vol. I, pp. 17,20. 
7For the Report of the Commission see (1920) 14 AJIL pp. 95-154, and also see Ferencz, Vol. I, p. 176, 
169-192. 
8For reasons see infra Chap. 3, notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
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premature. 9 The other attempt in the way of adopting draft statutes for an international 
criminal court was made by non-governmental organisations such as the Inter- 
Parliamentary Union in 1925,10 and the International Law Association in 1926.11 None of 
these efforts could bring the international criminal court into the scene of international law. 
Similarly, a Convention for the creation of an international criminal court to try terrorist 
offences was annexed to the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism12 
on 16 November 1937 by the League of Nations, but it never came to in operation. 
2.1.3. After the Second World War 
After World War II, the idea of creating an international criminal court was revived again 
to try individuals those who were responsible for the worst crimes against humanity and 
human dignity. For this reason, in 1944 the UN established a War Crimes Commission to 
investigate the allegations against the German war criminals, and this Commission prepared 
a draft convention for the establishment of a United Nations War Crimes Court. 13 
Thereafter, the Allied powers created the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to 
prosecute and punish major German war criminals. 14 A similar approach was also taken for 
the Japanese in the Far East and another International Military Tribunal was established at 
Tokyo. '5 Despite the fact that these tribunals were criticised as a "victor's court or 
justices16 they were the first International Tribunals in the history of human beings and their 
Charters and decisions have played a crucial role for the classification of crimes in 
international humanitarian law. The international community, for the first time in its history, 
faced with the definition of crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes" 
9Records of First Assembly of the League of Nations, (1920), Plenary Meetings, pp. 744-745. 
1°For the Inter-Parliamentary Union Proposal for an International Criminal Code for the Repression of 
International Crimes (7 October 1925), see Ferencz, Vol. I, pp. 244-251. 
"For the International Law Association proposal for an International Criminal Court, including Statute for 
the Court (11 August 1926), see Ferencz, Vol. I, pp. 252-268. 
12For the text of the Conventions, see Ferencz, Vol. I. pp. 380-398. 
13 For the related documents, see Ferencz, Vol. I, pp. 414-433. 
'See supra Chap. 1, note 1. 
"See supra Chap. 1, note 1. 
"See supra Chap. 1, note 6. 
"Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal defines these crimes as follows: 
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, 
but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian 
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and witnessed the applicability of international humanitarian law rules as a means of created 
International Tribunals. 
Although the International Military Tribunals have made very important 
contribution to international humanitarian law, they cannot be accepted as truly established 
international criminal courts from the point of view of international law. This is because 
during the war many atrocities were also committed by the Allied powers, but no one were 
charged with that by the Tribunals. In other words, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials "were 
imposed by victorious nations on defeated nations". 'g 
Having seen the International Military Tribunals, the UN recognised the necessity of 
the establishment of an international criminal court to prosecute and punish responsible 
individuals for committing international crimes such as genocide. 19 The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on 9 December 1948.20 In this Convention, genocide was accepted as "a crime 
under international law"21 and it stated that persons charged with genocide "shall be tried 
by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by 
such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction". 22 To bring this regulation into 
operation, the UN General Assembly mandated the International Law Commission to work 
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, 
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity; 
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on 
political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 
Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a 
Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed 
by any persons in execution of such plan. 
"Jamison. S., L., "A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past 
Objections", (1995) 23 Denv. J. Int. 1 L. & Pol'y p. 426.; "(T)he new crimes created for Nuremberg were 
defined by the victorious allies only in the context of Nazi and Imperial Japanese activities and were not 
applied to the Soviets, who also invaded Poland and Baltic States by what were evidently pre-arranged 
"acts of aggression, " and whose treatment of some national minorities might have been considered within 
any definition of "crimes against humanity" that had not been drafted to apply only to the defeated 
enemies". (Rubin, A., P., "International Crime and Punishment", (1993) 33 Nat. Int. p. 73. ).; "Nor were 
they applied to the bombing of Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, or Nagasaki, or to other Allied conduct 
including treatment of prisoners and submarine warfare. The offences were drafted to apply only to the 
defeated enemies". (Blakesley, C., L., "Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal", 
(1994) 18 Flet. F. W. Aff. p. 80). 
19UJN GA Res. 260,179th Plenary Meeting, (9 December 1948). 
20The thext of the Genocide Convention is available in the annex to the UN GA Res. of 260 of 9 December 
1948. 
Z' Art. 1 of the Genocide Convention. 
22 Art. 6 of the Genocide Convention. 
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on the possibility of setting up a permanent international criminal court. 23 According to the 
Commission's conclusion, the creation of an international criminal court was both desirable 
and possible. Moreover, the Nuremberg principles and the Geneva Conventions -which 
were adopted in 1949 and extended the list of war crimes consisting of torture, 
international infliction of suffering, serious bodily injury, forcing prisoners to work for 
imprisoners, and the deprivation of a right to a free trial- could be drafted as a "Code of 
Offences". 24 Although two draft statutes for an international criminal court were 
successfully prepared in the years 1951 and 1953,25 the General Assembly decided to 
postpone the consideration of draft statutes because of the question of defining aggression 
and its connection with the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind. 26 In 1957, the UN General Assembly repeated its view again in relation to the 
definition of the crime of aggression when it decided to defer consideration of the question 
of the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 27 The lack of 
definition of aggression had been a major obstacle for creating an international criminal 
court, and its definition was able to possible in 1974 by means of a General Assembly 
Resolution28 which included some phrases that were not clear enough and could be 
interpreted in different ways. 29 
In addition to the difficulty of the definition of the crime of aggression, the 
international political situation during the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's made the idea of 
creating an international criminal court impossible. In this respect, particularly, the Soviet 
23UNGA Res. 260 of 9 December 1948 "... to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an 
international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes over which 
jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by international conventions". 
24Jamison, p. 426.; Bridge, p. 222. 
u UN General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 11, "Report of the Committee 
on International Criminal Jurisdiction" on its session held from 1 to 31 August 1951, U. N. Doc. A/2136, 
New York, 1952. and UN General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 12, "Report 
of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction" (27 July-20 August 1953), U. N. Doc. 
A/2645, New York, 1954. Documents are also available in Ferencz, Vol. II, pp. 337-364,429-459 
respectively.; For some of the particular Articles and features of these draft statutes, see Bloom, R, A., 
"Introduction to Various Drafts Concerning an International Criminal Court", in Julius Stone and Robert 
K. Woetzel (eds. ), Toward a Feasible International Criminal Court, Geneva: World Peace Through Law 
Center (1970), (pp. 160-167), pp. 164-167. 
26UNGA Res. of 266 [898(1)X], adopted by the GA at its 512th plenary meeting, on 14 December 1954. 
27UNGA Res. of 1186 (XII), adopted its 727th meeting, on 11 December 1957. 
22UNGA Res. of 3314 (XXIX), (14 December 1974). Article 1 of the Resolution (including 8 Articles to 
define aggression) defines aggression as follows: 
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, 
as set out in this Definition. 
2` Ferencz, Vol. II, p. 75. 
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Union opposed to establish such a court throughout the Cold War by stating that it was an 
infringement upon its state sovereignty. 30 However, in these periods, the demand of 
international community to try individuals those who committed international crimes 
occurred in some international conventions. 31 The Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 32 the International Convention for the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 33 the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 34 and the International Convention 
against the Taking of Hostages35 were just some examples proving this fact. 
2.1.4. The Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and the International Criminal Court 
The proposal of Trinidad and Tobago to fight against narcotics trafficking by means of the 
establishment of an international criminal court drawn up the attention of the international 
community to create an international criminal court in 1989.36 After that the UN General 
Assembly mandated the International Law Commission to work on a draft statute, 
including jurisdiction for drug trafficking, for an international criminal court. 37 
Apart from this proposal, in 1990, the idea of establishing an international criminal 
court was revived again in order to try Iraqi leaders for crimes such as aggression and war 
crimes committed during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War. Although 
this idea was strongly supported by the international community, no action was taken. 38 
"Jamison, p. 427. 
31lbid. 
32Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, U. N. T. S. 860,105, (1971) 
10 ILM 133. 
"International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1974) 13 ILM 
50. 
341973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons 
including Diplomatic Agents, U. N. T. S. 1035,167.; (1974) 13 ILM 41. 
351979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, (1979) 18 ILM 1456. 
36See "Analysis of Issues in the draft statute" [for the ICC], prepared by the UN Department of Public 
Information, May 1998. Available on the web: http: //www. un. org/icclstatute. htm#intro. 
37UNGA Res. 47/33 (25 November 1992). 
38The concept of creating an international criminal court by means of a United Nations to deal with crimes 
against humanity, crimes against peace, genocide, war crimes and environmental crimes was suggested by 
Germany. (Speech by the German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Upon 
Receiving an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Ottawa on 27 September 1991). Another 
suggestion, at this point, was made by France and it supported the idea of using "a Nuremberg-type 
procedure". (Note of Professor Alain Pellet on the responsibility of Saddam Husein). The Council of 
Ministers of the European Communities also discussed the question of the personal responsibility of the 
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During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the international community witnessed 
one of the most widespread atrocities constituting war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide as a part of the policy of ethnic cleansing, which lead to the UN Security Council 
establishing the ICTY in 1993.39 Similarly, the crime of genocide committed, among other 
international crimes, in Rwanda in 1994 made the Security Council follow the same 
procedure with the Yugoslavian case. As a result, another international tribunal, the ICTR, 
was established to hold individuals accountable for those atrocities and deter future 
crimes. 40 
In light of these developments, in 1994, the International Law Commission by 
examining international precedents such as the Nuremberg and the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunals' Statutes, the 1951 and 1953 draft statutes, the ICTY and the ICTR 
Statutes, prepared a draft statute for an international criminal court4' and submitted it to 
the UN General Assembly. Thereafter, the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court "to review the major 
substantive and administrative issues arising out of the draft statute". 42 In 1995, the General 
Assembly established another committee called the Preparatory Committee to deal with 
"preparing a widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for an International 
Criminal Court as a next step towards consideration by a Conference of 
plenipotentiaries". 43 
The Preparatory Committee met six times during the years in 1996-1998 to prepare 
for the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
Iraqi leaders and the possibility of bringing them to justice before an international court and moreover 
wanted the Secretary-General of the United Nations to consider these matters. (Letter from Mr. Jacques 
Poos, President-in-Office of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities, to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, on 16 April 1991). For these documents and other related materials, review 
of efforts in relation to the establishment of an international tribunal to try Iraqi leaders, see The Path to 
the Hague-Selected Documents on the Origins of the ICTY, (1996).; And also see, Greenberg, M., D., 
"Creating an International Criminal Court", (1992) 10 Bos. Univ. Int. 'I L. J. p. 119.; Cavvichia, J., "The 
Prospects for an International Criminal Court in the 1990's" (1992) 10 Dick. J. Int. '1 L. p. 223.; O'Brien, 
W., V., "The Nuremberg Precedent and the Gulf War", (1991) 31 Virg. J. Int. '1 L. p. 391.; Moore, J., N., 
"War Crimes and the Rule of Law in the Gulf Crisis", (1991) 31 Virg. J. Int. 'I L. p. 403. 
39For historical background and the steps taken by the UN Security Council to establish the ICTY see supra 
Chap. 1, pp. 8-14,16-18 
40See supra Chap. 1, pp. 14-16. 
41For the analysed study outlining and explaining the characteristics of the Statute, see Crawford, J., "The 
ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal", (1994) 88 AJIL pp. 140-152.; and also see 
Crawford, J., "Prospects for an International Criminal Court" (1995) 48 CLP pp. 303-326. 
42UN GA Res. 49/53, U. N. Doc. A/Res/49/53. 
43 UN GA Res. 50/46, U. N. Doc. A/Res/50/46. 
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International Criminal Court. 44 In these preparatory meetings, the Draft Statute submitted 
by the International Law Commission was taken as a base for discussion. In its sessions, the 
Committee generally dealt with the issues of the scope of jurisdiction and the definition of 
crimes, general principles of criminal law, complementarity, trigger mechanisms, state co- 
operation with the International Criminal Court, fair trial and the rights of suspects and 
accused, penalties, the composition and administration of the Court, the method of 
establishing the Court and the relationship between the Court and the United Nations. `' 
As a result of this work, a Diplomatic Conference, the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
was held in Rome, Italy, from 15 June to 17 July 1998 and it was ended with the adoption 
of a "Statute of the International Criminal Court". 46 The Conference and some features of 
the Statute will be examined below. 
2.2. OBSTACLES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) 
There are a number of issues that made the establishment of the ICC difficult. Some of 
them are the principle of State sovereignty and criminal jurisdiction, subject-matter 
jurisdiction (which law will be applied) and personal jurisdiction (to whom this law will be 
"The General Assembly had decided that "a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries... be held in 1998, 
with a view to finalizing and adopting a convention on the establishment of an international criminal 
court" in its resolution 51/207 on 16 December 1996. 
45For an account of these sessions, see Hall, C., K., "The First two Sessions of the UN Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court" (1997) 91 AJIL p. 177.; Kaul, H., P., 
"Towards a Permanent International Criminal Court, Some Observations of a Negotiator", (1997) 18 
Hum. Rts. L. J. p. 169.; Hall, C., K., "The Third and Fourth Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court", (1998) 92 AJIL p. 124.; Hall, C., K., "The Fifth 
Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court", 
(1998) 92 AJIL p. 331.; Hall, C., K., "The Sixth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court", (1998) 92 AJIL p. 548.; and also see Bassiouni, M., C., 
"Observations Concerning the 1997-98 Preparatory Committee's Work ", in The International Criminal 
Court: Observations and Issues Before the 1997-98 Preparatory Committee; and Administrative and 
Financial Implications, Chicago: International Human Rights Institute De Paul University, (1997) pp. 5-32. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, U. N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 183/9.; As of 7 February 2000, only six States (Fiji, Ghana, Italy, San Marino, Senegal, Trinidad 
and Tobago) ratified the ICC Statute. According to Article 126, the ICC Statute will enter into force on the 
first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
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applied), the possibility of creating ad hoc tribunals when circumstances require and 
procedural law to be applied. 
2.2.1. The Principles of State Sovereignty and Criminal Jurisdiction 
Two of the fundamental obstacles, among others as will be indicated below, to the creation 
of an international criminal court are the principles of State sovereignty and criminal 
jurisdiction. This is because the concept of sovereignty and criminal jurisdiction are 
interrelated, and States do not want to surrender their exclusive jurisdiction in criminal 
matters to any other State or international institutions (international tribunal or court) being 
regarded as a major, inevitable element of State sovereignty. 47 On the other hand, the 
internationalisation of events has created a new world in which the sovereignty of States 
can affect other States' rights. 48 In this sense, it should not be seen that for example, the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda were solely matters of these States alone 
and the international community should not have intervened to bring an end to these 
conflicts. In fact, crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda had created a threat to 
international peace and security. In order to reach a peaceful world for the benefit of human 
being, States should take part in establishing an international criminal court to try 
individuals those who are committed certain crimes, and should relinquish their criminal 
jurisdiction, in this regard, to this international organisation. If this is regarded as a 
limitation to the principle of State sovereignty, it will be valid for every State and the 
limitation of sovereignty in this way will play a crucial role for preventing the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community. For this reason, it can be said that this 
type of limitation makes States more sovereign than they were, since they will be able to 
prosecute and punish the perpetrators of international crimes through the establishment of 
an international criminal court. 
Due to States' reluctance to surrender their criminal jurisdiction to an international 
court as being accepted a mark of States' sovereignty, one solution can be the 
47Remarks by James R. Crawford on "The Internationalization of Criminal Law", (1995) ASIL 
Proceedings, p. 301.; Crawford, "Prospects.... ", p. 305.; Graefrath, B., Universal Criminal Jurisdiction and 
an International Criminal Court", (1990) 1 EJIL pp. 72-75. 
48Jamison, p. 431. 
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establishment of an international tribunal or court having a "concurrent or complementary 
jurisdiction", which "concerns the allocation of jurisdiction between domestic courts and 
the ICC". 49 The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR both include the same provisions giving 
concurrent jurisdiction to the national courts and the International Tribunals. SO However, 
the concurrent jurisdiction of national courts is limited by the primacy of the International 
Tribunal. In other words, the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals give primacy to the 
International Tribunals. When exercising their primacy over national courts the ad hoc 
tribunals have power to intervene "at any stage of the procedure .... request national courts 
to defer to the competence of the International Tribunal". 31 This intervention into national 
courts' concurrent jurisdiction can even be at the investigation stage. 52 
The principle of concurrent jurisdiction is interrelated with the other principle 
namely, "non bis in idem" which means nobody shall be tried or punished twice with 
regard to the same offence. Articles 10 (1) and 9 (1) of the Statutes of the ICTY and the 
ICTR include the principle of non bis in idem. 53 The primacy of the International Tribunals 
49Bleich, J., L., "Complementarity", in The International Criminal Court: Observations and Issues Before 
the 1997-98 Preparatory Committee; and Administrative and Financial Implications, Chicago: 
International Human Rights Law Institute De Paul University, (1997), p. 231. 
SOArticle 9 of the ICTY Statute (concurrent jurisdiction) provides: 
"1. The International Tribunal and national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute 
persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991. " 
Article 8 of the ICTR Statute (concurrent jurisdiction) provides: 
"1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda and national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to 
prosecute persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, 
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. 
s'Article 9 (2) of the ICTY Statute states that: 
"2. The International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts. At any stage of the procedure, 
the International Tribunal may formally request national courts to defer to the competence of the 
International Tribunal in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
the International Tribunal". 
Article 8 (2) of the ICTR Statute states that: 
"The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have primacy over the national courts of all States. At 
any stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal for Rwanda may formally request national courts to 
defer to its competence in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda". 
52Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY. 
"Article 10 (1) of the ICTY Statute (non-bis-in-idem) reads: 
"1. No person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of 
international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for which he or she has already been tried by the 
International Tribunal". 
Article 9 (1) of the ICTR Statute (non-bis-in-idem) reads: 
"1. No person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of 
international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for which he or she has already been tried by the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda". 
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can be again examined with respect to the application of this principle. 54 In this sense, if an 
accused is tried by the International Tribunal, it creates an obstacle for further national 
proceedings, but in the case of trial before a national court will not prevent the 
International Tribunal from a following trial which is subject to the condition that "the 
national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the 
accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently 
prosecuted". 55 
In practice, in the case of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, the defence challenged the 
primacy of the ICTY on the ground that there were no basis in international law to give 
primacy to the ICTY and it created an infringement upon the sovereignty of States, in this 
case according to the defence States were the Republic of Bosnia - Herzegovina where the 
crimes committed and Bosnian Serb Republic directly effected and the Federal Republic of 
Germany where the accused resided at the time of his arrest indirectly effected. 56 In fact, 
this argument is directly related to the establishment of the ICTY by the Security Council 
and it was discussed in detail in the previous Chapter. 57 Nevertheless in order to 
demonstrate that the argument of the defence has no basis in international law, it is useful 
to refer some principles in this regard: 
Firstly, the defence has no right to raise the issue of primacy over domestic courts, 
because of issues related to sovereignty can be raised only by a sovereign State, and an 
individual cannot put himself in the position of a State so as to challenge the jurisdiction of 
an international tribunal, in this case the ICTY. In the case of Israel v. Eichman, the 
District Court of Jerusalem rightly held that "the right to plead violation of the sovereignty 
of a State is the exclusive right of that State. Only a sovereign State may raise the plea or 
waive it, and the accused has no right to take over the rights of that State". 58 The Trial 
Chamber and the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in their decisions referred to this 
34Shraga, D., and Zacklin, R., "The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia", (1994) 5 EJIL p. 
372.; Greenwood, C., "The International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia", (1993) 69 Int. Aff. p. 654. 
ssArt 10 (2) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 9 (2) of the ICTR Statute. 
Defence Motions, (Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, Principle of Ne-Bis-in-Idem, Form of the Indictment), 
Dusko Tadic, Case No: IT-94-1-T, (23 June 1995) (hereinafter Defence Motions), paras. 6,7.4.1., 7.4.2., 
7.4.3., 7.4.4., 7.4.5.; Defence's Brief to Support the Notice of (Interlocutory) Appeal (Jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, Dusko Tadic, Case No: IT-94-1-T, (25 August 1995), (hereinafter Defence's Brief), paras. 7.3., 
7.4., 7.5. 
57See supra Chap. 1, pp. 26-45. 
58lsrael v. Eichman (1961) 36 ILR p. 5, p. 62., affirmed by the Supreme Court of Israel, (1962) 36 ILR 277. 
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judgement to support their views. 59 Additionaly, it should be noted that the most effected 
States, in this case Bosnia-Herzegovina where the crimes committed and the Federal 
Republic of Germany where the accused resided at the time of his arrest, have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal. On this ground, the allegation of the defence 
clearly constitutes a controversy to the express intent of those States. 60 In relation to the 
entity known as Bosnian Serb Republic, the international law principle is clear enough, that 
is to say, without recognition by the international community that entity cannot claim the 
violation of its sovereignty as not having the full rights of a State may enjoy. 61 In this sense, 
"the accused as an individual, has no locus standi" and "to allow the accused to do so 
would be to allow him to select the forum of his choice, contrary to the principles relating 
to coercive criminal jurisdiction". 62 
Secondly, it should be emphasised that the crimes over which the International 
Tribunal has jurisdiction to try are not crimes purely domestic in nature, and that they are 
the crimes universal in nature, and prosecution and punishment of those crimes are of 
concern to the international community. The principle of sovereignty of States cannot 
prevent the international community from acting appropriately when the situations "affect 
the whole of mankind and shock the conscience of all nations of the world". 63 
Thirdly, the contention of the defence relying on the principle of jus de non 
evocando, 6' right to be tried by one's national courts, cannot be upheld in this context. This 
is because this principle does not prevent the accused from being tried before an 
international tribunal and does not defeat the right of a State to confer jurisdiction on such 
a tribunal, in this case the ICTY. As rightly concluded by the Appeals Chamber, "(t)his 
principle is not breached by the transfer of jurisdiction to an international tribunal created 
by the Security Council acting on behalf of the community of nations". 6S Further, as being 
"Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, (Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction), Trial Chamber, Case No: 
IT-94-1-T (10 August 1995), (hereinafter Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision), par. 41.; Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadic, (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), Appeals Chamber, Case 
No: IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995), (hereinafter Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision), par. 55. 
60Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 41. 
61Prosecutor's Response to the Defence's Motions Filed on 23 June 1995, Dusko Tadic, Case No: IT-94-1- 
T, (7 July 1995), (hereinafter Prosecutor's Response), pp. 31-32. 
62Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 41. 
631bid. par. 42.; Similarly, the Appeals Chamber in its Jurisdiction Decision also held that: "It would be a 
travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be 
allowed to be raised successfully against human rights". (par. 58). "[The offences alleged ... 
do not affect 
the interests of one State alone but shock the conscience of mankind". (par. 57). 
Defence Motions, paras. 7.1., 7.2., 7.3. 
65Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 62. 
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accepted the concept of universal jurisdiction in relation to international crimes, a suspect 
of such offences can be brought before an international court or tribunal. In the Tadic 
Case, the accused was brought before the ICTY "for a dispassionate consideration of his 
indictment by impartial, independent and disinterested judges coming ... from all continents 
of the world". '56 
Finally, as explained in Chapter 1, the establishment of the ICTY by the Security 
Council in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter binds States under Article 25 of 
the Charter and this type of regulation overrides the sovereign rights of States. The 
creation of the ICTY to try those responsible for committing international crimes cannot be 
accepted as an invasion into a States' sovereignty in criminal jurisdiction as these crimes 
were not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any State. 67 
On the other hand, the significance of the principle of State sovereignty can be 
examined with regard to the investigation stage of any case as a factor affecting the work 
of an international tribunal. 68 The ICTY was faced with this issue in the case of Prosecutor 
v. Tihomir Blaskic when seeking to get documents related to this case. The problem was 
the validity of orders, subpoena duces tecum, to appear in the court for the purpose of 
handing over documents, issued by a Judge of the Trial Chamber of the Tribunal on 15 
January 1997 to the Republic of Croatia and its Defence Minister. 69 The Republic of 
Croatia challenged the competence of the ICTY in respect to issuing a subpoena to a 
sovereign State and to the naming of its high government official, and additionally, also 
stated that like any sovereign State, it has a right to protect its national security interests. 70 
On the ground of these allegations, the Republic of Croatia did not complete the 
requirements of the subpoena. 
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY concluded in relation to these arguments that it has 
the power and authority to issue orders that properly be in the term of subpoena duces 
tecum to States and to their high government officials as well as individuals, " and also 
Ibid. par. 62.; see also Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 37-43. 
67Prosecutor's Response, p. 35.; Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 44. 
"Cassese, p. 14. 
"Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of 
Subpoena Duces Tecum, Trial Chamber, Case No: IT-95-14-PT, (18 July 1997), (hereinafter Subpoena 
Decision), par. 1. 
7OTrial Chamber, Blaskic Case, Subpoena Decision, par. 3. 
"Ibid paras. 30,69.; "... a Judge of Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal has the authority and 
power to issue orders to States and individuals, including high government officials, for the production of 
documents required for the preparation or conduct of a trial. Moreover, these orders may properly be 
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stated that the objection of national security interests is not subject to full privilege and 
cannot be validly raised as an obstacle to compliance with orders of the ICTY, and the 
concept of national security interests cannot be used to prevail over the international 
interests. 72 
However, the Appeals Chamber took a different view from the Trial Chamber's 
decision, and it held that subpoena duces tecum (in the sense of injunction accompanied by 
threat of penalty) could not be addressed to States as the International Tribunal does not 
have any power to take enforcement measures against States and criminal sanctions in the 
context of national criminal systems cannot be applied to States under modern international 
law, 73 but binding "orders" or "requests" can be addressed to States. 74 With regard to 
addressing subpoenas to State officials acting in their official capacity, the Appeals 
Chamber dismissed the Trial Chamber decision and stated that such officials were just 
instruments of a State and their action in this sense could be attributed to the State, not to 
them. " In relation to the concept of the national security interests of a State, the Appeals 
Chamber shared the same view with the Trial Chamber and concluded that States could 
not, by depending upon national security interests, withhold documents and other 
evidentiary material requested by the Tribunal, but it recognised that practical arrangements 
could be made adopted by the relevant Trial Chamber to make allowance for legitimate and 
bona fide concerns of States. 76 
termed subpoena duces tecum and, as such, there is a clear obligation on both States and their officials to 
comply fully with their terms". (par. 150).; For the analysis of these issues by the Trial Chamber, see the 
decision paras. 14-64 (justifying the power of the ICTY to issue subpoenas to States), paras. 65-69 
(explaining the reasons why the ICTY has the power to issue binding orders to government officials). 
72Trial Chamber, Blaskic Case, Subpoena Decision, paras. 132-133.; "Any objection to an order for the 
production of documents, including a claim that a State's national security interests could be threatened by 
disclosure, does not automatically excuse the State or individual from compliance. Rather, such claims 
must first be assessed by the relevant Trial Chamber. " (par. 150).; and also see paras. 107-149 (justifying 
the national security interests that cannot take over the international interests, in particular, par. 132).; In 
this context, see Wedgwood, It, "The International Criminal Tribunal and Subpoenas for State 
Documents", in M. N. Schmitt and L. C. Green (eds. ), The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next 
Millennium, Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, (1998), pp. 483-499. 
"Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the 
Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, (Appeals Chamber), Case No: IT-95-14-AR108bis (29 
October 1997), (hereinafter Subpoena Decision), par. 25. 
74Appeals Chamber, Blaskic Case, Subpoena Decision, par. 25.; For the analysis of the legal meaning of 
the term subpoena, see paras. 20-21. 
75Appeals Chamber, Blaskic Case, Subpoena Decision, par. 38. 
761bid. paras. 61-69.; In this context, see Malanczuk, P., "A Note on the Judgement of the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the Issuance of Subpoenae 
Duces Tecum in the Blaskic Case", (1998) 1 YIHL pp. 229-244. 
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As far as the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, the UN 
Charter Chapter VII and the Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) are concerned, the 
judgement rendered by the Appeals Chamber should be seen as in compliance with the 
contemporary international law rules. This is the natural result of Article 29 of the Statute 
of the ICTY granting power to the ICTY to address binding orders including a variety of 
judicial matters such as: the identification and location of persons, the taking of testimony 
and the production of evidence, the service of documents, the arrest or detention of 
persons, and the surrender or the transfer of the accused. " By means of this legal ground a 
"vertical" relationship has been established between States and the Tribunal, and it can be 
clearly seen in the cases of the surrender or the transfer of the accused persons to the 
Tribunal. As is well-known, extradition between States depend upon bilateral treaties and it 
is subject to the discretionary power of the State concerned because of the principle of the 
equality of States. This relationship is "horizontal" in nature. In contrary, the relationship 
between a State and the International Tribunal does not leave any room for the State to 
exercise its power whether it will surrender the accused or not, due to the Tribunal being 
endowed with binding authority as a result of its legal basis. 78 
From the point of view of international law, the concept of primacy of the 
International Tribunals and their powers can be seen, at first glance, as an infringement 
upon the principle of State sovereignty. However, it should not be forgotten that the 
"Article 29 of the Statute of the ICTY regulates co-operation and judicial assistance between States and the 
ICTY as follows: 
"1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of 
persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a 
Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to: 
(a) the identification and location of persons; 
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence; 
(c) the service of documents; 
(d) the arrest or detention of persons; 
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal". 
The Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) establishing the Tribunal also indicates States' co-operation 
and judicial assistance with the ICTY as follows: "... all States shall cooperate fully with the International 
Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the International 
Tribunal and that consequently all States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic law to 
implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to 
comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 29 of the Statute". 
(emphasis added), (par. 4 of the Resolution). 
78Appeals Chamber, Blaskic Case, Subpoena Decision, par. 47.; Cassese, pp. 13-14.; and also Rule 58 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY provides: 
"The obligation laid down in Article 29 of the Statute shall prevail over any legal impediment to the 
surrender or transfer of the accused or of a witness to the Tribunal which may exist under the national law 
or extradition treaties of the State concerned". 
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Tribunals have been dealing with the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community, and human being will get benefit from their success. For these reasons, they 
constitute a novelty in the world community, and co-operation and judicial assistance with 
them should not be perceived by States as a violation of their sovereignties. 
In this context, lastly, the impact of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals on the ICC 
Statute and the differences between them can be indicated as follows: 
Firstly, like the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, the principle of concurrent or 
complementary jurisdiction finds its place in the paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1 
of the ICC Statute, which provides that "the International Criminal Court ... shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions". However, there is no provision giving 
the primacy to the ICC over domestic courts. This way of regulation reflects a general 
consensus with regard to the allocation of jurisdiction between the ICC and national 
authorities. In other words, the ICC does not replace national criminal courts, but can just 
complement these courts. In a sense, the ICC Statute gives primacy to domestic 
jurisdictions, in contrary to the two ad hoc tribunals' primacy. Nevertheless, Article 17 of 
the ICC Statute can be interpreted as the ICC is complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions in the cases of national courts are not available or ineffective. 79 Article 17 of 
the ICC Statute provides: 
"1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall 
determine that a case is inadmissible where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over 
it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the 
State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from 
the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; " 
Secondly, as a consequence of having concurrent jurisdiction between the ICC and 
national courts, like ICTY and the ICTR Statutes, the principle of non bis in idem has 
79The Preamble of the Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court submitted by the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court as a Report to the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court held 
in Rome, Italy, between 15 June-17 July 1998 had emphasised the nature of the complementary jurisdiction 
of the ICC as follows: "... such a court [the ICC] is intended to be complementary to national criminal 
justice systems in cases where such trial procedures may not be available or may be ineffective". (par. 3 of 
the Draft Statute, U. N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1.14 April 1998). 
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taken its place in Article 20 of the ICC Statute. Although the ICC has no primacy, with the 
aforementioned exception, over national criminal systems in relation to the concept of 
concurrent or complementary jurisdiction, it has primacy, like the ICTY and the ICTR, 
over domestic courts with regard to the application of the principle of non bis in idem. In 
other words, the decision of the ICC precludes subsequent trials before national courts, 80 
while the principle of non bis in idem does not preclude a subsequent trial before the ICC 
in the following two circumstances: "The proceedings in the national court (a) [w]ere for 
the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court; or (b) [o]therwise were not conducted independently or 
impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognised by international law 
and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice". " 
Giving the primacy to the ICC in this context should be regarded as in compliance 
with the spirit of the Statute and paragraph 10 of the Preamble, Articles 1 and 17 of the 
Statute. This is because in the aforementioned situations which the ICC has primacy over 
national courts, they do not act in complying with the enforcement of international 
humanitarian law. The only way to overcome this matter is to give a power to the ICC to 
conduct a subsequent trial. In the present context, the primacy of the ICC over national 
criminal courts is an inevitable element for the implementation and enforcement of 
international humanitarian law. Otherwise, as a result of human nature, the international 
community could have faced with the danger of international crimes being treated as 
"ordinary crimes" or proceedings being "designed to shield the accused" or cases not being 
carefully prosecuted in national courts. 82 
2.2.2. Jurisdiction of the ICC 
"Article 20 of the ICC states: 
"1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with respect to conduct 
which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court. 
2. No person shall be tried before another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for which that 
person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court. " 
8'Art. 20 (3) of the ICC Statute. 
82Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 58. 
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One of the other obstacles to create an international criminal court is the question of the 
scope of the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction (what laws or crimes will be covered) and 
personal jurisdiction (to whom the laws will be applied). 
As will be examined later in detail, the ICC was created to have jurisdiction over 
only "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole", 83 
which are: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of 
aggression. 84 In this context, the impact of the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes on the subject- 
matter jurisdiction of the ICC is obviously seen. In a sense, concluding that the ICC Statute 
is the combination of Articles 2-5 of the ICTY and Articles 2-4 of the ICTR Statutes 
should not be regarded as wrong with the exception of the crime of aggression. 83 
The view deployed by the international community in relation to the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the ICC reflects the best system so as to provide a universal acceptance of 
the ICC that paves the way for early ratification of the Statute and bring the Court in 
operation as soon as possible. Having gained the respect of the international community, 
the jurisdiction of the ICC can be expanded to a larger number of international crimes by 
means of an agreement of the States ratified the Court's jurisdiction. 86 
Like the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC has jurisdiction only over natural persons, 87 
and it does not have jurisdiction over legal entities such as corporations, which is very 
important with regard to economic crimes like money laundering, and States. When the 
world becomes more interdependent, it might be possible to see the ICC has jurisdiction 
over such entities. " The concept of personal jurisdiction will be discussed in the following 
Chapter in light of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. 
83Par. 4 of the Preamble of the ICC Statute. 
84Art. 5 (1) of the ICC Statute. 
"Genocide: Art. 4 of the ICTY Statute and Art. 2 of the ICTR Statute.; Crimes against Humanity: Art. 5 of 
the ICTY Statute and Art. 3 of the ICTR Statute.; War Crimes: Arts. 2-3 of the ICTY Statute and Art. 4 of 
the ICTR Statute. The crime of aggression is not taken its place in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. 
Although, the Statute of the ICC includes this crime, its applicability by the Court is subject to the 
condition that provided in Article 5 (2) of the Statute: "The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and 
setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such 
a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations". 
86Jamison, p. 435. 
87 Art. 25 of the ICC Statute.; Art. 6 of the ICTY.; Art. 5 of the ICTR Statute. 
88Bassiouni M., C., and Blakesley, C., L., "The Need for an International Criminal Court in the New 
International World Order", (1992) 25 Van. J. Trans. L. p. 169.; For the developments in criminal 
responsibility for breaches of international law, including acts of corporations and States, see Meron, T., 
"Is International Law Moving towards Criminalization? ", (1998) 9 EJIL p. 18. 
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2.2.3. The Possibility of Creating Ad Hoc Tribunals 
The possibility of the establishment of ad hoc tribunals when they are needed is another 
problem for the creation of an international criminal court. This argument is not defensible 
in international humanitarian law for the following reasons: 
Firstly, the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal reflects a type of "selective justice", 
which means that why the international community established ad hoc tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda while such tribunals have never been set up for the 
crimes (international crimes in nature) committed in Cambodia, Haiti or Iraq during the 
Gulf War. An international criminal court does not face with this type of argument and can 
operate in a more consistent way. 
Secondly, ad hoc tribunals cannot deter future crimes as effectively as an 
international criminal court. The restrictions of time and place with regard to the 
jurisdiction of ad hoc tribunals play a central role not to deter future crimes. For example, 
after the establishment of the ICTR thousands of refugees have been killed in Rwanda, but 
that Tribunal's power is limited to events occurred in 1994. The existence of a permanent 
court makes potential criminals afraid of a punishment will be rendered by this institution. 89 
Thirdly, the existence of a permanent international criminal court can overcome the 
deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals. As is known, the creation of ad hoc tribunals needs more 
time and expense those of which prevent tribunals from becoming in operation on time. 90 In 
meantime, crucial evidence can be destroyed, perpetrators can escape, witnesses can be 
intimidated and in conclusion, investigation becomes more expensive. 
Finally, the existence of a permanent institution brings an end to the argument that 
ad hoc tribunals may violate the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena 
sine lege: no crime without law, no punishment without law). 91 This principle will be 
discussed in the following Chapters in relation to the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR. 
2.2.4. The Issue of Procedural Laws to Apply 
89Jamison, p. 438. 
901bid. 
911bid pp. 437-438.; For the other advantages of having a permanent international criminal court, see 
Crawford, "Prospects... ", pp. 314-315.; Ferencz, Vol. II, p. 35. 
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The issue of applicable procedural law is not of primary significance. This is because 
"international human rights norms and standards on fairness have reached such a level that 
developing a common denominator of a sufficiently high standard to satisfy the 
requirements of most countries of the world is quite possible". 92 The Statutes of the ICTY 
and the ICTR and their Rules of Procedure and Evidence prove the level the international 
community reached in terms of providing a fair trial to accused persons. Article 21 of the 
Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal and Article 20 of the Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal 
indicate the rights of the accused. Among those are the right to have a fair and public 
hearing, 93 the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, 94 the right to be tried in his 
presence, to have legal assistance (counsel), to examine the witnesses and not to be 
compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 9S Rules of Procedures and Evidence 
of the ICTY and the ICTR made more clearer the rights of the accused. 96 
The procedural law being applied by the ad hoc tribunals should be seen as mainly 
reflecting the principles of international human rights law and as in compliance with the 
human rights instruments such as Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR, Article 6 (1) of the ECHR 
and Article 8 (1) of the ACHR those of which provide a fair trial for the accused. 97 
Similarly, the ICC Statute has provisions indicating the rights of the accused in a 
detailed way. Articles 63 (trial in the presence of the accused), 66 (presumption of 
innocence), 67 (rights of the accused) are just few examples demonstrating that the accused 
will have a fair trial before the ICC. In this regard one more point should be emphasised 
that in the preparation of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, the legal 
instruments (Statutes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) and the practice of the ad 
hoc tribunals will play a significant role as they played the role for being an example for the 
preparation of the Statute of the ICC. 
2.3. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ICC 
92Bassouini and Blakesley, p. 174. 
93Art. 21 (2) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 20 (2) of the ICTR Statute. 
HArt. 21 (3) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 20 (3) of the ICTR Statute. 
'SArt. 21 (4) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 20 (4) of the ICTR Statute. 
For example, see Rule 42 of the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the rights of suspects in the 
investigation level of a case. 
97See supra Chap. 1, note 210. 
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As having been explained in the previous Chapter, there are four different means of 
establishment of an international criminal court or tribunal: (a) an international treaty, (b) a 
General Assembly Resolution, (c) a Security Council Resolution, and (d) setting up an 
international criminal court by way of amending the UN Charter. 98 In the cases of the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda for the establishment of both ad hoc tribunals, the method 
of Security Council Resolution was chosen, due to it was in compliance with the UN 
Charter and the situations which need explicit and definite solution in order to protect 
international peace and security. However, for the establishment of the ICC, this method 
cannot be accepted as providing a precedent, since the establishment of the ICC is 
prospective, not retrospective and the ICC as an international institution is created in an 
attention to deal with future crimes. For these reasons, the treaty based establishment is the 
most appropriate way for setting up such a Court'oo and it was deployed by the 
international community in the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court. '°1 
The advantages of using the treaty approach are to give an opportunity to States to 
examine and elaborate the issues relating to the establishment of the ICC, and to allow 
States to exercise their sovereign will in the negotiation and conclusion of the treat Y. 102 
Moreover, the "treaty-based court is, in general, a more solid institution, since it is firmly 
grounded in the consent of the States parties and not, as United Nations ad hoc tribunals 
are, dependent for its continued existence on the Security Council or the General 
Assembly", 103 however, this does not mean that the ICC created by this mode would lack 
prestige since it is not supported by the United Nations for the following reasons: Firstly, 
the ICC was created "in relationship with the United Nations system with jurisdiction over 
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole". '°4 
"See supra Chap. 1, pp. 19-22. 
"For the explanation of advantages and disadvantages of other methods that can be used for creating ad 
hoc tribunals, see supra Chap. 1, pp. 19-21. 
10°Kolodlcin, R., A., "An Ad Hoc International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia", (1994) 5 Crim. L. F. pp. 394-395. 
1°'The Conference was held in Rome, Italy, 15 June-17 July 1998, and the Statute of the ICC was adopted 
in this Conference. 
102See supra Chap. 1, p. 20. 
103Comments Received Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 49/53 on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, [Comments From the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, (5 January 1995)], U. N. Doc. A/AC. 244/1 (20 March 
1995), par. 5. 
104Par. 9 of the Preamble of the ICC Statute. 
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Secondly, the ICC will be brought into relationship with the United Nations through an 
agreement. 1 ' Thirdly, the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations can refer a situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC to initiate an 
investigation. 106 Lastly, in the cases of the Security Council is involved in any situation 
through a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the ICC may not 
commence or proceed any investigation or prosecution for a period of 12 months after the 
Security Council has requested the Court. This request may be repeated by the Council. 107 
Giving such a power to the Security Council for deferral of investigation or prosecution 
under Article 16 of the ICC Statute can be seen, at first glance, that the Security Council 
may prevent the ICC from taking action, because of its political nature and the possible 
veto by one of the five permanent members of the Council. 108 Nevertheless, this Article 
should be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty [in this case the Statute of the ICC] in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose". 109 On this ground the literal meaning of the terms used in the 
provision "may be commenced or proceeded" does not reflect that the ICC has to act in 
accordance with the Security Council request in every circumstances. From the 
interpretation of this provision, it should also be understood that the ICC has a power to 
assess the situations in order to whether it will initiate investigation or prosecution. This 
view should be regarded as in compliance with the purposes of the creation of the ICC 
which are indicated in the paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Preamble of the ICC Statute. ' 10 Article 
16 of the Statute cannot be interpreted as it gives the power to the Security Council to take 
control over the ICC. 
In conclusion, the method deployed by the international community, conclusion of a 
treaty, in establishing the ICC should be considered as the most appropriate way for the 
aforementioned reasons. In this sense it should also be indicated that the establishment of 
105Art. 2 of the ICC Statute. 
106Art. 13 (b) of the ICC Statute. 
'°7Art 16 of the ICC Statute. 
108In this context, it should be noted that the USA and China, two permanent members of the Security 
Council, voted against the adoption of the ICC Statute. 
109Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. 
"'Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not 
go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level 
and by enhancing international cooperation". (par. 4 of the Preamble of the ICC Statute). 
"Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes". (par. 5 of the Preamble of the ICC Statute). 
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an organic link with the United Nations through an agreement would improve the ICC's 
prestige and could make easier the ICC becoming in operation soon. 
2.4. THE UNITED NATIONS DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF 
PLENIPOTENTIARIES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT (15 JUNE -17 JULY 1998) 
The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court was held in Rome, Italy, between 15 June-17 July 1998 and 
ended with the adoption of a "Statute of the International Criminal Court""' by a vote of 
120 in favour (including the UK, France and Russia) to 7 against (the USA, 12 China, 
Libya, Iraq, Israel, Qatar and Yemen) with 21 abstentions. 
During the Conference, constitutional, institutional and substantive law issues were 
discussed. The discussion mainly concentrated on the subject matter jurisdiction, 
complementarity and trigger mechanisms of the ICC. In light of the Statute some of the 
characteristics of the Court can be indicated as follows: 
Firstly, according to the Statute, the ICC is a permanent institution, 113 which has an 
international personality, "4 and it is composed of three organs namely: (a) judicial organ 
consisting of the presidency, an appeals division, a trial division and a pre-trial division, (b) 
investigatory and prosecutorial organ (the office of the Prosecutor) and (c) administrative 
organ (the Registry). "' 
"'See supra p. 56 note 46.; The Statute of the ICC consists of 13 Parts including 128 Articles: Part 1: 
Establishment of the Court, Arts. 1-4.; Part 2: Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law, Arts. 5-21.; 
Part 3: General Principles of Criminal Law, Arts. 22-33.; Part 4: Composition and Administration of the 
Court, Arts. 34-52.; Part 5: Investigation and Prosecution, Arts. 53-61.; Part 6: The Trial, Arts. 62-76.; 
Part 7: Penalties, Arts. 77-80.; Part 8: Appeal and Revision, Arts. 81-85.; Part 9: International Cooperation 
and Judicial Assistance, Arts. 86-102.; Part 10: Enforcement, Arts. 103-111.; Part 11: Assembly of States 
Parties, Art. 112.; Part 12: Financing, Arts. 113-118.; Part 13: Final Clauses, Arts. 119-128. 
1121t is surprising that the USA voted against the establishment of the ICC. This is because it is the USA 
which played the central role in establishing the ICTY, and also America seems always to be supportive the 
creation of an international criminal court until the adoption of the ICC Statute. In this sense, see Scharf, 
M., P., "Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court", (1994) 6 Pace Int. '1 L. Rev. p. 103.; 
Scharf, M., P., "The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court", (1995) 6 Duke J. Comp. & 
Int. '1 L. pp. 170-171.; For the American view on why it was against the adoption of the ICC Statute and its 
criticism in international law, see infra notes 127,130. 
113 Art. 1 of the ICC Statute. 
"4Art. 4 of the ICC Statute. 
115Art. 34 of the ICC Statute. 
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Secondly, the ICC has a power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons in relation 
to "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole" . 
16 
Having indicated the jurisdiction of the ICC in general, the Statute specifies these crimes 
over which the ICC has jurisdiction as follows: (a) the crime of genocide, (b) crimes against 
humanity, (c) war crimes, and (d) the crime of aggression. 117 As is known from the Statutes 
of both ad hoc tribunals, the first three categories of crimes, "core crimes", constitute the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICTR. The main difference between the 
ICC Statute and the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals lies on the inclusion of the crime of 
aggression in the ICC Statute. From the point of view of international humanitarian law, 
the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of agression should be welcomed. The exclusion 
of the crime of aggression in the ICC Statute would mean that granting immunity to those 
responsible for "the supreme international crime". '" Ever since the judgement of 
Nuremberg, aggressive war was described as an international crime, not a national right. 19 
If the crime of aggression had not been included within the jurisdiction of the ICC, the 
international community would have taken a step backwards from the practice of 
international humanitarian law. 120 
However, the ICC's jurisdiction over the crime of agression is subject to the 
condition that is indicated in Article 5 (2) of its Statute as follows: "The Court shall 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance 
with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be 
consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations". It is clearly 
understood from this Article that the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression when the definition and conditions of this crime are set up by the international 
community. This is actually the result of the aggression's link with the Security Council 
' 16Arts. 1 and 5 of the ICC Statute. 
' "Art. 5 of the ICC Statute.; For the negotiating process of the crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction 
in the Rome Conference, see Arsanjani, M., H., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court", 
(1999) 93 AJIL pp. 29-36.; Kirsch, P., and Holmes, J., T., "The Rome Conference on an International 
Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process", (1999) 93 AJIL pp. 6-8.; Kirsch, P., and Holmes, J., T., "The 
Birth of the International Criminal Court: The 1998 Rome Conference", (1998) 36 Can. Y. Int. 'l L. pp. 
22-23,30-32. 
'"Statement by Benjamin B. Ferencz, Pace Peace Center, (16 June 1998). 
1191bid.; and also see, UN Press Release LJROM/8, "Former Nuremberg War Crimes Prosecutor Declares 
That Aggressive War is not a National Right but an International Crime", (16 June 1998). 
' 2°Statement by H. E. Mr. Albano L. T. Asmani, United Republic of Tanzania, (16 June 1998). 
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which is the only organ that can determine whether aggression by a State has occurred or 
not. For this reason, the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council must be 
clearly established through an agreement as provided in Article 2 of the Statute to solve the 
problems in relation to the definition and conditions of the crime of agression. 
Although the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC will be examined in comparison 
with the substantive law of the ad hoc tribunals in detail in following Chapters, one point 
should be indicated here in relation to the non-inclusion of the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons, anti-personnel mines, blinding laser weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction under the definition of war crimes. In particular, non-inclusion of nuclear 
weapons can create unfair results in terms of application of the rule of law by the ICC. For 
example, if somebody kills one person with a poisoned arrow or dumdum bullet, the ICC 
has jurisdiction, but in the case of thousands of civilians are killed with a nuclear weapon, 
the ICC will have no jurisdiction. 12' How can it be justified in international humanitarian 
law? 
Thirdly, the ICC's jurisdiction is complementary to national criminal justice 
systems. It does not replace national courts; where national criminal courts are not able or 
unwilling to act to prosecute and punish those who committed the most serious crimes of 
international concern, the ICC exercises its jurisdiction. 122 As has been indicated above, this 
is the natural result of the principle of sovereignty of States in international law. ' 
Fourthly, the ICC is designed to be an independent, fair, impartial, effective and 
representative of the international criminal judiciary and also be free from any political 
effects. 124 In this context, the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council plays a 
central role. During the Conference, this was one of the main theme. 123 In particular, the 
USA wanted the ICC to be controlled by the Security Council by stating that the ICC 
121 UN Press Release L/ROM/14, "Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Should be Included in Criminal 
Court's Definition of War Crimes, Say Several Conference Speakers", (18 June 1998).; In particular, see 
Statement by Ambassador Muhammad Zamir, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, (18 
June 1998), Statement by Alhaji Abdullahi Ibrahim, Oft, San, Honourable Attorney General and Minister 
of Justice of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, (18 June 1998). 
'ZZArt. 17 of the ICC Statute. 
123See supra pp. 57-58,64. 
'24UN Press Release L/ROM/22, "UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to 
Establish Permanent International Criminal Court", (17 July 1998). 
125UN Press Release LJROM/10, "Role of United Nations Security Council in International Criminal Court 
Among Issues Discussed This Afternoon at UN Conference", (17 June 1998).; Kirsch and Holmes, pp. 8-9. 
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"must operate in co-ordination -not in conflict- with the Security Council". 126 The view 
taken by the USA'27 was not accepted by the international community on the ground that if 
the ICC or its prosecutor was made subject to the control of any political bodies, whether 
the Security Council or State parties, it would not have been credible, and international 
justice would have been seriously injured. 128 In fact, the issue is related to the trigger 
mechanisms of the ICC by which the jurisdiction of the Court can be set up. The trigger 
mechanisms of the ICC is regulated in Article 13 of the Statute under the heading of 
"exercise of jurisdiction". According to this Article, the Court can exercise its jurisdiction 
over the crimes where there is a reference by a State party, the Prosecutor or the Security 
Council'29 to the ICC. The USA did not agree with the referral by a State party or the 
prosecutor by declaring that its soldiers taking part in peacekeeping forces all over the 
world could be faced with prosecutions by the ICC and America might have to deal with 
politicised complaints before the ICC. 13o From the point of view of international 
humanitarian law, this argument has no basis for the following reasons: 
Firstly, to create an independent, impartial, fair and effective permanent 
international criminal institution, its prosecutor should have a right to initiate an 
investigation in respect to the most serious international crimes as provided in Article 13 
'26Statement by the Hon. Bill Richardson, United States Ambassador at the United Nations, (17 June 
1998).; UN Press Release IJROM/11, "United States Declares at Conference that UN Security Council 
Must Play Important Role in Proposed International Criminal Court", (17 June 1998). 
127For the criticism of the American position, see Goldstone, it, "A Court That Needs a Fair Trial - The 
US. is on the wrong side of history in opposing an international war-crimes court-", Time, Vol. 152, No. 5, 
(3 August 1998).; Ertan, F., "Daimi Afahkeme Kutlu Olsun, (The Permanent Court Welcomes)", Zaman, 
(19 July 1998).; In this context, see Wedgwood, R., The International Criminal Court: An American 
View", (1999) 10 EJIL pp. 97-98.; Hafner, G., Boon, K., Rubesame, A., and Huston, J., "A Response to the 
American New as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood", (1999) 10 EJIL pp. 113-115. 
'28UN Press Release L/ROMJ11, "United States Declares at Conference that UN Security Council Must 
Play Important Role in Proposed International Criminal Court", (17 June 1998).; Britain's Foreign 
Secretary, Robin Cook, indicated his view after the Conference as follows: "I am delighted that the court 
will have an independent prosecutor, and I don't think that the changes that have been made strike at the 
heart of the court. It will be a strong court with a wide remit that will send a signal to the Saddam Hussein 
and Pol Pots that they will be held to account and brought to justice", in The Observer, John Hooper, 
"Nowhere to run for War Criminals", (19 July 1998). 
1 In fact, the way of giving power to the Security Council to refer a situation to the Court should be 
considered as one of the reflections of the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals on the ICC Statute since the 
situations similar to the former Yugoslavian and Rwandan can be referred by the Security Council to the 
ICC. This is also the only exception for the principle of consent of States under which the ICC can exercise 
jurisdiction. (Cassese, A., "The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary 
Reflections", (1999) 10 EJIL p. 161). 
13°Statement by the Hon. Bill Richardson, United States Ambassador at the United Nations, (17 June 
1998). In this context, see Zwanenburg, M., "The Statute for an International Criminal Court and the 
United States: Peacekeepers under Fire? ", (1999) 10 EJIL pp. 124-143.; Scheffer, D., J., "The United 
States and the International Criminal Court", (1999) 93 AJIL p. 18. 
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(c) of the ICC Statute. At the same time, although the prosecutor can initiate investigations 
proprio motu, it is subject to the approval of a three judge pre-trial chamber131 which 
provides a safeguard against a possible unprofessional manner of the prosecutory service. 
Secondly, the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter can 
refer a situation to the Prosecutor to launch an investigation 132 and also the Security 
Council may request the ICC to defer investigation or prosecution in relation to the 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter situations. 133 As a result, the ICC will work together with 
the Security Council in order to protect or maintain international peace and security, as 
long as the situations referred to the Court by the Security Council are related to Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. 
Having examined some important features of the Statute of the ICC, it needs to be 
briefly emphasised the contribution of the ICC to international humanitarian law and human 
rights law. 
First of all, the establishment of the ICC should be regarded as "a gift of hope to 
future generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards universal human rights 
and the rule of law". 134 
Secondly, the creation of the ICC fulfils the missing link in international law by 
enforcing individual criminal responsibility and it brings an end to the concept of impunity 
to achieve a global justice for human being and human dignity. 135 
Thirdly, the establishment of the ICC will hopefully bring an end to conflicts, 
whether international or non-international, and deter future international crimes as seen one 
of the significant purposes of establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. 136 
Fourthly, by creating the ICC complementary to national criminal courts as a result 
of the principle of State sovereignty, the international community will witness that the 
"'Art. 15 of the ICC Statute. 
'32Art. 13 (b) of the ICC Statute. 
"'Art. 16 of the ICC Statute. 
'34Statement by the United Nations Secretary - General Kofi Annan at the Ceremony Held at Campidoglio 
Celebrating the Adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, (18 July 1998).; UN Press 
Release LJROM/23, "Secretary - General Says Establishment of International Criminal Court is Major 
Step in March Towards Universal Human Rights, Rule of Law", (18 July 1998). 
"SAs is well- known, the International Court of Justice deals with cases between States, it has no 
jurisdiction to enforce the principle of individual criminal responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. 
136See supra Chap. 1, p. 26 note 109. 
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national legal systems will introduce necessary law regulations in their own legal systems to 
prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of international concern. 
If not, the ICC will have to take over national criminal courts in accordance with its 
Statute. 
Lastly, but most importantly, the establishment of the ICC by a vote of 120 in 
favour to 7 against indicated that the new world order will not be governed by the world's 
remaining superpower and that the rule of law which is the only way to achieve a global 
justice will guide the international community. 
2.5. CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of creating an international criminal court to prosecute and punish individuals 
those who are responsible for violations of international humanitarian law has been 
discussed by the international community for almost 100 years and its establishment 
became possible just before the millennium through the adoption of the Statute of the ICC 
in the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court held in Rome, Italy, between 15 June 17 July 1998. 
The reasons behind why the international community could not have such a court 
for a long time derive from some obstacles for the establishment of a permanent institution 
which has a criminal nature and power to deal with individual criminal responsibility. The 
most important obstacles in this regard are the principles of State sovereignty and criminal 
jurisdiction that are interrelated. No State wants to surrender its criminal jurisdiction to any 
other State or international court or tribunal since the concept of criminal jurisdiction is 
considered as an inevitable element of State sovereignty. However, the internationalisation 
of events has created a new world order, and the full enjoyment of State sovereignty by a 
State has affected other States' rights. As a result, States should not see that, for instance, 
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda were merely matters of these States 
alone and the international community should not have intervened in a military way or 
establishing ad hoc tribunals by the Security Council to bring an end to these conflicts. In 
fact, these conflicts consisting of international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity had created a threat to international peace and security. 
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In order to reach a global justice, it is needless to say that the international 
community needs a permanent criminal court whose jurisdiction will be over certain crimes 
and individuals. For this reason, States have to surrender or transfer their criminal 
jurisdiction to this institution. If this is regarded as a limitation to the principle of State 
sovereignty, it will be the same for every State and will play a significant role for preventing 
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. In a sense, this type of 
limitation makes States more sovereign than they were, because of providing prosecution 
and punishment of the perpetrators of international crimes through the establishment of the 
international criminal court. 
Due to States are reluctant to transfer their criminal jurisdiction to an international 
criminal court as being accepted a mark of State sovereignty, the concept of concurrent or 
complementary jurisdiction is the only way to overcome this matter. The Statutes of the 
ICTY and the ICTR both include the same provisions providing concurrent jurisdiction to 
the national courts, with the exception of the primacy of the International Tribunals. In 
relation to concurrent jurisdiction, the principle of non bis in idem has also taken its place 
in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. In practice, the international community has found it 
possible to apply the principle of State sovereignty and concurrent jurisdiction to 
international criminal institutions. In this sense, the practice of the ICTY in the cases of 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic and Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic should be noted. There is no 
doubt that the established ICC will be guided by the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in a 
large scale, when it comes in operation. The impact of the Statutes of ad hoc tribunals on 
the ICC Statute clearly demonstrates this fact and it gives place to similar provisions 
regulating the principle of complementary between national courts and the ICC which is 
different from ad hoc tribunals in terms of giving primacy to national courts as well as the 
principle of non bis in idem. 
One of the other obstacles to create an international criminal court is the question of 
the scope of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. The practice 
of the international community with regard to the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY 
and the ICTR have played a major role in preparing the ICC Statute. In fact, the ICC 
Statute should be mainly seen as a combination of Articles 2-5 of the ICTY and Articles 2- 
4 the ICTR Statutes on the ground that the crime of genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity constitute the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals as well as 
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the jurisdiction of the ICC. The only exception is the inclusion of the crime of aggression in 
the ICC Statute. The view taken by the international community at this point reflects the 
best way in order to provide a universal acceptance of the ICC which paves the way for 
early ratification of the Statute and bring the ICC in operation as soon as possible. With 
regard to the personal jurisdiction of the ICC, the same view with the ICTY and the ICTR 
was deployed by the international community and according to this, the ICC has 
jurisdiction only over natural persons, not over legal entities and States. 
In respect to the issue of procedural laws to be applied by an international criminal 
court, the procedural law being applied by the ad hoc tribunals should be seen as mainly 
reflecting the principles of international human rights law and as in compliance with the 
human rights instruments such as the ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR that all provide a fair trial 
for the accused persons. The impact of the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes on the ICC 
Statute can be again examined in this regard. 
Although, there were lots of issues making the establishment of an international 
criminal court difficult, the international community was able to establish the ICC by 
conclusion of a treaty, the Statute of the ICC, which was the most appropriate way to 
establish an international organisation in Rome in 1998. This was perhaps one of the major 
achievements of the international community in the twentieth century for the following 
reasons: Firstly, the ICC fulfils one of the most serious defects to enforce the rules of law 
which is the lack of an international criminal court to try individuals responsible for 
violations of international humanitarian law. Secondly, by enforcing individual criminal 
responsibility through the ICC, the concept of immunity and its result impunity will not be 
argued as a defence before the ICC or national courts. Finally, next generations will not 
hopefully face with the conflicts, and ad hoc tribunals, which are generally regarded as 




THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW (SUBJECT - MATTER JURISDICTION) OF THE AD 
HOC TRIBUNALS: THEIR PRACTICE AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND IMPACT ON THE ICC 
CHAPTER 3 
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the fact that international humanitarian law and international human rights law are 
interrelated in protecting the rights of individuals, there are significant differences between 
two branches of international law with regard to being a subject of international law. 
International humanitarian law originated in customary law and sought to implement 
individual criminal responsibility through either domestic courts or international institutions 
(tribunals or courts, ad hoc or permanent). Human rights law is a recent category of 
international law and regulates the relations between States and individuals those who are 
seeking protection of their rights, primarily against States. ' As will be explained below, 
although the purpose of international humanitarian law is to enforce individual criminal 
responsibility, this concept could not be truly implemented by the international community 
until recent times, and States remain internationally responsible since they are principal 
subject of international law. However, during the twentieth century the international 
community has witnessed two World Wars and a number of international or non- 
international armed conflicts around the world. These events resulted in the notion that 
individual criminal responsibility should be enforceable by international and national courts 
or tribunals in order to deter future crimes and to prevent future conflicts. The 
establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter as a measure to protect international peace and security, and the practice of 
these ad hoc tribunals are the latest examples proving that individual criminal responsibility 
'For the differences and similarities between international human rights and international humanitarian 
law, see Vinuesa, K, E., "Interface, Correspondence and Convergence of Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law", (1998) 1 YIHL p. 69. 
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is enforceable at the international level for crimes which are all concern to the international 
community. Moreover, the adoption of the Statute of the ICC by a large number of States 
indicated that the principle of individual criminal responsibility and its implementation is 
one of the most important desire of the international community to achieve a universal 
justice for human beings. 
In this part of the study, before examining the substantive law of the ad hoc 
tribunals, their practice and contribution to international humanitarian law, the concept of 
individual criminal responsibility will be explained since it lies at the centre of enforcement 
of international humanitarian law rules. The application of this principle by the ICTY and 
the ICTR, and in this sense their contribution to international humanitarian law and possible 
effect on the ICC and the regulation of the ICC Statute will be examined and analysed. 
3.2. THE CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The concept of attribution of criminal responsibility to individuals is not a completely new 
issue in international law. Some international crimes such as piracy, slavery (slave trading 
and slave trafficking) were regulated in 1800's and these regulations today became a part of 
customary international law, jus cogens in nature. 2 However, the regulations of armed 
conflicts as a concept just goes back to the last part of the nineteenth and the beginning of 
twentieth century3 which created the base for international humanitarian law that known as 
the Law of The Hague which was the result of diplomatic conferences held in 1899 and 
1907.4 The main importance of the Hague Law in respect to humanitarian law was the 
codification of customary law rules with regard to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 3 
and after this time the notion of violations of laws or customs of war emerged in the 
ZBassiouni, M., C., Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, Dordrecht, Boston, London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1992), pp. 193-196. 
3For historical background on the laws of war and examples on war crimes trials, see Keen, M., H., The 
Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages, London: Routledge & Kean Paul, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, (1965).; Sunga, L., S., Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights 
Violations, Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1992), p. 18. 
'The text is available in D. Schindler and J. Toman (eds. ), The Laws of Armed Conflicts A Collection of 
Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents, Sijthoff& Noordhoff, (1981), pp. 57-92. 
5See supra Chap. 2, pp. 49-50. 
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international scene and today it constitutes one of the main parts of war crimes. 6 On the 
other hand, Hague Conventions and Regulations provided for State responsibility rather 
than individual criminal responsibility for the breaches of the laws and customs of war. 7 
For the first time at the international level, the enforcement of individual criminal 
responsibility under a treaty was provided in the Treaty of Versailles signed by Germany on 
26 June 1919 that established the individual criminal responsibility of the ex-German 
emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, under Article 227 of that Treaty for the supreme offence 
against peace. Article 228 provided the prosecution of German military personnel who 
committed war crimes. 8 It was decided to implement the provisions of the Treaty by 
establishing a war crimes tribunal, 9 but it proved impossible to procede since Germany did 
not surrender its own nationals and the Allies ultimately agreed to allow Germany to 
prosecute its own citizens before its national court in Leipzig. 10 The trials held in Leipzig 
between on 23 May and 16 July 1921 can be regarded as a failure and it demonstrated the 
difficulty for the implementation of individual criminal responsibility through nationals 
courts, but in terms of setting up the principle that individuals committed war crimes should 
be responsible and should not go unpunished marked an important place in the history of 
war crimes trials. " 
One of the most significant developments, after the First World War, in the context 
of the emergence of the principal of individual criminal responsibility probably was the 
1919 Report of the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and 
Enforcement of Penalties for Violations of the Laws and Customs of War. 12 The 
significance of this Report lies on providing a list of international crimes that constitutes 
violations of the laws and customs of war13 and individual criminal responsibility. '4 
6For the explanation of violations of laws or customs of war and the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR see 
infra Chap. 4, pp. 206-224. 
7Sunga, p. 21. 
8Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles states: The German Government recognises the right of the Allied 
and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in 
violation of the laws and customs of war. 
9Art. 229 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
10Bassiouni, pp. 199-200.; Marquardt, P., D., "Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an 
International Criminal Court", (1995) 33 Col. J. Trans. 'l L. pp. 79-80. 
"Bassiouni, p. 202. 
12For the Report of the Commission see, Ferencz, B., B., An International Criminal Court -A Step Toward 
World Peace, A Documentary History and Analysis, Vol. I, London, Rome, New York: Ocean 
Publications (1980), pp. 169-192.; and also available in (192) 14 AJIL pp. 95-154. 
'The Commission in its Report under Chapter II (Violations of the Laws and Customs of War) listed 32 
different types of international crimes. Some of them are: murders and massacres, systematic terrorism, 
putting hostages to death, torture of civilians, deliberate starvation of civilians, rape, abduction of girls and 
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However, whatever the achievements of the international community prior to the 
Nuremberg trials are, international responsibility was predominantly fixed on States not on 
individuals, since States are the first and main subject of international law. For this reason, 
the turning point for the development of the principal of individual criminal responsibility 
was the view taken by the international community to establish the International Military 
Tribunals at Nuremberg and at Tokyo in order to enforce personal responsibility for war 
crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity after the Second World War. " 
The practice of these tribunals clearly indicated that any individual, regardless of his rank 
should be responsible for war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity and 
that individual responsibility is enforceable at the international level. 16 Under this guideline, 
the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC were able to be established by the international 
community. 
Despite the fact that the application of the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility and substantive law at this point by the International Military Tribunals 
creates an important example in international humanitarian law, it was not sufficient for the 
international comunity's needs in this context. On this ground, new codification movements 
with regard to the customary international law and conventional law rules regulating armed 
conflicts (international or non-international) in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and the Additional Protocols (I and II) of 1977, some other international conventions such 
as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and 
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment of 1984 were introduced to the international community. Parallel to these 
developments, customary international and conventional law rules have evolved even since 
the adoption of these conventions, in addition to the judgements of the Nuremberg and 
women for the purpose of enforced prostitution, deportation of civilians, internment of civilians under 
inhuman conditions, pillage, confiscation of property, imposition of collective penalties, wanton 
devastation and destruction of property, deliberate bombardment of undefended places, wanton destruction 
of religious, charitable, educational, and historic buildings and monuments etc. 
The Commission in its Report under Chapter III (Personal Responsibility) concluded that: "All persons 
belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, 
including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the 
laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution". 
'SRatner, S., R., and Abrams, J., S., Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law 
Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1997), p. 6.; For the impact of the Nuremberg 
trials on the protection of individuals, see pp. 6-7. 
"Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 
(1994), par. 171. (Hereinafter Final Report for Rwanda).; Marquardt, pp. 82-83. 
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Tokyo Tribunals and principles derived from these judgements and from the Nuremberg 
Charter. " In compliance with this, the concept of individual criminal responsibility has also 
evolved. In this regard its application by the ICTY and the ICTR should be seen as having 
an historical place in international humanitarian law since they were first truly established 
international criminal tribunals in contrast to the argument of the International Military 
Tribunals being a victor's justice. 18 Undoubtedly, their practice will have a significant 
impact on the ICC when it comes in operation. 
Due to the significance of the principal of individual criminal responsibility for the 
effective enforcement of international humanitarian law, in compliance with the structure of 
the study, the emergence of this principle will be briefly and separately explained for each 
category of international crime. Some other international human rights and humanitarian 
law instruments will also be indicated below, before the examination of the practice of the 
ICTY and the ICTR and their contribution to international humanitarian law and impact on 
the ICC in this regard. 
3.2.1. War Crimes'9 
In international humanitarian law, war crimes is divided into two principal categories: 
"grave breaches" and "violations of the laws or customs of war". Both of them are mainly 
regarded as regulating international armed conflicts. As will be examined later, although to 
protect human rights, the nature of the conflict whether international or non-international is 
not important any more, the law applicable to non-international armed conflicts is different 
from the law applicable to the international one. 20 
3.2.1.1. The Grave Breaches System 
"The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution as Affirmation of the Principles of 
International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946. UNGA Res. 95 (I) (11 
December 1946).; and also in 1950 the International Law Commission prepared a report called Principles 
of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgement of the 
Tribunal, (hereinafter the Nuremberg Principles), available in Schindler and Toman (eds. ), pp. 835-836. 
''See supra Chap. 1, note 6. 
19See infra Chap. 4. 
20For the explanation see infra Chap. 4, pp. 153-160. 
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The 1949 Geneva Conventions21 were one of the most important results of the Second 
World War as regards the protection of victims of war and represented a major step 
towards the codification of the law of armed conflicts. Additional Protocols (I and II) of 
1977 followed this development. 22 
Common Articles 49 of the First Geneva Convention, 50 of the Second Geneva 
Convention, 129 of the Third Geneva Convention and 146 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention are different from all other breaches of the Conventions since they place an 
obligation on the High Contracting Parties to legislate and prosecute "grave breaches" of 
the Conventions. 23 As will be examined in detail later, the important point in this respect is 
to indicate the regulation of individual criminal responsibility under this new system. 
The Geneva Conventions do not place any direct obligations on individuals but 
States are obliged to enact necessary legislation and provide prosecution for grave 
breaches. 24 However, when the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions are 
examined, it can be clearly seen that although in the Conventions the phrase "war crimes" is 
not used in relation to the acts defined as grave breaches, those acts constitute war crimes 
and in consequence individuals are fully responsible for the breaches of the laws of war. 25 
These acts are defined in the Geneva Conventions as involving any of the following acts: 
"wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully 
21The four Conventions were signed at Geneva on 12 August 1949: Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 UNTS 31 (First Geneva Convention).; 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, 75 UNTS 85 (Second Geneva Convention).; Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 135, (Third Geneva Convention).; Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287 (Fourth Geneva Convention). 
22For the explanation, see infra Chap. 4, p. 132.; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (8 June 1977) 
(Protocol 1), (1977) 16 ILM 1391.; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), (8 June 1977), 
1977) 16 ILM 1442. 
3Article 49 of the first Geneva Convention provides: 
"The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal 
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present 
Convention defined in the following Article. 
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, 
or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their 
nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own 
legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such 
High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case..... ". Articles 50,129 and 146 of the Second, Third 
and Fourth Geneva Convention have the same provisions (respectively). 
24Gross, 0., "The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia", (1995) 16 
Mich. J. Int'l L. p. 793. 
25Gross, p. 793. 
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causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly". 26 Under the modem concept of international humanitarian law, there is no doubt 
that the grave breaches system constitutes a part of war crimes and whoever commits such 
acts are individually criminally responsible. Moreover, it can be concluded that the grave 
breaches system, both as a part of war crimes and also as a part of customary international 
law, has reached the level of jus cogens and the obligation to prosecute and punish 
individuals responsible is an obligatio erga omnes in nature. 27 
The recent practice of the international community with regard to the grave 
breaches system and individual criminal responsibility in this regard supports this view. 
Article 2 of the Statute of the ICTY, under the heading of "Grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949" (which literally contains the same acts), and its practice on this point 
and Article 8 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute (again under the same heading as in the ICTY 
Statute) are recent examples proving this fact. Lastly, in relation to the obligations 
imposed on States in the Geneva Conventions, it can be said that at the time of the 
Conventions were adopted, there was no international criminal court and the enforcement 
of individual criminal responsibility could have been possible only through national courts 
at that time, but the international community now has two ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals and one international criminal court. For this reason, the provisions of the 
Conventions should be interpreted by taking into account of these facts in order to 
understand why the Geneva Conventions did not place any direct obligation on individuals. 
3.2.1.2. Violations of the Laws or Customs of War 
The other part of war crimes are the so called "violations of the laws or customs of war" 
which derives from the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, 28 from the Nuremberg Charter" and from the 
WArt. 50 of the First Geneva Convention.; Art. 51 of the Second Geneva Convention.; Art. 130 of the Third 
Geneva Convention.; Art. 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.; and Art. 85 of the Protocol I of 1977. 
27Bassiouni, M., C., "International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes", (1996) 59 LCP pp. 
68,72.; Sunga, pp. 52-53.; For a recent and detailed study on the concept of erga omnes, see Ragazzi, M., 
The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1997). In particular, for 
the relationship between the concept of jus cogens and the concept of erga omnes, see pp. 189-210. 
28Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Hague Convention No. IV 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, (18 October 1907), (hereinafter Regulations), in 
Schindler and Toman (eds. ), pp. 69-87. 
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judgements of the International Military Tribunals. 30 Some of the acts constituting 
violations of the laws or customs of war can be indicated as follows and any individual 
engaged in any of the following acts is fully responsible in international humanitarian law: 
using poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering '3 
' the 
wanton destruction or devastation of cities, towns or villages not justified by military 
necessity, 32 attack, or bombardment of undefended towns, villages, dwellings or buildings, 33 
the seizure of or destruction or damage to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, 
education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science34 and the 
plunder of public or private property. 35 In addition to these acts, which are regarded as 
mainly governing the means and methods of warfare, violations of Common Article 3 to the 
Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions should 
also be noted as a part of the concept of violations of the laws or customs of war. 36 These 
acts today in international humanitarian law have reached the level of jus cogens and 
obligations of States to prosecute, punish or extradite the perpetrators is an obligatio erga 
omnes 37 In accordance with the development of international humanitarian law, whoever 
commits violations of the laws or customs of war (a part of war crimes) is fully responsible 
for his or her acts. 38 The Statutes of the ICTY and the ICC are the latest legal documents 
proving that the principle of individual criminal responsibility for the mentioned acts is a 
part of Jus cogens norm. 39 
3.2.2. The Crime of Genocide40 
"Art. 6 (b) of the Nuremberg Charter. 
30For the agreements establishing these tribunals see supra Chap.!, note 1. 
31Regulation 23 (a) and (e).; Art. 3 (a) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 8 (2) (b) (xvii-xx) of the ICC Statute. 
32 Regulation 23 (g).; art. 6 (b) of the Nuremberg Charter.; Art. 3 (b) of the ICTY Statute. 
"Regulation 25.; Art. 3 (c) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 8 (2) (b) (v) of the ICC Statute. 
34Regulation 56.; Art. 3 (d) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 8 (2) (b) (ix) Art. 8 (2) (e) (iv) of the ICC Statute. 
33Art. 6 (b) of the Nuremberg Charter.; Art. 3 (e) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 8 (2) (b) (xvi) and 8 (2) (e) (v) 
of the ICC Statute. 
In this regard the practice of the ad hoc tribunals has played a central role to achieve this point in 
international humanitarian law. The inclusion of these acts in the ICC Statute should be seen as one of the 
reflections of this role. In this context, see infra Chap. 4, pp. 217-224. 
37Bassiouni, "International Crimes... ", pp. 68,72.; Of course, not all provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
and the 1977 Additional Protocols to thereoto have reached such a level in international humanitarian law. 
38Morris, M., H., "International Guidelines Against Impunity: Facilitating Accountability", (1996) 59 LCP 
p. 29.; For the differences of these two categories of war crimes see infra Chap. 4, p. 131. 
39Arts. 6-7 of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 25 of the ICC Statute. 
40See infra Chap. 5. 
86 
Despite the fact that the international community has been faced with a number of acts of 
genocide, as a concept the crime of genocide is really a new and well - developed category 
of international crime resulting from the atrocities of the Second World War. 41 Although 
the term "genocide" was not used in the Nuremberg Charter and the Judgements of the 
Tribunal, many acts defined as war crimes or crimes against humanity in Article 6 (b and c) 
of the Nuremberg Charter definitely qualify the crime of genocide42 which was defined and 
codified as reflecting the customary international law rule in the 1948 Genocide 
Convention. 43 According to the Genocide Convention any of the following acts constitutes 
the crime of genocide when committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group: killing members of the group, causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, 
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group. 44 This Article, without any change, has taken its 
place in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and of the ICC. 43 As the Genocide Convention 
provides individual criminally responsible for the responsible rulers, public officials, or 
private individuals, 46 under the latest developments and the practice of international 
humanitarian law, any individual regardless of his official position or rank (military or 
civilian) taking part in these acts is fully responsible for that47 and there can be no doubt 
that the crime of genocide is a new separate category of international crime which has 
reached the level of jus cogens and States' obligation on prosecuting, punishing or 
extraditing the perpetrators of this crime, in other words, enforcing individual criminal 
responsibility is an obligatio erga omnes48 
4'Ratner and Abrams, p. 24. 
'121bid. p. 25.; Sunga, p. 65. 
"Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948,78 UNTS 
277. 
44Art. 2 of the Genocide Convention. 
43Art. 4 of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 2 of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 6 of the ICC Statute. 
MArt. 4 of the Genocide Convention. 
Morris, p. 29.; Arts. 5-6 of the ICTR Statute.; Arts. 6-7 of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 25 of the ICC Statute. 
48Bassiouni, "International Crimes... ", pp. 68,72.; Morris, p. 29.; Sunga, p. 73.; Scharf, M., "The Letter of 
Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes", (1996) 59 LCP 
pp. 43,44-45.; Ragazzi, pp. 92-104.; and also see the cases: Reservations to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Advisory Opinion), (1951) ICJ Reports 15 at 23.; 
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Judgement, (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), (11 July 1996), (1996) 
ICJ Rep. p. 595, par. 13. 
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3.2.3. Crimes Against Humanity49 
One of the most important outcome of the Second World War was the introduction of the 
concept of crimes against humanity and the enforcement of individual criminal 
responsibility for this category of crimes to the international community through the 
Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals30 and Control Council Law No. 10 for 
Germany, 5' since the categories of war crimes and crimes against peace were not enough to 
cover some offences which either occurred in peace time or committed against the State's 
own citizens. 52 According to the Nuremberg Charter, the following acts constitute crimes 
against humanity and individuals taking part in the commission of these crimes will be 
responsible: "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated". 53 In the Nuremberg practice, for the application of crimes 
against humanity, the Tribunal did not interpret this as a separate category of crime. Instead 
it looked for a connection with war crimes or crimes against peace to be a punishable 
offence. 54 
Since the Nuremberg Trials, the notion of crimes against humanity has evolved by 
means of some practice of the national courts. " However, in this context, the most 
important developments are the adoption of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and of the 
ICCS6 giving power to these institutions to try individuals committed crimes against 
humanity under the subject-matter jurisdiction of each international organ. In compliance 
with the development of international humanitarian law, the international community has 
49See infra Chap. 6. 
50 Art. 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter.; Art. 5 (c) of the Tokyo Charter. 
5'Art. 2 (1) (c) of the CCL No. 10. 
s2Sunga, pp. 44,46-47. 
53 Art. (c) of the Nuremberg Charter.; Article 5 (c) of the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal is identical to the 
Nuremberg one. 
54Sunga, p. 46. 
"The most significant example in this sense is the Eichmann Case. In this context, see infra Chap. 6, p. 
279 note 21. 
MArt. 5 of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 3 of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 7 of the ICC Statute. Each Statute is slightly 
different from each other, although the legal base is the same as the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals' 
Charters and CCL No. 10. 
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found opportunity to witness the application of crimes against humanity by the established 
ad hoc tribunals. " Although, in the Nuremberg Trials, the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility was being argued, today there is no place to assess this contention on the 
ground that as a concept crimes against humanity has become a separate category of 
international crimes that has reached the level ofjus cogens and States' duty to prosecute, 
punish or extradite the individuals responsible for crimes against humanity is an obligatio 
erga omnes in nature. 58 
3.2.4. The Crime of Aggression (Crimes Against Peace) 
The concept of crimes against peace (the crime of aggression) and the enforcement of 
individual criminal responsibility for that were introduced to the international community by 
Article 6 (a) of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal39 which states that: "crimes against 
peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war 
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy of the accomplishment of any of the foregoing". 
At the time of the drafting the Nuremberg Tribunal Charter, launching of an 
aggressive war was a new category of international crime and the application of the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility with regard to this crime was not clear60 on 
the ground that it was not covered by the definition of war crimes or any other international 
crimes. 61 Since the Nuremberg Trials, international humanitarian law has evolved and the 
notion of crimes against peace or the crime of aggression has developed in accordance with 
the provisions of the United Nations Charter, in particular, Articles 2 (4) , 39 and 
51 are 
related to the aggression, and the resolutions (declaring that a war of aggression is a crime 
against the peace and brings international responsibility) of the United Nations General 
Assembly. 62 
57For the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and their contribution to international humanitarian law and 
possible impact on the ICC with regard to crimes against humanity, see infra Chap. 6, pp. 280-299. 
mBassiouni, "International Crimes.... ", pp. 68,72.; Morris, p. 29. 
59Sunga, p. 36. 
60Wright, Q., "The Law of the Nuremberg Triar, (1947) 41 AJIL pp. 62-67. 
61Sunga, p. 36. 
62UNGA Res. (1970) 2625 (xxv) (Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations), and 
UNGA Res. (1974) 3314 (Definition of Aggression). 
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Despite the fact that there is a major difficulty in defining the crime of aggression, 63 
it was applied by the Nuremberg Tribunal and the international community has a guideline 
in this regard. For these reasons, its non-inclusion, in particular in the Statute of the ICTY 
is unfortunate and inconsistent with the development of international humanitarian and 
human rights law. This is because the crime of aggression is the source of or mother of 
other international crimes. Moreover, its exclusion from the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals 
brings some doubts into the minds that international politics or relations still prevail the 
international law practice by way of giving immunity and its consequense impunity to 
persons who are responsible for the commission of this crime. However, the ICC Statute 
gives power (with an exception)" to the ICC to try individuals who are responsible for the 
crime of aggression. 65 This regulation clearly indicates that under international humanitarian 
law, the crime of aggression has definitely become an independent category of international 
crimes that has reached the level of jus cogens and States' duty to prosecute, punish or 
extradite individuals responsible for this crime, in other words, the enforcement of 
individual criminal responsibility in this respect is an obligatio erga omnes in nature. 66 
3.2.5. Other International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Instruments 
In terms of implementing the principle of individual criminal responsibility at the 
international level some other international humanitarian and human rights law instruments 
have a special place. Some of them can be indicated as follows: The Convention on the 
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 67 
The Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 6" The 
63For the definition of the crime of aggression ibid., and also see supra Chap. 2, notes 26-29 and 
accompanying text. 
64Art. 5 (2) of the ICC Statute. 
65Art 5 (1) of the ICC Statute. 
66Bassiouni, "International Crimes... ", pp. 68,72.; Ragazzi, pp. 74-91. 
"'The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity, (26 November 1968), 754 UNTS 73, reprinted in (1969) 8 ILM 68. Article 2 provides: 
"Convention shall apply to representatives of the state authority and private individuals... ". 
MThe Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, (30 November 1973), 
reprinted in (1974) 13 ILM 50.; Article 3 states that: "Individual criminal responsibility shall apply ... to individuals, members of organizations and institutions and representatives of the State". As is well-known, 
although this Convention was adopted for the events of South Africa, the Convention does not mention the 
State of South Africa, and it was drafted in general terms as to be applicable to other cases. (Sunga, p. 76).; 
The recent development in relation to this concept is the inclusion of the crime of apartheid as a crime 
against humanity in the Statute of the ICC. See Art. 7 (1) (j) and 7 (2) (h) of the ICC Statute. 
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Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment69 and the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 70 
In addition to providing individual criminal responsibility, those conventions 
together with other international human rights instruments such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights7l and the American Convention on Human Rightsn play a 
central role for facilitating the work of the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the definition of 
crimes. In the following Chapters, under the substantive law of the ad hoc tribunals, this 
concept and its importance will be examined in detail. 
3.3. THE PRACTICE OF THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND THEIR 
CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON THE ICC 
Although the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and its Judgement can be regarded as the 
most authoritative legal source for the enforcement of individual criminal responsibility at 
the international level, they cannot be accepted as truly established precedents for the 
following reasons: The election of judges of the Nuremberg Tribunal, trial proceedings (in 
particular, there was no appeal), and the application of the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility were one sided, in other words, it was the judgement enforced by the Allied 
Powers on the Axis countries. 73 However, the Judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal and 
other post Second World War war crimes trials may nevertheless provide guidance for the 
ad hoc tribunals. On this background, the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR by the 
UN Security Council on behalf of the international community, the election of judges from 
69 he Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (10 
December 1984), (1985) 24 ILM 535.; (1984) 23 ILM 1027. Article 2 (3) of the Convention provides 
individual criminal responsibility as follows: "An order from a superior officer or a public authority may 
not be invoked as a justification of torture". This Article is similar to Article 8 of the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal which states that "[t]he fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his 
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility". The significance of the Convention 
lies on providing a "general international recognition that rules extending international responsibility to 
individuals are required to suppress torture". (Sunga, p. 86). 
70ILC's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and the Security of Mankind of 1996, in Articles 2 (1) and 
3, provide individual responsibility, respectively, as follows: "A crime against the peace and security of 
mankind entails individual responsibility", "An individual who is responsible for a crime against the peace 
and security of mankind shall be liable to punishment". 
"European Convention on Human Rights (1950), 213 LINTS 221. 
72American Convention on Human Rights (1969), 1144 LINTS 123.; (1970) 9 ILM 673.; (1971) 65 AJIL 
679. 
73See supra Chap. 2, p. 52. 
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neutral countries (from all over the world), trial proceedings (recognising the rights of 
accused to have a fair trial together with appeal stage) made these ad hoc tribunals the 
strongest authority for rightly implementing the concept of individual criminal responsibility 
in international law. For these reasons, the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR plays a 
crucial role for the interpretation and application of the principle and it will also affect the 
operation of the ICC. 
According to Article 5 and Article 6 of the Statutes of the ICTR and the ICTY 
(respectively) the personal jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals is limited to natural persons. 
This is in compliance with the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal; 74 with a number of 
resolutions of the Security Council affirming that persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law are individually responsible for them; 75 with the Report of 
the Secretary - General; 
76 and also perhaps most importantly, it is consistent with the 
personal jurisdiction of the ICC77 which reflects the highest level of consensus which the 
international community reached in international humanitarian law. 
Unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal which was seeking for the nationality of the 
accused78 to hold individuals criminally responsible for the crimes, the jurisdiction of the 
ICTY and the ICTR gives power to ad hoc tribunals to try any individual, irrespective of 
their nationality, charged with the crimes enumerated in the Statutes of the Tribunals. The 
regulation of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals with regard to being unlimited character 
for personal jurisdiction reflects the development of international humanitarian law and is in 
compliance with the principle of equality of justice and the purpose of the establishment of 
74Article 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal states that: "... the power to try and punish persons 
who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries.... " (emphasis added). 
75SC Res. 764 (1992) (13 July 1992).; SC Res. 771 (1992) (13 August 1992).; SC Res. 808 (1993) (22 
February 1993).; SC Res. 827 (1993) (25 May 1993).; SC Res. 935 (1994) (1 July 1994).; SC Res. 955 
(1994) (8 November 1994). 
76Report of the Secretary - General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) 
(hereinafter Secretary- General's Report). "[T]he International Tribunal shall be established for the 
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law... the ordinary 
meaning of the term "persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law" would 
be natural persons to the exclusion of judicial person". (Secretary-General's Report, par. 50. ). 
"Article 25 (1) of the ICC Statute provides that: "The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural 
persons.... ". 
78Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter states: "... persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis 
countries.... ". 
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the ICTY and the ICTR79 ("to do justice, to deter further crimes, and to contribute to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace"). 80 
On the other hand, while the Nuremberg Charter recognised the concept of 
individual criminal responsibility based on membership of a group or organisation -in other 
words group criminal responsibility81- for the first time in international law level- the 
Statutes of ad hoc tribunals (and also the Statute of the ICC) do not include such a 
provision, on the ground that imposing criminal responsibility on groups or organisations is 
not clear in international law82 and the criminal acts enumerated in the Statutes of the ad 
hoc tribunals are carried out by natural persons, not by association or organisation. 83 
However, this view should not be regarded as in compliance with the situations, in 
particular, which occurred in the former Yugoslavia in where a great deal of crimes were 
carried out by paramilitary groups84 that encouraged their members to commit atrocities 
and made the conflicts or events expand to the civilians. Moreover, it does not reflect the 
customary international law as far as the practice of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the 
Judgement of this Tribunal that are creating the main guidance for the ICTY and the ICTR 
are concerned. For these reasons, the Statute of the ICTY (also the Statute of the ICTR 
and of the ICC) should have included such a provision similar to the Nuremberg Charter 
establishing individual criminal responsibility relying on membership in a criminal group or 
organisation as long as the person know the criminal purpose or acts of the organisation. In 
the former Yugoslavia case there is no doubt that paramilitary groups fall within this 
definition. Despite this ommission in the Statute of the ICTY, in practice, at least the ICTY 
79Morris, V., and Scharf, M., P., An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, A Documentary History and Analysis, Vol. I, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational 
Publishers, (1995), pp. 90-91. 
80See supra Chap. 1, p. 26, note 109. 
$'Morris and Scharf, p. 94.; Morris, V., and Scharf, M., P., The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Vol. I, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, (1998), (hereinafter the 
ICTR), pp.. 268-269.; Ratner and Abrams, pp. 14-15.; Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter provides: "to try 
and punish persons... whether as individuals or as members of organizations... ", Article 9 of the 
Nuremberg Charter provides: "... any individual member of a group or organization the Tribunal may 
declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or 
organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization". 
82Ratner and Abrams, p. 15. 
83Secretary-General 's Report, par. 51. 
84According to the Final Report of the Commission of Experts, there were 45 reported special forces 
(paramilitary groups) "which usually operate under the command of a named individual and apparently 
with substantial autonomy... ". (Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), par. 121). Among these paramilitary groups, especially two of 
them, Arkan's "Tigers" and e e1j's "White Eagles" (also referred to as "Chetniks" committed some of the 
worst violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. (Final Report, par. 121). 
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should regard being a member of criminal organisation (paramilitary group) and taking part 
in criminal acts of this organisation as an aggravating factor while deciding how long the 
accused will serve imprisonment. By means of this application, one of the reality of 
international humanitarian law may not become ignored or avoided. 
Having briefly examined the concept of personal jurisdiction of the ICTY and the 
ICTR, the following section will consider the principle of individual criminal responsibility 
and the extent to which an individual can be held criminally responsible in the light of the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals. 
3.3.1. Individual Criminal Responsibility Under Article 7 (1) of the ICTY Statute and 
Article 6 (1) of the ICTR Statute 
Article 7 (1) of the ICTY Statute and Article 6 (1) of the ICTR Statute provide that: "A 
person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime ... shall be individually responsible". 
At first glance, it can be seen that these Articles reflect a broad approach to the 
occasions in which an individual can be held criminally responsible for his/her participation 
in the commission of an offence. The purpose of this type of regulation is to ensure that all 
those who take part in the planning, preparation or execution of serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, in other words, all those who contribute to the commission 
of the violation are individually responsible. " More clearly, under Articles 7 (1) and 6 (1) 
of the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes, the principle of individual criminal responsibility is not 
only just for the persons who directly committed the crime (as principal), but also for the 
persons who facilitated the commission of the offence in a way indicated in the mentioned 
Articles (as participant). 
As indicated above, the concept of individual criminal responsibility for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law (in particular, responsibility for war crimes, 
genocide, crime against humanity and the crime of aggression) has reached the level of jus 
cogens. For the persons who directly committed the offence (as a principal) the rule is clear 
enough in the customary international and conventional law rules, but for the other persons 
who facilitated the commission of the crime, the principle of individual criminal 
85Secretary-General's Report, par. 54.; Morris and Scharf, p. 93.; Morris and Scharf, The ICTR, p. 233. 
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responsibility and its application is more difficult: what is the degree of participation to be 
held criminally responsible? In this regard, as will be mentioned below, the Nuremberg and 
post-Second World War war crimes trials failed to reach a specific criterion, although 
instructive examples are available. For this reason, it is important to examine the application 
of the principle of individual criminal responsibility under Articles 7 (1) of the ICTY and 6 
(1) of the ICTR Statutes in order to draw the line for the scope of individual responsibility 
and also for setting up general criteria making clear the degree of participation to be 
considered as individually responsible in international humanitarian law. 
3.3.1.1. The Elements of the Principle of Individual Criminal Responsibility 
The conditions of the principle of individual criminal responsibility under Article 7 (1) of 
the ICTY Statute were examined in the case of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic86 by the Trial 
Chamber of the ICTY. As indicated earlier, the notion that an individual who committed 
the offence can be held criminally responsible for violations of international humanitarian 
law was regulated in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters and applied by these International 
Military Tribunals. 97 In addition to the direct commission, the concept of individual criminal 
responsibility and accountability for assisting, aiding, abetting or in any way of participation 
in the commission of a crime has also become a part of international customary law rule. 88 
To reach this conclusion, the Trial Chamber rightly referred to conventional and customary 
law rules: Article 4 (1) of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment using the phrase "complicity or participation in 
torture", Article III of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of 
the Crime of Apartheid using the phrase "participate in, directly incite, or conspire in, abet, 
encourage or cooperate in the commission of the crime" were cited by the Chamber. 89 
86Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997), (hereinafter Tadic Case, Judgement). 
87See supra p. 82.; Art. 6 of the Nuremberg Charter.; Article 2 (2) of the CCL No. 10 also includes similar 
provision.; Trial Chamber in the Tadic Judgement, having indicated the developments after the First World 
War, in this sense, cited and accepted these provisions as a legal base for individual responsibility as a 
principal. See paras. 663-665. 
"Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 669. 
891bid par. 666.; Moreover, Article III of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 
recognises the culpability of individuals who take part in the following acts: conspiracy to commit 
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, complicity in 
genocide. For the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in relation to the establishment of individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of genocide, its significance and different aspects from the regulation of the 
ICC Statute, see infra Chap-5, pp. 261-270.; Article 2 of the ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace 
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The principle of criminal responsibility for those persons who participated in a crime 
was applied by the post-Second World War war crimes trials. In particular, two of these 
cases were referred by the Trial Chamber: 90 The Trial of Wagner and Six Others9' and the 
Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and 39 Others (The Dachau Concentration Camp Trial). 92 
Having indicated the customary international nature of the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility for participation, the Trial Chamber discussed in detail the elements 
of such responsibility in light of the Nuremberg war crimes trials (which failed to set up 
criteria in this context) and conventional law rules in order to reach a general criterion. 
According to the Chamber, two conditions have to meet at the same time for individual 
culpability: Firstly, "there is a requirement of intent, which involves awareness of the act of 
participation coupled with a conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating, 
ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime". 
Secondly, there is a requirement of "participation in that the conduct of the accused 
contributed to the commission of illegal act". 93 
3.3.1.1.1. The Mental Element (Mens Rea) 
According to the Trial Chamber in the Tadic Case, to hold an individual criminally 
responsible there must be an intent (mental element, mens rea), "which involves awareness 
of the act of participation coupled with a conscious decision to participate by planning, 
instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a 
crime". 94 To reach this conclusion, the Trial Chamber examined the Second World War war 
and Security of Mankind, uses almost the same phrases in this respect, some of them are: 
"order,... knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of such a 
crime, including providing the means for its commission... planning or conspiring... directly and publicly 
incite[ment]... ".; Article 25 of the ICC Statute also includes similar provisions. 
90Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 667-668. 
91 Trial of Robert Wagner, Gauleiter and Head of the Civil Government ofAlsace during the Occupation, 
and Six Others, (Permanent Military Tribunal at Strasbourg, 23 April-3 May 1946, and Court of Appeal, 
24 July 1946), (1948) III Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, (hereinafter Law Reports), p. 23. In this 
case complicity was the base for criminal responsibility. (pp. 40-42). 
The Dachau Concentration Camp Trial, Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-Nine Others, 
(General Military Government of the United States Zone, Dachau, Germany, 15 November - 13 December 
1945), (1949) XI Law Reports, p. 5. In this case, the phrases like acting in pursuance of a common design 
to commit acts, wilfully, deliberately and wrongfully aid, abet and participate in were used as a legal base 
for criminal responsibility. (p. 5). 
"Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 674. 94 Ibid. 
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crimes trials and cited some of them like the cases of Werner Rohde and Eight Others, 95 
the Trial of Joseph Altstotter and Others (Justice Case)96 and the Trial of Hans Alfuldisch 
and Six Others (the Mauthausen Concentration Camp Trial, Mauthausen Case) 97 in those 
of which for the element of intent, knowledge was accepted as sufficient to be held 
individually criminally responsible. 
3.3.1.1.2. The Physical Element (Actus Reus) 
The other requirement of individual criminal responsibility is the physical element (actus 
reus), which means that there must be a participation that contributed to the commission of 
the crime. In this context, the Trial Chamber discussed the concepts of direct contribution 
and the required extent of participation to be held criminally culpable in light of the war 
crimes trials. 98 In this sense, the participation must directly affect the commission of the 
crime when it is combined with the requirement of knowledge (intent). The notion of direct 
contribution should not be understood as requiring that the participation must be in the 
physical commission of the illegal acta' For example, the presence of a person at the scene 
of the crime'00 -providing that there is also mens rea- is enough to be regarded as 
individually culpable. The other example indicating the direct contribution to the 
commission of a crime can be found in the Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (Zyklon B 
Case). ' O' In this case the suppliers of poison gas were found guilty on the ground that they 
had knowledge that the gas was to be used for killing human beings and without the supply 
of gas, the killings would not have been possible in that manner. Thus the accused 
"Trial of Werner Rohde and Eight Others, (British Military Court, Wuppertal, Germany, 29 May-1 June 
1946), (1948) V Law Reports p. 54. 
96Trial of Joseph Altstotter and Others (The Justice Trial), (United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 17 
February -4 December 1947), (1948)VI Law Reports p. 1, at 88. 
In the Dachau Camp Case, related part of the Mauthausen Case was cited in (1949) Xl Law Reports 
P. 15. 
"Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 678-687. 
991bid. par. 679.; and also for the interpretation of this principle in the case of Furundzija, see infra pp. 
102-103. 
100Trial of Franz Schonfeld and Nine Others, (British Military Court, Essen, 11-26 June 1946), (1949) XI 
Law Reports p. 64, at 70.; "... presence alone is not sufficient if it is an ignorant or unwilling presence. 
However, if the presence can be shown or inferred, by circumstantial or other evidence, to be knowing and 
to have a direct and substantial effect on the commission of the illegal act, then it is sufficient on which to 
base a finding of participation and assign the criminal culpability that accompanies it". (Trial Chamber, 
Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 689). 
101 Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (the Zyklon B Case), (British Military Court, Hamburg, 1-8 March 
1946), (1947) 1 Law Reports p. 93, at 94,101. 
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participated directly in contributing to the commission of the act of mass extermination. '12 
With regard to the required extent of participation in other words, the amount of assistance 
to be held responsible for taking part in a crime needed to be interpreted by the Trial 
Chamber, since the post-Second World War war crimes trials did not set up specific 
criteria, but they can guide the ad hoc tribunals in providing examples. 10' In this respect, 
some cases like the Dachau Camp Case, 1 °4 the Mauthausen Case, '°5 the Trial of Otto 
Sandrock and Three Others (Almelo Case)106 and the case of Gustav Becker, Wilhelm 
Weber and 18 Others107 were cited by the Trial Chamber to indicate the required extent of 
participation to be held criminally culpable. '°8 
Lastly, in this context, one more point relating to the degree of assistance should be 
noted that is that the assistance must contribute directly and substantially effect on the 
commission of the illegal act. 109 
3.3.1.2. The Significance of the Tadic Judgement in International Humanitarian Law 
The significance or contribution of the Tadic Judgement in international humanitarian law 
and its possible impact on the ICC with regard to interpreting and applying the concept of 
102Trial Chamber in the Tadic Judgement referred to the Zyklon B Case as an example to explain the 
customary international nature of the concept of direct contribution in par. 680. 
103Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 681. 
104The Dachau Camp Case in which the accused was charged with acting in pursuance of a common design 
to participate in the acts in a form of encouraging, aiding, and abetting (in (1949) XI Law Reports p. 13). 
'°57he Mauthausen Concentration Camp Case, (General Military Government Court of the U. S. Zone, 
Dachau, Germany, 29 March - 13 May 1946), (1949) XI Law Reports p. 15. 106Trial of Otto Sandrock and Three Others (The Almelo Trial), (British Military Court for the Trial of War 
Criminals, Held at the Court House, Almelo, Holland, on 24-26 November 1945), (1947) I Law Reports 
p. 35. In this case, staying in the car to prevent any person from disturbing the perpetrators killing the 
victims, presence, knowledge and intent to assist were regarded as a degree of participation to be held 
criminally responsible (p. 43). 
107 Trial of Gustac Becker, Wilhelm Weber and 18 Others (Permanent Military Tribunal at Lyon, Concluded 
17th July 1947), (1948) VII Law Reports p. 67 at 70-71. In this case, complicity by means of having caused 
the arrest, detention and torture of innocent people by virtue of denunciation was accepted as an amount of 
assistance for the crimes committed by other perpetrators (p. 71). The importance of this case lies on the 
fact that to be criminally responsible for participation in a crime, even the presence may not be necessary, 
and the act of commission of the crime and the act facilitating or contributing to the commission may be 
geographically and temporarily distanced from each other (Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par 
687). 
108Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 682,684-685,687. 
1091bid par. 688. To reach this conclusion the Chamber accepted the ILC Draft Code as reflecting the 
customary nature of the Nuremberg war crimes trials. According to the ILC Draft Code "[aln individual 
shall be responsible for a crime ... if he knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, 
directly and 
substantially, in the commission of such a crime... ", (Art. 2 (3) (d) emphasis added). For the discussion of 
this regulation see infra pp. 102-103. 
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individual criminal responsibility for international crimes lies on the creation of specific 
criteria that includes the aforementioned elements of participation in a crime to be held 
individually responsible. This can be quoted as follows: "the accused [any individual] will 
be found criminally culpable for any conduct where it is determined that he knowingly 
participated in the commission of an offence that violated international humanitarian law 
and his participation directly and substantially affected the commission of that offence 
through supporting the actual commission before, during, or after the incident. He will also 
be responsible for all that naturally results from the commission of the act in question'. "o 
There is no doubt that this achievement creates a major step towards the development of 
international humanitarian law and also fulfils one major gap in international humanitarian 
law by virtue of providing specific criteria for establishing individual criminal responsibility 
since the post- Second World War war crimes trials failed to establish such criteria to hold 
individuals, those who contributed to the commission of the crime, criminally responsible. 
The practice of the ICTY with regard to establishing specific criteria to draw a line 
for individual criminal responsibility either as a perpetrator or as a participant in the Tadic 
Judgement has already taken its place as creating a precedent or guidance for the following 
cases of the International Tribunals. '11 By virtue of application or practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals, the scope of individual criminal responsibility has been becoming more clearer 
day after day. In this context, the case of Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzya'12 should be briefly 
indicated in order to prove that even the application by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in 
the Tadic Judgement may cause some misinterpretation or misunderstanding in the 
customary international law rules. 
3.3.1.3. The Concept of "Aiding", "Abetting" in International Humanitarian Law 
10Trial Chamber, Tadic Judgement, par. 692. 
"'Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic also known as "Pavo ", Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo also 
known as `Zenga", Case No.: IT-96-21-T, (16 November 1998), (hereinafter Celebici Camp Case, 
Judgement), par. 329.; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, Case No.: ICTR-96-4-T, (2 
September 1998), (hereinafter Akayesu Case, Judgement), par. 6.2 229-230.; Prosecutor v. Clement 
Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, (21 May 1999), (hereinafter 
Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement), par. 199.; Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Judgement, (25 
June 1999), (hereinafterAleksovski Case, Judgement), par. 60. 
12Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement, Case No.; IT-95-17/1-T10, (hereinafter Furundzija Case, 
Judgement), (10 December 1998). 
99 
Having decided that under Article 7 (1) of the Statute, the planning, ordering or instigating 
of rape or sexual assault or otherwise aiding and abetting in the perpetration are prohibited 
as well as the commission of these acts, 113 the Trial Chamber in the Furundzija Case dealt, 
in detail, with the definition or elements of "aiding, abetting" as indicated in Article 7 (1) of 
the ICTY Statute. 
Before examining the practice of the ICTY in the Furundzya Case and its 
contribution to international law, one issue relating to the drafting of the Statutes of ad hoc 
tribunals needs to be made clear. Article 6 (1) of the ICTR and 7 (1) of the ICTY Statutes 
provide for the criminal responsibility of a person who "... or otherwise aided and abetted 
in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime ... " 
(emphasis added). When literally 
interpreted the terms "aiding and abetting" may seem to be synonymous, although there is a 
big difference between these two concepts. Aiding indicates giving assistance to someone, 
while abetting may involve facilitating the commission of an act by being sympathetic 
thereto. 114 In other words, for example providing means for the commission of a crime can 
be considered as aiding, not abetting, similarly, moral encouragement e. g. being presence in 
the scene of the commission of a crime can be considered as abetting, but not aiding. The 
issue that "whether the individual criminal responsibility provided for Article 6 (1) is 
incurred only where there was aiding and abetting at the same time" first arose in the Jean- 
Paul Akayesu Case before the ICTR, and the Chamber rightly concluded that either aiding 
or abetting alone is sufficient to be held criminally responsible. " 3 As can easily be inferred 
from the examples already mentioned above, the opinion of the Trial Chamber of the ICTR 
and its interpretation reflect the customary international law rule on the ground that the 
latest two international instruments; the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, and the Statute of the ICC, both of them can be regarded as the most 
authoritative international legal documents constituting evidence of customary international 
law, reflecting, clarifying or crystallising them, do not use the terms "aiding and abetting" 
together, instead, these words are separated by a comma as follows: "aids, abets or 
otherwise assists ....... 
116 For these reasons, the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals should have 
been drafted as the 1996 Draft Code and the Statute of the ICC were drafted, or the 
113'Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, Judgement, par. 187. 
'"Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.2.242.243. 
1151bid 
116Art. 2 (3) (d) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code.; Art. 25 (3) (c) of the ICC Statute. 
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Statutes should have used the term "or" instead the term "and" between aiding and 
abetting. Despite the failure of the Statutes, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and their 
interpretation and application of the customary international law rules indicate the highest 
level that can be considered as beyond the literal meaning of their Constitutions. 
3.3.1.3.1. The Elements of "Aiding", "Abetting" 
Having been indicated this fact, now the importance of the Furundzya Case will be 
discussed in a way of underpinning some significant differences from the Tadic Judgement. 
The importance of this case in international humanitarian law lies on the examination of the 
nature or elements of aiding, abetting in relation to rape, sexual assault and torture. 
3.3.1.3.1.1. The Mental Element (Mens Rea) 
For the requirement of mens rea (mental element) in the context of aiding, abetting the 
crime, the Trial Chamber concluded that mere knowledge that assists the principal in the 
commission of the crime is sufficient and that is not necessary for the aider or abettor to 
share the mens rea of the perpetrator to be held criminally responsible under Article 7 (1) 
of the ICTY Statute. "7 As clearly understood from this interpretation, knowledge is 
different from the intent in the sense of positive intention to commit the crime. This slight 
but important distinction can be very important to establish individual criminal 
responsibility. Article 2 (3) (d) of the ILC's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind using the phrase "knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists... " 
(emphasis added) proves this fact. 118 However, in the Tadic Judgement, the terms "intent" 
and "knowledge" are used misleadingly as synonymous, '19 although both decisions reached 
the same standard. 120 Similarly, Article 30 of the ICC Statute uses these terms together as 
follows "intent and knowledge", but when Article 30 is carefully examined, it is understood 
that this regulation does not create any controversy in terms of reflecting customary 
117Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, Judgement, paras. 236,245.; To reach this conclusion the Trial 
Chamber referred to some cases including the Tadic Judgement, the Zyklon B and the Schonfeld cases. 
See paras. 237-241. 
118Trial Chamber in the Furundzja Case referred to the 1996 ILC Draft Code and accepted it as a legal 
base for its view, see paras. 242-243. 
""Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 675-677. 
120Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, Judgement, par. 247. 
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international law rules12' as long as Article 30 (2) (a) is interpreted as reflecting the mental 
element as intent, and Article 30 (2) (b) the phrase "that person means to cause that 
consequence", and Article 30 (3) are interpreted as demonstrating the mental element as 
knowledge. Although this way of interpretation is consistent with the customary 
international law practice, the way of drafting in Article 30 (1) by virtue of using the 
wording "intent and knowledge" together, instead of using a comma (, ) or the word "or" 
should be considered as unfortunate since it may cause misunderstanding, misleading or 
misinterpreting the Statute in a way of looking for these two concepts (may be different in 
some situations) has to meet at the same time to hold an individual criminally responsible. 
3.3.1.3.1.2. The Element of Actus Reus 
For the requirement of physical element (actus reus) of aiding, abetting a crime, the Trial 
Chamber held that "the actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law 
requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial 
effect on the perpetration of the crime". 122 This conclusion is not completely consistent 
with the decision held in the Tadic Judgement as specific criteria for the application of 
Article 7 (1) of the ICTY Statute for the following reasons: In the Tadic Judgement the 
phrase "directly and substantially" is used (may be under the effect of the 1996 ILC Draft 
Code regulation)'2' in explaining the nature of the participation or in determining the 
degree of assistance to be held criminally responsible. The Chamber in the Furundzya Case 
did not use the term "directly" on the basis that "the term "direct" [may qualify] the 
proximity of the assistance and the principal act to be misleading as it may imply that 
'Z'Article 30 of the ICC Statute (mental element) provides: 
"1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and 
knowledge. 
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: 
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; 
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will 
occur in the ordinary course events. 
3. For the purposes of this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. "Know" and "knowingly" shall be construed 
accordingly". 
'Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, Judgement, par. 235. 
' Article 2 (3) (d) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code states "knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly 
and substantially" (emphasis added). 
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assistance needs to be tangible, or to have a causal effect on the crime". 124 Similarly, the 
Statute of the ICC does not use the word "direct" in aiding or abetting the crime125 in order 
to include either physical forms or the form of moral support in aiding, abetting as rightly 
concluded by the Trial Chamber in the Furundzija Case. Although at first glance, both 
decisions may seem to be controversial, in fact they are not. This is because, the Trial 
Chamber in the Tadic Judgement held that "aiding and abetting includes all acts of 
assistance by words or acts that lend encouragement or supports126 that is entirely in 
compliance with the Furundzya Case. However, the view deployed by the Chamber in the 
latter case should be regarded as more convenient than the first one on the ground that this 
way of setting up criteria prevents future application of the concept of individual criminal 
responsibility by the ad hoc tribunal from misleading or misinterpreting the notion, and also 
is consistent with the ICC Statute reflecting the customary international law as the most 
authoritative instrument that the international community has reached. 
3.3.1.3.2. The Distinction Between the Concept of "Aiding", "Abetting" and Co- 
perpetration 
In addition to analysing the elements of aiding, abetting, one of the other important 
contribution of the FurundzUa Case to international humanitarian law can be seen in 
distinguishing the concepts of aiding, abetting from the case of co-perpetration consisting 
of a group of persons pursuing a common design to commit crimes. 127 The Trial Chamber, 
to indicate the difference between these two concepts, referred to the Dachau 
Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, Judgement, par. 232.; "... assistance need not be tangible. In addition, 
assistance need not constitute an indispensable element, that is, a conditio sine qua non for the acts of the 
principal". (par. 209).; Similarly, in the case of Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, the Trial Chamber of the 
ICTR found that the position of the Accused as a major facilitated the commission of crimes including rape 
and sexual violence in the way of aiding, abetting. "The Tribunal finds, under Article 6 (1) of its Statute, 
that the Accused aided and abetted the ... acts of sexual violence, by allowing them to take place on or near 
the premises.... by facilitating the commission of these acts through his words of encouragement in other 
acts of sexual violence, which, by virtue of his authority, sent a clear signal of official tolerance for sexual 
violence, without which these acts would not have taken place". (par. 7.7.141). 
Article 25 (3) (c) and (d) of the ICC Statute provides: "3. ... a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: ... (c) For the purpose 
of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its 
attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission; (d) In any other way contributes 
to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose.... "; Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, Judgement, paras. 231-232. 
Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 689. 
'27Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, Judgement, par. 210. 
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Concentration Camp Case'28 in which the legal base for the prosecution was that all 
accused who held some position in the hierarchy running the camp, had "acted in pursuance 
of a common design" to kill and mistreat prisoners, in other words to commit war 
crimes. '29 In this case, any degree of participation in the enterprise was regarded sufficient 
to be held criminally responsible. The same distinction was also made in the Statute of the 
ICC between participation in a common criminal plan or enterprise and aiding, abetting a 
crime. 130 By means of this regulation "two separate categories of liability for criminal 
participation appear to have crystallised in international law -co-perpetrators who 
participate in a joint criminal enterprise, on the one hand, and aiders and abettors, on the 
other. 131 
'28See supra note 104. 
'29Ibid 
10Article 25 (3) (d) of the ICC Statute states that a person who "contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of ... a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal 
purpose of the group ... (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime" 
shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime. 
Article 25 (3) (c) of the ICC Statute states that a person who "[f]or the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, 
including providing the means for its commission" shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime. 
In the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, the notion of common purpose (participating in a common criminal 
purpose) was examined, in detail, by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic Judgement in relation 
to the crime of murder. ( Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 
15 July 1999). The Appeals Chamber in its Judgement focused on the concept of acting in pursuance of a 
common purpose or design to commit a crime that consists of three different categories of the notion of 
common purpose; (a) "The first ... category 
is represented by cases where all co-defendants, acting pursuant 
to a common design, possess the same criminal intention", (paras. 196-201). (b) Concentration camp cases 
(paras. 202-203). (c) "The third category concerns cases involving a common design to pursue one course 
of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits an act which, while outside the common design, was 
nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common purpose". (paras. 204- 
219). Having examined all three different aspects of the concept of common purpose, the Appeals Chamber 
indicated the differences between acting in pursuance of a common purpose or design to commit a crime, 
and aiding or abetting a crime (par. 229). 
In the light of this fact, it can be concluded that the International Tribunal, by way of the practice of the 
Trial Chamber in the Furundzija Judgement and of the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Judgement, clarified 
one of the major important aspects of international humanitarian law, which is the concept of common 
purpose. The way adopted by the Appeals Chamber should be seen as making more clearer the differences 
between acting in pursuance of a common purpose or design to commit a crime, and aiding or abetting a 
crime than the Furundzija Judgement. More importantly, the view taken by the Appeals Chamber will 
create a precedential value for the ICC in its future work since the ICC Statute explicitly deploys the phrase 
"common purpose" as a legal ground for establishing individual criminal responsibility. 
'3mTrial Chamber, Furundzija Case, Judgement, par. 216.; For the application of these two separate 
categories of participation (as a perpetrator or co-perpetrator and as an aider and abettor) to torture, see 
paras. 250-257. 
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3.3.1.4. The Significance of the Furundzija Judgement in International Humanitarian 
Law 
In light of the explanation made above, the contribution of the Furundzija Case to 
international humanitarian law with regard to analysing the concept of aiding, abetting in a 
crime is as follows: "the legal ingredients of aiding and abetting in international criminal law 
to be the following the actus reus consists of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral 
support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime. The mens rea 
required is the knowledge that these acts assist the commission of the offence. This notion 
of aiding and abetting is to be distinguished from the notion of common design, where the 
actus reus consists of participation in a joint criminal enterprise and the mens rea required is 
intent to participate". 132 
3.3.1.5. Concluding Remarks 
The view deployed in the Furundzija Case by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY reflects the 
customary international law and conventional law rules more clearly than the Tadic 
Judgement. The impact of the ICC Statute can also be witnessed on the practice of the ad 
hoc tribunals133 in particular with regard to distinguishing the concepts of co-perpetrator 
and aider or abettor as being two separate categories of responsibility for participation in a 
crime. 
However, it should not be forgotten that the Tadic Judgement must be regarded as 
creating general criteria and that it does not cause any controversy with the Furundzija 
Judgement on the basis that the Furundzija Case can be considered as an interpretation and 
application of the notions of aiding, abetting in torture, rape, sexual assault. The 
significance of the Furundzfja Judgement may be found in the way of drawing attention to 
the possibility of misunderstanding, misinterpreting or misleading the Tadic Judgement 
"Zlbid par. 249. 
133 Although in our study, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and their contribution to international 
humanitarian law and its possible effect on the ICC when it comes in operation are discussed, surprisingly, 
the impact of the Statute of the ICC on the practice of the ad hoc tribunals can also be examined. That is 
why, concluding that the Statute of the ICC has been interpreting and has been applying by the ad hoc 
tribunals even if it is not in operation should not be regarded as wrong from the point of view of 
international humanitarian law practice. For examples, see paras. 216,227,231,244 of the Furundzija 
Judgement. 
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when its criteria is applied by the ad hoc tribunals or by the ICC in their future cases. In 
particular, the concept of intent, knowledge for the requirement of mens rea, the concept of 
directly, substantially effect for the requirement of actus reus need not be together to hold 
an individual criminally responsible for participation in a crime at the international level. 
For the reasons explained above, and in light of the decisions held by the ad hoc 
tribunals, general criteria to find an individual criminally culpable for participation in a 
crime can be drawn as follows: 
Any individual is criminally responsible for any conduct where it is determined that 
he/she intentionally or knowingly participated in the commission of an illegal act 
that violates international humanitarian law and his/her participation substantially 
affected the commission of that illegal act through supporting the actual 
commission before, during, or after the incident. 
3.3.2. Individual Criminal Responsibility Under Article 7 (2) of the ICTY Statute and 
Article 6 (2) of the ICTR Statute 
Articles 7 (2) of the ICTY and 6 (2) of the ICTR Statutes provide that: "The official 
position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor 
mitigate punishment". 
The purpose of the inclusion of this provision in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals 
is to ensure the individual criminal responsibility for the persons who acted in pursuance of 
the authority of the State and to prevent them from using their official position as a defence 
not to be held criminally culpable. 134 This is consistent with the international practice, 
international customary law as applied by the International Military Tribunals after the 
Second World War. 135 It is also consistent with the Statute of the ICC which indicates that 
it will be applied equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. 136 
134"The Statute should... contain provisions which specify that a plea of Head of State immunity or that an 
act was committed in the official capacity of the accused will not constitute a defence, nor will it mitigate 
punishment". (Secretary-General's Report, par. 55). 
'"Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter states that: "The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of 
State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from 
responsibility or mitigating punishment". Article 2 (4) (a) of the CCL No. 10 has the same provision. 
' Article 27 of the ICC Statute (Irrelevance of Official Capacity) provides: 
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In 
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an 
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The enforcement of individual criminal responsibility for persons who held official position 
in a State and non recognition of the concept of sovereign immunity as a defence is crucial 
in order to implement international humanitarian law. This is because, if the notion of 
sovereign immunity had been considered as a defence for example Heads of States had 
enjoyed sovereign immunity, other officials (military or civilian) who are in lesser rank 
could have claimed that they acted in accordance with superior orders, in consequence, 
there would not have been possible to enforce international humanitarian law. 
In particular, the recognition and enforcement of individual criminal responsibility 
for State officials either as Head of State or Government or government senior officials 
plays a central role for preventing future crimes. In this sense, with regard to the crime of 
aggression, individual responsibility of Head of State, government officials and persons 
acting in official capacity is crucial for preventing human beings from facing with violations 
of international humanitarian law since this is the crime which is the mother or source of 
other international crimes and can mainly be committed by persons who are in official 
position. As indicated earlier, its non-inclusion in the ad hoc tribunals' Statutes is 
unfortunate, but this does not mean that those persons cannot be held individually 
criminally responsible for the crimes such as war crimes, the crime of genocide and crimes 
against humanity. When the practice of ad hoc tribunals, up to now, is examined, the best 
examples can be found in the practice of the ICTR. In the case of Prosecutor v. Jean 
Kambanda, 137 the accused (Jean Kambanda) was the Prime Minister of Rwanda when the 
horrible atrocities (genocide) occurred in Rwanda and he was charged with genocide, 
crimes against humanity and was found guilty in a variety of participation such crimes, 
amongst them, he was presiding over meetings of the Rwandan Council of Ministers at 
which massacres against Tutsis were discussed, he was using the media to incite the people 
to commit massacres against Tutsi and moderate Hutu population. 13' The significant point 
in this case is that for international crimes the position held in the level of Government 
administration cannot create a defence, even a mitigating factor, moreover, it can be 
elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether 
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a 
p3erson". 
'The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, Case No.: ICTR 97-23-S, (4 September 
1998) (hereinafter Kambanda Case, Judgement). 
'38'rrial Chamber, Kambanda Case, Judgement, paras. 39-40. 
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considered as an aggravating factor on the basis that these officials are responsible for 
maintenance of peace and security and their participation in any form indicated in Articles 6 
(1) of the ICTR and 7 (1) of the ICTY Statutes in a crime constitutes abusing the authority 
or trust they have just because of official position. 139 The same view was also deployed by 
the same tribunal in the case of Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu. 140 
Similarly, for the Yugoslavian case, Heads of State or Government and public 
officials (including the President of the FRY, Mr Slobodan Milosevic, and Radovan 
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, first president of the Bosnian Serb administration, the general 
of the Bosnian Serb army, respectively) are individually and in concert with others planned, 
instigated, ordered or otherwise aided, abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of 
mass rape and sexual assault, of the unlawful detention of civilians, of unlawful attacks 
against the civilian population and individual civilians with area fire weapons such as 
mortars, rockets and artillery, of the destruction of sacred sites, of persecutions on political 
and religious grounds etc. responsible under Article 7 (1) and (3) of the ICTY Statute, 
because of all these crimes were committed as a part of ethnic cleansing that was planned, 
instigated and ordered by mainly political authorities. "" 
Before leaving this topic, it should be noted that as proved the practice of the ad 
hoc tribunals, the concept of sovereign immunity and its consequence impunity cannot be 
used as a defence or mitigating factor as far as Heads of State and government officials are 
concerned. Moreover, official position can be (must be) taken into account as aggravating 
factor for the mentioned reasons. This is one of the major achievements of the international 
community by means of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. In addition, it should not be 
1391bid. paras. 44,61. 
140Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 1.1.1.2.4., 1.1.1.2.12-13.; Three other ministers in 
Rwanda were also indicted in this context, see indictments: Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, (ICTR- 
97-21-I).; Prosecutor v. Andre Ntagerura, (ICTR-96-10-T).; Prosecutor v. Theoneste Bogosora, (ICTR-96- 
7-1).. 
'For the importance of the inclusion of Art. 7 (2) of the ICTY Statute with regard to mass rape and sexual 
assault, see Cleiren, C., P., M., and Tijsen, M., E., M., "Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Assault in the 
Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Legal, Procedural, and Evidentiary Issues", (1994) 5 Crim. L. 
F. pp. 490-491.; See indictments: Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic.; Prosecutor v. Milan 
Martic.; Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic, Milan Simic, Miroslav Tadic also known as "Miro Brko", Stevan 
Todorovic, Simo Zaric.; Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, Veselin Sijivancanin, Slavko 
Dokmanovic.; Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac.; Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic. In relation to the 
individual criminal responsibilities of the President and other high ranking officials of the FRY for the 
Yugoslavian conflict, the ICTY had not issued any indictment against them, but the recent Kosovo conflict 
created another opportunity for the International Tribunal in this regard and the Tribunal issued an 
indictment against them. See Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, 
Drago jub Ojdanic and Vlajko Stojilkovic, Indictment, (22 May 1999). 
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forgotten that the concept of immunity and impunity is the anti-thesis of accountability, and 
impunity for violations of international humanitarian and of international human rights law 
is, in fact, a betrayal of human dignity, 112 thus bringing those persons who are responsible 
for horrifying atrocities occurred in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda to justice and in 
this . sense co-operation with the ad 
hoc tribunals is a duty that has reached the level of 
obligatio erga omnes for every State. This is also significant to prevent future conflicts and 
to deter international crimes as indicated as one of the purpose of the establishment of the 
ad hoc tribunals. 143 
3.3.3. Individual Criminal Responsibility Under Article 7 (3) of the ICTY Statute and 
Article 6 (3) of the ICTR Statute 
Articles 7 (3) of the ICTY and 6 (3) of the ICTR Statutes both provide that: "[t]he fact that 
any of the acts ... was committed 
by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal 
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit 
such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take necessary and reasonable measures 
to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof'. 
The purpose of the inclusion of this Article in the both ad hoc tribunals' Statutes is 
to ensure the criminal responsibility for all persons throughout the chain of hierarchy who 
contributed or facilitated the commission of international crimes, in our context, war 
crimes, the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity. This regulation is consistent 
with the customary international law and conventional law rules, although neither of the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunals and CCL No. 10 included such a provision. 
However, as will be discussed below, the concept of superior responsibility was applied by 
the post - Second World War war crimes trials, 144 in accordance with the customary 
international and conventional law rules which had given place to the notion before the 
alleged crimes committed during the course of Second World War. The Hague Law, 145 the 
142Bassiouni, M., C., "Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability", (1996) 
59 LCP pp. 26-27. 
'43See supra Chap. 1, p. 25. 
144See infra, pp. 110,114-115,117. 
"SThe 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land is regarded as 
establishing the root of the concept of superior responsibility. (Art. 1 of the Annex thereto). 
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1919 Report of the Commission"" and the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles 147 
constituted the necessary justification for that time. In addition to the Second World War 
war crimes trials, the Genocide Convention, 148 the Nuremberg Principlesl49 and the 1977 
Additional Protocol 1150 provided provisions for the superior responsibility. Against this 
background, the regulations of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals introduces a clear 
provision to the international community so as to incur individual criminal responsibility for 
the persons those who are in a position of superior, and it is in compliance with the recent 
international humanitarian law documents or instruments such as the Secretary - General's 
Report, "' the Reports of the Commission of Experts for the Former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda, 152 the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, 153 and most importantly it is consistent with the Statute of the ICC. '54 
Although, the concept of superior responsibility has found its place in a number of 
international humanitarian and human rights law instruments, and was applied by the post - 
Second World War war crimes trials, no clear rule was able to be created in this regard, '' 
until the recent time when the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC were established. Moreover, 
since the Second World War the notion that the persons who are in a position of superior 
can be held criminally responsible for their own acts or participation, and for the crimes 
committed by his subordinates had not been applied by the international community. For 
these reasons, the application of the concept of superior responsibility, its interpretation, 
making clear its elements or conditions by means of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals 
constitute a significant contribution to international humanitarian and human rights law with 
regard to protecting human rights by virtue of deterring future conflicts, and of preventing 
future crimes that can be committed under the relationship of superior - subordinate. 
146See supra note 12. "All persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have 
been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of State, who have been guilty of offences against the 
laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution", (in Ferencz, Vol. I, p. 
177). 
147For Arts. 227 and 228 of the Treaty, see supra Chap. 2, p. 50 and supra notes. 8-11. 
148Art. IV of the Genocide Convention. 
149Principle III provides: "... Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from 
responsibility under international law". 
15°Arts. 86 and 87 of the Additional Protocol I. 
151 Secretary - General's Report, par. 56. 132 For references, see supra Chap. 1, notes 16,51. Interim Report, paras. 51-53.; Final Report, paras. 55- 
60.; Final Report for Rwanda, paras. 173-174. 
's'Arts. 6 and 7 of the 1996 ILC Draft Code. 
's'Art. 28 of the ICC Statute. 
'"Brand, G, "The War Crimes Trials and the Laws of War", (1949) 26 BYIL p. 424.; for explanation see 
infra pp. 114-115,117. 
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Before the examination of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and their contribution 
to international humanitarian law and impact on the ICC, one issue concerning that the use 
of the phrase "command responsibility" to describe individual criminal responsibility under 
Articles 7 (3) of the ICTY and 6 (3) of the ICTR Statutes needs to be clarified since it does 
not reflect the real meaning of the concept of individual criminal responsibility. Moreover, 
it may cause some misleading, misunderstanding, or misinterpreting such as limiting the 
responsibility under Articles 7 (3) and 6 (3) to justify military commanders that is 
completely against the purpose of the provisions of the Statutes. This is because, firstly, the 
Statutes do not use the term "command responsibility, military command etc. ", instead, the 
word "superior" is used. 156 Secondly, interpreting the mentioned Articles as command 
responsibility creates a controversy with regard to the practice of the ad hoc tribunals 
which have been trying civilians and finding them individually criminally responsible under 
Articles 6 (3) of the ICTR and 7 (3) of the ICTY Statutes, "' as well as military 
commanders. However, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the Celebici Camp Case 
employs the phrases "command responsibility and superior responsibility" 
interchangeably. 158 For the aforementioned reasons, individual criminal responsibility under 
Articles 7 (3) of the ICTY and 6 (3) of the ICTR Statutes should be termed "superior 
responsibility", not "command responsibility", on the ground that the concept of superior 
responsibility includes military, political, or bureaucratic superiors those who can be held 
criminally responsible for the acts of their subordinates as well as responsible for their own 
acts or participation in a crime. '59 
From the point of view of this study, the significance of the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals with regard to the concept of superior responsibility lies on the application of the 
superior responsibility by way of explaining the legal status of the concept and of indicating 
'See Art. 6 (3) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 7 (3) of the ICTY Statute.; Moreover, the Secretary - General's 
Report deploys the phrase as follows: "A person in a position of superior authority... " (emphasis added) 
(par. 56).; In addition, the ICC Statute in Article 28 under the heading of "Responsibility of Commanders 
and Other Superiors" makes clear the concept of superior responsibility for both military and civilian 
persons who are in a position of superior in a way of using the terms military commanders and other 
superiors. 
'57For the case of Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, see supra pp. 107-108. 
'-'sTria1 Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 331-400. By way of taking this view, the 
international community missed the opportunity of developing a new term which prevents the international 
community and the international law practice from any misleading or misunderstanding. 
1 Fenrich, W., J., "Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia", (1995) 6 Duke J. Comp. & Int. '! L. p. 110. The author, in 
this article indicates the importance of the use of the term "superior responsibility" defining as including 
military and civilian superiors. 
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its elements in detail. This was the case of Celebici Camp Case in which the international 
community has witnessed "the first elucidation of the concept of command [superior] 
responsibility by an international judicial body since the cases decided in the wake of the 
Second World War". 160 
3.3.3.1. The Legal Character of Superior Responsibility and the Importance of the 
Use of the Term "Objective Responsibility" 
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the Celebici Camp Case, before examining the elements 
of individual criminal responsibility under Article 7 (3) of its Statute, considered the legal 
character of superior responsibility and its status under customary international law. In this 
context, the Trial Chamber divided the concept of superior responsibility into two principal 
categories under which a superior can be held criminally culpable. These are direct 
command (superior) responsibility which derives from the positive acts of the superior and 
indirect command (superior) responsibility which derives from the negligence or omission 
of the superior in failing to take measures to prevent or repress the unlawful conduct of his 
subordinates. Under these two different types of superior responsibility, a person in a 
position of superior authority can be held criminally responsible for both ordering, 
instigating or planning criminal acts committed by his subordinates and for failing to take 
measures to prevent or repress the unlawful conduct of his subordinates. The significance 
of this division can be found in the legal base of criminal liability under which the first 
category of superior responsibility is completely the same with Article 7 (1) of the ICTY 
Statute, and the second category is a new and totally different criminal responsibility 
regarded as imputed responsibility set out in Article 7 (3) of the Statute. 161 In this part of 
the study, indirect superior responsibility and its elements will be discussed in light of the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals. For the direct superior responsibility and its elements, the 
explanation made with respect to Articles 7 (1) of the ICTY and 6 (1) of the ICTR Statutes 
is applicable and valid. 162 At this point, one issue relating to the terminology should be 
made clear. Although the reference made by the Trial Chamber to explain imputed 
16°Press Release on Celebici Case: The Judgement of the Trial Chamber, CC/PIU/364-E, The Hague, (16 
November 1998). 
16'Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 333-334. 
'62See supra pp. 94-106. 
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responsibility as indirect command (superior) responsibility is acceptable, it may still cause 
some problems such as making a condition to take part in an illegal act that committed by 
subordinates in an indirect way, for example the presence of superior in the scene of 
commission of the crime. This way of interpretation is entirely against the literal and 
spiritual meanings of the Statutes. To prevent such understandings, this type of 
responsibility can be - as an opinion - named as objective responsibility, on the basis that to 
hold a superior criminally culpable, his participation in the commission of an offence is not 
a condition, in other words, is not necessary. In fact crimes are committed by his 
subordinates, and superiors are held responsible just because of their position on the 
ground that they failed to take measures to prevent or repress the unlawful conduct of their 
subordinates. Moreover, as will be discussed below, the elements of superior responsibility 
support this view and, more importantly, to find a superior criminally accountable, one of 
the main element of crimes establishing individual criminal responsibility in national and 
international levels, causation, in this context, means that if the superior's failure to act by 
taking measures to prevent or repress the unlawful conduct of his subordinates did not 
cause the commission of the illegal act, the superior cannot be held criminally responsible 
for the acts of his subordinates is not required. For these reasons, to refer this type of 
superior responsibility, using the name of objective responsibility must be preferred to 
indirect superior responsibility. 163 
Apart from this terminology, the significance of the categorisation of the concept of 
superior responsibility made by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY is that it provides clear 
guidance as to which legal base that might be either under Article 7 (1) as an accomplice or 
Article 7 (3) as a superior responsibility a superior can be regarded as liable or responsible. 
This application and interpretation of the concept undoubtedly creates a precedent or 
example for future cases of the ad hoc tribunals and more likely for the ICC, due to being 
in accordance with the development of international humanitarian law164 and first decision 
in international level in this sense. 
3.3.3.2. The Elements of Superior Responsibility 
'63For the other element of individual responsibility under Articles 7 (3) of the ICTY and 6 (3) of the ICTR 
Statutes in respect to supporting this view see infra pp. 114-119. 
''Article 6 of the 1996 ILC Draft Code and Article 28 (2) of the ICC Statute provide similar provisions for 
superior responsibility. 
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The application of the notion of superior authority to be held criminally responsible and its 
interpretation by the ad hoc tribunals play a crucial role in international humanitarian or 
criminal law for establishing the elements of the concept of superior responsibility and for 
making clear its conditions and providing precedents for future cases since the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility of superiors for failure to take necessary measures to 
prevent or repress the unlawful conduct of their subordinates has evolved after the post - 
Second World War war crimes trials in which the principle was applied quite differently to 
each cases in few situations. 
On this ground, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY rightly indicated the essential 
elements of superior responsibility for failure to act under Article 7 (3) of its Statute as 
follows: "(i) the existence of a superior - subordinate relationship; (ii) the superior knew or 
had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and (iii) 
the superior failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or 
punish the perpetrator thereof. 165 
3.3.3.2.1. The Element of Superior - Subordinate Relationship 
For the first requirement of the superior responsibility that there must be a superior - 
subordinate relationship the Trial Chamber concluded that a superior, whether military or 
civilian, can be held criminally responsible as long as the superior has a power which can be 
either de facto or de jure in nature to control the acts of his subordinates committing the 
violations of international humanitarian law. '66 
To reach this conclusion, the Trial Chamber referred to a number of cases such as 
Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 167 the German High Command Trial, '68 the 
"'Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 346. 
'66Ibid. paras. 354,377-378. 
167Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, United States Military Commission, Manila, (8 October -7 
December 1945), and the Supreme Court of the United States (Judgements Delivered on 4 February 1946), 
(1948) IV Law Reports p. 1. In this case, responsibility of a military commander for offences committed by 
his troops was examined and applied. 
168The German High Command Trial (Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb and Thirteen Others), United States 
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, (30 December 1947 - 28 October 1948), (1949) XII Law Reports p. 1. In 
this case, the prerequisites for criminal responsibility of commanders for offences committed by their 
subordinates and associate units were examined and applied (pp. 1-2). 
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Hostages Case, 169 the Toyoda Case170 in those of which for the element of superior - 
subordinate relationship, the power of the superior to control his subordinates was 
indicated to be held criminally responsible. The most important point in the practice of the 
ad hoc tribunal in this context is the expansion of superior - subordinate relationship to the 
civilian superiors as well as military superiors those who are in de jure or de facto positions 
in accordance with the customary international and conventional law rules. This is 
especially significant for the Yugoslavian case in which the establishment of superior 
responsibility and a chain of political or military authority is not easy since the war was 
mainly between small paramilitary groups. 1' As the practice of the ICTY in the Celebici 
Camp Case demonstrates that to set up a chain of political and military authority, it is not 
necessary being or having under official power or authority to be regarded as responsible. 
De facto authority is sufficient for establishing individual criminal responsibility under 
Articles 7 (3) of the ICTY and 6 (3) of the ICTR Statutes. This is consistent with the 
political and military structures of the former Yugoslavia and most importantly consistent 
with the development of international humanitarian law on the ground that most of the 
conflicts occurring in the world today have an internal character that creates the same 
difficulties with the Yugoslavian case rather than international. For these reason, the 
interpretation and application of the concept by the ad hoc tribunal in this way should be 
accepted as in accordance with one of the main purposes of international humanitarian law 
that the law should provide necessary solutions of the international community in general 
and in compliance with the purpose of the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals indicated in 
Articles 1 of both Statutes in particular. 
3.3.3.2.2. The Mental Element (Mens Rea): Knew or Had Reason to Know 
The second element of superior responsibility is that the superior knew or had reason to 
know that the illegal act was about to be or had been committed by his subordinates (the 
mental element, mens rea), the Trial Chamber concluded that a superior can possess this 
'69The Hostages Trial (Trial of Wilhelm List and Others), United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, (8 
July 1947 - 19 February 1948), (1949) VIII Law Reports p. 34. In this case, high ranking German army 
officers were charged with the offences committed by toops under their command. 
10The Trial ofAdmiral Toyoda, in Major William H. Parks, "Command Responsibility for War Crimes", 
(1973) 62 Mil. L. Rev. p. 69. 
171 O'Brien, J., C., "The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the 
Former Yugoslavia", (1993) 87 AJIL p. 652. 
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requirement to be held criminally responsible in a way of having actual knowledge or of 
having information in his possession as a result of the terms "had reason to know" used in 
Article 7 (3) of its Statute. 172 In terms of actual knowledge to establish criminal 
responsibility of superiors, international tribunals do not face with serious problems. This is 
because, it can be easily established through direct or circumstantial evidence13 that is 
proving that subordinates were about to be or were committing serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. However, for the second category of the requirement of 
mens rea, there is a big problem in interpreting the phrase "had reason to know" to set up 
criminal responsibility for superiors. In this respect, the Trial Chamber decided that "a 
superior can be held criminally responsible only if some specific information was in fact 
available to him which would provide notice of offences committed by his subordinates", 174 
as a result of applying the French text of Article 86 of Additional Protocol I which was 
regarded as reflecting the customary international law rule at the time of the commission of 
the alleged offences. '75 
The view taken by the Trial Chamber cannot be regarded as in compliance with the 
development of international humanitarian law and its practice in this context for the 
following reasons: 
Firstly, accepting that Article 86 of Additional Protocol I reflects the customary 
international law at the time of the commission of the offences by way of implementing the 
French version of the mentioned provision which requires a superior actually should 
possess information that allow him to conclude that his subordinates were committing or 
"? Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 383. 
"''The Commission of Experts in its Final Report indicated some events that may be useful for establishing 
superior responsibility as follows: "(a) The number of illegal acts; (b) The type of illegal acts; (c) The scope 
of illegal acts; (d) The time during which the illegal acts occurred; (e) The number and type of troops 
involved; (f) The logistics involved, if any; (g) The geographical location of the acts; (h) The widespread 
occurrence of the acts; (i) The tactical tempo of operations; (j) The modus operandi of similar illegal acts; 
(k) The officers and staff involved; (1) The location of the commander at the time". (par. 58).; The Trial 
Chamber in the Celebici Camp Case cited this in par. 386. 
'74Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 393. 
""Ibid. par. 390.; "When considering the language of this provision as finally adopted, [Article 86 of 
Additional Protocol I] problems of interpretation arise if the English and French texts are compared. While 
the English text contains the wording "information which should have enabled them to conclude", the 
French version, rather than the literal translation "des information qul auraient du leur permettre de 
concluire", is rendered "des information leur permettant de concluire" (literally: information enabling 
them to conclude). The proposition has been made that this discrepancy amounts to a distinction between 
the English text, which is said to embrace two requirements, one objective (that the superior had certain 
information) and one subjective (from this information available to the superior he should have drawn 
certain conclusion), and the French text containing only the objective element". (par. 392, footnote in 
original omitted, emphasis in original). 
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were about to commit violations of international humanitarian law should not be accepted 
as consistent with the purpose of superior responsibility in the sense that the concept 
provides an objective responsibility for superiors, and the position taken by the Trial 
Chamber in relation to the wording "had reason to know" creates a confusion in minds 
when it is compared with the concept of actual knowledge. The interpretation of this phrase 
by the Chamber is nothing else than repeating the circumstantial evidence to set up actual 
knowledge for the requirement of mens rea. If this way of application is considered as the 
necessary mental element of superior responsibility, what was the reason to employ the 
terms "had reason to know" in both ad hoc tribunals' Statutes? 
Secondly, even the Second World War war crimes trials had applied the criteria or 
tests of "should have known" or "must have known" to determine the mental element of 
superior responsibility. 176 Although these two tests seem to be similar, there is a significant 
difference in terms of providing duty on superiors in relation to preventing violations of 
their subordinates and of producing different results from each other. When the concept of 
"must have known" or "could have known" was applied an objective standard or an 
ordinary reasonable person having a superior's knowledge of the facts and operating under 
the same circumstances is taken into account. "' Although this method is preferable for the 
purpose and implementation of international humanitarian law rules, the subjective standard 
"should have known" which derives from the circumstances and from the knowledge of the 
superior must be accepted to establish superior responsibility, due to the difficulties occur 
in every armed conflicts. '78 On this background, the Trial Chamber should have taken into 
account the international law practice179 and should have applied the second standard in the 
Celebict Camp Case to be in accordance with the previous applications of the concept that 
16In the High Command Case, the test of "should have known" was applied, but in the case of Yamashita, 
the test of "must have known" was applied. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, p. 385.; Bassiouni, M., 
C., and Manikas, P., The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Irvington- 
on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, (1996), p. 362.; In the Toyoda Case, the test of "should 
have known" was again applied as follows: "... if he knew, or should have ! mown, by use of reasonable 
diligence, of the commission by his troops of atrocities and if he did not do everything within his power and 
capacity under the existing circumstances to prevent their occurrence and punish the offenders, he was 
derelict in his duties". (emphasis added), in Major William H. Parks, "Command Responsibility for War 
Crimes", (1973) 62 Mil. L. Rev. p. 1 at p. 73. 
"'Bassiouni and Manikas, p. 345. 
"slbid. 
"'Although the Trial Chamber in its decision referred to some cases like the Toyoda Case, it did not 
consider them sufficient to establish the mental requirement of superior responsibility in this sense. See 
Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 389. 
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could have guided the Chamber18° in the post - Second World War war crimes trials. In this 
sense, by means of achieving a completely different method or interpretation, the Trial 
Chamber has taken a step backward. 
Thirdly, the position taken by the Trial Chamber by virtue of indicating that Article 
86 of Additional Protocol I (its French version) reflects the customary international law at 
the time of the commission of the alleged crimes and the present content of customary law 
may be different from this opinionlsl cannot have a basis in international humanitarian law 
on the ground that firstly, although the said Article reflects the customary nature of 
international law, international humanitarian law has evolved since the adoption of the 
mentioned Protocol (1977) and while the Chamber strongly considered this provision to 
find a legal base for its decision, it did not give the same weight to the previous decisions of 
war crimes trials in the aftermath of Second World War war crimes trials, those of which 
created more clearer guidance than the 1977 Additional Protocol I. Secondly and most 
importantly, the alleged crimes occurred in the former Yugoslavia after 1991 and the 
Statute of the ICC, although it was adopted in 1998, is the most authoritative international 
legal document reflecting customary international law rules and in this context making 
crystal clear the mental element of superior responsibility by virtue of employing two 
different standards for both civilians and military superiors by taking into account the reality 
(fact) of the establishment of a chain of superior authority that is very weak for civilian 
superiors when it is compared with military superiors. According to the ICC Statute, a 
civilian superior is responsible under the criterion of "either knew, or consciously 
disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or 
about to commit such crimes", 182 but for military superiors the ICC Statute brings a 
different standard in compliance with the international practice as follows: "... military 
commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have 
known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes". 183 On this 
180Fenrick, p. 115. This scholar in relation to the post - Second World War war crimes trials accepts that 
"[t]he existence of the "should have known" test is clearly established in the case law". (p. 115). 
""Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 393. 
'82Art. 28 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute.; The decision of the Trial Chamber can be found similar to this 
standard, but in the decision there is no indication for its conclusion that it is just for civilian superiors, in 
other words, there is no such categorisation to establish different standards for military and civilian 
superiors. In fact, the ICTR in the Kayishema and Ruzindana Case referred to the regulation of the ICC 
Statute and accepted it reflecting customary rules of international humanitarian law. (See Kayishema and 
Ruzindana Case, Judgement, paras. 226-228). 
'"Art. 28 (1) (a) of the ICC Statute (emphasis added). 
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ground, accepting Article 86 of Additional Protocol I as a customary international law rule 
and indicating the ICC Statute present customary law rule 184 does not reflect the fact since 
a creation of customary international law principle by the international community usually 
takes years or decades. In other words, between 1991-1998 was the customary law 
principle changed with regard to the criterion under which a superior can be held criminally 
responsible under Article 7 (3) of the ICTY and 6 (3) of the ICTR Statutes? 
For the reasons have already been mentioned, the position taken by the Trial 
Chamber of the ICTY should be considered as not in compliance with international 
humanitarian law and in particular, customary international law principles. The regulation 
of the ICC Statute as reflecting customary law rules and the meaning of objective 
responsibility especially for military superiors require the implementation of the test of 
"should have known". 185 
3.3.3.2.3. The Element of Necessary and Reasonable Measures 
For the third element of the superior responsibility that the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator 
thereof the Trial Chamber truly and in accordance with the ICC Statute18" concluded that a 
superior can be found liable for failing to take necessary and reasonable measures which are 
within his powers to prevent the commission of crimes by his subordinates or to punish the 
perpetrators thereof. 187 
3.3.3.2.4. The Element of Causation 
Lastly, the issue whether the principle of causation that a superior's failure to act did not 
cause the commission of the crime, superiors cannot be held criminally responsible for the 
acts of their subordinates is required to establish superior responsibility or not needs to be 
'$"Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 393. 
'"The approach taken by the ICTR in the Kayishema and Ruzindana Case should be seen as supporting 
this view. In this sense, see Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, paras. 225-228. 
'"Article 28 (1) (b) of the ICC Statute provides that: "... military commander or person failed to take all 
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution". Article 28 (2) (c) of the 
ICC Statute has the same provision with one difference in terms of employing the term superior instead of 
military commander. 
'"Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 394-395. 
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explained. In this context, the Trial Chamber again rightly and in accordance with the 
existing case law and treaty law decided that "causation has not traditionally been 
postulated as a conditio sine qua non for the imposition of criminal responsibility on 
superiors for their failure to prevent or punish offences committed by their subordinates". "' 
The absence of the element of causation to establish superior responsibility has a 
significant place for the concept of objective responsibility and for the enforcement of 
international humanitarian law on the basis that the notion of superior authority can be 
exercised in different ways and different levels such as administratively, executively, 
operationaly and tactically and its natural result, many superiors may be found responsible 
for the crimes of the same subordinates regardless of which superior's negligence lead to 
the commission of violations of international humanitarian law. 189 Otherwise, it was not 
possible to implement superior responsibility on the ground that superiors could have 
claimed that the crimes committed by their subordinates were not the result of their criminal 
negligence and consequently, a number of superiors could not have been found responsible 
under Articles 7 (3) of the ICTY and 6 (3) of the ICTR Statutes, but just under Articles 7 
(1) and 6 (1) of the Statutes of ad hoc tribunals respectively. This type of interpretation and 
application might have been the end of the concept of superior responsibility. Moreover, as 
indicated earlier, in particular, for the concept of objective responsibility superiors are held 
responsible for the crimes committed by their subordinates just because of their positions 
which requires them to prevent their subordinates from committing crimes. If superiors 
cannot implement their duties in this regard their criminal responsibility must be inevitable. 
Therefore, the principle of causation cannot be an ingredient of the concept of superior 
responsibility. 
3.3.4. Individual Criminal Responsibility Under Article 7 (4) of the ICTY Statute and 
6 (4) of the ICT'R Statute 
Articles 7 (4) of the ICTY and 6 (4) of the ICTR Statutes provide that "[t]he fact that an 
accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not 
'u1bid. par. 398.; One scholar (Bassiouni) accepts the element of causation to be held superiors responsible 
as the essential element of culpability. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, p. 372.; Bassiouni and 
Manikas. p. 350. 
'"Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 397. 
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relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if 
the International Tribunal determines that justice so requires". 
The purpose of the inclusion of this provision in the ad hoc tribunals' Statutes is to 
prevent those persons (subordinates) who are acted in accordance with an order given by 
their Governments or superiors from using the notion of obedience to superior orders as a 
defence and this is in compliance with the international law practice and international 
humanitarian law documents. 190 The value of the non recognition of the obedience to 
superior orders as a defence lies on the enforcement of humanitarian law principles and 
shares the same logic with Articles 7 (2) of the ICTY and 6 (2) of the ICTR Statutes. As 
indicated earlier, 191 if this concept had been accepted as a complete defence for individual 
criminal responsibility, other persons who are in the chain of political, military or 
bureaucratic would have claimed that they had obeyed the orders of their superiors and this 
hierarchy could have reached until the Head of State who could have argued the sovereign 
immunity and at the end of the day, there would not have been a point to implement 
international humanitarian law rules. 
190Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter provides: "The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his 
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of 
punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires".; Article 6 of the Charter of the IMTFE, 
Article 2 (4) (b) of the CCL No. 10 and Principle IV of the Nuremberg Principles have the same or similar 
provisions. In this context, see Bassiouni and Manikas, pp. 374-409.; Green, L., C., Superior Orders in 
National and International Law, Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff (1976).; Green, L., C., "Superior Orders and 
Command Responsibility", (1989) 27 Can. Y. Int. '1 L. p. 167.; Best, G., War and Law Since 1945, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, (1994), pp. 188-192.; Secretary - General's Report, par. 57.; Interim Report, par. 54.; 
Final Report, paras. 61-62.; Final Report for Rwanda, par. 175.; Joyner, C., C., "Redressing Impunity for 
Human Rights Violations: The Universal Declaration and the Search for Accountability", (1998) 26 Denv. 
J. Int. '1 L. & Pol'y. p. 608. 
Moreover, the latest and most authoritative legal documents in international humanitarian law, the 1996 
ILC's Draft Code which similarly uses the same terms with the Nuremberg Charter and the Nuremberg 
Principles, and the Statute of the ICC give place to the concept of superior orders. However, the inclusion 
of superior orders in the ICC Statute is significantly different from the international law practice in terms 
of providing a complete defence not to be held criminally responsible and of not using the phrases that 
superior orders can be considered as a mitigation factor in determining punishment. Article 33 of the ICC 
Statute under the heading of Superior Orders and Prescription of Law states that: 
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an 
order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of 
criminal responsibility unless: 
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question; 
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and 
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful. 
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly 
unlawful". 
191 See supra pp. 106-109. 
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In addition to this fact, it should be noted that the existence of a superior order in 
every situation should not be perceived as a mitigating factor in sentencing, 192 as clearly 
inferred from the provisions of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals using the wording "if... 
justice so requires". In this sense, if a subordinate willingly participates in a commission of 
an illegal act, the existence of a superior order without any doubt does not constitute a 
mitigating factor in his punishment. When the subordinate commits a crime without his own 
free will his situation may be considered as a mitigating factor. 193 The best example 
accompanying this case can be examined when the concept of superior order is combined 
with duress. This was one of the main issue the ICTY had to deal with in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic. 194 In this case the majority of the Appeals Chamber195 
and its consequence the Trial Chamber rightly concluded that "duress 196 does not afford a 
complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against humanity and/or a war crime 
192Morris and Scharf, p. 102. 
'93 Ibid. 
'94Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgement, (Trial Chamber), Case No. IT-96-22-T, (29 
November 1996).; Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Judgement, (Appeals Chamber), Case No. IT-96-22- 
A, (7 October 1997).; After the ruling of the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber dealt with the case 
again and handed its decision in accordance with the view taken by the Appeals Chamber. Prosecutor v. 
Drazen Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgement, (Trial Chamber), (5 March 1998).: The Erdemovic Case was 
the first sentencing judgement rendered by an international criminal institution since the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Tribunals. For the significance of this case in international humanitarian law, see Turns, D., "The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: The Erdemovic Case", (1998) 47 ICLQ pp. 
461-474. 
195For the supportive opinions see, Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge 
Mcdonald and Judge Vohrah (7 October 1997).; and Separate and Dissenting Opinion [but not in this 
context] of Judge Li. 
For the opposite view see, Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Cassese, (7 October 1997).; and Separate and Dissenting Opinion ofJudge Stephen, (7 October 1997). 
For a criticism on the ruling of the Appeals Chamber in the Erdemovic Case, see Rowe, P., "Duress as a 
Defence to War Crimes After Erdemovic: A Laboratory for a Permanent Court"; (1998) 1 YIHL p. 210, in 
particular, pp. 213-220. iWIn this case duress was examined in combined with superior order. In this sense one part of the testimony 
of the accused before the Trial Chamber I on 31 May 1996 can be quoted as follows: "Your Honour, I had 
to do this. If I had refused, I would have been killed together with the victims. When I refused, they told 
me: If you are sorry for them, stand up, line up with them and we will kill you too. I am not sorry for 
myself but for my family my wife and my son who then had nine months, and I could not refuse because 
they would have killed me". (in Trial Chamber, Erdemovic Case, Sentencing Judgement, par. 14). 
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involving the killing of innocent human beings", 197 "[i]t may be taken into account only by 
way of mitigation". 19' 
In light of the decision held by the Appeals Chamber and the Trial Chamber of the 
ICTY in accordance with the international customary and conventional law rules in the 
Erdemovic Case, it can be concluded that the existence of a superior order does not 
constitute a complete defence not to be held individually criminally responsible and even 
may not constitute a mitigating factor in punishment, which results from special 
circumstances such as combination of a superior order and duress. In this sense, there 
should not be any doubt that this way of interpretation and application of the concept will 
create a precedential value for the future cases of the ad hoc tribunals and more likely for 
the ICC, due to being the first and detailed decision in this regard after the Second World 
War practice. However, it should also be noted that with regard to war crimes the 
regulation of the ICC Statute'99 departs from the customary rules of international law200 in 
terms of providing a complete defence which is subject to the conditions set out in Article 
33 (1) (a-c) of the Statute. Hopefully, the ICC when becomes in operation will interpret 
and apply the provisions of Article 33 of its Statute, in its case law, in compliance with 
customary international law. 201 In this context, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals will be 
the main guidance for the ICC to reach such a conclusion. 
3.4. CONCLUSIONS 
Appeals Chamber, Erdemovic Case, Judgement, par. 19.; Trial Chamber, Erdemovic Case, Sentencing 
Judgement, par. 17.; For one of the latest practice of national courts in relation to the commission of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity under duress or/(both) superior orders, see Martins, F., "The Defences of 
Reprisals, Superior Orders and Duress in the Priebke Case Before the Italian Military Tribunal", (1998) 1 
YIHL p. 354, in particular, pp. 358-360. For background information on this case, see Marchisio, S., "The 
Priebke Case Before the Italian Military Tribunals: A Reaffirmation of the Principle of Non Applicability 
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity", (1998) 1 YIHL p. 344. 
198Trial Chamber, Erdemovic Case, Sentencing Judgement, par. 17. 
1 See supra note 190. 
20°For an excellent analysis of Article 33 of the ICC Statute in light of the rules of customary international 
law, see Gaeta, P., "The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal Court 
versus Customary International Law", (1999) 10 EJIL pp. 172-191.; In this sense, also see Cassese, A., 
"The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections", (1999) 10 EJEL pp. 156- 
157. 
201 Gaeta, p. 191. 
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One of the main purposes of international humanitarian law is to enforce individual criminal 
responsibility through either domestic courts or international institutions (tribunals or 
courts, ad hoc or permanent). At the international level, until the recent time, the most 
authoritative precedents with regard to the implementation of the concept of individual 
criminal responsibility were the practice of the International Military Tribunals at 
Nuremberg and at Tokyo and Subsequent Proceedings that the international community 
witnessed after the Second World War. For the mentioned reasons, 202 the practice of the 
post - Second World War war crimes trials do not constitute a truly established precedents. 
In this context, the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR by the Security Council on 
behalf of the international community, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a measure 
to protect international peace and security, and the practice of the ad hoc tribunals with 
regard to interpreting and applying the principle of individual criminal responsibility have a 
significant place in the development of international humanitarian law in terms of proving 
the enforceability of individual criminal responsibility at the international level for the 
crimes which are all concern to the international community. The adoption of the Statute of 
the ICC by a large number of States followed this and indicated that the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility and its implementation is one of the most important desire 
of the international community to achieve a universal justice for human beings. 
While the international community was discussing the emergence of individual 
criminal responsibility and its possible implementation in international law until this decade, 
today in accordance with the development of international humanitarian law the 
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and the 
adoption of the Statute of the ICC left no room to discuss the possibility of the 
enforcement of individual criminal responsibility, in particular, for the crimes which are all 
concern to the international community; war crimes, the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and the crime of aggression all of which become independent category of 
international crimes that have reached the level ofjus cogens and States' duty to prosecute, 
punish or extradite individuals responsible for these crimes, in other words, the enforcement 
of individual criminal responsibility in this respect become an obligatio erga omnes in 
nature. 
See supra pp. 91-93. 
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On this ground, Articles 7 (1) of the ICTY and 6 (1) of the ICTR Statutes provide 
the individual criminal responsibility is just not only for the persons who directly committed 
the crime (as principal), but also for the persons who facilitated the commission of the 
offence in a way indicated in the mentioned Articles (as participant). For the first category 
of persons the rule is clear enough in the customary international and conventional law 
rules, but for the second category of persons who facilitated the commission of the crime, 
the principle of individual criminal responsibility and its application is more difficult on the 
basis that what is the degree of participation to be held criminally culpable? At this point, 
the Nuremberg and the post- Second World War war crimes trials failed to reach a specific 
criterion. For this reason, the application of the concept of individual criminal responsibility 
by the ad hoc tribunals gains an important place for interpreting and drawing the line for 
the scope of individual responsibility and also for setting up general criteria making clear 
the degree of participation to be considered as individually criminally responsible in 
international humanitarian law. This is one of the main contribution203 that can be examined 
in the Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic and Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzya cases of the ad hoc 
tribunals to international humanitarian law and their possible impact on the ICC when it 
becomes in operation. In light of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, general criteria which 
fulfils one major gap in international humanitarian law since the post - Second World War 
war crimes trials failed to establish such criteria, to find an individual criminally culpable for 
his participation in a crime can be drawn as follows: - Any individual is criminally 
responsible for any conduct where it is determined that he/she intentionally or knowingly 
participated in the commission of an illegal act that violates international humanitarian law 
and his/her participation substantially affected the commission of that illegal act through 
supporting the actual commission before, during, or after the incident-. 
When the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in relation to Articles 7 (2) of the ICTY 
and 6 (2) of the ICTR Statutes is examined, it can be found that the enforcement of 
individual criminal responsibility for State officials either as Head of State or Government 
or government senior officials and non recognition of the concept of sovereign immunity 
and its consequence impunity as a defence have significant place in international law in 
203For the other contributions of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, for example, making clear the 
terminology for preventing the ad hoc tribunals' practice in relation to future cases and the ICC from 
misleading, misunderstanding or misinterpreting in relation to the concepts of aiding, abetting, directly and 
substantially effect, making distinguishment between being a co-perpetrator to a crime and being an abettor 
or aidetor to a crime, see supra pp. 99-106. 
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terms of implementing international humanitarian law principles. This is because, if the 
notion of sovereign immunity had been considered as a defence for example Head of State 
had enjoyed sovereign immunity, other officials (military or civilian) who are in lesser rank 
could have claimed that they acted in accordance with superior orders, in consequence, 
there would not have been possible to enforce international humanitarian and criminal law. 
In addition to the non recognition of sovereign immunity as a defence not to be held 
criminally accountable, even a mitigating factor, the position held in the level of State or 
Government administration can (must) create an aggravating factor in punishment on the 
ground that these officials are responsible for the maintenance of peace and security and 
their participation in a crime constitute abusing the authority or trust which they have just 
because of their official positions. This is one of the major achievements of the international 
community by means of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals that can be examined in the 
Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda and Prosecutor v. Jean - Paul Akayesu cases. 
When the practice of the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the concept of superior 
responsibility is considered, the value of the practice can be examined in the application of 
the superior responsibility by virtue of explaining the legal status of the concept and of 
indicating its elements in detail in the Celebici Camp Case. In this context, the Trial 
Chamber of the ICTY divided the concept of superior responsibility into two big categories 
under which a superior can be held criminally responsible as direct command (superior) 
responsibility and indirect command (superior) responsibility. 204 The significance of this 
categorisation lies on providing a clear guidance under which legal base that might be either 
under Articles 7 (1) of the ICTY and 6 (1) of the ICTR Statutes as an accomplice or 
Articles 7 (3) of the ICTY and 6 (3) of the ICTR Statutes as an objective responsibility a 
superior can be held criminally responsible, and this application and interpretation of the 
concept undoubtedly creates a guideline for future cases of the ad hoc tribunals and also 
more likely for the ICC due to being the first decision in this sense. In addition to this 
contribution of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals to international humanitarian law, the 
real contribution can be found in the examination of the elements of the concept of superior 
responsibility by way of making clear its conditions and providing precedents for future 
cases, since the principle of individual criminal responsibility of superiors for failure to take 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or repress the unlawful conduct of their 
204For the discussion about the name of indirect superior responsibility and why this type of responsibility 
should be named as objective responsibility see supra pp. 112-113. 
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subordinates has evolved after the post- Second World War war crimes trials in which a 
clear principle was not be able to set up in this sense. Although the practice is unique due to 
being the first elucidation of the concept by an international judicial organ, the view taken 
by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the Celebici Camp Case in relation to the requirement 
of the mental element of the superior responsibility, the interpretation of the phrase "had 
reason to know" and non-application of the standard of "should have known" should be 
considered as inconsistent with the rules of customary international law and with the 
development of international humanitarian law. 203 Despite this interpretation and 
application, the position taken by the Trial Chamber with regard to whether the principle of 
causation is required or not to held a superior criminally responsible reflects a big 
achievement in terms of supporting the view that indirect superior responsibility should be 
named as objective responsibility in international humanitarian law. 206 
Lastly, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the concept of superior 
orders as a defence not to be held criminally culpable can be concluded that it is in 
accordance with the international customary and conventional law rules as has been dealt 
with in the case of Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic in which the Appeals Chamber and the 
Trial Chamber held that the existence of a superior order does not constitute a complete 
defence for subordinates not to be held criminally accountable, even may not constitute a 
mitigating factor in punishment whose application relies on some special circumstances 
such as combination of a superior order with duress. There is no doubt that the view 
deployed by the ICTY will create a guideline for future cases of the ad hoc tribunals and 
for the ICC, due to being the first detailed decision held by an international judicial body 
after the Second World War practice. 
205For the discussion of this issue see supra pp. 115-119 .; and also 
for the other elements of the superior 
responsibility and the importance of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals see supra pp. 114-115,119-120. 






Despite the fact that there are many problems deriving from the different legal systems 
being used around the world, one of the main issues is the limitation of the substantive law 
(subject-matter jurisdiction) of the international criminal tribunals or courts. It is not 
enough to solve this problem, as the Secretary-General's Report did in relation to the 
ICTY Statute, by indicating that international criminal tribunals or courts should apply 
"rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary 
laws1 for the following reasons: 
Firstly, rules governing armed conflicts are mainly regarded as regulating 
international armed conflicts and these rules have not been applied by a truly established 
international organisation until recent times when the ad hoc tribunals were established by 
the Security Council for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, both of whose 
interpretation and application of the rules of international humanitarian law went beyond 
the intention of the body that created them. 2 
Secondly, the nature of armed conflicts has changed from international to mainly 
internal or internationalised and individual criminal responsibility for the crimes committed 
in the latter type of armed conflicts has been recognised and applied by the ad hoc 
tribunals. 3 
Thirdly, although the nature of crimes remain the same, the manner of committing 
them, targeting civilians and civilian property, have changed remarkably since the Second 
World War and the adoption of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and of the Additional 
Protocols (I and II) of 1977 to thereto that are regarded as the main body of law governing 
'Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
(hereinafter Secretary-General's Report), par. 34. 
2For examples, see infra pp. 220-222. 
'In particular, the establishment of the ICTR to deal with the Rwanda case which was an internal armed 
conflict in nature indicates the first and major step in terms of creating a turning point by way of enforcing 
individual criminal responsibility for violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II (Art. 4 of the ICTR Statute) in the development of international humanitarian law.; 
For the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and the regulation of the ICC Statute in this context, see infra pp. 
207-224. 
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armed conflicts. For example, rape as a crime under customary international law was 
committed on a massive scale in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Kosovo as a method 
of war crime, as a weapon or destroying an ethnic, religious group within the meaning of 
the Genocide Convention. On this ground, the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR plays a 
crucial role for interpreting and applying the conditions, applying the international 
humanitarian law norms to the recent events over which they have jurisdiction. Their 
contribution to international humanitarian and human rights law in this respect will create 
guidance for the ICC since those rules for the first time in international level were able to 
be applied by the ad hoc tribunals. In accordance with these developments, it should be 
noted that "[i]nternational humanitarian law has developed faster since the beginning of the 
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia than in the four-and-a-half decades since the Nuremberg 
Tribunals and the adoption of the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of 
War of August 12,1949". ° 
Having indicated the changing structure of international humanitarian law, from the 
perspective of this study, war crimes and the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and their 
contribution to international humanitarian law and their impact on the ICC will be examined 
by way of dividing the concept of war crimes into two principal categories: "The Grave 
Breaches System" and "Violations of the Laws or Customs of War". s As will be discussed 
in this Chapter, in detail, the division of war crimes based on the nature of armed conflicts 
as international or non-international does not reflect the modern concept of international 
humanitarian law since human rights violations, whether occurring in an international armed 
conflict or not, must not be tolerated and the characterisation of armed conflicts must not 
precedence over the protection of innocent civilians. However, as long as the Statutes of 
the ad hoc tribunals and their practice with regard to the concept of war crimes, and more 
4Meron, T., "War Crimes Law Comes ofAge", in Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age Essays, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1998), p. 297. 
5Wexler, L., S., "Committee Report on Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, and Complemantarity", (1997) 
25 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y p. 227.; Decision on the Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on the Limited Jurisdictional Reach of Articles 2 and 3, (Dario 
Kordic, Mario Cerkez, Case No: IT-95-1412-PT, 2 March 1999), (hereinafter Kordic & Others), paras. 22- 
25.; However some scholars divide war crimes, as far as the ICTY Statute is concerned, into two as "the 
law of Geneva" and "the law of the Hague", (See Morris, V., and Scharf, M., P., An Insider's Guide to The 
International Criminal Tribunal for The Former Yugoslavia, A Documentary History and Analysis, Vol. I, 
Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, (1995), (hereinafter An Insider's Guide), p. 63. 
However, this categorisation cannot be perceived as reflecting the regulation of international humanitarian 
law. As will be discussed in light of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, the so-called Hague Law is much 
broader than some scholars, and defence before the ICTY argued and much broader than its name. See 
infra pp. 214,216. 
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importantly the latest practice of the international community in the adoption of the ICC 
Statute are concerned, the examination of war crimes under two different categories is 
inescapable since all these instruments mainly accept this artificial distinction between 
6 international and non-international armed conflicts and applicable law to these cases. 
4.2. THE GRAVE BREACHES SYSTEM 
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute under the heading of "[g]rave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949" provides that: 
"The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or 
ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
namely the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the 
relevant Geneva Convention: 
(a) wilful killing; 
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; 
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; 
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity 
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; 
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power; 
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial; 
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; 
(h) taking civilians as hostages". 
The legal base for Article 2 of the ICTY Statute is the grave breaches provisions of 
the four Geneva Conventions$ that are set out in Articles 50,51,130 and 147 of each 
Convention respectively. In fact, not all of these acts are mentioned in all four Conventions, 
just the first three categories of offences are included in all four Conventions. When 
drafting the ICTY Statute, the main guideline was Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of war, together with Article 130 
6See infra pp. 131-224. 
7The ICTR Statute is not relevant here, because it does not include such a provision. 
BFor references to these Conventions, see supra Chap. 3, note 21.; For background information about the 
Geneva Conventions, see Gutteridge, J., A., C., "The Geneva Conventions of 1949", (1949) 26 BYIL pp. 
294-326.; Yingling R., T., and Ginnane, R., W., "The Geneva Conventions of 1949", (1952) 46 AJIL pp. 
393-427. 
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of the Third Geneva Convention for the Prisoners of War. 9 Although the clear impact of the 
Fourth Convention on the Statute is examined, one notable improvement is made in Article 
2 of the Yugoslavian Tribunal's Statute by way of replacing the notion of "protected 
persons" with a specific designation of "civilians" in the provision. 10 As will be discussed 
later in detail, the using of the term "civilians", plays a crucial role for indicating the 
development of international humanitarian law and the interpretation of the conditions of 
the grave breaches system that are to be an international armed conflict and the concept of 
protected persons or property. " 
The distinguishing feature of the grave breaches system from other breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions and other violations of the laws or customs of war is that it imposes 
an obligation on States parties to the Convention to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere auf 
judicare) persons responsible for the grave breaches of the Conventions regardless of their 
nationality, '2 in other words, the concept of universal jurisdiction is accepted for the grave 
breaches system. Until the practice of the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the interpretation 
and application of the norms of international humanitarian law, the concept of universal 
9Greenwood, C., "The International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia", (1993) 69 Int. 'l Aff. p. 560.; For the 
explanation of Article 2 of the ICTY Statute, see Secretary-General 's Report, paras. 37-40. 
Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: 
"Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if 
committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or 
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling 
a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the 
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly". 
Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention states: 
"Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if 
committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman 
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or 
health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a 
prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention". 
°Joyner, C., C., "Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to 
Accountability", (1996) 59 LCP p. 157.; Joyner, C., C., "Strengthening Enforcement of Humanitarian Law: 
Reflections on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia", (1995) 6 Duke J. Com. & 
Int'l L. p. 83. 
1'For the analysis and practice of the ad hoc tribunals in this context, see infra pp. 164-165. 
12Articles 49,50,129 and 146 of the Geneva Conventions respectively. 
Article 146 (2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: 
"Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, 
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, it prefers, and in accordance with the 
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party 
concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case". 
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jurisdiction could be regarded as one of the major achievements of the international 
community after the Second World War as far as national criminal jurisdiction systems and 
the principle of sovereignty of States are concerned. However, today the international 
community has two ad hoc tribunals and one ICC that hopefully will function soon. In light 
of these developments, the notion of universal jurisdiction in international level should be 
perceived as changed and accepted for all serious violations of international humanitarian 
law. 13 
The 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts14 supplemented the provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions relating to the grave breaches, and also extended the application 
of that system of repression to breaches of the Protocol. By means of Protocol I, acts 
committed against new categories of persons and objects protected were accepted as grave 
breaches. ls From the perspective of the ICTY Statute, the important point is whether the 
ICTY has jurisdiction over the grave breaches of the Additional Protocol I, although it is 
not expressly included in its Constitution. Since the ICTY applies "rules of international 
humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law", the significant 
criterion is the nature of its provisions in terms of whether being regarded as part of 
customary international law. 16 On this point, some scholars indicate that the ICTY does not 
have jurisdiction over the grave breaches of the Additional Protocol I on the basis that it 
cannot be perceived as a part of customary international law. " From the point of view of 
13For reasons to reach this conclusion in light of the practice of ad hoc tribunals, see infra pp. 154-159. 
"For the reference see supra Chap. 3, note 22.; In this context, see Bothe, M., Partsch, K., J., and Solf, W., 
A., New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1982).; For the 
significance of the Additional Protocols in International Humanitarian Law, see Gasser, H-P., "Negotiating 
the 1977 Additional Protocols: Was It a Waste of Time? ", in Astrid J. M. Delisssen and Gerard J. Tanja 
(eds. ), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead Essays in Honour of Frits Kalshoven, 
Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1991), pp. 81-92. 
'5Wyngaert, C., "The Suppression of War Crimes Under Additional Protocol I". in Astrid J. M. Delissen 
and Gerard J. Tanja (eds. ), pp. 198-199.; For example refugees and stateless persons in the power of an 
adverse party (Art. 73 of the Protocol I), medical or religious personnel, medical units or medical transports 
which are under the control of the adverse party and protected under the Protocol (Arts. 15-31 of the 
Protocol ), combatants and prisoners of war (Art. 44 of the Protocol I), protection of persons who have 
taken part in hostilities (Art. 45 of the Protocol I). In particular, Article 85 (3-4) of the Protocol I has a 
specific importance in terms of providing protection for civilian population. 
16In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires 
that the international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any 
doubt part of customary law... ", (Secretary-General's Report, par. 34). 
'7Shraga, D., and Zacklin, R., "The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia", (1994) 5 
EJIL p. 364. 
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international humanitarian law, with many respects, such a view does not have any basis for 
the following reasons: 
Firstly, many provisions of Additional Protocol I are related to the protection of 
civilians and reflect the customary international law at the time it was adopted. '8 
Secondly, the argument that since there is no State practice, 19 which is one of the 
main conditions to accept a rule as a customary law principle has no base as far as the 
practice of international humanitarian law is concerned. Until the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals, the international community has witnessed very few international judicial 
decisions on international humanitarian law indicating that conventional law rules have 
become customary law rules. For example, the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg in relation to the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907, similarly the 
United States Military Tribunal in United States v. Von Leeb (the High Command Case) 
with regard to the many provisions of the 1929 Geneva Convention of Prisoners of War 
decided that they were part of customary international law2° without examining the actual 
practice of States. In the same vein, this time, a different international organ, the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua Case, 2' decided that common Articles 1 and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
had become part of customary law, 22 even though in its decision the ICJ did not examine 
one of the essential conditions for being a customary rule through provisions of a 
''Cassese, A., "The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law ofArmed Conflict and Customary 
International Law", (1984) 3 UCLA Pac. Bas. L. J. p. 86., in particular, pp. 86-97.; Greenwood, p. 644.; 
Penna, L., R, "Customary International Law and Protocol I: An Analysis of Some Provisions", in C. 
Swinarski (ed. ), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in 
Honour of Jean Pictet, Geneva, The Hague: International Committee of the Red Cross, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, (1984), p. 201., in particular, pp. 210-224. 
19Lopez, L., "Uncivil Wars: The Challenge ofApplying International Humanitarian Law to Internal Armed 
Conflicts", (1994) 69 New. U. L. Rev. p. 951. Although the view taken by the author is related to the civil 
war concept and Additional Protocol II of 1977, if the matter is State practice to become a customary 
international law rule, it has to be valid for all Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols to thereto. 
20Trial of German Major War Criminals, 1946, Cmd. 6964, at 65,11 Trials of War Criminals before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals under CCL No. 10 (1948) at 462. For references see, Meron, T, "Geneva 
Conventions as Customary Law", in Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law..., pp. 154-155. 
21 Nicaragua v. U. S., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Merits), (1986) ICJ Rep. p. 14. 
'Ibid. paras. 218-220, at pp. 113- 114. 
In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ had a different path from the way which it followed in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. The 
Netherlands), (1969 ICJ Rep. p. 3) in which the Court had strictly looked for the two elements of 
customary law rule: State practice and opinio juris. See in particular, paras. 70-92 of the Judgement of the 
Court.; Abi-Saab regards the ICJ's practice in the Nicaragua Case as a moving forward from the concept of 
the custom to general international law. Abi-Saab, G., "The 1977 Additional Protocols and General 
International Law: Some Preliminary Reflexions", in Astrid J. M. Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja (eds. ), pp. 
121-122. 
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multilateral treaty, State practice. 24 The reason why international judicial decisions in 
relation to humanitarian law rules mostly ignore State practice can be explained by giving 
two reasons: Firstly, it is difficult to find State practice in this field of international law. 
Secondly, and significantly, international "tribunals have been guided, and may continue to 
be guided, by the degree to which certain acts are offensive to human dignity. The more 
heinous the act, the more willing the tribunal will be to assume that it violates not only a 
moral principle of humanity but also a positive norm of customary law". 25 Under this 
guidance, there is no doubt that many provisions of Geneva Conventions, including both 
grave breaches and other breaches, and Additional Protocol I together with Additional 
Protocol II constitute part of customary international law beyond any doubt, as far as the 
protection of innocent civilians in armed conflict situations is concerned. 
Thirdly, during the process for the establishment of the ICTY, there was no doubt 
that many provisions of grave breaches of Additional Protocol I were regarded as part of 
customary international law. The issue at that time was that under which Article of the 
ICTY Statute, the Tribunal could have jurisdiction for such acts. The general intention was 
not Article 2, but Article 3 of the Statute under the heading of "violations of the laws or 
customs of war". 26 
Lastly and most importantly, two recent international instruments give a significant 
place to provisions of Additional Protocol I. The 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind, in Article 20 under the heading of war crimes, although 
it does not divide war crimes into two as grave breaches and other violations of the laws or 
24For a relationship between multilateral treaties and customary international law, see Baxter, R., R., 
"Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law", (1965-1966) 41 BY1L pp. 275-300.; 
and also see Greenwood, C., "Customary Law Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols", in Delissen and Tanja 
(eds. ), pp. 96-99. 
uMeron, "Geneva Conventions... ", p. 157. 
26-It must be noted that the statute of the International Tribunal refers to grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 in article 2 and to violations of the laws or customs of war in article 3. It does not 
refer explicitly to grave breaches of Additional Protocol I. Many of the grave breaches of Additional 
Protocol I also constitute violations of the laws and customs of war". (Final Report of the Commission of 
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), (hereinafter Final Report), par. 
51).; "it is understood that the "laws or customs of war" referred to in Article 3 include all obligations 
under humanitarian law agreements in force in the territory of the former Yugoslavia at the time the acts 
were committed, including common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, and the 1977 Additional 
Protocols to these Conventions". (Statement by Mrs. Albright on behalf of the USA in voting for Resolution 
827/1993), Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting, 
S/PV. 3217, (25 May 1993).; in V. Morris and M. P. Scharf, An Insider's Guide..., Vol. II, pp. 187-188.; In 
the same way, see also statement by Sir David Hanvay on behalf of the UK, in V. Morris and M. P. Scharf, 
An Insider's Guide..., Vol. II, p. 190.; Statement by Mr. Merimee on behalf of France, in V. Morris and 
M. P. Scharf, An Insider's Guide..., Vol. II, p. 184. 
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customs of war, 27 employs almost the same regulation with Article 85 (3 and 4) of the 1977 
Additional Protocol 1.28 Similarly, the ICC Statute includes the same provisions among a 
large number of acts constituting serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed conflicts. 2 
In sum, the ICTY has jurisdiction over the grave breaches of Additional Protocol I 
for the aforementioned reasons as well as the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949. The practice of the ICTY in this regard will be examined in detail below. 
4.2.1. THE PRACTICE OF THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND THEIR 
CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON THE ICC 
Since the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols are now beeing applied for 
the first time at the international level by the ad hoc tribunals, the interpretation and 
application that they place on them undoubtedly has a significant place in the development 
of international humanitarian law. In this context, as to subject-matter jurisdiction of the ad 
hoc tribunals, their contribution to international humanitarian law and their impact on the 
ICC can be examined in two ways. Firstly, the ICTY and the ICTR, to ensure that they do 
not violate the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege), examine the conditions of the 
applicability of different category of crimes, such as under which conditions war crimes or 
the crime of genocide is applicable to a specific event, and by this way, give guidance on 
the conditions for the applicability of international crimes. Secondly, the ad hoc tribunals 
specifically deal with each acts regarded as crimes and examine the elements of specific 
acts, such as is rape an act of torture or inhuman treatment under Article 2 (b) of the ICTY 
Statute. The importance of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in this sense lies in the 
determination of the scope of international crimes. 
27For its importance, see infra pp. 153-160. 
281996 ILC Draft Code, Art. 20 (b, c, d). Article 20 (a) of the Draft Code includes the acts regarded as grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions without referring them as grave breaches. 
29Art. 8 (2) (b) of the ICC Statute. Although the ICC Statute in Article 8 (2) (a) regulates the grave 
breaches system, it does not give any place to grave breaches of the Additional Protocol I in that part. As 
will be discussed later, this division is just symbolic in nature. As far as the concept of jurisdiction of the 
ICC is concerned, there is no difference between Article 8 (2) (a) and 8 (2) (b) of the Statute. See Infra pp. 
158-159. 
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From the perspective of the grave breaches system, the practice of the ICTY has the 
same effects and its contribution to international humanitarian law and most likely its 
impact on the ICC can be followed on this direction. 
4.2.1.1. The Conditions for the Applicability of the Grave Breaches System 
The conditions which apply to the grave breaches system can be examined by dividing them 
into two categories: General Conditions and Specific Conditions. 
4.2.1.1.1. General Conditions 
Before explaining the specific conditions for the applicability of the provisions of grave 
breaches system, it is necessary to address general requirements for the application of the 
norms of international humanitarian law to a particular situation as far as the concept of 
war crimes is concerned. 30 These are: The existence of an armed conflict, whether 
international or not, and the link (nexus) between the acts of the accused and the armed 
conflict. 31 
4.2.1.1.1.1. The Existence of an Armed Conflict 
To apply the concept of war crimes (grave breaches system and other violations of the laws 
or customs of war) to a particular event, there has to be an armed conflict either 
international or non-international in nature. 
The criteria when the law of armed conflict and to what extend can be applied was 
for the first time set up in the case of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic by the Appeals Chamber 
of the ICTY in its "Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction". The Appeals Chamber adopted the following formula to determine whether 32 
there exists an armed conflict: 
30For the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity conditi ons are different from war crimes. See 
infra Chap. 5 and Chap. 6 pp. 239-254,280-292 respectively. 
"These conditions are the same for the application of the other violations of laws or customs of war (Art. 3 
of the ICTY Statute) as the applicability of the grave breaches system. 
32The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No: IT-94-1-AR72, (2 October 1995), (hereinafter Jurisdiction Decision). 
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"... an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups 
or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the 
initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a 
general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful 
settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to 
apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the 
whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place 
there' . 
33 
The significance of the view taken by the Appeals Chamber can be found in its 
effect on the creation of a guideline for the following cases of the ad hoc tribunals and for 
the ICC when it comes in operation. As clearly being witnessed, the ICTY in each case 
refers to the Jurisdiction Decision on the Tadic Case to decide on the issue whether a state 
of armed conflict exists. 34 
From the perspective of international humanitarian law, it is not difficult to decide 
whether there is an international armed conflict. The issue lies in the determination of 
whether there is a non-international armed conflict. The basic norms regulating internal 
armed conflicts can be found in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and the 
1977 Additional Protocol II thereto. Common Article 3 does not have a clear criterion 
setting out when it was applicable, what the level of hostilities required to trigger its 
protections on civilians. Common Article 3 just mentions a standard of "armed conflict not 
of an international character"" that gives a broad discretion to governments in terms of 
33Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 70. 
34Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Trial Chamber, Opinion and Judgement, Case No: IT-94-1-T, (7 May 1997), 
(hereinafter, Tadic Case, Judgement), par. 561. The Tadic Case was considered as very significant in 
international humanitarian law due to being the first detailed decision of an international criminal tribunal 
since the Nuremberg Trials. In this sense, see Scharf, M., P., and Epps, V., "The International Trial of the 
Century? a "Cross-Fire" Exchange on the First Case Before the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal". 
(1996) 29 Corn. Int. 'i L. J. pp. 635-663.; Scharf, M., "The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal of the 
First International War Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg", (1997) 60 Alb. L. Rev. pp. 861-882.; Prosecutor 
v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic also known as "Pavo", Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo also known as 
"Zenga", Trial Chamber, Judgement, Case No: IT-96-21-T, (16 November 1998), (hereinafter Celebici 
Camp Case, Judgement), par. 183.; Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Trial Chamber, Judgement, Case No: 
IT-95-17/1-T10, (10 December 1998), (hereinafter Furundzija Case, Judgement), par. 59. 
35Common Article 3 (1) to the Geneva Conventions states: "In the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict 
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: " 
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determining whether the Article is applicable or not. 36 In other words, although the level of 
conflict is sufficient to trigger the application of the Article, governments can claim that the 
conflict is just an internal disturbance and tension such as riots. To resolve this problem, the 
international community adopted the 1977 Additional Protocol II for the applicability of 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. Under this Protocol, the level of armed 
conflict to apply norms regulating non-international conflicts is defined as follows: "... 
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and 
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol". 37 Then the 
Protocol II, different from Common Article 3, clearly provides that it "shall not apply to 
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts". 38 However, this 
detailed adoption still leaves a discretionary power to governments to distinguish armed 
conflicts from internal disturbances, 39 in the absence of an independent international body 
that can solve the problem. 
At first sight, it may be thought that the Additional Protocol II resolves many 
problems with regard to the threshold of applicability of norms to internal conflicts, but in 
fact it introduces a higher thereshold than found in Common Article 3. According to the 
Protocol II, there has to be "(a) two sets of armed forces, (b) responsible command, and (c) 
sufficient control over territory to carry out sustained operations"40 for the application of its 
provisions. However, the requirements of Additional Protocol II are not consistent with the 
latest international humanitarian law instruments. Firstly, the 1996 ILC Draft Code does 
not give any place for such requirements and just employs the phrase "armed conflict not of 
an international character" which is similar to the vague standard of Common Article 341 
and it does not mention internal disturbances and tensions. Secondly, the ICC Statute again 
NNier III, C., L., "The Yugoslavian Civil War: An Analysis of the Applicability of the Laws of War 
Governing Non International Armed Conflicts in the Modern World', (1992) 10 Dick. J. Int'l L. p. 316. 
37Art. 1(1) of the Additional Protocol II. 
Art 1 (2) of the Additional Protocol II. 
"Nier III, p. 317. 
40Ratner, S., R., and Abrams, J., S., Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law 
Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1997), p. 94.; Kooijmans, P., H., "In the 
Shadowland Between Civil War and Civil Strife: Some Reflections on the Standard-Setting Process", in 
Delissen and Tanja (eds. ) pp. 231-232. 
41Art. 20 (f) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code. 
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does not require the conditions of Additional Protocol II, while it deploys the provisions of 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and of Article 1 (2) of the Protocol 11.42 In 
addition to this regulation, the ICC Statute introduces a new criterion for the acts indicated 
in Article 8 (2) (e) under the heading of "[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character,... 9A3 by means of adopting 
Article 8 (2) (f) of the Statute. It provides "[p]aragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not 
of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances 
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar 
nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is 
protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups 
or between such groups". (emphasis added). Although this new criterion is regarded as 
"reflecting recent developments of the law", 44 it can be considered as the ICC Statute 
creating different standards for the violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions by way of Article 8 (2) (c) (d) and for other serious violations of the laws or 
customs applicable in internal armed conflicts by way of Article 8 (2) (e) (f) as far as the 
literal meaning and the way of its drafting are concerned. Undoubtedly, such a division and 
different standards as to the threshold for non-international armed conflicts cannot be 
explained and cannot be accepted from the perspective of international humanitarian law. 
The criterion that there be protracted armed conflict between governmental 
authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups indicated in Article 8 (2) 
(f) of the ICC Statute, for the first time in international law, was interpreted and applied by 
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic Case in relation to Common Article 3 to 
the Geneva Conventions. `' In its decision, the Trial Chamber concentrated on two aspects 
of a conflict to distinguish an internal armed conflict from banditry, unorganised and short- 
lived insurrections, or terrorist activities; the intensity of the conflict and the organisation 
of the parties to the conflict. 46 To avoid applying different standards for violations of 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and for other violations of the laws or 
customs of war applicable to non-international armed conflicts, the way adopted by the 
42Art. 8 (2) (c) (d) of the ICC Statute. 
43For the acts constituting other serious violations of the laws or customs applicable in armed conflicts not 
of an international character, see Art. 8 (2) (e) of the ICC Statute. 
"Meron, War Crimes Law..., p. 309. 
45Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 70., see supra pp. 136-137.; Trial Chamber, 
Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 562-567. 
46'Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 562. 
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ICTY should guide the ICC on the premise that the concept of protracted armed conflict or 
violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such 
groups within a State, which cannot be found either in Common Article 3 or in the 
Additional Protocol II, must be considered as one of the major impact of the practice of the 
ad hoc tribunals on the ICC Statute. This is an important achievement of the international 
community to clarify the vagueness of the threshold of applicability of international 
humanitarian law norms to internal conflicts. The practice of the ad hoc tribunals can 
clearly guide the ICC in this respect, and the existence of the ICC as an independent 
international criminal judicial body does not leave any room for a broad discretion to 
governments in determining when the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable. 
4.2.1.1.1.2. The Link (Nexus) Between the Acts of the Accused and the Armed 
Conflict 
To apply the rules of international humanitarian law to a specific event, the existence of an 
armed conflict is not enough. At the same time, there has to be a clear link (nexus) between 
the criminal act and the armed conflict. This criterion was described by the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY as follows: "It is sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely 
related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties 
to the conflict". 4' Similarly, the Trial Chamber in the Tadic Judgement decided that "[for a 
crime to fall within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, a sufficient nexus must be 
established between the alleged offence and the armed conflict which gives rise to the 
applicability of international humanitarian law"48 and then clarified this element as follows: 
"It would be sufficient to prove that the crime was committed in the course of or as part of 
the hostilities in, or occupation of, an area controlled by one of the parties... It is not... 
necessary [that the crime] be part of a policy or of a practice officially endorsed or tolerated 
by one of the parties to the conflict, or that the act be in actual furtherance of a policy 
associated with the conduct of war or in the actual interest of a party to the conflict". 49 As 
clearly been understood, the reason why the element of nexus is required is to exclude 
47Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 70. 
"Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 572. 
491bid par. 573. For the application of this element to the specific event of the Tadic Case and its 
discussion by the Trial Chamber, see Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 573-576. 
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purely domestic crimes committed during an armed conflict from the jurisdiction of the ad 
hoc tribunals. 
The interpretation and the application of this element has already taken its place in 
the ICTY's cases that were decided after the Tadic Case, 3° and there is no doubt that this 
practice will create a guideline for the ICC in terms of determining its jurisdiction over the 
crimes which are not domestic crimes in nature. 
4.2.1.1.2. Specific Conditions Applying to the Grave Breaches System 
In addition to the general conditions, specific requirements that are necessary to apply the 
concept of grave breaches system will be discussed and their consistency with the 
development of international humanitarian law in light of the practice of the ICTY and of 
the latest international humanitarian law instruments such as the 1996 ILC Draft Code and 
the ICC Statute will be analysed in detail below. 
4.2.1.1.2.1. The Existence of an International Armed Conflict 
The nature of the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, whether international or non- 
international and whether the internationality of an armed conflict is a jurisdictional 
prerequisite for the application of the grave breaches system under Article 2 of the ICTY 
Statute were the biggest issues to be dealt with by the ICTY. 
The matter of the nature of the armed conflict was first time arisen by the defence in 
the Tadic Case as an interlocutory appeal. The defence in its argument contended that 
Article 2 of the Statute was only applicable to the situations of an international armed 
conflict and the armed conflict in which the offences have allegedly been committed by 
Dusko Tadic cannot be defined as an international armed conflict and thus the International 
Tribunal has no jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 5' 
On the other hand, the Prosecutor argued that the grave breaches system was 
applicable to the case on the premise that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was an 
"Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 193-198.; Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, 
Judgement, par. 65. 
S'Brief to Support the Motion on the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No: IT- 
94-1-T (23 June 1995) (hereinafter Defence Brief on Jurisdiction), paras. 9.3,9.6. 
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international armed conflict. 52 To support its case, the Prosecutor mainly depended upon 
the Security Council's treatment of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an international 
armed conflict by way of referring to the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 33 the 
clear involvement of the JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) to the conflict in the period of 
1992 when the alleged crimes have been committed made the conflict international, 54 and 
the agreements made by the parties to the conflict during the course of the conflict. 55 In 
relation to the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, the United States submitted an 
amicus curiae brief indicating that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, in particular for 
this case in Bosnia-Herzegovina was an international armed conflict in character56 and 
grave breaches provisions of Article 2 of the Statute was applicable, even moreover, the 
grave breaches provisions of that Article can be applied to armed conflicts of a non- 
international character. 57 
The Trial Chamber in relation to its jurisdiction over the grave breaches system held 
that "the element of internationality forms no jurisdictional criterion of the offences created 
by Article 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal"58 on the ground that Article 2 has 
been drafted as to be self-contained, S9 the element of internationality cannot be found in its 
wording60 and the Tribunal applies international law rules, "beyond any doubt part of 
customary law" under which there cannot be any "ground for treating Article 2 as in effect 
importing into the Statute the whole of the terms of the Conventions, including the 
reference in common Article 2 of the Geneva Convention to international conflicts", 61 
S2Prosecutor's Response to the Defence's Motion file on 23 June 1995, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case 
No: IT-94-1-T, (7 July 1995), (hereinafter Prosecutor's Response), p. 36. 
53Prosecutor's Response, pp. 37-38. The Prosecutor along with a number of Security Council Resolutions 
especially quoted SC/RES/764 of 13 July 1992. "... [r]ecalling the obligations under international 
humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949... [r]eaffirms that all parties are 
bound to comply with the obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and that persons who commit or order the commissions of grave breaches 
of the Conventions are individually responsible in respect of such breaches.... ", (Prosecutor's Response, p. 
38). 
Prosecutor 's Response, pp. 39-42. 
ssjbid. pp. 44-45.; For the other evidence submitted by the Prosecutor, see Prosecutor's Response, pp. 43, 
45-46. 
56Amicus Curiae Brief Presented by the Government of the United States of America, (Dusko Tadic, Case 
No: IT-94-1-T) (25 July 1995), (hereinafterAmicus Curiae Brief), pp. 26-35. 
s'Amicus Curiae Brief, p. 35. 
"'Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion, (Jurisdiction of the Tribunal), Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadic, Case No: IT-94-1-T, (10 August 1995), (hereinafter Jurisdiction Decision), par. 53. 
"Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 49. 
601bid, par. 50. 
61Ibid, par. 51. 
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which is a requirement for a national court to have jurisdiction over grave breaches because 
of the principle of State sovereignty, not a requirement for an international tribunal or 
court. 62 Having indicated these facts, the Trial Chamber did not decide the nature of the 
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, although it indicated that there were "clear indications in 
the great volume of material before the Trial Chamber that the acts alleged in the 
indictment were in fact committed in the course of an international armed conflict". 63 
On appeal, the Appeals Chamber treated the issue significantly different from the 
Trial Chamber. Firstly, the majority of the Chamber64 regarded the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia as a "mixed conflict" having both internal and international characteristics . 
6' In 
its decision, the Appeals Chamber depended mainly upon the agreements made by the 
parties to stand by certain rules of humanitarian law, 66 the Security Council's Resolutions, 
reflecting an awareness of the mixed character of the conflicts67 and the nature of the rules 
of international humanitarian law in respect to grave breaches and in particular the concept 
of "protected persons" that can create an illogical result for the civilians especially for the 
Bosnian Serbian civilians . 
6' The decision of the Appeals Chamber in this regard was clearly 
against the majority opinion amongst international lawyers and the Report of the 
621bid, par. 52. 
631bid, par. 53. 
"Judge Li was in the opinion that the Tribunal should consider the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as a 
single and international armed conflict. See Separate Opinion of Judge Li on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 17-19. 
65Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 77.; The related part of the decision to reach 
such a conclusion can be quoted as follows: "The conflict in the former Yugoslavia had been rendered 
international by the involvement of the Croatian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina and by the involvement of 
the Yugoslav National Army ("JNA") in hostilities in Croatia, as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina at least 
until its formal withdrawal on 19 May 1992. To the extent that the conflicts had been limited to clashes 
between Bosnian Government forces and Bosnian Serb rebel forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as 
between the Croatian Government and Croatian Serb rebel forces in Krajina (Croatia), they had been 
internal (unless direct involvement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) could be 
proven)". (par. 72). 
66Ibid. par. 73. 
67Ibid, par. 74. 
68" 
serious infringements of international humanitarian law committed by the government army of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina against Bosnian Serbian civilians in their power would not be regarded as "grave 
breaches", because such civilians, having the nationality of Bosnia-Herzegovina, would not be regarded as 
"protected persons" under Article 4, paragraph 1 of Geneva Convention IV. By contrast, atrocities 
committed by Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian civilians in their hands would be regarded as "grave 
breaches", because such civilians would be "protected persons" under the Convention, in that the Bosnian 
Serbs would be acting as organs or agents of another State, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia. 
Montenegro) of which the Bosnians would not possess the nationality". (Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, 
Jurisdiction Decision, par. 76).; For the criticism of such an interpretation see Greenwood, C., 
"International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case", (1996) 7 EJIL pp. 272-274. 
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Commission of Experts that the conflict should be treated as a single conflict and 
69 international in nature. 
Secondly, the majority of the Appeals Chamber7° held that the element of 
internationality was a jurisdictional requirement for the applicability of grave breaches 
system under Article 2 of its Statute7' on the ground that the internationality requirement 
was a necessary limitation on the grave breaches system due to the principle of State 
sovereigntyn and the concept of protected persons or property could be applicable only if 
there was an international armed conflict. 73 
The view taken by the Appeals Chamber with regard to the requirement of 
internationality of a conflict to apply Article 2 of the Statute has created a guideline for the 
International Tribunal's practice, as having been witnessed in the cases of Rule 61 
proceedings74 and in Final Judgements; the Tadic Judgement, 75 Celebici Camp Case 
Judgement, 76 the Aleksovski Judgement. " 
690'Brien, J., C., "The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law In the 
Former Yugoslavia", (1993) 87 AJIL p. 647.; Meron, T., "International Criminalization of Internal 
Atrocities", (1995) 89 AJIL p. 556.; Meron, T., "The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia", (1993) 72 
Foreign Affairs, p. 128.; Bassiouni, M., C., and Manikas, P., The Law of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, 
Inc., (1996) p. 453.; Roch, M., P., "Forced Displacement in the Former Yugoslavia: A Crime Under 
International Law? ", (1995) 14 Dick. J. Int'l L. p. 7.; Joyner, C., C., "Enforcing Human Rights 
Standards.... ", p. 247.; Amicus Curiae Brief, pp. 26-35.; Final Report, par. 44.; For the criticism and 
whether the element of internationality is required in terms of grave breaches and the concept of "protected 
persons and its relationship with the internationality of the conflict see infra pp. 153-166. 
"Judge Abi-Saab was in the opinion that Article 2 of the ICTY Statute (grave breaches) was also applicable 
to internal armed conflicts. See Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, p. 5. 
71 Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 84. 
721bid, par. 80. 
731bid., par. 81.; and also see supra note 68.; For the criticism and assessment see infra pp. 163-166. 
'4Article 21 (4) (d) of the ICTY Statute prohibits trials in absentina, but judges of the Tribunal while 
drafting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal first time in international level created a 
procedure that is known as "Rule 61 Proceedings" for the situations where arrest warrants had not been 
executed within a reasonable time. For the conditions of the Rule 61 proceedings and its consequences, see 
Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.; Decision of Trial Chamber I- Review of Indictment 
Pursuant to Rule 61, (Vukovar Hospital Case), Case No: IT-95-13-R61 (3 April 1996), ("The general 
conditions for application of Article 2 of the Statute are the existence of an international armed conflict and 
the classification of victims as protected persons.... ", par. 25).; Decision of Trial Chamber II - Review of 
the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic and 
Victor Andric, Case No: IT-95-12-R61, (13 September 1996), par. 21.; Decision of Trial Chamber I- 
Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, Case No: 
IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, (11 July 1996), par. 88. 
''Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 561-608. 
76Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 204-235. 
77Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Judgement, (25 June 1999), (hereinafter, Aleksovski 
Case, Judgement), par. 46. With regard to the applicability of the grave breaches system the Judgement 
was rendered by the majority of the Trial Chamber. See Joint Opinion of the Majority, Judge Vohrah and 
Judge Nieto-Navia, on the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute Pursuant to Paragraph 46 of the 
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To be in accordance with the Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction, the nature 
of the armed conflict has to be decided by the ICTY in every case including any alleged 
crimes regarded as grave breaches under Article 2 of its Statute. As a result, the ICTY has 
to devote lots of its time to decide whether the Article 2 crimes are committed in an 
international armed conflict, since every defendant accused of committing grave breaches 
has contended that the crimes with which was accused had not been committed in an 
international armed conflict situation. 79 
The nature of the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia has been discussed by the 
ICTY in the Tadic Case for the first time in a level of final judgement. The finding of the 
International Tribunal can be considered as in compliance with the Appeals Chamber 
Decision on Jurisdiction in terms of accepting the date of 19 May 1992 the crucial moment 
changing the character of the conflict from international to internal one that should be 
determined under the specific circumstances of each case. Firstly, the majority of the Trial 
Chamber79 held that the conflict in question was at least from the beginning of 1992 to 19 
Judgement, (hereinafter Aleksovski Case, Joint Opinion), par. I. The Presiding Judge, Almiro Simoes 
Rodrigues, dismissed in this regard with the majority of the Trial Chamber. See Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Rodrigues, Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber, (hereinafter Aleksovski Case, Dissenting Opinion 
ofJudge Rodrigues). 
As will be discussed later, in the Tadic, Celebici Camp andAleksovski Cases, one of the major issue was 
the nature of the armed conflict to be dealt with by the ICTY. The Furundzija Case in this regard is not 
relevant since in that case there was no allegation against the defendant constituting grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions. Apart from these cases, for examples see Form of the Indictment Motion #4 - Joint 
Defence Motion to Strike all Counts Arising Under Article 2 or Article 3 for Failure to Allege a Nexus 
between the Conduct and an International Armed Conflict, (Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, 
Case No: IT-95-14/2-PT, 22 January 1999), (hereinafter Kordic & Others), paras. 4-7.; Jurisdictional 
Motion #2 - Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss the Amended Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on 
the Limited Jurisdictional Reach of Articles 2 and 3, (Kordic & Others, 22 January 1999), paras. 11-12.; 
Prosecutor's Response to Joint Defence Form of the Indictment #4 Motion to Strike All Counts Arising 
Under Article 2 or Article 3 for Failure to Allege a Nexus Between the Conduct and an International 
Armed Conflict, (Kordic & Others, 5 February 1999), paras. 2-13.; Kordic Defence Pre-Trial Brief, 
Volume II - Legal Issues, (Kordic & Others, 6 April 1999), paras. 3-26.; Pre-Trial Motion by the 
Prosecution Requesting the Trial Chamber to Take Judicial Notice of the International Character of the 
Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic, Milan Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Stevan 
Todorovic and Simo Zaric, Case No: IT-95-9-PT, 6 December 1998), (hereinafter Simic & Others), paras. 
10-20.; Defence Response to Pre-Trial Motion by the Prosecution Requesting the Trial chamber to Take 
Judicial Notice of the International Character of the Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Simic & Others, (3 
February 1999).; Decision on the Pre-Trial Motion by the Prosecution Requesting the Trial Chamber to 
take Judicial Notice of the Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Simic & Others, (25 March 1999). 
'The Presiding Judge, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, in this case dismissed in this respect with the majority of 
the Trial Chamber. See Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald Regarding the Applicability 
of Article 2 of the Statute, (Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No: IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997), (hereinafter 
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald).; For a view in compliance with the Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge McDonald, see Beane, D., "After the Dusko Tadic War Crimes Trial: A Commentary on 
the Applicability of the Grave Breaches Provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions", (1997) 27 Stet. L. 
Rev. pp. 589-627. 
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May 1992 an international armed conflict. 80 Secondly, the majority of the Chamber decided 
that to regard the conflict either international or internal "the degree of the involvement of 
the VJ [the new name for the army of the FRY after the withdrawal of JNA] and the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) after the 
withdrawal of the JNA on 19 May 1992s81 should be examined. At this point, the Trial 
Chamber again followed the same procedure with the Appeals Chamber Decision on 
Jurisdiction as to determine the nature of the conflict and depended its decision upon the 
concept of protected persons, according to the Appeals Chamber and the Trial Chamber, 
that can only be found in an international armed conflict. "' To determine the relationship 
whether there is an agency relationship between the VJ and the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia on the one hand and the VRS (the army of the Bosnian Republika 
Srpska) and the entity of Republika Srpska on the other hand was discussed by the 
Chamber, in detail, in light of the Nicaragua Case which was decided by the ICJ. 83 By 
comparing the Nicaragua Case with the situations of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Tadic 
Case, the majority of the Tribunal decided that "after 19 May 1992 the armed forces of the 
Republika Srpska could not be considered as de facto organs or agents of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), either in opstina Prijedor [where the 
alleged crimes occurred] or more generallyi84 for the following reason: The VJ and the 
government of the FRY did not exercise "effective control", which was the essential 
element to determine whether there is an agency relationship between the mentioned sides - 
according to the Trial Chamber- that criterion was set up by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case, 
over the VRS and the authorities of Republika Srpska. 8S Although the Trial Chamber 
referred to the involvement of the JNA and the FRY into the conflict in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina by means of equipping, supplying, maintenance and staffing the VRS, 86 
keeping co-ordination with the VRS and Republika Srpska87 and sharing the same goal 
80Tria1 Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 569. 
811bid par. 571. 
82Ibid. par. 583. For the criticism of this concept, see infra pp. 163-166. 
83See supra note 21.; Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 585-588. 
"Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 607. 
851bid. 605. 
861bid. paras. 592,594-595. 
811bid. par. 598. 
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with these political and military organisations in the sense that creating a Greater Serbia! g 
none of them were regarded as sufficient to establish agency relationship between both 
sides by the Trial Chamber. 
However, the Tadic Judgement was appealed by the Prosecution Service of the 
ICTY in this regard89 and the Appeals Chamber reversed the Tadic Judgement by deciding 
that the conflict in question was an international armed conflict and in consequence the 
grave breaches system was applicable. 90 To reach this conclusion the Chamber did not 
regard the Nicaragua Test as a guideline since that test would not seem to be consonant 
with the logic of the law of State responsibility' and is at variance with judicial and State 
practice. 92 Instead, the International Tribunal applied a different test, namely overall control 
that constitutes the legal criteria for determining when armed forces participating in an 
armed conflict which is prima facie internal may be regarded as acting on behalf of a 
foreign power, thereby rendering the conflict international. According to the International 
Tribunal such control "go[es] beyond the mere financing and equipping of such forces [in 
this context, Bosnian Serb forces] and involv[es] also participation in the planning and 
supervision of military operations". 93 However, it should not be perceived as "such control 
should extend to the issuance of specific orders or instructions relating to single military 
actions". 94 In applying this criteria to the conflict, the Appeals Chamber shared the factual 
findings of Trial Chamber's Judgement by indicating that it was disagreed with the legal 
881bid. par. 606.; To establish "effective control" the Trial Chamber concentrated on whether the 
Government of the FRY and JNANJ directed or influenced the actual military operations of the VRS. The 
decision of the Chamber was on negative way about this issue. (see par. 605). 
89In this context, see The Notice ofAppeal of the Prosecution on the Trial Chamber's Judgement Filed on 
6 June 1997, (Tadic Case, Case No. IT-94-1-A).; The Respondent's Brief of Argument of the Prosecution 
(Cross Appeallant) of 12 January 1998, (Tadic Case, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 24 July 1998).; The 
Respondent's Brief of Argument on the Brief of Argument of the Prosecution (CrossAppeallant) of 
January 19,1999, (Tadic Case, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 19 January 1999). 
90Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgement, Case No: IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, paras. 162, 
167-169. 
91Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 116-123. 
921bid. paras. 124-145. 
931bid. par. 145.; In addition to the test of overall control, the Appeals Chamber referred to the two more 
tests establishing individual criminal responsibility as well as State responsibility in international law. The 
first one is related to the crimes committed under specific instructions (or subsequent public approval) by 
single individuals or militarily unorganised groups. The second one "is the assimilation of individuals to 
State organs on account of their actual behaviour within the structure of a State (and regardeless of any 
possible requirement of State instructions). (par. 141. emphasis in original). 
941bid. par. 145.; This is the main point that makes the decision of the Appeals Chamber different from the 
Trial Chamber's Judgement in which the test of "effective control" was applied and directing or 
influencing the actual military operations of the VRS by the Government of the FRY and VJ was 
considered as the decisive criterion to set up such test. See supra note 88. 
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interpretation to be given to those facts. " In accordance with this guideline the Tribunal 
held that the Government of the FRY and its army, JNA/VJ, exercised overall control over 
Republika Srpska and VRS both of whom were acting de facto organs of the FRY, and 
such finding was sufficient to clasify the conflict as an international armed conflict. 96 
Even before the ruling of the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Judgement, the ICTY 
in another case, the Celebici Camp Case, had taken a completely different view from the 
view taken in the Tadic Judgement and held that the Nicaragua Case could not guide the 
Tribunal due to being decided by a very different judicial body (the ICJ) and considering a 
completely different issue of international law - State responsibility-. 
97 The Trial Chamber 
also concluded that the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be regarded as an international 
armed conflict throughout 1992 and there must not be any doubt about the involvement of 
the JNA (later VJ) and the authorities of the FRY into the conflict, even after 19 May 
1992, since the withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina leaving staff, equipment 
to the Bosnian Serbs, creating the VRS from the JNA etc. could be considered as a 
deliberate attempt to cover up their participation into the conflict. 98 
The view taken by the International Tribunal in the Celebici Camp Case is 
completely consistent with the Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald in the 
Tadic Case. 99 
From the point of view of this study, it should be noted that the most important 
point in international humanitarian law and human rights law is the protection of the rights 
of individuals, thus, that as will be pointed out below, the nature of the armed conflict 
should not have a role to play in the application of the rules of international humanitarian 
law to armed conflicts and that the grave breaches system, if it is still regarded as a different 
concept of war crimes from other violations of the laws or customs of war -we are not in 
951bid. par. 148.; The only difference of the decision of the Appeals Chamber from the Trial Chamber's 
Judgement was that the examination of the Dayton Peace Accord, which the FRY was signatory to it and 
represented Republika Srpska, to prove the overall control of the FRY and its army, JNANJ, over the entity 
of Republika Srpska and VRS. (see paras. 157-160). 
961bid. par. 162. 
97Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 230-231.; It should be noted that the Celebici 
Camp Case was rendered before the Appeals Chamber Decision on Tadic Judgement. As far as the 
conclusion is concerned the Appeals Chamber Decision on Tadic Judgement and the Celebici Camp Case 
Judgement are in compliance with each other apart from some differences with regard to the content and 
interpretation of the events. 
"]bid par. 234. For the explanation to reach this conclusion, see paras. 208-227 
99See Tadic Case, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald. Actually the Trial Chamber refers 
to this fact in its decision par. 233. 
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this opinion- must be applicable to both armed conflicts either international or non- 
international in character. 1°° However, it is necessary to discuss in some levels the nature of 
the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, in particular, the conflict in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, since the Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction held that the 
internationality of an armed conflict was a prerequisite for the application of Article 2 of its 
Statute (grave breaches) in light of the final judgements rendered by the ICTY so far. 
Firstly, at first sight, both decisions of the Trial Chambers may seem to be in 
compliance with the Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction in which the nature of the 
armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia was considered as having both international and 
internal dimensions. In this sense, the Tadic and the Celebici Camp Cases' Judgements do 
not create any controversy on the premise that the first one regards the conflict as internal 
and does not apply the grave breaches system, and the second one accepts the conflict as 
international and applies the grave breaches system. However, what creates the controversy 
is that both cases deal with the alleged crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
throughout 1992.101 Under the principles of international humanitarian law and the decision 
of the Appeals Chamber on Jurisdiction, "international humanitarian law [rules] ... apply 
in 
the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole 
territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there". 102 
Unless it is proven that the conflict in question (for a specific case) is a separate armed 
conflict, the rules applicable to the conflict must be the same. On this ground, the cases 
occurring in the same year, involving similar circumstances and evidence should not be 
treated completely different from one to another. In this context, when both decisions of 
the Trial Chambers of the ICTY are examined, the natural result must be that at least 
throughout the year 1992, the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be regarded as an 
international armed conflict for the reasons explained in the Celebici Camp Case and in the 
10°See infra pp. 153-160. 
1 °'See Prosecutor v. Dusan/Dusko Tadic Goran Borovnica, Initial Indictment, Case No. IT-94-1 T, 
(February, 1995). This Indictment has been amended twice in September and December 1995. It charges 
the acused with events alleged to have occurred in the Omarska Camp, located in the opstina of Prijedor, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, between about 23 May and about 31 December 1992. (See Initial Indictment, paras. 
2.1. -2.6., 3.1. -3.9.; Second Amended Indictment, paras. 2.1. -2.7., 3.1. -3.9).; Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, 
Zdravko Mucic, also known as "Pavo ", Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, also known as "Zenga ", 
Indictment, Case No. IT-96-21-T, (19 March 1996). The Indictment is concerned with events alleged to 
have occurred in the Celebici Prison Camp, located in the Konjic municipality, Bosnia-Herzegovina, from 
May 1992 to December 1992. (See paras. 1-15) 
102Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 70 and also see par. 68. 
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Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald in the Tadic Case. 103 As has already 
been indicated above, in the appeal level, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial 
Chamber's Judgement in the Tadic Case and rightly held that the conflict in question was 
an international armed conflict. The view taken by the Appeals Chamber should be 
perceived as in compliance with the development of international humanitarian law and 
most importantly with the structure of the Yugoslavian case. 104 
Secondly, the definition of aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
1974 supports the view that the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was an international armed 
conflict in the sense that the JNA (later VJ) and the Government of the FRY left arms and 
military staff to the Bosnian Serbs and also financed them through paying salaries in order 
to create a "Greater Serbia" in that part of Europe that were sufficient evidence to regard 
the involvement of any State into any conflict as a part of aggression are such ways under 
Article 3 (g) of the definition of aggression. 'os If the involvement of the authorities of the 
FRY cannot be perceived as a sort of aggression against the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
how can the acts of handing over staff, troops, weapons etc. by the JNA while it was 
withdrawing from Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Bosnian Serbs instead of to the responsible 
government, that is internationally recognised as a State Bosnia-Herzegovina, be explained 
under international law? The only explanation for this must be that the withdrawal of the 
JNA was fictitious and it was a cover up for their participation into the conflict as decided 
by the ICTY in the Celebici Camp Case and explained by Judge McDonald in her Separate 
and Dissenting Opinion in the Tadic Case. 106 
103Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 208-227.; Separate and Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge McDonald in the Tadic Judgement. 
104See supra pp. 147-148.; The Appeals Chamber with regard to the conditions of the applicability of the 
grave breaches system as to be an international armed conflict and protected persons or property refers to 
the Appeals Chamber Jurisdiction Decision (see Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 80-82). 
However, it does not examine the possibility of the applicability of the system to all conflicts. For these 
reasons, the same criticism is also valid for the Appeals Chamber's Tadic Judgement. 
1°5LN GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), (14 December 1974). Article 3 (g) of the Resolution states: 
"Any of the following acts regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:... 
(g)The sending by on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out 
acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts.... or its substantial 
involvement therein". 
1°6See supra p. 148.; The Supreme Court of Bavaria in the case of Public Prosecutor v. Djajic (No. 20/96, 
23 May 1997) also took the same view in its judgement with regard to the application of the Geneva 
Conventions to the Yugoslavian conflict in a national level, in Christoph J. M. Safferling, Case Note with 
Commentary, (1998) 92 AJIL pp. 530-531. 
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Thirdly, the practice of domestic criminal courts with regard to the application of 
the grave breaches system for the Yugoslavian situation again supports the view that the 
conflict was an international armed conflict. '07 Undoubtedly, the jurisdictional base for the 
application of the grave breaches system by a national criminal court is the concept of 
universal jurisdiction and that does not create a breach of the principle of State sovereignty. 
As far as the practice of domestic criminal jurisdiction is concerned, the requirement of 
armed conflict that be an international in nature is a sine qua non element to apply the 
system not to violate sovereignty of States. For an International Tribunal, as will be 
explained below, to apply the grave breaches system such a requirement must not be a 
prerequisite jurisdictional element. However, the Appeals Chamber in the Jurisdiction 
Decision, as indicated above, decided that the internationality of armed coflict was a 
prerequisite jurisdictional element for the applicability of the grave breaches system as a 
result of the principle of State sovereignty. 108 In this sense, to be in compliance with the 
State practice, the ICTY should decide the conflict has international aspects. From the 
perspective of international humanitarian law, it is not easy to explain while a national court 
describes the conflict as an international armed conflict, how the International Tribunal can 
consider it is a non-international on the premise that the interpretation and application of 
the rules of international humanitarian law by the Tribunals or the ICC must be more 
flexible than their domestic counterparts as far as the protection of innocent civilians and 
the jurisdictional base of the international judicial bodies are concerned. 
Lastly, the point in respect to what the criterion must be to determine whether an 
armed conflict is international or internal and the applicability of the Nicaragua Case by the 
International Tribunal should be examined. The Decision of the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case 
cannot be regarded as guiding the ICTY to determine the nature of the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia, more specifically in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the ground that the 
jurisdictional base of the ICJ and the International Tribunal are completely different and in 
the Nicaragua Case the major problem was the concept of State responsibility, not 
individual criminal responsibility. 109 However, even if it is regarded as a guideline to 
107Ibid.; IN Re G., Military Tribunal, Division 1, Lausanne, Switzerland, 18 April 1997, in Andreas R. 
Ziegler, Case Note with Commentary, (1998) 92 AJIL p. 78.; and also see Fischer, H., "Some Aspects of 
German State Practice Concerning IHL", (1998) 1 YHIL p. 380. 
108Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 80. 
109Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald in the Tadic Judgement, paras. 27-28.; Celebici 
Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 230-231.; Meron, T., "Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former 
Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's Fallout', (1998) 92 AJIL pp. 236-237.; Fenrick, W., "The Development of the 
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determine the nature of armed conflicts, its interpretation and application by the majority of 
the Trial Chamber in the Tadic Case must be considered as misinterpreted and misapplied 
by the Tribunal on the following basis: To determine that an armed conflict has an 
international aspect as a result of an agency relationship between the State in question on 
the one hand and the armed forces and authorities of the Party to the conflict on the other 
hand, the Nicaragua Case did not establish the criterion of "effective control" to decide 
whether there exists an agency relationship, the concept of dependency for the war 
necessities and control (not necessary to be effective) in this sense should be enough to 
characterise the conflict as having an international dimension. "o In the appeal stage of the 
Tadic Judgement, the Appeals Chamber has applied the concept of overall control, which 
should be regarded as supporting this view, to determine whether there existed an 
international armed conflict in the period of Yugoslav conflict in question . 
"' It is very 
clear that the view taken by the Appeals Chamber will be authoratative in the practice of 
the ICTY and will create the main guideline for the following cases of this Tribunal in 
relation to this specific point. 
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that finding a State responsible for its 
wrongful acts and the nature of the conflict are totally different concepts and to find the 
State responsible, there is no need to find out the nexus between attribution and the nature 
of the armed conflict12 that constitutes another evidence why the Nicaragua Case must not 
create a precedent for the International Criminal Tribunal. In relation to the Yugoslavian 
conflict, the ICJ has again faced with the issue of determining State responsibility, in this 
case the responsibility of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for acts of unlawful 
intervention as argued by Bosnia-Herzegovina that Yugoslavia violated Articles 2 (1-4) and 
31 of the UN Charter, and customary international law in the Case Concerning Application 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
Law ofArmed Conflict through the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia", in Michael N. Schmitt and Leslie C. Green (eds. ), The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next 
Millennium, Vol. 71, Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, (1998), p. 83. 
110Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald in the Tadic Judgement, par. 4.; If the Nicaragua 
Case is considered as a precedent, the view taken by Judge McDonald in her Separate and Dissenting 
Opinion in the Tadic Judgement must be accepted as authoritative for the interpretation and application of 
the Case into the Yugoslavian situation. 
""See supra pp. 147-148. 
12Meron, "Classification ofArmed Conflict... ", pp. 240-241. 
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(hereinafter the Genocide Case). 113 In this case, the ICJ did not discuss the nature of the 
conflict at the provisional measures stage. The Case is still under examination by the Court. 
As will be discussed in the following Chapter, as far as the application of the Genocide 
Convention is at issue, the nature of the armed conflict does not have any role to play in the 
sense that "genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime 
under international law". 114 The ICJ in the Genocide Case referred to this fact as follows: 
"the Convention [Genocide Convention] is applicable, without reference to the 
circumstances linked to the domestic or international nature of the conflict, provided the 
acts to which it refers in Articles II and III have been perpetrated. In other words, 
irrespective of the nature of the conflict forming the background to such acts, the 
obligations of prevention and punishment which are incumbent upon the States parties to 
the Convention remain identical". "5 In light of this fact, and the reasons explained above, 
even if the ICJ in its final judgement holds that the nature of the armed conflict is either 
international or non-international, although it is not necessary for the Case, it should not 
guide the ICTY. Moreover, the ICJ does not have jurisdiction over the establishment of 
individual criminal responsibility. 116 Given this background, there is no way to accept the 
opinion that the determination of the nature of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is a 
vital issue and thus it should be decided by the ICJ, not by the ICTY which has a limited 
jurisdiction and mandate. "7 
In sum, for the reasons explained above, the conflict in question must be regarded 
as having international aspects more than having internal dimensions. "' 
4.2.1.1.2.1.1. The Nature of Armed Conflicts Must Not Have Any Significance in 
International Humanitarian Law 
113 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, (1993) 
ICJ Rep. pp. 3,325.; Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (1996) ICJ Rep. p. 595.; For background to the Case 
and all relevant documents, see Boyle, F., A., The Bosnian People Charge Genocide, Amherst, 
Massachusetts: Aletheia Press, (1996). 
114Art. 1 of the Genocide Convention. 
'"The Genocide Case, Jurisdiction andAdmissibility, par. 31. 
' 16See supra Chap. 1, p. 25. 
"'Alvarez. J., E., "Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgement", (1998) 96 Mich. L. Rev. pp. 2099- 
2100. 
"8Some scholars regard the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as an internal armed conflict. Amongst them: 
Gray, C., "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Civil War or Inter-State Conflict? Characterization and 
Consequences". (1996) 67 BYIL pp. 178-179.; Nier III, p. 313.; Hayden, K, M., "Bosnia's Internal War 
and the International Criminal Tribunal", (1998) 22 Flet. For. World All p. 50. 
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Having indicated the practice of the ICTY in relation to the existence of an international 
armed conflict to apply the grave breaches system and our view that if this condition is still 
important why the conflict must be considered as international in nature, now one of the 
major purposes of the study that why the characterisation of armed conflicts must not be 
important any more for choosing different laws to different armed conflicts as far as the 
protection of innocent civilians in a wartime situation is concerned will be discussed. 
Firstly, the nature of armed conflicts has increasingly changed from international to 
internal or internationalised one in the last decades of the twentieth century. In this sense, 
the laws of war codified in the Geneva Conventions has become irrelevant. 19 As indicated 
earlier120, the Geneva Conventions were one of the major results of the Second World War 
and the intention behind them was to codify rules governing international armed conflicts. 
At that time, the principle of sovereignty of States was dominant and there was no 
possibility to accept criminal jurisdiction of other States due to being considered as 
infringement of States' sovereignty. In the Geneva Conventions just one Article (Common 
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions) was drafted to regulate internal armed conflicts and it 
was not included in the grave breaches system of the Conventions which could be only 
applicable to the conflicts that have international character. However, the developments 
being witnessed by the international community since 1950 have shown that distinguishing 
armed conflicts as either international or internal has been becoming increasingly difficult, 
and the differences between the grave breaches system and other war crimes in terms of 
which law and under which conditions will be applied have been becoming irrelevant'21 as 
far as the protection of innocent civilians in wartime circumstances or more generally, the 
protection of human rights is concerned. For these reasons, the artificial distinction'22 
should not have any role for determining which law to which type of conflict will be 
applied. The view taken by the ILC with regard to war crimes in its 1996 Draft Code 
reflects the desire of international community at least in terms of abandoning the distinction 
'Lopez, 19p. 916.; O'Connell, M., E., "New International Process", (1999)93 AJIL p. 346. 
120See supra Chap. 3, p. 84. 
121McDonald, A., "The Year in Review", (1998) 1 YIHL, p. 120. 
122Abi-Saab, R, "Humanitarian Law and Internal Conflicts: The Evolution of Legal Concern", in Delissen 
and Tanja (eds. ), p. 209.; Meron, "War Crimes in Yugoslavia... ", p. 81.; Von Sternberg, M., R., 
"Yugoslavian War Crimes and the Search for a New Humanitarian Order: The Case of Dusko Tadic", 
(1997), 12 St. John's J. L. Comm. p. 382.; Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, (Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision), p. 5. 
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23 between the grave breaches system and other violations of the laws or customs of war. ' 
However, the ICC Statute separately regulates the concept of grave breaches system from 
the other violations of the laws or customs of war under the law applicable to international 
armed conflicts'24 that is not consistent with the development of international humanitarian 
law and that can create some problems due to having two different categories of war crimes 
for international armed conflicts in specific, instead of having one governing all armed 
conflicts in general (the ICC Statute regulates internal armed conflicts in similar way as 
well). 125 To avoid such problems, Article 8 of the ICC Statute should not have constituted 
different laws to different categories of armed conflicts and in particular, should not have 
included grave breaches system just for international armed conflicts. For this reason, the 
ICC Statute in this respect should have been drafted as follows: "The Court shall have 
jurisdiction in respect of war crimes irrespective of the nature of the armed conflict". 126 
Although the ICC Statute includes such a different law applicable to international armed 
conflicts from internal armed conflicts, as will be indicated below, in terms of the grave 
123Art. 20 of the ILC Draft Code. 
'24Art. 8 of the ICC Statute. 
'uCassese, A., "The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections", (1999) 10 
EJIL p. 150. 
'26Article 8 (1) of the ICC Statute states: "The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in 
particular when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such 
crimes" (emphasis added), then in Art. 8 (2) (a) the grave breaches system and in Art. 8 (2) (b) other 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict are regulated. Art. 8 (2) 
(c, d, e, f) governs internal armed conflicts. At this point, it should be noted that the ICC Statute for war 
crimes introduces a new element that "in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as a part of a 
plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes" which cannot be found in the 
Nuremberg Charter, the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols to thereto, and that causes some 
problems as to mixing war crimes with the concept of crimes against humanity described in Article 7 of the 
ICC Statute as "any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population... " (emphasis added). This type of regulation must be assessed as 
an unfortunate in terms of determining the conditions of the crimes under which the ICC can deal with 
such crimes. This way of adoption of the ICC Statute should be regarded as a drawback from the customary 
international humanitarian law that has considered each act can constitute a war crime, regardless of being 
committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission. In additionally, the problem 
with the new element lies on its interpretation. Does it mean that an individual committed a single crime 
committed in a wartime situation will not be prosecuted and punished as long as it was proved that such 
offence was committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission? If so, the 
regulation of the ICC Statute cannot be accepted as reflecting the customary international law in this 
regard. As long as the main purpose of the ICC is understood as its first duty is to prosecute major 
criminals, in other words, high ranking military and political individuals responsible for the commission of 
war crimes, the interpretation of new element in this way may be understandable, but this cannot be the 
conclusion which can be drawn from the provisions of the ICC Statute. Cassese regards the new element as 
"relat[ing] to the Court's jurisdiction and must not affect the existing notion of war crimes". (Cassese, "The 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.... p. 149). If this view is right, it should have been indicated in 
some other Articles, not under the war crimes. Hopefully, the ICC when it becomes in operation will solve 
this problem through case law. The practice of the ad hoc tribunals will clearly guide the ICC in this 
respect. 
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breaches system or other violations of the laws or customs of war applicable to 
international armed conflicts on the one hand and of its internal counterpart regulations on 
the other hand does not constitute a different concept of jurisdiction such as universal 
jurisdiction for the grave breaches. 
Secondly, the grave breaches system must be applicable to all conflicts irrespective 
of the nature of the armed conflict and for its applicability the element of internationality 
must not be a precondition for international tribunals or the ICC on the ground that the 
grave breaches system was introduced into international humanitarian law in order to 
provide the enforcement of the system by States parties to the Conventions by way of 
adopting the concept of universal jurisdiction. 127 At the international level, the development 
of international humanitarian law and the practice of the ad hoc tribunals proved that the 
notion of universal jurisdiction could not be only devoted to the grave breaches system, as 
will be indicated below. The ICC Statute also indicates this fact by establishing the 
conditions of the exercise of jurisdiction regardless of whether the acts constitute grave 
breaches or other violations of the laws or customs of war of whether they are committed 
in an international armed conflict or non-international armed conflict. 128 From the point of 
view of war crimes, as indicated earlier, the main distinction of the grave breaches system 
from other war crimes is the recognition of the concept of universal jurisdiction which 
brings an obligation (erga omnes in nature) on States to punish or extradite the persons 
responsible for committing such acts. As long as the 1949 Geneva Conventions and States 
parties to these Conventions are concerned, for domestic enforcement of international 
humanitarian law, the distinction in this regard can be accepted. However, for the ad hoc 
tribunals or the ICC, the system as including universal jurisdiction concept cannot be 
imported into the international level. The international community today has two ad hoc 
tribunals and the ICC those of whom should not tolerate any more human rights law 
127Trial Chamber, Aleksovski Case, Dissenting Opinion ofJudge Rodrigues, par. 38. 
' 22Article 12 of the ICC Statute brings the condition of State consent to have a jurisdiction over war crimes, 
genocide, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression. One of the consent of the related States - 
the State where the act occurred or the State of nationality of the accused or a third State which is not party, 
but accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC with regard to the crime in question- is enough to exercise 
jurisdiction. Apart from this general principle, if the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter refers to the Prosecutor pursuant to Article 13 (b) of the ICC Statute that a situation in which war 
crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or the crime of aggression has occurred, to exercise jurisdiction 
over such crimes, the ICC does not need any consent of related States. This way of regulation must be 
considered as the impact of the way of the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR on the ICC Statute. 
(Cassese, "The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal.... p. 161). 
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violations just because of the artificial distinction of armed conflicts and of different 
concepts of jurisdiction for different types of crimes. This is because they were created in 
the 1950's in the absence of an international criminal court and under completely different 
situations which the international community faced at that time. For these reasons, the ad 
hoc tribunals or the ICC must interpret and apply the international humanitarian law 
instruments, in this context the Geneva Conventions, in compliance with the development 
of international law and the situations of the world that has increasingly changed since 
1950. 
Thirdly, as will be discussed later, the view taken by the Appeals Chamber in the 
Tadic Jurisdiction Decision in relation to the interpretation of Article 3 (violations of the 
laws or customs of war) of its Statute as a very broad category of crimes "cover[ing] all 
violations of international humanitarian law other than the "grave breaches" of the four 
Geneva Conventions falling under Article 2 (or, for that matter, the violations covered by 
Articles 4 and 5, to the extent that Articles 3,4 and 5 overlap)", '29 covering Common 
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II and applicable to all 
conflicts regardless of the nature of the conflict on the basis that they are minimum 
fundamental customary law rules, 130 is not consistent with the view taken by the Appeals 
Chamber with regard to the applicability of the grave breaches system that was created as 
only applicable to international armed conflicts in the Geneva Conventions. If the ICTY had 
strictly interpreted Common Article 3, as Article 2 of its Statute, it would not have been 
possible to apply the Article to international armed conflicts since Common Article 3 
clearly deploys the phrase "armed conflict not of an international character". In this 
context, there is a clear controversy in the interpretation and application of Articles 2 and 3 
of the ICTY Statute. It is not understandable that while the ICTY applied the grave 
breaches system without mentioning the customary nature of these rules, and why it 
interpreted Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions under Article 3 of its Statute and 
concluded that the nature of armed conflict was not important to apply it. 131 There is no 
doubt that the grave breaches system is a part of fundamental norms of international 
129Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 87. 
1OIbid paras. 91,102,103,117,137.; The Final Judgements of the ICTY: Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 
609-617.; Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 316-317.; Furundzija Case, Judgement, paras. 132-133. 
"'Meron, T., "The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law", 
(1996) 90 AJIL p. 242.; Meron, T., "War Crimes Law for the Twenty-First Century", in Schmitt and Leslie 
(eds. ), p. 328.; Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab in the Jurisdiction Decision on Appeal, p. 4.; 
O'Connell, p. 348. 
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humanitarian law that are customary law rules in nature and must be applicable to all types 
of armed conflicts. 132 In this sense, the ICC Statute must be perceived as a step backward 
from customary international law since devoting grave breaches system only applicable to 
international armed conflicts. 
Fourthly, the international community has been witnessing the criminalisation of 
internal atrocities133 which creates the same effect with the grave breaches system on the 
premise that once the international community recognises the criminalisation of internal 
conflicts and the individual criminal responsibility for that it should be considered as giving 
a right to every State to prosecute or extradite responsible persons. In other words, acts 
constituting non-grave breaches but violations of the laws or customs of war can fall within 
universal jurisdiction. 134 The practice of the international community leads to this 
conclusion for the following reasons: Firstly, for example with regard to crimes against 
humanity and the crime of genocide, the notion of universal jurisdiction was accepted in the 
absence of a provision in particular in the Genocide Convention. In this sense why should 
not violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II be regarded as leading to 
universal jurisdiction inherent it? 135 Secondly, although violations of Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II were not included in the grave breaches system, they are all concern 
to the international community and must be subject to universal condemnation and States' 
duty in this respect must be characterised as erga omnes in nature. 136 The latest 
developments of international humanitarian law support such a result. In light of the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals (in relation to the applicability of Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II to the Yugoslavian and Rwandan cases), 137 the regulations of the 
1996 ILC Draft Code138 and the ICC Statute, '39 it can be concluded that although, at first 
sight, it may seem to be that there is a big difference between the grave breaches system 
and other violations of international humanitarian law, such as violations of Common 
'32Simic & Others, Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief (31 March 1999), paras. 53-55.; Decision on the Defence 
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on the Limited Jurisdictional 
Reach of Articles 2 and 3, (Kordic & Others, Case No: IT-95-14/2-PT, 2 March 1999), par. 25.; Trial 
Chamber, Aleksovski Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rodrigues, paras. 39-41. 
133Meron, T., "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities", (1995) 89 AJIL p. 554. 
"°Ibid p. 569. 
'35Ibid. 
''Ibid p. 576. 
"'See Infra pp. 217-224. 
''Art. 20 of the 1996 ILC Draft Code. 
139A XL 8 of the ICC Statute. 
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Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, this difference does not create any obstacle to holding 
individuals criminally responsible, as long as the jurisdiction of the ICC and legal 
instruments in this regard are concerned. In particular, the ICC Statute does not introduce a 
special jurisdiction for the grave breaches system, even though it is designed as a separate 
category of crimes. With regard to the jurisdiction of the ICC over the international crimes, 
there is no distinction between the grave breaches and other serious violations of the laws 
or customs of war, regardless of whether they are committed in an international or non- 
international armed conflict, as far as the concept of universal jurisdiction and its 
applicability are concerned. For these reasons, the traditionally and artificially accepted 
distinction between these category of crimes with regard to whether providing universal 
jurisdiction is outdated today, and the Conventions in this regard must be interpreted as 
consistent with the development of international humanitarian law, in particular consistent 
with the developed customary international law, and the needs of the international 
community. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the substantive content of the grave breaches system 
and Common Article 3 is similar to each other. 10 Both regulations mainly consist of 
guaranteeing minimum human rights standards in an armed conflict situation and innocent 
persons are protected against horrendous crimes of concern to the international community 
such as murder, rape, torture, inhuman treatment and taking of hostages. 141 They can all be 
committed in international or internal armed conflicts. 142 Although grave breaches of the 
Conventions resemble to the offences in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, the 
application of these rules as different from international to internal conflicts can create 
illogical results. For example, as indicated above, one of the conditions of the applicability 
of the grave breaches system to an armed conflict is to be an international armed conflict 
which can cause some problems. Under such circumstances, if the Yugoslavian case is 
considered as just simply an internal armed conflict, charges of torture, murder or rape 
cannot be brought before the ICTY as grave breaches of the Conventions. They can be 
140Meindersma, C., "Violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as Violations of the Laws 
or Customs of War Under Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia", (1995) 42 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. pp. 391-392.; Paust, J., "Applicability of International Criminal 
Laws to Events in the Former Yugoslavia", (1994) 9 Am. U. J. Int'l L& Pol'y p. 511.; Paust, J., J., and 
Blaustein, A., P., "War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh Experience", (1978) 11 
Van. J. Trans'l L. p. 28. 
"'See Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and grave breaches provisions of the Conventions. 
142John, R, W., D., J., The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, (1998), p. 12. 
159 
presented as violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3), genocide (Article 4) or 
crimes against humanity (Article 5), however, all other category of crimes require different 
elements to set up individual criminal responsibility and its consequence some of the worst 
crimes can go unpunished as a result of the artificial distinction between the classification of 
armed conflicts as either international or internal in character. 143 From the point of view of 
international humanitarian law, such an outcome cannot be on any ground justified. The 
question that what makes these crimes (grave breaches of the Conventions) so special and 
only applicable to international armed conflicts, not applicable to internal conflicts, cannot 
be answered as far as the protection of human rights and of innocent lives in wartime 
situations are concerned. 
4.2.1.1.2.2. The Concept of Protected Persons or Property 
The concept of the grave breaches system and the offences enumerated in Article 2 of the 
ICTY Statute can only be applicable when the acts are perpetrated against persons or 
property considered as "protected" by the Geneva Conventions. Article 4 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention on Civilians defines protected persons as "those who, at any given 
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, 
in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not 
nationals". 144 The Geneva Conventions do not only protect persons in a wartime situation, 
but also protect the property that mainly includes hospitals and the personal property of 
civilians. '45 In the case of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia the international community 
13 See Infra Chap. 5 and Chap. 6. 
"Art. 4 (1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The content of the protected persons can be summarised for 
each Convention as follows: Articles 13 (wounded or sick members of armed forces), 24 (protection of 
permanent personnel-medical-), 25 (protection of auxiliary personnel) and 26 (personnel of aid societies) of 
the First Geneva Convention.; Articles 13 (wounded, sick or shipwrecked members of armed forces), 36 
(protection of the personnel of hospital ships) and 37 (medical and religious personnel of other ships) of the 
Second Geneva Convention.; Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention (prisoners of war).; Articles 4 
(definition of protected persons) and 20 (hospital staff) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
"SRelated Articles of the Conventions can be indicated as follows: Articles 19 (medical units and 
establishments), 33 (buildings and stores in relation to the medical units and establishments) and 34 
(property of aid societies) of the Fist Geneva Convention.; Articles 22 (notification and protection of 
military hospital ships), 24 (hospital ships utilized by relief societies and private individuals of -parties to 
the conflict-), 25 (hospital ships utilized by relief societies and private individuals of -neutral countries) and 
27 (coastal rescue craft) of the Second Geneva Convention.; Articles 18 (protection of hospitals), 19 
(discontinuance of protection of hospitals), 21 (land and sea transport), 22 (air transport), 33 (pillage, 
reprisals), 53 (prohibited destruction of property belongs to individuals, State or any other organisation), 57 
(requisition of hospitals) of the Fourth Convention. 
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witnessed how the hospitals, schools, cultural or religious places and individual property of 
civilians have been targeted. To protect such a horrendous outcome, the inclusion of the 
protection of property under the grave breaches system has a significant place in 
international humanitarian law, but in the practice of the ICTY, this concept can be 
examined in a secondary level since the ICTY has mainly concentrated on the notion of 
protected persons. 146 
The concept of protected persons first time by the ICTY was interpreted in the 
Tadic Jurisdiction Decision as an interlocutory appeal. The Appeals Chamber147 in its 
decision examined the concept of protected persons in connection with the nature of the 
armed conflict and held that "provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to persons or 
objects protected only to the extent that they are caught up in an international armed 
conflict". 148 According to the Chamber the requirement of internationality was a sine qua 
non element for the application of the grave breaches and its second requirement of being 
protected persons or property for the following reason: If the conflict between the forces of 
Bosnian Government and of the Bosnian Serbs had been regarded as international in 
particular after the withdrawal of the JNA under the assumption that the Bosnian Serbs 
acted as de facto agents or organs of the FRY it would have created an unjustifiable 
conclusion that atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serbs against the Bosnian Muslims in 
their hands would be regarded as grave breaches, because such civilians would be regarded 
as protected persons while atrocities committed by the Bosnian forces against the Bosnian 
Serbs in their hands would not be regarded as grave breaches, because such civilians would 
not be considered as protected persons under the Convention due to sharing the same 
nationality with the Bosnian Muslims. 149 
The ruling of the Appeals Chamber was followed by the Trial Chamber in the Tadic 
Judgement that was the first and detailed examination of the notion in a final judgement 
'The main practice of the ICTY with regard to the concept of protected property can be found in a Rule 
61 decision in the Rajic Case: Decision of Trial Chamber 11 - Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 
61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic and Victor Andric, Case No: IT-95- 
12-R61, (13 September 1996), paras. 38-43. 
'47The Trial Chamber did not interpret the concept of protected persons in its Jurisdiction Decision, it just 
referred to the definitions of the concept in the Geneva Conventions. Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, 
Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 49,51. 
"Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 81. 
1491bid. par. 76. For quotation see supra note 68. 
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level. The majority of the Chamber'" - as parallel to the Appeals Chamber Decision on 
Jurisdiction and the nature of the armed conflict- held that the victims of the alleged 
offences were not protected persons in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying 
power of which they were not nationals on the ground that the conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina after the withdrawal of the JNA on 19 May 1992 could be regarded as an 
internal armed conflict and the armed forces of the Republika Srpska could not be 
considered as de facto organs or agents of the FRY under the guidance of the Nicaragua 
Case's' The criterion for the determination of whether victims of the alleged offences were 
protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention was the same as with the 
requirement of internationality discussed by the Chamber in its decision. 152 The same view 
was also deployed by the ICTY in the Aleksovski Judgement. 153 However, in the appeal 
stage, the Appeals Chamber in relation to the Tadic Judgement has taken a completely 
different view from the Trial Chamber. Having decided that the conflict was an 
international one, the International Tribunal held that victims of the alleged crimes were 
protected persons on the ground that the Bosnian Serb forces were acting de facto organ of 
the FRY and the Geneva Conventions (in this context Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention) should be interpreted in light of its purpose that is the protection of civilians to 
the extend of maximum level. 15' Hopefully, the Appeals Chamber will follow the same view 
in the appeal stage of the Aleksovski Judgement. 
Even before the ruling of the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Judgement, the other 
Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the Celebici Camp Case had taken a completely different 
view from the Tadic and Aleksovski Judgements of the Trial Chamber and decided -in 
addition to the characterisation of the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina- that for 
the purposes of the application of the grave breaches system under Article 2 of the Statute, 
the victims of the alleged offences - in this case the Bosnian Serbs- must be regarded as 
having been in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying power of which they were 
1S°Presiding Judge McDonald was dissident on this point. See Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
McDonald in the Tadic Judgement. 
'51Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 607. 
"'See paras. 578-607 of the Tadic Judgement. For the criticism of the decision with regard to the concept 
of protected persons, the same assessment and criticism are valid. In this sense, see supra pp. 153-160. 
'"Trial Chamber, Aleksovski Case, Judgement, par. 46.; Aleksovski Case, Joint Opinion, paras. 1,14-27, 
28-35.; In this sense, also see Press Release, Aleksovski Case: The Judgement of the Trial Chamber, 
(JUPIU/400-E, 7 May 1999).; Press Release, The Aleksovski Judgement, (CC/PIS/413-E, 30 June 1999). 
", Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 167-168. 
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not nationals, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina'55 on the basis that the 
conditions of Article 4 of the Geneva Convention on Civilians must be interpreted in a more 
flexible manner to meet the necessities of the international community and also to be in 
accordance with the development of the human rights doctrine. '56 In this sense, domestic 
legislation of a State on citizenship in a situation of disintegration of a State which leads the 
creation of new States and the concept of State succession cannot be the convenient 
criterion to decide whether victims of grave breaches of the Conventions can enjoy the 
protected person status or not as far as the purpose of the Convention that is the protection 
of individuals not to protect State interests in this regard is concerned. 157 
In addition to the interpretation of nationality in this way, one of the other 
important points in the Celebici Camp Case that should be noted is that the 
characterisation of the armed conflict and the concept of protected persons or property are 
significantly different elements, although they have close link in most cases. '58 
From the perspective of international humanitarian law, the view taken by the Trial 
Chamber in the Celebici Camp Case and by the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Case 
(Judgement) must be regarded as more convenient than other views for the following 
reasons: Firstly, the Geneva Conventions, which were drafted to mainly regulate 
international armed conflicts after the Second World War, must be interpreted and applied 
flexible to be in accordance with the development of international humanitarian and of 
human rights law that has rapidly changed since 1950. Secondly, the protection of 
individuals' rights in a wartime situation must not be violated by way of literally 
interpreting and applying the norms of international humanitarian law, as having been 
witnessed in the Tadic and Aleksovski Judgements of the Trial Chamber with regard to the 
concept of nationality. 
'ss'Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 274. 
'mIbid paras. 263,266. 
'571bid par. 263.; Appeals Chamber, Tadic Judgement, par. 168. 
'S$Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 210.; "there arises a connection with the issue of 
the nature of the armed conflict, for clearly a showing that individuals are "in the hands of' a party of 
foreign nationality would generally lead to the conclusion that the conflict is international in nature. 
Conversely, if individuals are deemed not to be protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention on the grounds 
that they are of the same nationality as their captors, it may well be, although it does not necessarily follow, 
that the relevant conflict is an internal one". (par. 245). Unfortunately, in the Tadic Case the Appeals 
Chamber ignores this fact, and explains the connection between the nature of armed conflicts and the 
concept of protected persons as follows: "Only if the Appeals Chamber finds that the conflict was 
international at all relevant times will it turn to the second question of whether the victims were to be 
regarded as "protected persons"". (Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 82). 
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In light of the practice of the ICTY and of the development of international 
humanitarian law, it must be noted that the concept of protected persons or property should 
be interpreted and applied in compliance with the following principles: 
Firstly, there should not be a connection between the nature of the armed conflict 
and the concept of protected persons or property. If the concept of protected persons or 
property as a condition to apply the grave breaches system is examined in connection with 
the nature of conflicts, as the Appeals Chamber on Jurisdiction Decision, the Trial 
Chambers' on the Tadic Judgement and the Aleksovski Judgement did, in other words, it's 
application is depended upon the existence of an international armed conflict, how can it be 
explained that for the application of the grave breaches system two different elements are 
required? The determination of the concept of protected person status by means of 
depending on the internationality of the conflict makes this element ineffective since it is 
inherited in the results of international armed conflicts, as being witnessed in the application 
of the notion by way of interpreting the phrase "in the hands of a party" by the Appeals 
Chamber's Jurisdiction Decision and the Trial Chambers' Tadic and Aleksovski 
Judgements. Such an outcome cannot be welcomed from the point of view of international 
humanitarian and human rights law on the ground that the internationality of a conflict and 
the concept of protected persons are quite different concepts. 1'9 Of course, it is clear that if 
the conflict is an international one, it is easy to establish the second element of the grave 
breaches system. There is no doubt that international armed conflicts bring the protected 
persons notion into the international law field at the same time. However, this way of 
interpretation and application of the norms of international humanitarian law do not meet 
the needs of the international community, as having been witnessed, the nature of the 
conflicts has increasingly changed from international to internal or internationalised one. In 
particular, in a situation of disintegration of a Federal State like the former Yugoslavia and 
in a situation of conflict within a State that has different ethnic origins, religious beliefs, 
culture etc. such as the Rwanda and Kosovo cases, is it possible to say that different groups 
or communities cannot be regarded as protected persons? For these reasons, the provisions 
of the grave breaches system of the Geneva Conventions must be interpreted and applied by 
taking into the reality of the structure of international humanitarian law account. 
159Tria1 Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 210.; Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief, (Simic & 
Others, Case No: IT-95-9-PT, 31 March 1999), par. 73. 
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Moreover, it should be noted that Article 2 of the ICTY Statute replaced the notion 
of "protected persons" by a specific designation of "civilians". As a result of adopting 
Article 2 in this way, it was provided that the grave breaches system can be applied by the 
International Tribunal whenever they are committed against civilians regardless of the 
nature of the conflict as international or non-international in nature. 160 In this sense, even it 
is not necessary to interpret and apply the grave breaches system of the Geneva 
Conventions in a way it was already indicated above. The wording of the ICTY Statute 
must be carefully examined and interpreted. However, when the entire Article is taken into 
account, a clear controversy can be found between the first paragraph deploying the phrase 
"acts against persons or property protected" and the scope of the grave breaches system 
deploying the term "civilian" or "civilians". The ICTY should interpret and overcome this 
controversy in favour of the use of the term of "civilians" which is in compliance with the 
development of international humanitarian and of human rights law and more importantly is 
consistent with the Yugoslavian situation. In general, the way of drafting the ICTY Statute 
indicates the trend in international law as to protecting human rights violations, but the 
most recent and significant development in international humanitarian law, the adoption of 
the ICC Statute, is not in compliance with the ICTY Statute with regard to the adoption of 
the grave breaches system. 161 It uses literally the same phrases with the Geneva 
Conventions. That is why, it must be considered as avoiding these important achievements 
of the international community. 
On this point, it must be noted that accepting the concept of protected persons as a 
separate element from the nature of armed conflicts has a vital importance to provide its 
applicability into internal armed conflicts and also constitute a great deal of evidence to 
prove why the grave breaches system must be applicable to all conflicts irrespective of their 
characteristics. 
Secondly, the notion of protected persons must not be interpreted by way of using 
the concept of nationality that derives from the domestic legislation on citizenship on the 
basis that the Geneva Conventions and literal interpretation of its provisions are not 
sufficient for the needs of the international community has occurred since 1950. For this 
160Joyner, "Arresting Impunity... ", p. 157.; This way of adoption of the ICTY Statute also supports the view 
that there must not be any artificial distinction as international or internal armed conflicts and different 
conflicts and different laws to different types of conflicts. 
161See Article 8 (2) (a) of the ICTY Statute. 
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reason, the interpretation and application of the grave breaches system, in particular, of the 
protected person status must be flexible162 as the Trial Chamber was in the Celebici Camp 
Case for the purposes of the applicability of the system. The use of the term "civilians" in 
the provisions of Article 2 of the Statute also indicates the necessity of the flexible 
interpretation of the concept of nationality in particular for the cases of dissolution of 
Federal States. In such circumstances, the concept of nationality should be taken into 
account in accordance with the notion of "community" which was clearly defined by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in 1930.163 In terms of interpreting nationality, 
there must not be any problem using the concept of "community" to guide the International 
Tribunal on this issue when the circumstances are not in compliance with the domestic 
legislation on citizenship and the facts of events, such as the Bosnian Serbs had the 
citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they did not accept it, and took part in the 
conflict against the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In the same vein, the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Judgement decided that in 
modern inter-ethnic armed conflicts, which the international community has been facing 
with since 1950's, ethnicity is more important than the concept of nationality and it is 
sufficient to define the concept of protected persons. '" The view taken by the Appeals 
Chamber should be perceived as in compliance with the reality of international humanitarian 
law and the Yugoslavian case. It is also important to indicate how the Geneva Conventions 
should be interpreted and applied to the events those are not international armed conflicts 
known from history. However, if the Appeals Chamber have used the concept of 
"community" instead of "ethnicity" to determine whether victims of armed conflicts were 
protected persons or not, it would have been more convenient since the concept of 
community is broader and more suitable than the concept of ethnicity for defining a group 
of people as protected persons under the Geneva Conventions. 
'62Paust, "Applicability of International Criminal Law.... ", pp. 512-513. 
163lnterpretation of the Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Emigration 
(Question of "Communities'), Section B, No. 17, (31 July 1930). The notion of "community" is defined as 
"... a group of persons living in a given country or locality, having race, religion, language and traditions of 
their own, and united by [those factors] in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their 
traditions, maintaining their form of worship, securing the instruction and upbringing of their children in 
accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and mutually assisting one another", in Roch, p. 21. 
The author prefers the definition of "community" to the definition of "group" indicated in the Genocide 
Convention with regard to the applicability of the Convention to the Yugoslavian case. 
164Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 166. 
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4.2.1.2. THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE GRAVE BREACHES SYSTEM 
One of the other major contributions of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals to international 
humanitarian law and its impact on the ICC can be examined in the determination of the 
scope of the grave breaches system and the definition of the elements of each crimes 
regarded as falling within the grave breaches system. 
Before analysing the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, in this context, the principle of 
legality (nullum crimen sine lege) in international law and the interpretation and application 
of it by the International Tribunals need to be briefly indicated. 
As is well known from the national criminal justice systems, the principles of nullum 
crimen sine lege and nulla sine lege, are basic pillars of the enforcement of individual 
criminal responsibility. However, the application of these rules in the international criminal 
justice system are quite different from its domestic counterparts since the method of 
criminalisation of conduct is different for national and international criminal institutions. 165 
While a criminalisation of an act relies upon legislation in the national level, there is not any 
institution making law for the international criminal justice systems and the principles can 
be drawn from conventions or customary international law. '66 As a result of this situation, 
crimes in international humanitarian and criminal law are regulated as a broad category such 
as war crimes, crimes against humanity without providing any detailed definitions of crimes 
and their elements. 167 For example, acts constituting wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health is a crime punishable under the grave breaches system, but 
what acts constitute such an offence is not clear. There is no doubt that rape or any other 
sexual violence can be punishable under this category, although they are not explicitly 
included in the grave breaches system. 168 Should this way of interpretation and application 
of the norms of international humanitarian law be perceived as a violation of the principle of 
legality? The same criticism is also valid for the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals which they 
have the same characteristics. The Commentary to the ICTY Statute, not to violate the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege, states that the International Tribunal "should apply 
165Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 403. 
166Ibid par. 404. 
167Cassese, "The Statute of the International Criminal Court... ", pp. 148-149.; Murphy, S., D., "Progress 
and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia", (1999) 93 AJIL, p. 
87. 
168See infra pp. 178-185. 
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rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary 
law". 169 With regard to the way of adoption of the Statutes of the Tribunals, the view that 
the principle of legality was violated since the definitions of crimes should have been 
included the elements of offences10 does not have any ground in international law. As far 
as the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR are concerned, from the technical and domestic 
law perspectives, their regulations can be regarded as not sufficient. However, for the 
reasons explained above, in the international field, it cannot be expected to find a detailed 
criminal code consisting of the elements of crimes that is also not required by international 
law171 although it is desirable. Non-inclusion of the crimes and their elements do not mean 
that the principle of legality is violated. At this point, the practice of the international 
criminal institutions has a very significant role to play for interpreting and applying the 
elements of offences, in other words, more generally for determining the scope of crimes 
and their elements. One of the most important aspects of the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals lies on this fact and it will create guidance for the ICC. 'n 
4.2.1.2.1. Wilful Killing 
169Secretary-General's Report, par. 34. The Secretary-General's Report specifies the customary law 
applicable by the Tribunal as: "the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War 
Victims; the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the 
Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948; and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 
1945". (par. 35 footnotes omitted). 
10Blakesley, C., L., "Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, and Triggering Mechanisms", (1997) 25 Denv. J. 
Int'l L. & Pol'y p. 243. 
"'Paust, J., J., "Nullum Crimen and Related Crimes", (1997) 25 Denv. J. Int. l L. & Pol'y p. 321.; Wexler, 
L., S., "Committee Report on Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, and Complementarity", (1997) 25 Denv. 
J. Int'l L. & Pol'y p. 224.; Wise, E., M., "General Rules of Criminal Law", (1997) 25 Denv. J. Int. 'l L. & 
Pol'y pp. 313-319. 
172 As different from the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC Statute, for the first time at 
international level, includes general principles of criminal law in a detailed way such as nullum crimen sine 
lege (Art. 22), nulla poena sine lege (Art. 23), non-retroactivity ratione personae (Art. 24), mens rea (Art. 
30). Moreover for the elements of crimes, Article 9 (1) of the ICC Statute provided: "Elements of Crimes 
shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6,7 and 8 [genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes respectively]. They shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of 
the Assembly of States Parties". The Preparatory Commission for the ICC will prepare the draft text of 
Elements of Crimes before 30 June 2000. See Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Res. E, UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 183/10 (1998). There cannot be any doubt that the Commission will benefit from the practice of 
the ad hoc tribunals to prepare the draft text of Elements of Crimes. 
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The crime of wilful killing is regarded as a grave breach under the four Geneva 
Conventions"' and there cannot be any doubt that it is one of the most heinous crimes 
prohibited in the customary and conventional international law rules. The counterpart of 
this crime in internal armed conflicts is the crime of murder derives from Common Article 3 
to the Geneva Conventions. As rightly concluded by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the 
Celebici Camp Case, there is no difference between these terms, as far as the elements of 
the offence are concerned. "a 
Since the crime of wilful killing and murder is well understood and defined in 
national criminal justice systems, it is thought that there is no need to define it in 
international level. With the same reason, in the practice of the ICTY, the definition of this 
crime has not been made, while the elements of the offence are examined. However, the 
ICTR in connection with the concept of crimes against humanity defined murder as "the 
unlawful, intentional killing of a human being". 175 
In accordance with this definition, the elements of the crime of wilful killing or 
murder can be briefly explained and analysed in light of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals 
as follows: 
To establish individual criminal responsibility, first of all, the element of actus reus 
(physical element) is required. In the case of this crime it is the death of the victim resulted 
from an unlawful act or omission of the accused. 176 In connection with this element, of 
course, it is necessary that there must be a causal link between the acts or omissions of the 
accused and the death of the victim. This was the requirement that was strictly applied by 
the Trial Chamber in the Tadic Case. The event was that whether the accused, Tadic 
together with a group of armed men, involved in calling out civilians from their homes, 
killing some of these people, beating the others and taking them away. After the accused 
along with the group had left the village, five men were found dead there. The matter of 
causal link arisen in relation to these five men. Although the Trial Chamber found that the 
accused participated in the aforementioned acts, "7 he was not found guilty for the killing of 
the five men or any of them on the ground that nothing was known as to who shot them or 
173See Arts. 50,51,130 and 147 of the Geneva Conventions respectively. 
17 Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 421-423. 
175 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, Case No.: ICTR-96-4-4, (2 September 1998), par. 
6.4.103. 
"'Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 424.; Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, 
6.4.104. 
ýýTrial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 369. 
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in what circumstances they were killed. "$ In other words, the Chamber was not satisfied 
that the accused had played any role in these murders. The ruling of the Chamber was 
appealed by the Prosecution Service on this point and the Appeals Chamber reversed the 
Trial Chamber's Judgement. In its Judgement, the Appeals Chamber referred to the fact 
that there were no witnesses suggesting that any other armed group might have been 
responsible for the killing of the five men, and decided that in light of the evidence the 
armed group to which the appellant belonged could have been responsible for the death of 
five men, and as a result of this ruling the appeallant, Tadic was found guilty for such 
event. 179 From the perspective of international humanitarian law, the interpretation of the 
requirement of causal link by the Appeals Chamber in a way of more flexible than the Trial 
Chamber's view should be welcomed. 
The other ingredient of the wilful killing or murder is the mental element or mens 
rea that is the central issue in this crime for both national and international criminal justice 
systems. Before the ad hoc tribunals, the defence and the Prosecution Service have mainly 
concentrated on the term "wilful" in their arguments for establishing individual criminal 
responsibility for wilful killing or murder. According to the defence, the mental element of 
the offence is the intent to commit the act which causes the death, and it excludes any form 
of recklessness from its scope. 18° To support its argument, the defence referred to the 
practice of national courts. 18' On the other hand, according to the Prosecution Service, the 
element of mens rea is set out when the accused has the intent to kill, or inflict grievous 
bodily harm on the victim and the word "wilful" encompasses "reckless acts as well as a 
specific desire to kill, whilst excluding mere negligence". 192 The International Tribunal 
shared the same view with the Prosecution Service and rightly held that the mental element 
1781bid par. 373. 
19Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 182-183.; In this case, although it was not clear that 
the accused (appellant) killed the five men or any of them (victims might have been killed the other 
members of the armed group), Tadic was found guilty for such event. The legal base for the decision was 
the application of the notion of common purpose to the event. For the detailed explanation of this concept, 
see Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 185-233. 
180TriaI Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 427-429.; Kordic & Others, Kordic Defence 
Pre-Trial Brief, Vol. II- Legal Issues, (6 April 1999), paras. 33-37. 
18'Kordic & Others, Kordic Defence Pre-Trial Brief, Vol. II- Legal Issues, (6 April 1999), par. 38. 
'trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 426.; Kordic & Others, Prosecutor's Pre-Trial 
Brief, (25 March 1999), p. 43. 
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of the crime, intention, includes the notion of recklessness that can be inferred from the 
circumstances of each case. '83 
The importance of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in this context can be found 
in making clear the vagueness of the requirement of mens rea, which was an unresolved 
issue in the Geneva Conventions, 184 of the wilful killing or murder. In particular, it should 
be noted that the criminal concepts in international level might be different from their 
domestic application. This was the case emphasised by the International Tribunal in relation 
to the examination of the mental element of wilful killing. According to the Tribunal, the 
most important point in the Geneva Conventions was to prevent the taking of lives of 
innocent persons. '" This was the principle guided the International Tribunals in terms of 
interpreting and applying the rules of international humanitarian law. In this sense, it should 
be addressed that international criminal tribunals or courts are not mainly dealing with 
single murder cases. Crimes in international field have their own characteristics as different 
from their domestic counterparts. Of course, murder as a crime is murder either in 
international or national level, but it must be separated from national context on the basis 
that -international tribunals have to mainly deal with mass scale crimes whose elements need 
to be interpreted and applied in a flexible manner'86 that may not be consistent with the 
practice of many national courts. 
In sum, the practice of the International Tribunals has a unique importance in terms 
of indicating the concept of recklessness is sufficient to establish the mental requirement of 
"'Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 437.; The ICTR applies the mens rea requirement 
in compliance with the ICTY practice. In the Akayesu Judgement this issue was indicated as follows: "at 
the time of the killing the accused or a subordinate had the intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm 
on the deceased having known that such bodily harm is likely to cause the victim's death, and is reckless 
whether death ensures or not". (par. 6.4.104. ). 
134 Gross, 0., "The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia", (1995) 16 
Mich. J. Int'l L. p. 799. 
]'Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 431.; One scholar expresses this view with regard 
to the offence of wilful killing as "[t]he term 'wilful killing' covers all cases in which a protected person is 
killed". Wolfrum, It, "Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law", in Dieter Fleck (ed. ), The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford University Press, (1995), p. 532. The logical 
extension of this view for murder cases under Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions should be that 
it covers all cases in which persons those taking no active part in hostilities in an internal armed conflict 
are killed. 
186The best example explaining this case can be found in the Appeals Chamber's Judgement in the Tadic 
Case. While explaining the notion of common purpose, the Chamber decided the responsibility of 
individuals for the crimes committed by a group, although he/she did not commit the crime. The criteria 
and the mens rea element was indicated as follows: "(i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be 
perpetrated by one or other members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk". (par. 228. 
emphasis in original). 
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the crime of wilful killing or murder as a grave breach or serious violations of Common 
Article 3, more generally as a war crime. However, in this context, the ICC Statute seems 
to be departing from the customary international law rules and from the practice of the ad 
hoc tribunals by excluding responsibility in the cases of recklessness for war crimes. '87 The 
way adopted in the ICC Statute should be assessed as a step backward in international 
humanitarian law. Hopefully, the ICC in its future work will overcome this issue in its case 
law by way of interpreting and applying the mental element of "intent and knowledge" "s in 
light of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. 
4.2.1.2.2. Torture or Inhuman Treatment Including Biological Experiments 
Article 2 (b) of the ICTY Statue refers to the crimes of torture or inhuman treatment 
including biological experiments as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. However, 
in the Conventions there cannot be found their definitions and elements. For this reason, to 
apply these offences into the events, the International Tribunal has to define and make clear 
their contents, elements in light of the customary international law rules. 
Although the ICTY Statute regulates these crimes as if they constitute single crime, 
in fact there are three different crimes inherent in it and all of them need to be separately 
examined. 
4.2.1.2.2.1. Torture 
There is no doubt that torture is a crime prohibited by conventional and customary law 
rules in international human rights and humanitarian law. There is a great deal of 
international law instruments prohibiting torture in times of peace and war. 189 In 
'$? See Art. 30 of the ICC Statute. For its disadvantages, see Cassese, "The Statute of the International 
Criminal Court... ", pp. 153.154. 
188Art. 30 (1) of the ICC Statute. 
189Some of them can be indicated as follows: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 5).; The 
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 7).; The European Convention on Human 
Rights (Art. 3).; The American Convention on Human Rights (Art. 5 (2)).; The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights (Art. 5).; The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (Art. 1).; The 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Art. 1) (adopted by the UN General Assembly Resolution on 9 
December 1975).; The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Art. 1).; The regulations for armed conflicts can be found in the 
Geneva Conventions and in the Additional Protocols to the Conventions. See Common Art. 3.; Arts. 12 
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compliance with its extensive prohibition, the crime of torture has acquired the status ofjus 
cogens and the obligation of States to prosecute, punish or extradite responsible persons 
for torture is erga omnes in nature. 190 On this ground there cannot be any room or any kind 
of priviliege not to be held criminally responsible for torture. The best example proving this 
fact can be found in the British practice in relation to the Pinochet Case in which the issue 
was whether General Pinochet was entitled to immunity, since he was the Head of State of 
Chile at the time of the alleged acts of torture and conspiracy to torture have been 
committed, from arrest and extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom with respect to 
these acts. In both hearings, the House of Lords (three to two)'9' and (six to one)192 
decided that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity for the alleged acts of torture and 
conspiracy to torture. 193 
Although, the crime of torture is universally prohibited, it is not possible to find its 
definition, apart from the ICC Statute, in international humanitarian law. However, 
international human rights instruments include the definition of torture. First is in the 
Declaration on Torture. 194 The second one is in the Inter-American Convention-195 The 
and SO of the First Geneva Convention.; Arts. 12 and 51 of the Second Geneva Convention.; Arts. 13,14 
and 130 of the Third Geneva Convention.; Arts. 27,32 and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.; Art. 75 
of the Protocol I.; Art. 4 of the Protocol II. As clearly understood from these regulations, torture is 
prohibited by the Geneva Conventions for both international and non-international armed conflicts. 
19°Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Trial Chamber, Judgement, Case No: IT-95-17/1-T10, (10 December 
1998), paras. 151-157.; Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 454. 
191R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty 
International and Others Intervening) [1998] 4 All ER 897. 
192Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 
(1999) 2 WLR 827. 
'"In particular, see the opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson that is common to the majority and it is 
important to indicate the jus cogens nature of the crime of torture, universal jurisdiction, and reflecting the 
impact of the ICTY and the ICTR practice on domestic law, pp. 832-848.; David Graves and John Steele, 
"Law lords verdict on Gen Pinochet puts the ball back in Straw's court", The Daily Telegraph, (25 March 
1999).; Joanna Bale and Frances Gibb, "Judgement on Pinochet sets dilemma for Straw", The Times, (25 
March 1999).; For a detailed discussion of the case, see Bianchi, A., "Immunity versus Human Rights: The 
Pinochet Case", (1999) 10 EJIL pp. 237-277.; In addition to the uniqueness of the British practice, the 
American practice should also be noted, but it only concerns civil suits, not criminal action. In this context, 
see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), 77 ILR 169.; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232 (2d 
Cir. 1995), 104 ILR 136., summarised in (1996) 90 AJIL p. 658.; and also see Eckert, A., E., "Kadic v. 
Karadzic: Whose International Law", (1996) 25 Denv. J. Int. 'l L. & Pol'y p. 173. 
19''Article 1 of the Declaration on Torture provides: 
"1.... torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or 
a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating him or other persons..... 
2. Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment". 
195Article 2 of the Inter-American Convention provides: "... [t]orture shall be understood to be any act 
intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes 
of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a 
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third one is in the 1984 Torture Convention which defines the offence as follows: "... the 
`term' torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering 
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not involve pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions". '96 
On the other hand, the only international humanitarian law instrument describing 
torture is the ICC Statute in which torture is defined under the category of crimes against 
humanity as follows: `"`Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the 
accused". 197 In some aspects, the approach taken in the ICC Statute is different from the 
international human rights instruments and as will be indicated later it is possible to create 
some confusion to distinguish torture from other offences of mistreatment such as from 
cruel or inhuman treatment. 198 
The definition in the Torture Convention was regarded as reflecting and crystallising 
the customary international law and was found applicable to armed conflict situations by 
the ad hoc 199 Nevertheless, in the Akayesu Case the ICTR and in the Celebici 
Camp Case the ICTY did not explain the legal grounds for reaching this conclusion, just in 
the later case it was referred as the definition of torture in the Convention was 
"representative of customary international law". 200 The reasons why this definition should 
be perceived as reflecting customary law rules were rightly explained by the International 
Tribunal in the Furundzya Judgement . 
201 The assessment of this conclusion and its 
penalty, or for any other purpose. Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person 
intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if 
they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish". 
'96Art. 1 (1) of the Torture Convention. 
''Art. 7 (2) (e) of the ICC Statute. 
'98See infra p. 177. 
"Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 459.; Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, 
Judgement, par. 160.; Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.4.111-112. 
20OTrial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 459.; In the Akayesu Judgement, there is even no 
such indication. 
201Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, Judgement, par. 160. 
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importance in international humanitarian law will be now indicated in examining the 
elements of torture which consist of three requirements for a crime to be torture. 
(i) The Element of Severe Pain or Suffering 
First of all there must be a severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, inflicted on 
the victim. 202 The problem with this element occurs when torture is compared with the 
other offences of mistreatment such as inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment. At this 
point, the issue is that what level of severe pain or suffering makes inhuman or cruel 
treatment the crime of torture since it is well recognised as an aggravated form of such 
offences. 203 As rightly decided by the Trial Chamber in the Celebici Camp Case it is too 
difficult to establish any criteria indicating the required level of pain or suffering for 
torture, 204 but it can be inferred from the specific circumstances of each case. International 
tribunals or courts should use their discretionary powers in light of the practice of the other 
international judicial institutions and of writing of the scholars to solve this problem. 205 
In relation to this element, it should be noted that severe pain or suffering can be 
inflicted by the accused as an act or omission. The significant point is that the act or 
omission must be intentional, 206 mere negligence is not enough to set up individual criminal 
responsibility for torture. 
202Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 461-469,494.; Trial Chamber, Furundzija 
Case, Judgement, par. 162.; Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.4.114.; The ICC Statute's 
definition also includes this element, see Art. 7 (2) (e) of the ICC Statute. 
203The Declaration on Torture explains torture in this way. See supra note 194.; The European Court of 
Human Rights in the Northern Ireland Case in relation to the use of five techniques of interrogation, which 
includes wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food and 
drink, decided that they did not constitute torture, but inhuman treatment, although the European 
Commission of Human Rights had accepted those acts constituting a practice of torture and inhuman 
treatment. In this context, see [19761 Y. B. Eur. Conv. on H. R. pp. 788-794. 
204Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 469. 
205The ICTY in the Celebici Camp Case followed this approach and to reach its conclusion relied upon the 
practice of the Human Rights Committee, the European Commission and European Court of Human 
Rights. See paras. 461-466. The Greek Case ([19691 12 Y. B. Eur. Conv. H. R. 186) , the 
Northern Ireland 
Case (for reference see supra note. 201), Aksoy v. Turkey, Judgement, 18 December 1996, (1997) 23 
EHRR p. 553 and Aydin v. Turkey, Judgement, 25 September 1997, (1997) 25 EHRR p. 251 can be 
referred in this sense.; For a recent and detailed study on the concepts of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment, see Evans, M., D., and Morgan, R., Preventing Torture A Study of the European Convention for 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998, in particular, see pp. 79-98. In this context, also see Rodley, N., S., The Treatment of Prisoners 
Under International Law, Second Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1999), in particular, pp. 18-133. 
206'Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 468.; Trial Chamber, Furundz /a Case, 
Judgement, par. 162.; Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.4.114.; Art. 7 (2) (e) of the ICC 
Statute.; Gross, p. 804. 
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(ii) The Element of Prohibited Purpose 
Secondly, for the offence of torture there must be a prohibited purpose207 which is indicated 
in the Torture Convention as follows: "... for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind' (emphasis added). This 
element is the main issue in the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. According to the defence 
argument the requirement of prohibited purpose is limited to obtaining of information, 
which is the major characteristic of torture in customary international law, and it should be 
interpreted narrowly not to violate the principle of legality. 20" On the other hand, the 
Prosecution Service depends on the definition of torture in the Torture Convention that 
regulates the requirement of prohibited purpose much broader than just obtaining 
information. 209 
As rightly indicated by the Trial Chamber in the Celebici Camp Case, the Torture 
Convention's definition represents the customary law rule in this sense, and the use of the 
words "for such purposes" and "for any reason based on discrimination of any kind" 
indicates that the regulation of the Convention consists of merely examples, the list of 
purpose is not exhaustive in nature. 210 
The importance of the interpretation of the requirement of prohibited purpose in 
torture lies on the application of this crime into the crimes of rape or any other forms of 
sexual violence as a part of grave breaches system due to non-inclusion of such crimes in 
the system. As the international community witnessed the commission of massive rape or 
any other forms of sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, these offences 
were not mainly committed for getting information or confession, or just for private 
Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 470-472.; Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, 
Judgement, par. 162.; Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.4.114. 
For the defence argument in brief, see Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 449-450. 
209For the Prosecution Service argument in brief, see Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 447-448.; 
and also see Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief, Simic & Others, Case No.: IT-95-9-PT, (31 March 1999), 
paras. 110,119-121. 
210Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 470.; Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, 
Judgement, par. 162.; Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.4.114. 
176 
reasons, 211 but for "secondary purposes212 such as punishment, intimidation, forcing people 
to flee from their places as a part of ethnic cleansing. 213 The other significant point with 
regard to the interpretation of this element can be examined in distinguishing torture from 
other offences like inhuman treatment and wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury 
to body or health those of which do not require a purpose to establish individual criminal 
responsibility. 
From the foregoing explanation it can be clearly seen that the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals will definitely guide the ICC in terms of providing precedents that examine the 
required elements of torture. In this context, it should be noted that despite the ICC Statute 
provides a definition of torture under the category of crimes against humanity in Article 7 
(2) (e) it is not possible to see the requirement of prohibited purpose in that definition. This 
way of adoption in the Statute should be perceived as insufficient on the ground that it 
creates some problems in relation to the issue that how torture can be differentiated from 
inhuman or cruel treatment, and from wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health. 214 To solve this issue, the ICC when it becomes in operation has to interpret 
the provisions relating to torture as consisting of the element of prohibited purpose inherent 
in the definition and the interpretation and application of the element by the International 
Tribunals will undoubtedly play a crucial role for the ICC to reach this natural result. 
(iii) The Element of Official Involvement 
2" If the commission of rape is merely for private reasons, it cannot be regarded as torture and that can be 
under the consideration of national law, not international criminal law, at least as far as the grave breaches 
system and violations of the laws or customs of war are concerned. This fact was indicated by the ICTY in 
the Celebici Camp Case, see par. 471. 
212Professor Bassiouni deploys this phrase to explain other prohibited purpose in torture than obtaining 
information or confession. See Bassiouni & Manikas, pp. 564-565.; The Prosecution service is also uses the 
comment of Bassiouni on torture to support its argument. See Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 447- 
448. 
213In this sense for the detailed explanation and analysis of rape as torture in accordance with the 
requirement of prohibited purpose, see infra pp. 178-185. 
214 In terms of providing means to charge the perpetrators of rape or any other forms of sexual violence as 
torture under the grave breaches system, the interpretation of the requirement of prohibited purpose in a 
broader manner is not necessary with regard to the crimes in this nature, since the ICC Statute gives a 
separate place and regulates sexual crimes in detail under the heading of war crimes. They are also 
accepted as a new category of grave breaches system in Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii). 
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The third and last requirement of torture is that there must be an official involvement in a 
crime to be considered as torture. 215 As decided by the International Tribunal in compliance 
with the Torture Convention in the Celebici Camp Case, "an act of torture must be 
committed by, or at the instigation of, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or 
acquiescence of, a public official or person acting in an official capacity". 216 This way of 
interpretation makes possible charge persons who are officials of non-State parties to a 
conflict with the crime of torture. In particular, its importance can be examined in the cases 
of internal or international armed conflicts involving non-State entities. 217 
The approach taken by the ad hoc tribunals in the Celebici Camp, Furundzya and 
Akayesu Cases can be assessed as it is in compliance with the customary rules of 
international humanitarian law and the events occurred in the former Yugoslavia and in 
Rwanda on the basis that many crimes of torture have been committed by paramilitary 
groups some of them have no connection with the Government and there cannot be found 
any official link in literal meaning. At the same time, it should never be forgotten that the 
main purpose of international humanitarian law is to protect innocent civilians. If the ad hoc 
tribunals should have interpreted and applied the requirement of official involvement in a 
different or strict manner, many perpetrators or responsible persons would have gone 
unpunished, that would be the result which cannot be explained from the aspects of 
international humanitarian law. In this sense, the latest development that can be perceived 
as an emerging new customary law rule in the ICC Statute should be addressed here that is 
the definition of torture without limiting its application to the acts of public officials, due to 
the possibility of the commission of this crime by non-State actors. 21' Undoubtedly, this 
way of adoption of the ICC Statute constitutes more evidence proving the correctness of 
the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. 
4.2.1.2.2.1.1. Rape and Any Other Forms of Sexual Violence as Torture under the 
Grave Breaches System 
21' Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 473-474,494.; Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, 
Judgement, par. 162.; Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.4.114. 
216Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 473.; Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, 
par. 6.4.114.; The requirement of official involvement was interpreted in the Furundzija Judgement as 
follows: "at least one of the persons involved in the torture process must be a public official or must at any 
rate act in a non-private capacity, e. g. as a de facto organ of a State or any other authority - wielding entity" 
(par. 162). 
217Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 473. 
218Art. 7 (2) (e) of the ICC Statute. 
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The crimes of rape and any other forms of sexual violence were not expressly indicated in 
the Conventions as a grave breach and even not in Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions to be applied to internal armed conflicts. 
However, there is no doubt that rape and any other forms of sexual violence were 
prohibited in international humanitarian law. For example, its prohibition can be found in 
Lieber's Code promulgated in 1863,219 the 1899 Hague Convention on the Laws and 
Customs of War and the 1907 Hague Regulations, 220 Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, n' Article 76 of the Additional Protocol I, m and in Article 4 of the Additional 
Protocol 11.223 Despite of the extensive prohibition of sexual crimes, until the practice of the 
ICTY and the ICTR, the international community has not paid real attention to the 
prosecution of responsible individuals for such offences. 224 They were not included in the 
Nuremberg Charter and subsequently were not prosecuted in the Nuremberg trials. 22s 
Nevertheless, in the Tokyo trials, rape was regarded as a violation of international 
humanitarian law, although it was not extensively prosecuted. 226 
219Art. 47 of the Lieber's Code (Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field), reprinted in Schindler and Toman (eds. ) pp. 3-23.; See Meron, T., "Shakespeare's Henry the Fifth 
and the Law of War", (1992) 86 AJIL p. 30. 
°Articles 46 of the Convention and the Regulation states: "Family honours and rights, individual lives ... 
must be respected". 
Article 27 (1-2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides: "Protected persons are entitled, in all 
circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights.... 
Woman shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced 
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault". 
Article 76 (1) of the Additional Protocol I provides: "Woman shall be the object of special respect and 
shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault". 
n3Article 4 (2) (e) of the Additional Protocol II expressly prohibits rape as follows: "outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any other form 
of indecent assault; ". As clearly understood from this provision, the prohibition of "outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment" in Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions can be interpreted as implicitly providing the prohibition of rape or any other forms of sexual 
violence. 
u"Cleiren, C., P., M., and Tijsen, M., E., M, "Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Assault in the Armed 
Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Legal, Procedural, and Evidentiary Issues", (1994) 5 Crim. L. F. pp. 
471-472.; MacKinnon, C., A., "Rape, Genocide and Women's Human Rights", in Alexandra Stiglmayer 
(ed. ), Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia Herzegovina, Lincoln, London: University of 
Nebraska Press, (1994), pp. 183-184.; Copelon, R, "Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes Against 
Women in Time of War", in Alexandra Stiglmayer (ed. ), p. 197.; Aydelott, D., "Mass Rape During War: 
Prosecuting Bosnian Rapists under International Law", (1993) 7 Emory Int'l L. R. pp. 585-586. 
On the other hand, CCL No. 10 expanded the list of crimes against humanity as including rape. Article II 
(c) of the CCL No. 10 defines crimes against humanity as follows: "Atrocities and offences, including but 
not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape,... " (emphasis 
added). 
Aydelott, p. 592.; Parks, W., H., "Command Responsibilityfor War Crimes", (1973) 62 Mil L. Rev. pp. 
69-73. Author in this article explains the case of Admiral Toyoda in which the accused was charged with 
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Despite the fact that rape and any other forms of sexual violence are prohibited by 
conventional and customary rules of international law, none of regulations provides a 
definition of rape or sexual violence in international law. This is a historical opportunity to 
witness the definitions and elements of such crimes that has to be cleared by the ad hoc 
tribunals not to violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. For the first time in 
international law, the ICTR in the Akayesu Case defined rape and sexual violence under the 
concept of crimes against humanity, which expressly includes rape, ' as follows: "rape [is] 
... a physical 
invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which 
are coercive. Sexual violence which includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual 
nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive '. 221 
The view taken by the ICTR should be perceived as "a broad, progressive 
international definition of both rape and sexual violences229due to being the first definition 
of rape and sexual violence in international law, undoubtedly, it plays a crucial role for 
guiding the ICTY and the ICTR for the following cases. In this sense, the practice of the 
Rwanda Tribunal has already taken its place in the cases before the ad hoc tribunals and has 
been regarded as a precedent in the Celebici Camp and the Furundzya Cases by the 
Yugoslavian Tribunal. 2'0 Even in the FurundzUa Judgement, the definition of rape was 
made more clearer and the objective elements of rape were indicated as follows: "(i) the 
violations of the laws and customs of war, including rape, under the concept of command responsibility and 
was acquitted of all charges.; Laviolette, N., "Commanding Rape: Sexual Violence, Command 
Responsibility, and the Prosecution of Superiors by the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda", (1998) 36 Can. Y. Int. 'l L. pp. 118-120. For the application of the command 
responsibility to cases of wartime sexual assault in light of the practice of the ICTY in the Celebici Camp 
Case, see Laviolette, pp. 140-147. 
227 Ad. 3 (g) of the ICTR Statute. 
22eTrial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.4.120-121.; Rape and sexual violence were again 
defined in this case in paras 7.7.130-131 and the concept of sexual violence was made more clearer as 
follows: "Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which 
do not involve penetration or even physical contact". The Tribunal cites as an example of this nature the 
forcing of a student to do gymnastics naked in front of a crowd. Moreover, the Court explained coercive 
circumstances in the following terms: "... coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of 
physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation 
may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict... ". 
In relation to this case, sexual violence was defined by the Prosecution Service in a way that can be 
perceived as elaboration of the acts of sexual violence as follows: "... acts of sexual violence include forcible 
sexual penetration of the vagina, anus or oral cavity by a penis and/or of the vagina or anus by some other 
object, and sexual abuse, such as forced nudity". (Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Amended Indictment, 
Case No.: ICTR-94-4-I, par. 10A). 
Askin, K., D., "Sexual Violence In Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: 
Current Status", (1999) 93 AJIL p. 107. 
23°Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 478-479.; Trial Chamber, Furundzlja Case, 
Judgement, paras. 176-177. 
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sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of 
the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the 
victim by the penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the 
victim or a third person". 23' The way of elaboration of elements of rape by the ICTY in the 
Furundzya Judgement should be, in a sense, seen as a regression from the broad and 
progressive definition of rape in the Akayesu Judgement. 232 This is because, the Frundzya 
Judgement limits the crime with the notion of sexual penetration while the Akayesu 
Judgement defines it as a physical invasion of a sexual nature. In wartime situations, rape 
should not be restricted with the concept of penetration on the basis that no one can guess 
the future perpetrators of rape who will employ different methods of committing sexual 
violence that may also be considered as rape. On this ground, the practice of the ICTR 
should be accepted as authoritative and more convenient in international law since 
providing a definitional framework for rape and sexual violence, as the same logic deployed 
for the definition of torture in the Torture Convention that does not enumerate specific acts 
constituting torture. 233 In this context, when the practice of the ICTY in the Furundzya 
Judgement is taken into account all together, it is clear that the Tribunal in this case mainly 
deals with whether forced oral penetration or sex can be regarded as rape or not. 4 The 
Tribunal reaches the conclusion that "forced oral penetration should be classified as 
rape". 235 For this reason, the application of the crime in this Judgement should be perceived 
as explaining the concept of forced oral sex as a form of rape and as providing an example 
of the substantive content of rape in accordance with the framework drawn by the Rwanda 
Tribunal in the Akayesu Judgement. 
More importantly, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and their contribution to 
international humanitarian law in this context will guide the ICC in terms of providing 
definition of rape and sexual violence and of making clear their elements and substantive 
content since the ICC Statute does not define such crimes, 236 although crimes in sexual 
23'Tria1 Chamber, Furundzija Case, Judgement, par. 185. 
232Askin, p. 113. 
233Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.4.118-119. 
234Tria1 Chamber, Furundzija Case, Judgement, paras. 182-184. 
'slhid. par. 183. 
In the ICC Statute just the crime of "forced pregnancy" is defined under the concept of crimes against 
humanity in Article 7 (2) (f) as follows: "... the unlawful confinement, of a woman forcibly made pregnant, 
with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations 
of international law". 
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nature first time in international level are taken their place in the ICC Statute in a detailed 
way. 
237 
Apart from the definition of rape and sexual violence, the issue regarding to these 
offences before the ad hoc tribunals was that although they were not expressly mentioned 
in the grave breaches system and in its extension to internal armed conflict in Common 
Article 3, but Article 4 of the Additional Protocol II explicitly includes these crimes as an 
act constituting outrages upon personal dignity, whether it was possible to charge persons 
responsible for sexual crimes either with the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
under the category of torture, inhuman treatment or wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health, or with violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions under the category of torture, cruel treatment or outrages upon personal 
dignity. 
At this point, from the perspective of international humanitarian law, there cannot 
be any doubt about when the requirements of other offences such as torture, inhuman or 
cruel treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, or 
outrages upon personal dignity are met, rape and any other forms of sexual violence can be 
tried as constituting a form of aforementioned class of crimes by the ICTY and the ICTR. 
This way of interpretation and application of international humanitarian law rules cannot be 
regarded as a violation of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. For example, as far as 
the crime of torture and its elements are concerned, 23g it is very clear that firstly, rape and 
sexual violence causes severe pain or suffering on the victim, secondly, they can be 
committed for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, punishment, 
discrimination, control or destruction of the victim, thirdly, they can be inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity. In fact, this was the way adopted by the ad hoc tribunals in the cases 
of Celebici Camp (rape as a torture under the grave breaches system) 9 and of Furundzya 
(rape as torture and outrages upon personal dignity under the concept of violations of the 
laws or customs of war). 240 In reaching this conclusion, the International Tribunal 
237See Arts. 7 (1) (g), 8 (2) (b) (xxii), 8 (2) (e) (vi) of the ICC Statute. 
238For other category of crimes and the applicability of rape and any other forms of sexual violence in this 
context, see infra p. 187.; For the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and sexual crimes, see infra 
Chap. 5 and Chap. 6, pp. 256-257,259-260,295. 
"9Tria1 Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 475-496. 
240Trial Chamber, Furundzfja Case, Judgement, paras. 165-186. 
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extensively reviewed international humanitarian and human rights law and mainly depended 
upon the recent decisions of international and regional judicial bodies in which rape was 
considered as a form of torture. In particular, two of them guided the Tribunal which were 
the cases of Fernando and Raquel Mejia v. Peru241 handed down by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, and of Aydin v. Turkey242 decided by the European Court 
of Human Rights. Although it is not indicated in the decisions of the International Tribunal, 
undoubtedly, the writings of international lawyers have affected the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals in terms of interpreting and applying the rules of international humanitarian law in 
a way that makes possible sexual crimes to be tried as a grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, or as a violation of the laws or customs of war or as an act constituting the 
crime of genocide. 243 
The practice of the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the crimes of rape or any other 
forms of sexual violence has a significant place in international humanitarian law on the 
premise that it provides more protection for innocent civilians and makes possible charging 
responsible individuals with these horrendous crimes that had never been given real 
attention by the international community until the present time. More importantly, sexual 
crimes were able to be regarded as war crimes either under the grave breaches system or 
under violations of the laws or customs of war. Even more, the international community 
has been witnessing the indictments merely dealing with crimes in sexual nature2" that 
241Fernando and Raquel Mejia v. Peru, Report No. 5/96, Case No. 10.970,1 March 1996, in (1996) 1 
Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights p. 1120., (referred in the Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, 
paras. 481-486, in the Furundzija Judgement, par. 163). 
242Aydin v. Turkey, Judgement of 25 September 1997, in (1997) 25 EHRR p. 251., (referred in the Celebici 
Camp Case, Judgement, paras, 487-489, in the Furundzija Judgement, par. 163).; The decision of the 
Court was taken by majority (14 votes to 7). Those judges who were against the decision were not 
convinced about whether the events alleged actually occurred. At this point, the view taken by the European 
Court can be strongly criticised on the ground that without sufficient evidence and proof rendering such a 
decision which can be considered as blaming officials or security services of a sovereign State by relying on 
a case that is brought before the European Commission and Court of Human Rights to raise some political 
views of a terrorist organisation (PKK: so-called Kurdish Workers Party) against Turkey seriously damages 
the credibility of these international organisations. In terms of international humanitarian, human rights or 
criminal law, it cannot be explained that how such a court decides in this way while 1/3 of its members are 
not even sure whether such event occurred? 
243Meron, T., "Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law", (1993) 87AJIL pp. 426-428.; 
Chinkin, C., "Rape and Sexual Abuse of Woman in International Law", (1994) 5 EJIL pp. 330-334.; 
Aydelott, pp. 598-621.; Bassiouni and Manikas, pp. 555-593.; Krass, C., D., "Bringing the Perpetrators of 
Rape in the Balkans to Justice: Time for an International Criminal Court", (1994) 22 Denv. J. Int'l L. & 
Pol'y. pp. 340-342.; Blatt, D., "Recognizing Rape as a Method of Torture", (1992) 19 Rev. L. & Soc. Ch. 
pp. 853-864.; Daes, E-I., A., "New Types of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Violations of 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law", (1993) 7 Int. '1 Gen. Y. pp. 59-64. 
2 See the indictments of Prosecutor v. Gagovic and Others, (26 June 1996), and of Prosecutor v. Kunarac, 
Case No.: IT-96-23-I, (13 July 1998). 
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should be considered as a major achievement of the application of the norms of 
international humanitarian law by the ad hoc tribunals and as giving a clear signal to 
possible future perpetrators of such crimes will not go unpunished any more. 
On the other hand, as far as the ICC Statute is concerned, the ICC will not have to 
apply war crimes law in a manner which have been interpreting and applying by the ad hoc 
tribunals since the ICC Statute includes a detailed regulation of sexual crimes under the 
categories of crimes against humanity and of war crimes. 24s Despite the fact that the ICC 
Statute does not include any provision regarding the crimes of rape and any other forms of 
sexual violence as a grave breach in Article 8 (2) (a) under the grave breaches title, it 
indicates in Article 8 (2) (b) under the serious violations of the laws or customs of war 
applicable in international armed conflict that such offences do constitute grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions. 246 It is very clear that the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR has 
created a historic guideline to set up a precedent for the prosecution of responsible 
individuals with rape or any other form of sexual violence in the cases of armed conflicts 
whether international or non-international in nature. The approach taken by the ad hoc 
tribunals in relation to the events such as massive rapes, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy etc. occurred in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda made possible to 
inclusion of such crimes into the ICC Statute as a grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and as a serious violation of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions on 
the basis that the ad hoc tribunals in their cases indicated that although such acts were not 
explicitly included as a grave breach or serious violation of Common Article 3 in their 
Statutes(in this context, just the ICTY Statute), they may qualify the elements of other 
crimes such as torture, inhuman or cruel treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health, or outrages upon personal dignity, and can be regarded as 
a form of these crimes. In this sense, the regulation in the ICC Statute also proves the way 
how the ad hoc tribunals rightly interpret and apply the norms of international humanitarian 
law. On this ground it should not be wrong to say that the practice of the ad hoc tribunals 
has played the central role for the creation of a new category of grave breaches in relation 
245See supra notes 236-237 and Art. 7 (1) (g) of the ICC Statute. 
2'6Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii) provides: "Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy,... enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of 
the Geneva Conventions".; The same regulation was also adopted by the international community with 
regard to internal armed conflicts and in Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) was provided that the same category of sexual 
crimes was also regarded as a serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions. 
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to rape and any other forms of sexual violence and for inclusion of these crimes into serious 
violations of Common Article 3 by means of the ICC Statute. 
Lastly, one more point with regard to the regulation of sexual crimes in the ICC 
Statute should be noted since being the first in international law. That is the reference to 
"gender" in Article 7 (1) (h) and its definition in Article 7 (3). Traditionally, gender-based 
crimes refer to women and the use of this term may have wrongly guided the ICC. In a 
sense, rape and other forms of sexual violence should not have been regarded as gender- 
based crimes, but as crimes of violence in sexual nature. 247 As being witnessed by the 
international community, the victims of these offences may be both male and female. To 
indicate this fact and to prevent any misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the ICC 
Statute, the term "gender" was defined as referring to the two sexes, male and female. 249 
For this reason, the provision of the Statute should be welcomed in international 
humanitarian law. 
4.2.1.2.2.2. Inhuman Treatment 
As with torture, the offence of inhuman treatment is prohibited by conventional and 
customary rules of international humanitarian and of human rights law. Under the grave 
breaches system, all four Geneva Conventions give a place to this crime249 and also human 
rights instruments contain similar provisions together with torture. 25° However, the 
definition of inhuman treatment was not made in those instruments. In the cases involving 
charges of inhuman treatment before the ad hoc tribunals this was the main legal argument 
upon which the defence relied. According to the defence, the crime of inhuman treatment 
"lacks sufficient specificity to form the basis of a criminal prosecution" and its application 
"potentially violates the principle of nullum crimen sine lege ". 25' As has already been 
indicated, the prohibition of inhuman treatment is a part of grave breaches system and 
undoubtedly forms a part of customary rules of international humanitarian law. Its parallel 
247Cleiren and Tijsen, pp. 474-475. 
248Ardcle 7 (3) of the ICC Statute provides: "For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term 
"gender" refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term "gender" does 
not indicate any meaning different from the above". 
249Arts. 50,51,130 and 147 of the Geneva Conventions respectively. 
25°For references see supra note 189.; For example Article 7 of the ICCPR states: "No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". 
25'Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 515.; Kordic & Others, Kordic Defence Pre-Trial 
Brief, Vol. II - Legal Issues, (6 April 1999), paras. 39-40. 
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regulation by way of the same international instruments with torture makes the offence 
reaching the level of jus cogens and resulting obligations on States erga omnes in nature. 
Given this ground, the defence argument has no basis in international law. 252 
For the first time in international humanitarian law, the offence of inhuman 
treatment was defined by the Trial Chamber in the Celebici Camp Case as: "... an 
intentional act or omission, that is an act which, judged objectively, is deliberate and not 
accidental, which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a 
serious attack on human dignity". " In reaching this definition, the Tribunal extensively 
reviewed the all four Geneva Conventions, including Common Article 3 and the Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions254 and the decisions of other international bodies such 
as the decisions of the European Court and the European Commission of Human Rights, 
and of the Human Rights Committee in which a variety of inhuman treatment can be found 
as example and gives idea to the Tribunal about what acts constitute inhuman treatment. 255 
When the practice of the ad hoc tribunals is compared with the other practice of the 
international judicial bodies, the importance of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and their 
contribution to international humanitarian law as well as to human rights law or their 
possible impact on the ICC lies on setting up the framework of inhuman treatment by way 
of providing a general definition of the offence that does not enumerate specific acts which 
252For other reasons why it should not be considered as a violation of the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege, see supra pp. 167-168. 
253Tria1 Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 543.; This definition is also consistent with the 
Prosecution Service's argument. The Prosecution Service indicates the specific elements of inhuman 
treatment as follows: "1. The occurrence of acts or omissions causing serious mental or physical suffering or 
injury or constituting a serious attack on human dignity; 2. The acts or omissions were committed 
wilfully". (Simic & Others, Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 31 March 1999, par. 129.; 
Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 513.; Kordic & Others, Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief, Case No. IT- 
95-14/2-PT, 25 March 1999, p. 44). 
u Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 521-532. 
255lbid. paras. 534-550.; In fact, in the human rights law practice a definition of inhuman treatment is 
made by the European Commission of Human Rights in the Greek Case as "at least such treatment as 
deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular situation, is unjustifiable" 
(Greek Case, (1969) 12 Y. B. Eur. Conv. on H. R. 186 ). In the case of Kordic & Others, the argument of 
the defence concentrated on this definition and in particular focused on the infliction of severe suffering. 
(Kordic & Others, Kordic Defence Pre-Trial Brief, Vol. II - Legal Issues, 6 April 1999, par. 41). In terms 
of international humanitarian law, the definition made by the European Commission of Human Rights in 
light of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not fit the purposes of international 
humanitarian law for the following reasons: Firstly, infliction of severe suffering is not the central element 
of inhuman treatment in international humanitarian law. If it was the case, the concept of wilfully causing 
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, another category of crime under the grave breaches 
system, would be pointless. Secondly, there is no doubt that wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health can be regarded as inhuman treatment since the offence of inhuman treatment is an 
umbrella charge, but the main difference when these two categories are compared lies on the protection of 
human dignity as far as inhuman treatment is concerned. 
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has to be judged in accordance with the circumstances of each case. For this reason, 
concluding that the International Tribunals play a crucial role for codifying and clarifying 
the norms of international humanitarian law should not be seen as extraordinary. 
As has been clearly inferred from the definition of inhuman treatment, the crimes of 
torture, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health can also 
constitute inhuman treatment. However, making clear its difference from other offences is 
not a difficult task if the interpretation and application of the norms by the ad hoc tribunals 
are regarded as a guideline. For example, an act to be considered as inhuman treatment 
does not need to consist of a purpose behind it and also no need for official involvement. In 
the same vein, the offence of inhuman treatment mainly protects human dignity and covers 
all acts which do not fall within the crimes of torture or wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health. 256 For example if rape or any other forms of sexual 
violence cannot be regarded as torture or wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury 
to body or health, it can be tried under the offence of inhuman treatment. 217 There cannot 
be any doubt that determination of acts either as torture or wilfully causing great suffering 
or serious injury to body or health on the one hand or as inhuman treatment on the other 
hand is significant in particular for the development of international humanitarian and 
human rights law specifically for the future cases of the ad hoc tribunals. More importantly, 
it creates an immense precedential value for the ICC in its future work. 
In this context, it should also be noted that as rightly concluded by the ad hoc 
tribunals in the Tadic and Celebici Camp Cases, the concepts of inhuman treatment, cruel 
treatment and inhuman acts are consistent with each other, in other words, their substantive 
contents are the same. 25' The approach taken by the International Tribunal should be 
considered as a significant step in terms of providing one definition for these categories of 
offences that are in fact the same, but the name is different for different category of crimes. 
Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras, 442,542,544.; and also see the argument in the 
previous note. 
'Bassiouni and Manikas, pp. 565-567. 
2Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par, 723. "... cruel treatment is a means to an end, the end being 
that of ensuring that persons taking no active part in the hostilities shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely" (emphasis added).; Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 552. The Tribunal as 
with the offence of inhuman treatment defines cruel treatment as follows: "... cruel treatment constitutes an 
intentional act or omission, that is an act which, judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental, which 
causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity".; For 
the connection between inhuman treatment and inhuman acts, see par. 533 of the Celebici Camp Case 
Judgement. 
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As is well-known, the concept of inhuman treatment is used for the grave breaches system 
and for the international armed conflict situations. The concept of cruel treatment is used 
for serious violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions as a reflection of 
inhuman treatment for internal armed conflicts. The notion of inhuman acts is used for the 
category of crimes against humanity. In this sense, the concept of humiliating and degrading 
treatment that is not included in the grave breaches system, but in Common Article 3 and 
the Additional Protocol II, 259 should also be considered as constituting inhuman 
treatment. 260 This way of understanding of interpretation and application of the norms of 
international humanitarian law should be welcomed since providing a clear guidance and 
not making complicated the application of norms for the same substantive content of crimes 
which were named different for different categories of crimes in international humanitarian 
law. 
Lastly, with regard to the offence of inhuman treatment, one of the other 
contribution of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals to international humanitarian law and 
possible impact on the ICC can be examined in introducing and defining the concept of 
"inhuman conditions". For the first time in international law, it was defined as "is a factual 
description relating to the nature of the general environment in which detained persons are 
kept and the treatment which they receive", 261 and regarded as a form of inhuman 
treatment, although there is no such offence in international humanitarian law. 262 The 
inclusion of inhuman conditions as a variety of inhuman treatment is significant in particular 
with regard to the prison camps and transportation of civilians, as being witnessed in the 
former Yugoslavia in which conditions were inhuman in nature. The interpretation and 
application of the concept by the International Tribunal make possible charging responsible 
individuals with inhuman conditions and thus it should be considered as consistent with the 
main objective of international humanitarian law that is to protect innocent lives and their 
dignity as well. 
4.2.1.2.2.3. Biological Experiments 
259Common Article 3 (c).; Art. 4 (e) of the Additional Protocol II. 
°Gross, p. 808. 
26'Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 556. 
2621bid paras. 554,558. 
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The prohibition of biological experiments derives from the terrible experience of World 
War II, and its consequence it has taken its place in the Geneva Conventions as a part of 
the grave breaches system. 263 Under Article 2 (b) of the ICTY Statute, the International 
Tribunal has jurisdiction over such acts considered as biological experiments that means 
"experiments on the human body or health". 2" By means of this regulation, innocent 
civilians, prisoners of war are protected from being used for scientific experiments in armed 
conflict situations. The problem with regard to biological experiments arises when the 
concepts of medical care and of medical experimentation are compared since medical care 
is allowed, even if it introduces new medical procedures. 265 
However, there is no charges of biological experiments before the ICTY and the 
ICTR until this time, as far as the available indictments and decisions of the ad hoc tribunals 
are concerned. Undoubtedly, if the International Tribunals face with this offence, they will 
definitely play the same role for the concept of biological experiments as with other 
offences such as torture or inhuman treatment. 
4.2.1.2.3. Wilfully Causing Great Suffering or Serious Injury to Body or Health 
The offence of wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health is 
prohibited in all four Geneva Conventions and regarded as a part of the grave breaches 
system. 2 Under Article 2 (c) of the ICTY Statute, the International Tribunal has 
jurisdiction over acts constituting the crime of wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health. 
As with other offences of mistreatment, the concept of wilfully causing great 
suffering or serious injury to body or health was not defined in international law. It is too 
difficult to define in a way that provides a clear guidance as to which conducts can be 
punished under this category of offence. Before the International Tribunal, the Prosecution 
Service argued that under this category of offence, there were two independent crimes 
namely "wilfully causing great suffering" and "wilfully causing serious injury to body or 
health" and that recklessness was sufficient to establish the mental requirement of the 
263Arts. 50,51,130 and 147 of the Geneva Conventions respectively. 
2 4Wolfrum, p. 532. 
' 5Ibid p. 533. 
Arts. 50,51,130 and 147 of the Geneva Conventions, respectively. 
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crime. 267 On the other hand, the defence contended that the offence in question did not 
qualify the requirements of the principle of legality and its application would violate the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege '26' and also alternatively, 
if this argument was failed, 
the defence also argued that with regard to the specific element of the crime, the term wilful 
did not include recklessness269 and moreover, in terms of serious injury to body or health, 
there had to be "a protracted loss of use of a bodily member or organ". 270 
The International Tribunal, firstly, made clear that the offence of wilfully causing 
great suffering or serious injury to body or health constituted only one crime and that to 
establish individual criminal responsibility, the occurrence of either great suffering, physical 
or mental, or serious injury to body or health was sufficient. 271 Secondly, with regard to the 
seriousness of the injury to body or health, the Tribunal defined the word "great" as "not 
slight or negligible". 272 Although it is not clear in the Celebici Camp Case Judgement, the 
argument of the defence regarding to serious injury to body or health can be merely 
considered as a criterion for the evaluation of the seriousness of the injury, not as an 
additional element of the offence on the premise that serious injury to body or health does 
not always need to be in the form of loosing the use of organ, it may also occur as a bodily 
harm. One more evidence of this fact can be found in the Tadic Judgement which the 
Tribunal found that severe beatings of the victim could constitute cruel treatment under 
Common Article 3 (1) (a) and Article 4 (2) (a) of the Additional Protocol 11,273 both 
provisions should be regarded as the extension or reflection of the offence of wilfully 
267For a brief explanation of the Prosecution's Service argument, see Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, 
paras. 499-500.; In the case of Simic & Others, the Prosecution Service did not concentrate on the two 
separate crimes and indicated the specific elements of this offence as follows: "1. The occurrence of acts or 
omissions causing serious mental or physical suffering or injury; 2. The acts or omissions were committed 
wilfully". (Simic & Others, Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief, Case No.: IT-95-9-PT, (31 March 1999), par. 
136).; and also see Kordic & Others, Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief, Case No.: IT-95-14/2-PT, (25 March 
1999), p. 44. 
268For a brief explanation of the defence argument, see Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 503.; For 
reasons why the defence argument has no basis in international humanitarian law, see supra pp. 167-168. 
269For this concept and the argument on this issue, see supra pp. 170-172. 
270Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 504-505.; Kordic & Others, Kordic Defence 
Pre-Trial Brief, Vol. II- Legal Issues, Case No.: IT-95-14/2-PT, (6 April 1999), paras. 50-52. 
271Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 506,509. 
272Ibid. par. 510. 
273Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 723-726.; Common Article 3 (1) (a) prohibits the 
following acts: "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture" (emphasis added). Article 4 (2) (a) of the Additional Protocol II consists of following 
prohibition in a detailed way: "violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in 
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal 
punishment" (emphasis added). 
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causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health to internal armed conflicts. As 
clearly understood from the decision, severe beatings do not always cause loosing the use 
of a bodily member or organ and do constitute the crime the crime of wilfully causing great 
suffering or serious injury to body or health. 
Finally, the International Tribunal defined the crime and distinguished it from 
torture as follows: "... the offence of wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health constitutes an act or omission that is intentional, being an act which, judged 
objectively, is deliberate and not accidental, which causes serious mental or physical 
suffering or injury. It covers those acts that do not meet the purposive requirements for the 
offence of torture, although clearly all acts constituting torture could also fall within the 
ambit of this offence". 274 
Undoubtedly, the definition of the offence of wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health, in a manner that provides all required elements of the 
offence solves the vagueness problem inherent in this crime, and the approach taken by the 
International Tribunal makes a great contribution to international humanitarian law and 
creates a precedential value for the ICC. 
4.2.1.2.4. Extensive Destruction and Appropriation of Property, Not Justified by 
Military Necessity and Carried Out Unlawfully and Wantonly 
Under the grave breaches system, not only persons, civilians, prisoners of war, wounded, 
sick, shipwrecked in the field and at sea, are protected, but also some category of property 
enjoy the same protection. 27' The prohibition of extensive destruction and appropriation of 
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly in the 
Geneva Conventions276 is one of the reflection of this protection. The acts of extensive 
destruction and of appropriation of property should be explained in conjunction with other 
acts constituting violations of the laws or customs of war, namely, "wanton destruction of 
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity", attack, or 
274Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 511. 
2"For the related Articles of the Geneva Conventions in relation to the protected property, see supra note 
145. 
276 Art 50 of the First Geneva Convention.; Art. 51 of the Second Geneva Convention.; Art. 147 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention.; The Third Geneva Convention does not include such a provision since it deals 
with prisoners of war. 
191 
bombardment, by whatever means of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings", 
seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity 
and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science' . 
277 
The reasons for examining these concepts together with the grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions can be indicated as follows: Firstly, to provide full protection for property, in 
some cases it is necessary to refer to other violations of the laws or customs of war. For 
example, Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding real or personal property 
covers property found in an occupied territory, but does not cover the destruction of 
property in enemy territory that can be only protected by the Hague Regulations which is 
the main part of the concept of violations of the laws or customs of war. 272 Secondly, the 
elements of these acts are mainly similar to each other and include some of the most 
controversial issues of the law of armed conflict such as military necessity which can justify 
the act as lawful. 
First of all, with regard to the offence of extensive destruction and appropriation of 
property, it should be noted that the use of the term "extensive" implies that an isolated 
incident of destruction or appropriation of property is not sufficient to be regarded as a 
grave breach as long as it is not carried out intentionally. 279 
To set up criminal responsibility for the acts of extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, the concept of military necessity needs to be clarified. In this 
context, the important issue is that how to judge whether military necessity existed and to 
what extent it may be applicable in international humanitarian law. Two concepts, military 
objective and the principle of proportionality, play a crucial role for the justification of an 
act whether it is committed in a situation that can be considered as a military necessity. 
The notion of military objective is for the first time defined in Article 52 (2) of the 
1977 Additional Protocol I as "... military objectives are limited to those objects which by 
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military advantage" (emphasis added). The same Article in 
paragraph I defines civilian objects as "... all objects which are not military objectives". In 
277 These regulations derive from Articles 23 (g), 24 and 27 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and they are 
included in Article 3 (b, c and d) of the ICTY Statute. 
278Article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulation prohibits "destr[uction] or seiz[ure] [ofJ the enemy's property, 
unless such destruction be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war". 
279Gross, p. 811. 
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the light of these provisions, the issue that what the scope or extent of military objective is 
should be taken into account for each specific case. For example, destruction of a bridge, 
school, cathedral, mosque or museum is not normally justified by military necessity, but if 
those places are used for military purposes like using the bridge as a military supply line, 
establishing headquarters of army in a school or storing arms in the school, they may 
become lawful military target and be destroyed as long as its destruction is consistent with 
the principle of proportionality. 280 Of course, the justification of acts will be made by the 
international tribunals or courts when they face with this offence281 in accordance with the 
provisions of the Additional Protocol I that should be regarded as reflecting customary 
rules of international law in this respect and the requirements of these provisions such as 
"effective contribution to military action" and "definite military advantage" will be 
clarified by case law of the tribunals or courts. 232 
The other element of military necessity to be justified as lawful is the principle of 
proportionality which derives from the idea of balancing military necessity and humanity. 
The purpose of the principle is to reduce incidental or collateral damage caused by military 
operations. 283 The notion of proportionality is defined in various Articles of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I. Article 57 (2) (b) of the Protocol states that "an attack shall be 
"For the application of this concept and its analysis with regard to the destruction of some roads, bridges 
and electricity-generating plants in the Gulf-War, see Hampson, F., J., Remarks on "Proportionality and 
Necessity in the Gulf Conflict" before American Society of International Law, reprinted in "Implementing 
Limitations on the Use of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity", (1992) 86 ASIL 
Proceedings pp. 45-54.; Remarks by Yoram Dinstein, in (1992) 86 ASIL Proceedings, p. 55.; For a detailed 
analysis of military objectives and its application in the Gulf - War, see Rogers, A., P., V., Law on the 
Battlefield, Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, (1996), pp. 27-46. 
28'For the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, see infra p. 195. 
282Kalshoven is not in the opinion of the related Article of the Additional Protocol I reflects customary rules 
of international humanitarian law. See Remarks by Frits Kalshoven in (1992) 86 ASIL Proceedings, p. 43.; 
We are not agree with the opinion of Kalshoven, for reasons see supra pp. 132-135. Moreover, the 
provisions of the Additional Protocol I in relation to the concept of military objectives were applied in the 
Gulf-War, (see Rogers, pp. 41-46) and recently in the Kosovo conflict by the international community. 
These are sufficient to prove that these rules have achieved the customary rule status of international law 
with all requirements: opinio juris and State practice.; Hampson is in the opinion of the provisions of the 
Additional Protocol I relating to military objectives represent customary international law, see Hampson, p. 
50. 
233 Rogers, p. 14.; and also see Walzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations, Second Edition, Basic Books, (1992), pp. 129-133.; Kalshoven, F., "Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The Diplomatic 
Conference, Geneva, 1974-1977', (1978) 9 Neth. Y. B. I. L pp. 115-123.; Best, G., Humanity in Warfare 
The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
(1980), p. 176.; For a general information about the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, see Gehring, 
R., W., "Loss of Civilian Protections Under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I", (1980) 90 
Mil. L. Rev. pp. 49-87.; Fenrick, W., J., "The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol 1 in Conventional 
Warfare", (1982) 98 Mil. L. Rev. p. 91. 
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cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is 
subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated' 
(emphasis added). 284 The principle set out in the Protocol I should be considered as 
representing customary rules of international humanitarian law28S and also the practice of 
the international community in the Gulf-War, in the Yugoslavia and Kosovo conflicts 
provides sufficient evidence to reach this conclusion, in particular generally the choice of 
weapon for example the use of smart missiles or bombs to attack on military targets 
reduced civilian casualties in a significant level that was the clear application of the principle 
of proportionality in armed conflicts. Moreover, the inclusion of the concept of 
proportionality in the ICC Statute in a way of representing the customary status of the 
Additional Protocol I and of reflecting the emergence of customary rule in relation to the 
severe damage to the natural environment also has to be taken into account while the 
principle is applied to armed conflicts should be seen enough to establish that the provisions 
of the Additional Protocol I in this respect have reached the level of customary 
international law. 286 The notion of proportionality and its requirements such as the 
existence of "the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated' will be interpreted 
and applied by the International Tribunal. 287 
In accordance with these norms, one of the other issue is that who is to take 
determination on whether military necessity existed. As known from the military practice, 
principally military commanders are in the position to take such decisions. At this point, a 
significant problem arises when a case is brought before an international tribunal or court in 
relation to the determination of military necessity. To establish any commander's individual 
criminal responsibility, the tribunal or court should use an objective criterion, that is, under 
the same circumstances how a reasonable commander should have determined whether 
there existed military necessity. 288 
284 Articles 48 and 57 (2) (a) (iii) of the Protocol I have similar provisions. 
2SHampson, p. 46.; For general explanation about why many provisions of the Additional Protocol I should 
be regarded as representing customary rules of international humanitarian law, see supra pp. 132-135. 
'6See Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv) of the ICC Statute. 
287 For the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, see infra notes 290-291 and accompanying text. 
In a sense, this criterion is similar to the establishment of conunand responsibility of an individual for 
the acts of his/her subordinates. See supra Chap. 3, pp. 112-120. 
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Given these grounds, the ad hoc tribunals have to clarify the elements of the 
offences of extensive destruction and appropriation of property and of unlawful attacks on 
civilians and civilian objects in light of the aforementioned norms of the Additional Protocol 
I. The practice of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals can also help to the ICTY and the 
ICTR. 289 Until the present time, there is no final judgement dealing with these offences 
rendered by the ad hoc tribunals. In a Rule 61 Decision in the Rajic Case, the Trial 
Chamber of the ICTY held that the destruction of the village of Stupni Do, which was 
populated by the Bosnian Muslims, and attacks on its residents could not be justified by 
military necessity on the premise that the village, which "was located off the main road and 
its destruction was not necessary to fulfil any legitimate military objectives", did not have 
any military significance and military installations or any other legitimate military target. 29° 
In this context, the first final judgement is likely to be rendered by the ICTY in the case of 
Kordic and Cerkez in which the Prosecution Service charged the accused with the 
destruction of property and of institutions dedicated to religion or education and unlawful 
attacks on civilians and civilian objects. 291 
Undoubtedly, when the ad hoc tribunals deliver their decisions on the offences of 
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, of attacks on civilian and civilian 
objects and of destruction of institutions dedicated to religion or education, the most 
difficult issues of international humanitarian law like the concept of military necessity and 
its requirements being military objective and proportionality will be interpreted and applied 
in accordance with the customary and conventional rules of international humanitarian law 
and will have a significant impact on the ICC. 
289For the definition of military necessity and its elements in accordance with the Second World War war 
crimes trials, see Downey, W., G., Jr., "The Law of War and Military Necessity", (1953) 47 AJIL p. 251.; 
In the Second World War war crimes trials, the concept of military necessity was considered in connection 
with the following two categories of offences: (a) the treatment of prisoners of war and unarmed enemy 
persons, (b) deportation and devastation of property in occupied enemy territory. See Dunbar, N., C., H., 
"Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials", (1952) 29 BYIL pp. 446-452. 
290Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, (13 September 1996), paras. 42,54-57. 
29'Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, (Amended Indictment, 30 September 1998), paras. 40-41, 
55-58.; For the elements of these crimes, according to the Prosecution Service, see Prosecutor's Pre-Trial 
Brief, (Kordic & Others, Case No.: IT-95-14/2-PT, 25 March 1999) pp. 46,48-50.; On the other hand, for 
the defence argument, see Kordic Defence Pre-Trial Brief, Vol.!! - Legal Issues, (6 April 1999), paras. 54- 
56,77-82,86-90,230-236.; and also see other indictments including these offences: Prosecutor v. Dorde 
Dukic, (Indictment, Case No: IT-96-20-1,29 February 1996), par. 7.; Prosecutor v. Milan Kovacevic, 
(Amended Indictment, Case No.: IT-97-24-I, 23 June 1998), paras. 54-57.; Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, 
(Indictment), paras. 15-18.; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, (Indictment), paras. 26-33, 
36-45. 
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4.2.1.2.5. Compelling a Prisoner of a War or a Civilian to Serve in the Forces of a 
Hostile Power 
The act of compelling a prisoner of a war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile 
power is prohibited in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and regarded as a part of 
the grave breaches system. Article 2 (e) of the ICTY Statute contains the same provision 
with one significant exception that is the use of the term "civilian" instead of "protected 
person". In practice, this difference should be interpreted and applied in a way of making 
possible the application of this rule to all armed conflicts regardless of the nature of the 
conflicts either international or non-international. 293 This way of understanding is also 
supported by customary international law on the ground that the Hague Regulations 
considered as customary international law which include similar prohibitions in armed 
conflict situations. ' 
However, when the practice of the ICTY is examined in this regard it can be seen 
that the International Tribunal does not pay a real attention to this crime. Although in the 
indictments it is indicated that civilians in the hands of hostile power are used as forced 
labour in particular for digging trenches, the alleged accuseds are not charged with this 
offence. 295 
4.2.1.2.6. Wilfully Depriving a Prisoner of War or a Civilian of the Rights of Fair and 
Regular Trial 
The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions regard the act of wilfully depriving a prisoner of 
war or a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial as a grave breaches of the 
An. 130 of the Third Geneva Convention.; Art. 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
293 For reasons, see supra pp. 164-165. 
294The 1907 Hague Regulations in Article 23 (h) provides: "... A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel 
the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, 
even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the war". 
Article 52 of the 1907 Hague Regulations again contains similar provision. Even the same prohibition can 
be found in Article 44 of the 1899 Hague Regulations. 
' 5See Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, (Amended Indictment, 30 September 1998), paras. 
46,49 52,54. 
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Conventions, the same provision with the exception of the replacement of "civilian" for 
"protected person" is included in the ICTY Statute. 297 
The main reason for this regulation is to provide basic guarantees to a prisoner of 
war or a civilian to have a fair and regular trial in armed conflict circumstances such as 
having the right of being assisted by a lawyer in a trial. 298 During the course of or after the 
armed conflict if one of the rights of a prisoner of war or a civilian in this context is denied 
by the Occupying Power, the cases including this offence can be brought before the ICTY 
and can be tried as a grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Until the present time, 
there is no indictment consisting of this category of grave breach before the International 
Tribunal. 
4.2.1.2.7. Unlawful Deportation or Transfer or Unlawful Confinement of a Civilian 
In the grave breaches system, the acts of unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful 
confinement of protected person (in the ICTY Statute, of a civilian) seem to be constituting 
one offence, but in fact there are two separate crimes: Unlawful deportation or transfer of a 
civilian; and unlawful confinement of a civilian. 
4.2.1.2.7.1 Unlawful Deportation or Transfer of a Civilian 
The offence of unlawful deportation or transfer of a civilian is regarded as a part of the 
grave breaches system only in Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and it has 
taken its place in Article 2 (g) of the ICTY Statute with the exception of the replacement of 
protected person by civilian. 2" From the Geneva Convention it can be derived that the 
crime of unlawful deportation or transfer of civilians can be applicable to only international 
armed conflicts. As indicated earlier, the grave breaches system must be applicable to all 
armed conflicts regardless of the nature of the armed conflicts. 300 One of the main reason 
for that was the customary nature of the system and there cannot be any doubt that the 
Art. 130 of the Third Geneva Convention.; Art. 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
MArt. 2 (f) of the ICTY Statute.; For the importance of the use of the term "civilian", see supra pp. 164- 
165. 
For detailed regulations, see Arts. 87,99-108 of the Third Geneva Convention.; Arts. 71-75,126 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention. 
For its importance, see supra pp. 164-165. 
30OSee supra pp. 156-158. 
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prohibition of unlawful deportation or transfer of civilians has reached the level of jus 
cogens 301 This is because, the offence was included in the Nuremberg Tribunal's Charter as 
a war crime and crimes against humanity as well. 302 The same adoption is also found in CC 
L No. 10 and in the Principles of International Law Recognised in the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgement of the Tribunal which was adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 1946 and by the ILC in 1950.303 The inclusion of this crime in the 
Geneva Convention was the result of the German practice of deportation for labour policy 
in the Second World War. 304 The 1977 Additional Protocols I and II even made more 
clearer the concept of deportation or transfer of civilians and made its application possible 
to internal armed conflicts too. 305 In addition to all these extensive regulations, two recent 
international humanitarian law instruments, the 1996 ILC Draft Code and the ICC Statute, 
need to be indicated as reflecting the customary nature of this offence and giving place to it 
under the categories of war crimes and crimes against humanity for both international and 
non-international armed conflicts. 306 
Having indicated the customary nature and applicability of the norms of 
international humanitarian law to all types of conflicts with regard to the offence of 
unlawful deportation or transfer of civilians, its content will be briefly explained now. 
The main regulation concerning the concept of unlawful deportation or transfer of 
civilians in the Fourth Geneva Convention is Article 49. First of all, the use of the term 30' 
301 For the customary nature of this crime, see Meron, T., "Deportation of Civilians as a War Crime Under 
Customary Law", in Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law..., pp. 142-153.; Henckaerts, J-M., "Deportation 
and Transfer of Civilians in Time of War", (1993) 26 Van. J. Trans. l L. pp. 480-484. 
Art. 6 (b) and (c) of the Nuremberg Charter. 
303Art. II (b) and (c) of the CCL No. 10.; Principle VI (b) and (c) of the Principles of International Law 
Recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgement of the Tribunal.; However, in 
the Hague Regulations, there is no provision expressly prohibiting unlawful deportation or transfer of 
civilians. This case is mainly explained by scholars as this offence was not practised any more in a large 
scale at the time of the adoption of the Hague Regulations (see Meron, "Deportation... ", p. 143). The other 
view in this respect is that in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the inclusion of the internment of 
civilians and of deportation were "generally rejected as falling below the minimum standard of civilisation 
and, therefore, not requiring express prohibition. To raise the issue of the illegality of the deportation of the 
population of occupied territories was considered unnecessary; the illegality was taken for granted" 
(footnote omitted), (Schwarzenberger, G., International Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals, Vol. 11, London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1968, p. 227.; Fried, J., H., E., "Transfer of Civilian 
Manpower from Occupied Territory", (1946) 40 AJIL pp. 307-308. 
304See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgement and Sentences, (1 October 1946) in (1947) 
41 AJIL pp. 239-243.; Dunbar, pp. 449-451. 
305Art. 85 (4) (a) of the Additional Protocol I.; Art. 17 of the Additional Protocol II. 
Art. 18 (g), 20 (a) (vii), 20 (c) (I) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code.; Arts. 7 (d), 8 (2) (a) (vii) and 8 (2) (e) 
(viii) of the ICC Statute. 
307Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides: 
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"unlawful" in this crime needs to be clarified since implying that some deportations can be 
perceived as lawful. The meaning to be given to the term "unlawful" should be taken into 
consideration with Article 49 (2) of the Convention in which total or partial evacuation of 
civilians by the Occupying Power is made possible if the security of the population or 
imperative military reasons is on the account. 308 In addition to this exception, it should also 
be addressed that Article 49 does not prohibit voluntary deportations or transfers. 309 
However, the nature of the voluntary deportations must be read in conjunction with the 
circumstances. For example, if civilians want to leave the occupied territory because of the 
persecution or discrimination against them, as the international community witnessed in the 
Yugoslavian, Rwandan and more recently Kosovo conflicts, 310 it must be considered as 
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportation of protected persons from occupied territory to 
the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, 
regardless of their motive. 
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security 
of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the 
displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material 
reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to 
their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased. 
The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest practicable 
extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the removals are 
effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health. safety and nutrition, and that members of the same 
family are not separated. 
The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they have taken place. 
The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of 
war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. 
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it 
occupies". 
In this context, Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention should also be noted that it deals with the 
transfer of protected persons to another power. 
For the explanation of the notion of evacuation in detail, see Henckaerts, pp. 473-477. 
"Gross. p. 818. 
310See United States' Reports, First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eight Reports on War 
Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, (for references, see Chap. 1, note 36).; Periodic Report on the Situation 
of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Pursuant to Paragraph 32 of Commission Resolution 
1993/7 of 23 February 1993, EJCN. 4/1994/3,5 May 1993, paras. 51-62.; Final Report of the Commission 
of Experts, par. 173.; Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. R. Degni- 
Segul, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under Paragraph 20 of Commission 
Resolution EICN. 4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, E/CN. 4/1995/7,28 June1994, paras. 34-40.; and also see 
E/CN. 4/1995/12,12 August 1994, parasl4-17., E/CN. 4/1995/50/Add. 4,16 February 1995, paras. 5-6.; For 
the Kosovo conflict and massive deportations, see the indictment, Prosecutor v. Slobodoan Milosevic, 
Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Drago jub Ojdanic and Vlajko Stojilkovic, paras. 91-93,96-96,100.; 
Decision on Review of Indictment and Application for Consequential Orders, (Prosecutor v. Slobodan 
Milosevic and Others, 24 May 1999), paras. 6-8.; Apart from these conflicts, the issue of whether 
deportations of civilians from occupied territories are legal or not has been discussed in detail with regard 
to the territories which were occupied by Israel after the 1967 War. In this context, see Roberts, A., "What 
is a Military Occupation? ", (1984) 55 BYIL pp. 281-283.; Henckaerts, pp. 500-516.; and also see the 
practice of the Israeli courts rejecting the applicability of the Geneva Convention (Art. 49) in the case 
known as Affo Judgement, Supreme Court Judgment in Cases Concerning Deportation Orders, reprinted in 
199 
constituting the offence of deportation. Undoubtedly, this form of deportation is covered by 
311 the ICTY Statute. 
Secondly, the Geneva Convention and other international humanitarian law 
instruments use the term deportation together with forcible transfer or just transfer. This 
way of regulation may be perceived as implying some differences between these two terms. 
In fact, one opinion regards the transfers of civilians as relocating them within the occupied 
territory, while deportation is considered as relocating civilians outside the occupied 
territory. 312 From the perspective of international humanitarian law, the important point is 
to protect innocent civilians and deportations or transfers of them is a violation of this 
protection. The place to where they are deported or transferred has no significance, the 
crucial physical element of the offence is the forced displacement of civilians from the place 
in which they are lawfully present. This was the view adopted by the international 
community in the ICC Statute and should be assessed as leaving no place for the argument 
that whether there exists any difference between deportation or transfer of civilians on the 
ground that in the ICC Statute, the use of the two terms has the same meaning. 313 
When the practice of the ad hoc tribunals is examined, it is seen that, at the 
moment, there is no final judgement dealing with the crime of unlawful deportation or 
transfer of civilians. Nevertheless, there are a number of indictments including this 
offence. 314 There cannot be any doubt about the contribution of the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals to international humanitarian law and impact on the ICC in terms of providing a 
(1990) 29 ILM 139.; On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that while the Israeli court was dealing 
with the Eichmann Case, it was referring to the crime of deportation as a legal base for its judgement. 
When these two cases are compared, it can be easily seen that States are using and practising the 
international law rules in a manner that is not against their own international and national policies. 
Hopefully, when the ICC functions it will overcome this way of one sided application of the norms of 
international humanitarian law. 
311Roch, pp. 6,15. 
312Henckaerts, p. 472. 
"'Under the category of crimes against humanity, deportation or forcible transfer of population is defined 
as: "... forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in 
which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law", (Art. 7 (2) (d) of the 
ICC Statute). 
314The most important one in this sense is the indictment against Slobodan Milosevic and Others in which 
the accuseds are charged with the forced deportation of approximately 740.000 Kosovo Albanian civilians. 
(Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic & Others, Indictment, paras. 97,100).; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic 
and Ratko Mladic, Indictment, par, 25.; Prosecutor v. Simic & Others, Initial Indictment, (21 July 1995), 
par. 20., First Amended Indictment, (25 August 1998), paras. 30-31., Second Amended Indictment, (11 
December 1998), paras. 36-39.; Prosecutor v. Radislav Brdanin, Indictment, Case No.: IT-99-36-I, (12 
March 1999), paras. 15-16,23,34-35.; Prosecutor v. Milan Kovacevic. Amended Indictment, Case No.: IT- 
97.24-I, (23 June 1998), paras. 50-53. 
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clear guidance by virtue of interpreting and applying the elements of unlawful deportation 
or transfer of civilians when they deliver their final judgements dealing with this offence. 
This is very important in particular for the establishment of a criterion relating to the 
concept of lawful deportation which can be done only for the security of the population or 
imperative military reasons since all accused will try to defend themselves with this notion 
before the ad hoc tribunals. 
4.2.1.2.7.2. Unlawful Confinement of a Civilian 
The concept of unlawful confinement of civilians is under the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the ICTY as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions as recognised in Article 147 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention. In compliance with all other grave breaches in the ICTY 
Statute, with regard to the offence of unlawful confinement, the term "civilian" is also used 
for the replacement of "protected person". This way of adoption clearly implies its 
applicability to all armed conflicts regardless of their nature. "' 
The major protected value in the prohibition of this act is to provide the individual 
freedom of civilians even in armed conflict circumstances. There cannot be any more 
fundamental principle than the protection of freedom of movement of civilians in 
international law. 316 
Although this right can be restricted in cases of armed conflicts, its limitation can 
only be in accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law. For the first time in 
international level, under which circumstances civilians can be confined and requirements of 
a lawful confinement were examined by the ICTY in the Celebici Camp Case. In its 
Decision, the International Tribunal extensively reviewed the related provisions of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, which were Article 5 and 27 as a general base for the 
confinement of civilians, on the ground of the security of the occupying State, Articles 41 
and 42 setting out the conditions of the confinement of civilians, Article 78 including 
31SFor its importance, see supra pp. 164-165.; Undoubtedly, the offence of unlawful confinement of 
civilians forms a part of customary international law. The concept of imprisonment as a crime against 
humanity in Article 2 (c) of the CCL No. 10,3 (d) of the ICTR Statute, 5 (e) of the ICTY Statute and 7 (1) 
(e) of the ICC Statute should also be considered as a form of this offence. Article 7 (1) (e) of the ICC 
Statute regards "[i]mprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental 
rules of international law" as an act constituting crimes against humanity. And also see Arts. 7 (1) (i), 7 (2) 
(i), 8 (2) (a) (vii) of the ICC Statute. 
316In this context, see Art. 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.; Art. 9 of the ICCPR.; Art. 3 of 
the ECHR.; Art. 7 (3) of the ACHR. 
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similar regulations in relation to occupied territory, and Articles 43 and again 78 indicating 
some basic procedural rights of the detained persons. 317 The significant points of the 
Celebici Camp Case Judgement with regard to the offence of unlawful confinement of 
civilians can be indicated as follows: Confinement of civilians is an exceptional measure and 
can be practised by Occupying Power only if the security of the State makes it absolutely 
necessary and can be taken on an individual basis, not on a collective basis. 318 Having the 
same nationality of enemy power cannot be regarded as justifying the confinement of a 
civilian. 319 Each individual's case should be independently taken into account and to deprive 
of an individual's freedom, his activities, knowledge or qualifications must be considered as 
threatening the security of the Occupying Power. 320 Confinement of civilians taken as a 
measure by the Occupying Power under these strict conditions can become unlawful, if the 
detaining power does not provide the application of the basic procedural guarantees of 
civilians which are indicated in Articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The 
most important right of the detained civilians is the reconsideration of the confinement and 
of its legal base -being absolutely necessary for security reasons- as soon as possible by an 
appropriate court or administrative board. 32' 
The view taken by the ICTY will clearly affect the future cases of the ad hoc 
tribunals and will have a significant impact on the ICC in terms of providing a clear 
guidance indicating that under which circumstances civilians can be confined and what the 
requirements of lawful confinement are. 
4.2.1.2.8. Taking Civilians as Hostages 
Taking civilians as hostages is a crime which fall into the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
ad hoc tribunals either as a part of the grave breaches system or as a violation of Common 
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. 322 The act of taking civilians as hostages undoubtedly 
317 Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 564-582. 
3181bid. par. 583.; In the Second World War, the practice of the confinement of civilians was depended 
upon the justification of being a member of enemy party, and it was taken on a collective basis. (See 
Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, par. 571). 
3191bid. par. 577. 
32°1bid. 
3211bid paras. 579-583. 
322 Art. 2 (h) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 4 (c) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 147 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.; Art. 3 (1) (b) common to the Geneva Conventions.; Art. 34 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
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violates the international humanitarian law rules that form a part of customary law . 
323 n 
this ground, the applicability of this offence into armed conflicts must be in the same way 
for both conflicts irrespective of the nature of the conflict. In fact, the use of the term 
"civilians" instead of "protected persons" should lead us to this conclusion. 324 
Despite the fact that there is no final judgement including the offence of taking 
civilians as hostages in the practice of the ad hoc tribunal until the present time, the term 
"civilians" has a significant place in terms of this crime, as far as understood from the 
arguments of the parties to the cases involving such offence. 32' According to the defence 
argument, there is no difference between the offence of taking civilians as hostages as a 
grave breach under Article 2 of the ICTY Statute and as a violation of Common Article 3 
to the Geneva Conventions under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, but the meaning to be 
given to the term "civilians" is very narrow and does not indicate the real content in 
particular with regard to the provision of Common Article 3.326 On the other hand, the 
argument of the Prosecution Service seem to be confusing the concepts of protected person 
and of civilians in a sense contending that for the applicability of Article 3 of the ICTY 
Statute (violations of the laws or customs of war, including violations of Common Article 
323Article 6 (b) of the Nuremberg Charter includes the crime of killing of hostages among the war crimes 
over which the Nuremberg Tribunal had jurisdiction. Article II (b) of the CCL No. 10 has the same 
provision. 
324For its importance, see supra pp. 164-165. 
325See Kordic & Others, Kordic Defence Pre-Trial Brief, Vol. 11-Legal Issues, (Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, 6 
April 1999), paras. 57-61. "By the terms of Article 2, this enumerated offence can only be committed 
against civilians. ... civilians are those who are not 
(a) members of the armed forces, (b) members of other 
militias or voluntary corps that have responsible command, a measure of organization and internal 
discipline, or (c) inhabitants of non-occupied territories who take up arms to defend themselves... " 
(emphasis in original, par. 58).; On the other hand, the Prosecution Service argues that the victims of the 
offence must be protected persons. See Kordic & Others, Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief, (Case No. IT-95- 
14/2-PT, 25 March 1999), p. 45.; In relation to violations of Common Article 3 in this context, while the 
defence indicates that "the offence of "taking of hostages" should be analyzed in a manner consistent with 
"taking civilians as hostages" under Article 2 [of the ICTY Statute-the grave breaches system-]", (Kordic & 
Others, Defence Pre-Trial Brief, Vol. 11 - Legal Issues, par. 74), the Prosecution Service contends that the 
victims must be persons taking no active part in hostilities, (Kordic & Others, Prosecutor's Pre-Trial 
Brief, p. 48). In the Blaskic Case, the Prosecution Service also stated that: "... it is clear that it is not a 
required element of the offence of hostage-taking under Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions that the 
persons be civilians: the requirement is that they be "persons taking no active part in the hostilities". 
(Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 4 April 1997), Response of the Prosecutor to the 
Defence Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Based Upon Defects in the Form of the Indictment 
(Vagueness/Lack ofAdequate Notice of Charges), p. 13.; It is clearly understood from the argument that 
according to the Prosecution Service there is a big difference between the concepts of "civilians" and 
"persons taking no active part in hostilities". We are not agree with such understanding of the provisions of 




3) the persons in question are not civilians, but persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities. 327 Similar to these arguments, the opinion that Article 2 (h) of the Statute only 
applies to hostage taking of civilians, whereas the prohibition of Common Article 3 covers 
a broader category than civilians should also be indicated. 328 
From the perspective of international humanitarian law, all aforementioned 
arguments should be considered as misunderstood, misinterpreted, insufficient and as not 
consistent with the norms of international humanitarian law for the following reasons: 
Firstly, the notion of civilians cannot be interpreted as protected person which is an 
artificial creation of the Geneva Conventions provided for the applicability of the grave 
breaches system by national courts. Secondly, the concept of civilians cannot be interpreted 
as just consisting of civilians who are not members of the armed forces or of other militias 
or voluntary corps or inhabitants of non-occupied territories who take arms to defend 
themselves, as the defence argued . 
329 The concept of civilians clearly includes the view 
adopted for Common Article 3 which states "[p]ersons taking no active part in the 
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those 
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause,... "". 33" This way 
of understanding or interpretation does not create any controversy under the condition that 
all the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II thereto are 
examined together. This is because, under Article 4 (4) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
the concept of protected persons is limited to that Convention and does not cover 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces either in the field or at sea. If 
these categories of persons fall into enemy hands, they will gain the status of prisoners of 
war. 331 However, the 1977 Additional Protocol I supplemented the Geneva Conventions 
and extended the categories of persons protected that clearly includes injured, sick 
shipwrecked members of enemy power, persons who have participated in hostilities and 
have fallen into enemy hands and persons hors de combat. 332 In light of these provisions, it 
can be concluded that the content of the offence of taking civilians as hostages is the same 
327See supra note 325. 
328Jones, p. 33. The opinion was depended upon the "Decision on the Defence Motion to Dismiss the 
Indictment Based Upon Defects Thereof (Vagueness/Lack ofAdequate Notice of Charges)" rendered in the 
Blaskic Case. (Case No. IT-95-14-PT, 4 April 1997). 
329See supra note 325. 
33OArt. 3 (1) Common to the Geneva Conventions. 
331Art. 14 of the First Geneva Convention.; Art. 16 of the Second Geneva Convention. 
3325 8,44,45,85 of the Additional Protocol I. 
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for the grave breaches system and for violations of Common Article 3. For these reasons, if 
the Prosecution Service unintentionally uses civilians for the applicability of Article 2 of the 
ICTY Statute instead of protected persons, 333 its content needs to be indicated in a way 
which has already been explained above. The rules of international humanitarian law should 
not be interpreted and applied to armed conflicts in a manner that is different for 
international and non-international conflicts, just because of an artificial distinction. At the 
end of the day, the offence of taking civilians as hostages is the same for both international 
and internal armed conflicts. In terms of the purpose of international humanitarian law, that 
is to protect innocent lives, there is no point making complicated the applicability of the 
norms to international or internal armed conflicts, as far as the content of the offence is 
concerned. 334 
Hopefully, the ad hoc tribunals in their practice will provide the definition of the 
offence of taking civilians as hostages335 and clarify its elements in the cases including this 
offence. 336 Undoubtedly, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in this context will contribute 
to international humanitarian law and will create an immense precedential value for the 
ICC. 
333See supra note 325 and infra note 335. 
of Course, for the applicability of the same offence to different categories of crimes, general conditions 
are different, not the content or elements of the crimes. For example, murder is murder either as a war 
crime or as a crime against humanity, but to consider the crime of murder as a crime against humanity, 
general requirements of the concept of crimes against humanity such as being a part of plan or widespread 
commission of the offence against civilians, are needed to establish individual criminal responsibility. See 
infra Chap. 5 and Chap. 6, pp. 254,293 respectively. 
335 The offence of taking civilians as hostages can be defined as: is an intentional act or omission causing 
person/s to be seized, detained, or otherwise unlawfully held and involving a threat to injure, kill, or 
continue to detain such person/s in order to compel a State, military force, international organisation, 
natural person or group of persons to act or refrain from acting, as an explicit or implicit condition for the 
safe release of the person/s. In this definition, the elements of the offence indicated by the Prosecution 
service in the Kordic & Others Case was regarded as a legal base. See Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief, (25 
March 1999), pp. 45,48.; For a broader definition and acts of taking of hostages, see Bassiouni, M., C., 
International Criminal Law A Draft International Criminal Code, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands 
Germantown, Maryland, USA: Sijthoff & Noordhoff. (1980), p. 92. 
"6Some indictments including the offence of taking civilians as hostages can be indicated as follows: 
Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, (Amended Indictment, 30 September 1998), paras. 50-54.; 
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, paras. 46-48. 
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4.3. VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR 
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute337 under the heading of [v]iolations of the laws or customs of 
war" provides: 
"The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or 
customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to: 
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering; 
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity; 
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, 
or buildings; 
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, 
charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and 
science; 
(e) plunder of public or private property". 
As far as the enumerated acts are concerned, it can be obviously seen that the legal 
base for Article 3 of the ICTY Statute is the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto, which mainly 
governs the means and methods of warfare. 338 The Commentary to the ICTY Statute also 
supports this fact. 339 Traditionally, the rules of Hague Regulations are regarded as only 
applicable to international armed conflicts in nature. 
340 This way of understanding and 
application of the norms of international humanitarian law is the natural result of the 
artificial distinction created between the laws applicable to international and internal armed 
conflicts. As far as the main purpose of the norms of international humanitarian law, that is 
to protect innocent civilians and to govern the means and methods of warfare, is concerned 
311 
such a distinction does not have any legal base. 
337The ICTR Statute does not contain such a provision, but under Article 4 of its Statue, the ICTR has 
jurisdiction over serious violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional 
Protocol II, which are a part of the concept of violations of the laws or customs of war. For the practice of 
the ad hoc tribunals and the substantive content of the notion, see infra pp. 207-224. 
338See supra Chap. 3, pp. 85-86. 
339Secretary-General 's Report, paras. 41-44. 
34°Bassiouni and Manikas, p. 510.; Jones, p. 35.; Final Report, paras. 52-54. 
3'For the explanation why there must not be any division of international and internal armed conflicts and 
applicable law to both types of conflicts, see supra pp. 153-160. 
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As having been indicated earlier, in accordance with the structure of the Statutes of 
the ad hoc tribunals and of the ICC, war crimes, in this study, are examined under the two 
separate categories as "The Grave Breaches System" and "Violations of the Laws or 
Customs of War". 342 In the widest sense, the notion of violations of the laws or customs of 
war includes the grave breaches system, the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity 
as long as the last two categories of crimes are committed in an armed conflict situation, 343 
and it cannot be only confined to the Hague Regulations and to international armed 
conflicts. 344 As the practice of the ad hoc tribunals proved, the concept of violations of the 
laws or customs of war is a broad category of war crimes under which no person seriously 
violating international humanitarian law would go unpunished and is applicable to all armed 
conflicts irrespective of their nature. 345 
4.3.1. THE PRACTICE OF THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND THEIR 
CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON THE ICC 
With regard to the concept of violations of the laws or customs of war, the practice of the 
ad hoc tribunals and their contribution to international humanitarian law and possible 
impact on the ICC can be examined in two ways. Firstly, not to violate the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege, the Tribunals make clear the conditions for the applicability of the 
notion of violations of the laws or customs of war. Secondly, having drawn the framework 
for the substantive content of the notion, which is different from the grave breaches system, 
they specifically deal with each acts regarded as violations of the laws or customs of war 
and examine the elements of specific acts. In this context, serious violations of Common 
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and of the 1977 Additional Protocol II and the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals in this regard have a historic significance since being the 
342See supra pp. 129-130. 
343For the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity, the existence of an armed conflict is not a 
requirement, they can be committed in peace time as well. See infra Chap. 5 and Chap. 6, pp. 230,281-283 
respectively.; The definition of war crimes also supports this view. "War crimes are violations of the laws 
and customs of the law of armed conflict and are punishable whether committed by combatants or civilians, 
including the nationals of neutral states". (Green, L., C., The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 
Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, (1993), p. 276). 
34See infra pp. 209-210,212,216. 
For the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and its importance see the following notes and accompanying 
text. 
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first time in international level, individual criminal responsibility was able to be enforced by 
the International Tribunals for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in internal armed conflicts. 
4.3.1.1. The Conditions for the Applicability of Violations of the Laws or Customs of 
War 
Under Article 3 of its Statute, the ICTY has jurisdiction over the crimes considered as 
violations of the laws or customs of war and has power to try persons responsible for such 
offences. One of the main issue the cases consisting of charges of violations of the laws or 
customs of war before the ICTY was to determine the scope of this part of war crimes and 
to make clear that under which conditions and to what extend the concept was applicable 
to the events occurred in the former Yugoslavia. 
In the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, the notion of violations of the laws or customs 
of war was examined in a great detail. In this case, the defence argued that the concept was 
limited to the Hague Regulations and could be applied to only international armed 
conflicts. 346 On the other hand, the Prosecution Service contended that the expression 
"laws or customs of war" used in Article 3 could be applied to both international and 
internal armed conflicts, and that since the acts enumerated in Article 3 were illustrative, 
the Tribunal had jurisdiction over violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions, which contains minimum humanitarian standards, regardless of the nature of 
the armed conflict, and that the application of Common Article 3 did not violate the 
principle of legality, as it formed a part of customary international law. 347 
The Trial Chamber in its Decision mainly shared the view of the Prosecution 
Service and decided that the concept of violations of the laws or customs of war in Article 
3 was applicable to international and internal armed conflicts, the character of the conflict 
was not important for the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Article 3 and 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions as a minimum standards in armed conflicts 
346Defence Motion on the Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 10.1-10.3. 
347Prosecutor's Response, pp. 47-53. 
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could be tried under violations of the laws or customs of war and its application did not 
violate the principle of legality. 348 
The defence challenged with the Trial Chamber's Decision on Jurisdiction and filed 
a notice of (interlocutory) appeal against the decision, which was basically including the 
same arguments put forward before the Trial Chamber. 349 
In the appeal stage, the Appeals Chamber in its Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction literally interpreted Article 3 of its Statute and found 
that violations of the laws or customs of war included a broad category of offences, the 
enumerated acts in Article were illustrative, not exhaustive and it could be considered as 
covering all violations of international humanitarian law. 350 According to the Chamber, 
Article 3 of the Statute was a general or residual clause to cover all violations of 
international humanitarian law not covered by Articles 2,4 and 5 of its Statute and this 
way of interpretation was in compliance with the main purpose of the establishment of the 
International Tribunal since providing no person responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law would go unpunished. 31' To reach such an interpretation of 
348Tria1 Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 74.; For the legal basis of the decision, see paras. 
58-73. 
349Defence's Brief to Support the Notice ofAppeal (Jurisdiction of the Tribunal), Tadic Case, Case No. IT- 
94-1-T, (25 August 1995), paras. 8.9-8.15.; and also see Prosecutor's Response to the Defence's Brief. (1 
September 1995).; Almost in every case these arguments were repeated by the defence even after the 
Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction of the Tribunal which was in favour of the applicability of 
violations of the laws or customs of war to all conflicts and of applicability of Common Article 3 as a part 
of it (see the following notes and accompanying text). For example, see Radic & Others, Defence 
Preliminary Motion, Case No. 1T-98-30-PT, (14 January 1999).; Radic & Others, Prosecutor's Reply to the 
Defence's Preliminary Motion including Annex, Case No. IT-98-30-PT, (28 January 1999).; Kordic & 
Others, Jurisdictional Motion #2- Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss the Amended Indictment for Lack of 
Jurisdiction Based on the Limited Jurisdictional Reach ofArticles 2 and 3, Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, (22 
January 1999).; Kordic & Others, Prosecutor's Response to Joint Defence Jurisdictional Motion #2 to 
Dismiss the Amended Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction, Based on the Limited Jurisdictional Reach of 
Articles 2 and 3, Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, (5 February 1999).; Kordic & Others, Joint Defence Reply in 
Support ofJurisdictional Motion #2- Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss the Amended Indictment for Lack of 
Jurisdiction Based on the Limited Jurisdictional Reach of Articles 2 and 3, Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, (12 
February 1999).; Kordic & Others, Decision on the Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on the Limited Jurisdictional Reach of Articles 2 and 3, Case 
No. IT-95-14/2-PT, (2 March 1999). 
350Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 87. "Article 3 may be taken to cover all 
violations of international humanitarian law other than the "grave breaches" of the four Geneva 
Conventions falling under Article 2.... " (emphasis in original, par. 87). 
35'The related parts of the Decision can be quoted as follows: 
"... Article 3 is a general clause covering all violations of humanitarian law not falling under Article 2 or 
covered by Articles 4 or 5, more specifically: (i) violations of the Hague law on international conflicts; (ii) 
infringements of provisions of the Geneva Conventions other than those classified as "grave breaches" by 
those Conventions; (iii) violations of Common Article 3 and other customary rules on internal conflicts; 
(iv) violations of agreements binding upon the parties to the conflict... " (par. 89).; 
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Article 3, the Chamber depended upon the wording of the Article "[s]uch violations shall 
include, but not be limited to", statements of the representatives of the USA, UK and 
France made after the adoption of Resolution 827, establishing the ICTY. 332 
Having indicated the general or residual nature of Article 3, the Chamber set out the 
conditions for the applicability of the concept of violations of the laws or customs of war as 
follows: 
"(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian 
law; 
(ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required 
conditions must be met [two requirements for a treaty that are: must be binding on the 
parties at the time of the alleged offence, and must not be in conflict with or derogated 
from peremptory norms of international law (in par. 143)]; 
(iii) the violation must be "serious", that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a rule 
protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for the 
victim...; 
(iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the 
individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching rule v. 353 
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber clearly held that provided that the requirements 
already indicated above were met, the notion of serious violations of the laws or customs of 
war were applicable to all armed conflicts irrespective of their nature either international or 
non-international. 354 
"Article 3 thus confers on the International Tribunal jurisdiction over any serious offence against 
international humanitarian law not covered by Article 2,4 or 5. Article 3 is a fundamental provision laying 
down that any "serious violation of international humanitarian law" must be prosecuted by the 
International Tribunal. In other words, Article 3 functions as a residual clause designed to ensure that no 
serious violation of international humanitarian law is taken away from the jurisdiction of the International 
Tribunal. Article 3 aims to make such jurisdiction watertight and inescapable". (emphasis in original, par. 
91). 
"... Article 3 fully realizes the primary purpose of the establishment of the international Tribunal, that is, 
not to leave unpunished any person guilty of any such serious violation, whatever the context within which 
it may have been committed". (par. 92). 
Judge Li was not agree with the majority opinion of the Appeals Chamber. See Separate Opinion of Judge 
Li on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 5-13. 
352Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 87-88.; For the Statements indicating that 
the term "the laws or customs of war" includes violations of Common Article 3 and the 1977 Additional 
Protocols, see supra note 26. 
353Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 94. 
354Ibid. 
210 
In its Decision, the Appeals Chamber discussed the third and fourth requirements of 
the applicability of Article 3 of its Statute in detail. For the first two requirements, it is very 
obvious that there cannot be any doubt that all charges including murder, rape, torture, 
inhuman or cruel treatment etc. constitute violations of international humanitarian law and 
these crimes are serious enough to trigger the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals. 3" 
As indicated above, for the applicability of the notion of violations of the laws or 
customs of war, the nature of armed conflict does not have any importance on the subject- 
matter jurisdiction of the ICTY. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber discussed at length the 
evolution of customary rules of international humanitarian law governing internal armed 
conflicts. 356 In this part of the Decision the Tribunal indicated that distinction between 
international and internal armed conflicts "[was] loosing its value as far as human beings are 
concerned". 357 To support this conclusion, the Chamber examined State practice in the 
situations of internal armed conflicts, including the Spanish Civil War, 358 the Chinese Civil 
War, 359 the Yemen Conflict, 360 the Congo Civil War, 36' the Biafra Conflict in Nigeria362 and 
the El Salvador Conflict; 363 the practice of the ICRC; 364 two resolutions adopted by the UN 
General Assembly which are Resolutions 2444 (1968) and 2675 (1970); 365 some 
declarations of the European Community (European Union); 366 and military manuals of 
States, 367 all of which were considered as indicating general principles of international 
humanitarian law that mainly protects civilians and civilian objects in cases of armed 
conflicts. Additionally, there are some rules governing the means and methods of warfare 
which are also applicable to both international and internal armed ConflictS. 368 In this 
context, the Tribunal particularly concentrated on the use of chemical weapons by virtue of 
illustration of the alleged acts of Iraqi authorities against its own Kurdish origin 
31-ITria1 Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 173,176,178,280. 
"Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 96-127. 
3571bid. par. 97.; However, this approach creates a controversy over the view adopted on the applicability of 
the grave breaches system. See supra pp. 143-144 and infra p. 212. 
"Ibid. paras. 100-101. 
359Ib1d par. 102. 
360Ibid. par. 103. 
36'Ibid. par. 105. 
3621bid. par. 106. 
3631bid, par. 107. 
364Ibld. par. 109. 
36S1bid. paras. 110-112. 
366Ibid. paras. 113,115-116. 
367Ibid par. 118. 
3"Ibid. par. 119. 
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population. 369 On this ground, the Chamber held that a number of customary international 
law rules governing international armed conflicts had been extended to govern internal 
armed conflicts. 370 According to the Chamber, "[t]hese rules, ... cover such areas as 
protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate attacks, protection 
of civilian objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all those who do not (or no 
longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed 
in international armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting hostilities! ' '371 and 
undoubtedly violations of these rules, in particular violations of Common Article 3, imposes 
individual criminal responsibility. 372 
From the perspective of international humanitarian law, the approach taken by the 
Appeals Chamber in relation to the interpretation of Article 3, violations of the laws or 
customs of war, should be assessed as a very important step towards the enforcement of 
the norms of international humanitarian law irrespective of the nature of armed conflicts. It 
is also significant that the view of the Appeals Chamber does not leave any room to persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law to go unpunished 
whatever the nature of the conflict is. On these basis, the approach taken by the ICTY in 
the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision is welcomed and considered as progressive and creative by 
international lawyers. 373 However, when the interpretation of Article 3 is compared with 
Article 2's interpretation (grave breaches) by the same Appeals Chamber, in the same 
Decision, it cannot be explained how such a Tribunal could interpret the grave breaches 
system in a strict way without mentioning the customary nature of the grave breaches 
system, that is also a part of violations of the laws or customs of war in a sense. This 
should be assessed as a clear controversy when the practice of the ICTY is taken entirely 
into account. 374 At this point, one question comes into minds that whether the 
9Ibid. paras. 120-124. 
3701bid. par. 126. 
"'Ibid. par. 127. 
372Ibid. par. 134.; For the examination of individual criminal responsibility in internal armed conflicts by 
the Appeals Chamber, see paras. 128-136. 
373Fenrick, W., "The Development of the Law of Armed Conflict through the Jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia", in Schmitt and Green (eds. ), p. 92.; King, F., 
P., and La Rosa, A-M., "The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal: 1994-1996", (1997) 8 EJIL p. 
146.; Aldrich, G., H., "Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia", 
(1996) 90 AJIL p. 69.; Meindersma, p. 396.; Von Sternberg, M., R., "Yugoslavian War Crimes and the 
Search fora New Humanitarian Order: The Case of Dusko Tadic", (1997) 12 St. John's J. of L. Comm. pp. 
360-364. 
374See supra pp. 143-144,157-158. 
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interpretation of Article 3 was a compensation for the interpretation of Article 2, in other 
words, whether the International Tribunal had to interpret and apply the concept of 
violations of the laws or customs of war so as to prevent persons responsible for grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, but they could not be tried under this category of 
3's crimes in cases of non-international armed conflicts, from going unpunished. 
Whatever the reason behind the interpretation of the concept of violations of the 
laws or customs of war by the International Tribunal is, the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision 
should be regarded as a turning point in the history of international humanitarian law. The 
significant aspects of the Decision can be briefly indicated as follows: 
First of all, it creates a guidance for the following cases of the ad hoc tribunals and 
this contribution can be examined in the cases endorsing the ruling of the Appeals Chamber. 
Amongst them, the Tadic, 376 Celebici Camp Case '377 Furund. -Ya378 and the 
Akayesu 
Judgement279 can be referred. 
Secondly and most importantly, the international community has witnessed the 
international criminalisation of internal atrocities, 38° and its consequence the enforcement of 
individual criminal responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law in 
internal armed conflicts. 381 In this context, the international community's practice has 
reached the same level with the practice with regard to international armed conflicts by 
virtue of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. In other words, customary rules of 
"sAldrich considers Article 3 of the ICTY Statute as a saviour, when it is compared with the Decision of 
the Chamber with regard to Article 2 of the Statute creating obvious problems for the applicability of the 
grave breaches system like the nature of the conflict to be international. Aldrich, p. 67. 
376First time in a final judgement level Article 3 of the ICTY Statute was applied in the Tadic Judgement in 
accordance with the requirements laid down in the Jurisdiction Decision by the Appeals Chamber. Trial 
Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 609-613. 
377 Trial Chamber, Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, paras. 278-280,296-298. 
38Trial Chamber, Furundzija Case, Judgement, paras. 132-133,258. 
379Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.5.140-143. 
380For a detailed explanation and discussion, see Meron, "International Criminalization.... ", pp. 554-577. 381 For an extensive discussion of the responsibility of individuals for violations of international 
humanitarian law in internal armed conflicts, from the aspects of different methods used to approach an 
issue -in this sense, individual criminal responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law in 
internal armed conflicts- in international law, see Simma, B., and Paulus, A., L., "The Responsibility of 
Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Pozitivist View", (1999) 93 AJIL p. 302.; 
Wiessner, S., and Willard, A., R., "Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses in Internal 
Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity", (1999) 93 AJIL p. 316.; O'Connell, p. 334.; 
Abbott, K., W., "International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities 
in Internal Conflicts", (1999) 93 AJIL p. 361.; Dunoff, J., L., and Trachtman, J., P., "The Law and 
Economics of Humanitarian Violations in Internal Conflict", (1999) 93 AJIL p. 394.; Charlesworth, H., 
"Feminist Methods in International Law", (1999) 93 AJIL p. 379.; and also see Ratner and Abrams, pp. 91- 
101. 
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international humanitarian law governing internal armed conflicts has achieved the status of 
Jus cogens and the obligations of States become erga omnes in nature. 392 
Thirdly, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals have played a crucial role for the 
adoption of the ICC Statute in a way which consists of detailed rules prohibiting serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable to international armed conflicts38. and to 
internal armed conflicts. 384 The inclusion of Common Article 3,385 some principles of the 
Hague Regulations, 386 some provisions of the Additional Protocols I and II, 387 explicit 
prohibition on rape and other forms of sexual crimes, 388 and criminalisation of some acts, 
first time being under the jurisdiction of an international criminal court, such as against 
humanitarian organisations, UN peace-keepers, their flags, emblems; recruiting the children 
under the age of fifteen years into armed forces389 demonstrated that the concept of 
violations of the laws or customs of war need not be confined to the means and methods of 
warfare, in other words, the Hague Regulations, and to international armed conflicts. The 
ICC Statute is the most authoritative international humanitarian law instrument consisting 
of sufficient evidence to prove that the approach taken by the International Tribunal in 
relation to the interpretation and application of the concept is generally consistent with the 
practice of the international community. It can be said generally in compliance with the ICC 
Statute. This is because, there is a clear controversy between the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals and the ICC Statute. 390 As indicated earlier, 391 the International Tribunal ruled that 
382Von Sternberg, pp. 376-383.; Meron, "International Criminalization... ", p. 576.; This achievement also 
indicates that there must not be any distinction between international and internal armed conflicts and the 
laws applicable to armed conflicts. See supra pp. 158-159. 
383Art. 8 (2) (b) (i-xxvi) of the ICC Statute. 
38' Art. 8 (2) (e) (i-xii) of the ICC Statute. 
385Article 8 (2) (c) of the ICC Statute explicitly includes serious violations of Article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions as a war crime (just for internal armed conflicts). 
386Principles governing the means and conducts of warfare such as prohibiting the use of poison or 
poisoned weapons (Regulation 23 (a and e).; Art. 3 (a) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 8 (2) (b) (xvii-xviii) of the 
ICC Statute), prohibiting attacks or bombardment of undefended towns, villages, dwellings or buildings 
(Regulation 25.; Art. 3 (c) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 8 (2) (b) (v) of the ICC Statute), prohibiting the 
seizure of or destruction or damage to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, education, the arts and 
sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science (Regulation 56.; Art. 3 (d) of the ICTY Statute.; 
Art. 8 (2) (b) (ix) and 8 (2) (e) (iv) of the ICC Statute) can be indicated as examples. 
387 For example compare Articles 85 and 57 of the Additional Protocol I with Article 8 (2) (b) (i-ii, iv, viii) of 
the ICC Statute (mainly concerning prohibiting on attacks on civilian population, civilian objects, the 
principle of proportionality and deportation or transfer of civilians). Compare Article 17 of the Additional 
Protocol II with Article 8 (2) (e) (viii) of the ICC Statute (concerning the displacement of civilian 
population). 
388Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxii) and 8 (2) (e) (vi) of the ICC Statute. 
389Art 8 (2) (b) (iii, vii, xxvi) and 8 (2) (e) (iii, vii) of the ICC Statute. 
39°Sarooshi, D., "The Statute of the International Criminal Court", (1999) 48 ICLQ p. 399. 
391 See supra p. 210. 
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the concept of violations of the laws or customs of war was applicable to all conflicts 
regardless of the nature of armed conflicts. However, the ICC Statute contains rules 
separately for international armed conflicts in Article 8 (2) (b) which is more detailed than 
rules governing internal armed conflicts in Article 8 (2) (e). Moreover, according to the 
International Tribunal, serious violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions 
form part of customary international law and applicable to both international and non- 
international armed conflicts, 392 however, serious violations of Common Article 3 to the 
Geneva Conventions is regulated for merely internal armed conflicts in Article 8 (2) (c) of 
the ICC Statute that can be considered as the extension of the grave breaches system to 
internal armed conflicts. The structure of the ICC Statute supports this view. 393 
Furthermore, there is no provision prohibiting the use of any kind of weapon in internal 
armed conflicts. Even the use of poisonous gas or biological, chemical weapons is not 
included in the ICC Statute for non-international armed conflicts. This is completely against 
the practice of the International Tribunal and of the international community. 394 On the 
other hand, the rules governing the means of warfare in cases of international armed 
conflicts in the ICC Statute393 are far away to be in compliance with one of the main 
purpose of international humanitarian law, that is to say, protecting innocent lives and 
reducing the suffering of human beings in armed conflicts. Even the use of biological, 
chemical weapons is not explicitly prohibited, but the ICC can interpret the provision of 
banning the use of poisonous or other gases to cover such weapons. 396 Unfortunately, there 
is no room to include the use of nuclear weapons as a war crime under the ICC Statute. 397 
392See supra p. 212. 
393For international armed conflicts, see the ICC Statute Art. 8 (2) (a) (grave breaches system), Art. 8 (2) 
(b) (other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflicts).; For 
internal armed conflicts, see the ICC Statute, Art. 8 (2) (c and d) (serious violations of Common Article 3 
to the Geneva Conventions), Art. 8 (2) (e) (other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts). 
394In this sense, see the argument and the view taken by the international community in relation to whether 
Iraqi authorities used chemical weapons against its own population who are in Kurdish origin and the 
examination of this issue by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 120- 
124.; Cassese, "The Statute... ", pp. 152-153. 
393Art. 8 (2) (b) (xvii-xx) of the ICC Statute. 
396Art. 8 (2) (b) (xviii) of the ICC Statute. 
397The legality of the use of nuclear weapons was recently discussed by the ICJ in a great detail. See 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, (8 July 1996), (1996) ICJ Rep. 
p. 226. In its Advisory Opinion, the ICJ, unfortunately, did not decide whether the use of nuclear weapons 
was illegal or not. The most important part of the Advisory Opinion can be quoted as follows: "... the Court 
cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in 
an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake; " (par. 105. 
2. E. ). From the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ can be inferred that the use of nuclear weapons is not illegal, 
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From the perspective of international humanitarian law, banning the use of some kinds of 
bullets, 398 poison or poisonous weapons, poisonous gases, 399 which can be interpreted as 
including biological, chemical weapons, but not the use of nuclear weapons cannot be 
explained in any legal ground as far as the protection of human beings in armed conflicts is 
concerned. 400 
On the basis of this explanation, it can be concluded that the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals with regard to the concept of violations of the laws or customs of war is more 
convenient than the ICC Statute since abandoning the distinction between international and 
internal armed conflicts and including the same prohibitions on the use of weapons and on 
the conduct of warfare for all armed conflicts whether international or non-international. To 
be in compliance with the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC Statute should have 
included just one category of violations of the laws or customs of war for all types of armed 
conflicts, at least, as far as the fundamental norms of international humanitarian law are 
concerned. The way adopted in the ICC Statute is obviously against the developed 
customary international law and a step backward from the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. 
4.3.1.2. The Substantive Content of the Violations of the Laws or Customs of War 
As has already been indicated above, the concept of violations of the laws or customs of 
war covers a broad field of war crimes under which civilians, civilian objects, persons who 
do not (or no longer) part in hostilities are protected and the means and methods of warfare 
are regulated. 401 From the perspective of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, the inclusion 
of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol II as a part 
of violations of the laws or customs of war into the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
International Tribunals has a special significance in international humanitarian law. For this 
reason, the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR in relation to the conditions for the 
but the rules of international humanitarian law must be taken into account such as the principles of military 
necessity, and of proportionality. There is no way to use nuclear weapons as used in the Second World War. 
398Art. 8 (2) (b) (xix) of the ICC Statute. 
399Art. 8 (2) (b) (xvii-xviii) of the ICC Statute. 
"The same criticism is also valid for the non-inclusion of the use of blinding laser weapons and landmines 
in the ICC Statute as a war crime. With regard to these means of warfare, the practice of the international 
community is on the way of prohibiting these weapons. In this context, see Zockler, M., C., "Commentary 
on Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons", (1998) 1 YIHL pp. 333-340.; Goose, S., D., "The Ottawa 
Process and the 1997 Mine Ban Treat)? ', (1998) 1 YIHL pp. 269-291. 
401 See supra pp. 209-210,212. 
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applicability and substantive content of Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocol II 
will be explained below. 
4.3.1.2.1. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol 
II 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions`02 is the only Article dealing with internal 
armed conflicts. 403 It states: 
"In case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one 
of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a 
minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who 
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, 
or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse 
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other 
similar criteria. 
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for... ". 
This Article was reaffirmed and supplemented by the Additional Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions. Although Article 4 (1) (2) of the Additional Protocol II generally 
402For the historical background and drafting history of Common Article 3, see Moir, L., "The Historical 
Development of the Application of Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts to 1949", 
(1998) 47 ICLQ p, 337, in particular, pp. 355-361. 
403For a detailed study on internal conflicts and the protection of human rights, see Meron, T., Human 
Rights in Internal Strife: Their International Protection, Cambridge: Grotious Publications Limited, (1987), 
in particular, pp. 45-69. 
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repeats Common Article 3, it contains some more prohibited acts such as collective 
punishments, acts of terrorism, pillage etc. For the first time in international level, Article 4 
of the ICTR Statute which was drawn from Common Article 3 and Article 4 of the 
Additional Protocol II expressly gave a power to an international criminal organisation to 
prosecute and punish persons responsible for violations of these norms of international 
humanitarian law. 404 Even though the ICTY Statute does not include such an Article, as 
indicated above, it has jurisdiction over violations of Common Article 3 and of the 
Additional Protocol II as long as the requirements of the concept of violations of the laws 
or customs of war are met. 405 
Under the modern concept of international humanitarian law, the applicability of 
Common Article 3 and many provisions of the Additional Protocol II cannot be limited to 
only non-international armed conflicts due to being regarded as the customary rules of 
international law and the minimum humanitarian standards which must be applied in all 
armed conflicts regardless of the character of the conflicts either international or non- 
international. 
404See Art. 4 of the ICTR Statute.; Common Article 3.; Art. 4 (1) (2) of the Additional Protocol II. 
40,5See supra pp. 210,212.; In a very recent interlocutory decision, the ICTY again made it clear that the 
ICTY had jurisdiction over serious violations of Common Article 3 and of the Additional Protocols I and II. 
See Decision on the Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss the Amended Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction 
Based on the Limited Jurisdictional Reach ofArticles 2 and 3, (Kordic & Others, Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, 
2 March 1999) par. 34. For reasons and brief explanation of the practice of the ICTY as a legal base for the 
Decision, see paras. 17-33. 
"The view taken by the ICJ with regard to the international humanitarian norms also supports this 
opinion. In the Nicaragua Case, the Court decided that: "Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 defines certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts of a non- 
international character. There is no doubt that, in the event of international armed conflicts, these rules also 
constitute a minimum yardstick; in addition to the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to 
international confiicts; [emphasis added] and they are rules which, in the Court's opinion, reflect what the 
Court in 1949 called "elementary considerations of humanity" (Corfu Channel, Merits, ICJ. Reports 1949, 
p. 22)" (emphasis in original, par. 218). Similarly, in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ indicated the customary nature of international humanitarian law norms 
in relation to the Hague and Geneva Conventions as follows: "It is undoubtedly because a great many rules 
of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person 
and "elementary considerations of humanity" as the Court put it in its Judgment of 9 April 1949 in the 
Corfu Channel case(I. C. J. Reports 1949, p. 22), [emphasis in original] that the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession. Further these fundamental rules are to be observed by all 
States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute 
intransgressible principles of international customary law". (emphasis added, par. 79). 
For the international community's effort on to provide the applicability of the norms of international 
humanitarian and of human rights law to all conflicts regardless of their nature by virtue of the concept of 
minimum humanitarian standards, see Eide, A., Rosas, A., and Meron, T., "Combating Lawlessness in 
Gray Zone Conflicts Through Minimum Humanitarian Standards", (1995) 89 AJIL pp. 215-223. 
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In addition to being customary or fundamental rules of international humanitarian 
law, to hold an individual criminally responsible for serious violations of Common Article 3, 
the conditions for the applicability of Common Article 3 must be met. These requirements 
were, for the first time, laid down by the ICTY in the Tadic Judgement as follows: "The 
rules contained in paragraph 1 of Common Article 3 proscribe a number of acts which: (i) 
are committed within the context of an armed conflict; (ii) have a close connection to the 
armed conflict; and (iii) are committed against persons taking no active part in 
hostilities". 407 First two elements of the applicability of Common Article 3, to be an armed 
conflict and nexus, are not different from the general requirements of the applicability of the 
grave breaches system. For this reason, the explanation made in this context is also valid for 
the applicability of Common Article 3 as well. 408 The significant element that which class of 
persons are protected by Common Article 3 is indicated in paragraph I of Common Article 
3 as "[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause... ". In other words, these are the persons who are protected 
in all four Geneva Conventions and grave breaches system applicable to them in 
international armed conflicts. 409 Common Article 3 just extends the regulations to internal 
armed conflicts in a way of excluding the applicability of the grave breaches regime to such 
conflicts. 410 The International Tribunal has to separately examine each individual's 
circumstances to decide whether the victim has taken an active part in the hostilities and 
whether the victim is protected by Common Article 3.41' 
The interpretation and application of serious violations of Common Article 3 and of 
the Additional Protocol II have a significant place in the practice of the Rwandan Tribunal. 
However, when the practice of the ICTR is compared with the ICTY's approach, it can be 
obviously seen that there are some contrasts which need to be discussed. In the Akayesu 
Case, first of all, the ICTR separately examined the conditions for the applicability of 
Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocol II. As previously indicated, 412 the regulation 
407Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 614. 
'See supra pp. 136-141.; In particular, the existence of an armed conflict that is non-international in 
nature was discussed in detail in supra pp. 137-140. 
409Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 615. 
OThis also constitutes another evidence to prove that there must not be any division for international and 
internal armed conflicts and the laws applicable to the conflicts. 
'Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 616. 
ZSee supra pp. 137-139. 
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of Common Article 3 is quite different from the Additional Protocol II with regard to the 
threshold of the applicability of the norms to internal conflicts. While Common Article 3 
does not include any criterion, just mentions "armed conflicts not of an international 
character", in this context, Article 1 (1) of the Protocol II introduces a higher threshold 
which can be indicated as being two sets of armed forces, responsible command and 
sufficient control over territory to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. In 
terms of determining the existence of an armed conflict for the applicability of Common 
Article 3, the view taken by the ICTR is, in this sense completely in compliance with the 
ICTY. As the ICTY made clear that to decide whether an armed conflict existed, the 
examination of the intensity and organisation of the parties to the conflict were enough to 
trigger the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal over serious violations of humanitarian 
law. 413 On the other hand, for the applicability of Protocol II, the ICTR examined the 
higher threshold set out in Article 1 (1) of that Protocol to apply Article 4 of its Statute to 
the Rwandan conflict. 414 
The approach taken by the ICTR can be criticised on two grounds: 
(a) To apply such a higher threshold for the applicability of the norms of Protocol 
II, the ICTR should have examined the customary nature of Article 1 (1) of the Protocol 
II 415 As indicated earlier, the requirements of Article 1 (1) of the Protocol II do not form 
part of customary rules of international humanitarian law. The 1996 ILC Draft Code and 
413See supra p. 139.; Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.5.162-163,6.5.1-3 
"Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.5.4-15.; The following cases of the ICTR also 
applied the ruling of the Akayesu Judgement. See Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, 
Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, (21 May 1999), (hereinafter Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, 
Judgement), paras. 171-172.; The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Judgement, 
Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, (6 December 1999), (hereinafter Rutaganda Case, Judgement), par. 2.4. (under the 
heading of Serious Violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II 
in the Applicable Law Part of the Judgement).; In this context, the opinion, amongst the scholars, that 
Common Article 3 applies to all armed conflicts but Protocol II only applies to internal conflicts and 
additional criteria need to be present for its application (Morris, V., and Scharf, M., P., The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Vol. I, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1998, p. 
146) should be indicated. Such a distinction cannot be acceptable from the perspective of international 
humanitarian law, at least from the aspect of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, on the premise that the 
Protocol II was adopted to make possible the enforcement of Common Article 3 and it reaffirmed and 
supplemented Common Article 3. While regarding Common Article 3 is applicable to all armed conflicts, 
limitation of the Protocol II to only internal armed conflicts cannot be justified in terms of many provisions 
of the Protocol II that have reached the level of customary rule status of international humanitarian law. 
For further explanation, see the following notes and the accompanying text. 
415This point also indicates the controversy inside the Decision of the ICTR in the Akayesu Case. Whereas 
the Tribunal indicated the customary nature of Article 4 of the Additional Protocol II which was the legal 
base for Article 4 of the ICTR Statute (paras. 6.5.156-157), Article 1 (1) of the Protocol II were not 
mentioned as constituting a part of customary rules of international humanitarian law. 
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the ICC Statute are the latest international humanitarian law instruments considered as 
reflecting customary international humanitarian law and both of them do not include such 
requirements for the applicability of the norms of international humanitarian law to internal 
armed conflicts. 416 In this context, the provision of the ICC Statute in Article 8 (2) (f) 
should not be considered as the reflection of Article 1 (1) of the Additional Protocol 11'417 
but for distinguishing internal armed conflicts from banditry, unorganised and short-lived 
insurrections, or terrorist activities and clarifying the vagueness of the threshold of the 
applicability of international humanitarian norms to internal armed conflicts. 418 
(b) With regard to Article 4 of the ICTR Statute, the explanation made by the 
Secretary General cannot justify the interpretation and application of the norms of 
international humanitarian law by the ICTR in this way. As is known, the Commentary to 
the ICTR Statute states that: "the Security Council has elected to take a more expansive 
approach to the choice of the applicable law than the one underlying the Statute of the 
Yugoslav Tribunal, and included within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Rwanda 
Tribunal international instruments regardless of whether they were considered part of 
customary international law or whether they have customarily entailed the individual 
criminal responsibility of the perpetrator of the crime. Article 4 of the Statute, 
accordingly, includes violations of Additional Protocol II, which, as a whole, has not yet 
been universally recognized as part of customary international law, and for the first time 
criminalizes common Article 3... ". 419 From the perspective of international humanitarian 
and international law in general, the approach taken in the Secretary-General's Report has 
no basis on the ground that the Security Council does not have any legislative power to 
make some acts can be prosecuted and punished by an international criminal 
organisation. 420 The Statutes adopted by the Security Council for the ICTY and the ICTR 
416For its discussion, see supra pp. 138-139. 
'"Article 8 (2) (f) of the ICC Statute provides: "Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an 
international character thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take 
place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities 
and organized armed groups or between such groups". For the assessment of this provision, see supra pp. 
138-139.; However, some scholars interpret this provision as a reflection of Article 1 (1) of the Additional 
Protocol II. Meron, "Epilogue" in War Crimes..., p. 309.; Arsanjani, M., H., "The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court", (1999) 93 AJIL p. 35.; Sarooshi, p. 399. 
"BThe wording of the ICC Statute in a way of using the terms "protracted armed conflict" soon after the 
indication of "internal disturbances and tensions" and the practice of the ICTY support this view. For the 
importance of the practice of the ICTY and its impact on the ICC Statute, see supra pp. 137-140. 
419Secretary-General's Report for Rwanda, par. 12 (emphasis added). 
420This fact was indicated in the Celebici Camp Case Judgement (par. 310) by the ICTY. 
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can only be considered as reflecting customary rules of international humanitarian law and 
can guide the ad hoc tribunals. Whatever the intent of the Security Council or Secretary- 
General's Report in adopting the ICTR Statute is, the ICTR should, in fact has to, interpret 
and apply customary rules of international humanitarian law, as rightly indicated in the 
Secretary-General's Report in relation to the ICTY Statute "the international tribunal 
should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of 
customary law". 42' 
On the basis of these facts, in this context, the ICTR should have applied the 
requirement of Common Article 3 for the applicability of Article 4 of its Statute. 
The second controversy in the ICTR's practice can be found in the examination of 
personal jurisdiction over serious violations of Common Article 3 and of the Additional 
Protocol II. In the Akayesu Judgement, the International Tribunal looked for a condition, 
that is to say, "the class of perpetrators", which was classified by the Tribunal as 
"commanders, combatants and other members of the armed forces... individuals of all ranks 
belonging to the armed forces under the military command of either of the belligerent 
parties, or to individuals who were legitimately mandated and expected, as public officials 
or agents or persons otherwise holding public authority or de facto representing the 
Government, to support or fulfil the war efforts" can be held accountable for serious 
violations of Common Article 3 and of the Additional Protocol II. 422 In the Decision, it is 
very clear that to hold a civilian criminally responsible, a higher standard is required which 
is completely against the practice of the international community and of the ICTY. As 
indicated earlier, to establish individual criminal responsibility either for military or a 
civilian, it is sufficient that the crimes in question are committed in connection with the 
armed conflict, that is nothing else than the existence of nexus which is one of the main 
requirement of war crimes. 423 According to the approach taken by the ICTR, many civilians 
will be able to go unpunished. 424 This creates an obvious controversy with the ruling of the 
421Secretary-General 's Report, par. 34. 
422Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.5.20-29.; In the following cases this approach guided 
the ICTR See Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, paras. 173-176.; Trial 
Chamber, Rutaganda Case, Judgement, par. 2.4. (under the heading of Serious Violation of Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II in the Applicable Law Part of the 
Judgement). 
42 See supra p. 140. 
424For the same reasons, Akayesu was not found guilty of violations of Common Article 3 and of the 
Additional Protocol II. See paras. 7.1.37-42. 
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Appeals Chamber in the Jurisdiction Decision which states that no serious violations of 
international humanitarian law would go unpunished. 425 
On this ground the view of the ICTR cannot be welcomed from the perspective of 
international humanitarian law. 426 Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocol II are 
designed to protect innocent lives, they cannot be interpreted and applied in a manner that 
a class of perpetrator can be held responsible for violations of their provisions. On the other 
hand, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals should be in compliance with each other. While 
the ICTY is interpreting Article 3 of its Statute (violations of the laws or customs of war) it 
has taken an important step forward in terms of providing the application of the norms of 
international humanitarian law in a way that does not leave any room for responsible 
persons to go unpunished. To reach such a conclusion, the legal base was the customary 
nature of Article 3, including Common Article 3 and many provisions of the Additional 
Protocol II which have reached the customary international law status. In this sense, the 
practice of the ICTR in relation to the conditions for the applicability of Common Article 3 
and of the Additional Protocol II cannot be explained in any legal ground. As far as the 
circumstances of internal armed conflicts in which every individual can easily involve in the 
hostilities because of his/her ethnic origin or religious differences, which were the cases in 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, are concerned, to establish individual criminal 
responsibility of a civilian for war crimes, the application of a higher standard does not 
meet the necessity of the international community and cannot be considered as consistent 
with the customary international humanitarian law. Hopefully, this controversy will be 
solved in the appeal stage of the Akayesu Case. The sharing of the same Appeals Chamber 
by the ICTY and the ICTR will also help to overcome this issue and to make the decisions 
of the ad hoc tribunals in compliance with each other. 
Moreover, while the ICTR exercising its jurisdiction in accordance with Article 4 of 
its Statute, it should be guided by the ICTY's approach, and the concept of serious 
violations of Common Article 3 and of the Additional Protocol II should be interpreted in a 
manner that covers all violations of the customary international law rules, at least many 
provisions of the Additional Protocol II regarded as customary law rules, and the Hague 
Regulations mainly governing the means and methods of warfare applicable to internal 
423See supra p. 209. 
426Cisse, C., "The End of a Culture of Impunity in Rwanda? ". (1998) 1 YIHL pp. 171-172.; Amann, D., 
M., "Commentary on Prosecutor v. Akayesu Case", in (1999) 93 AJIL pp. 197-199. 
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armed conflicts. The wording of the ICTR Statute also allows the Tribunal to take this way 
of approach by virtue of deploying the phrase "[t]hese violations shall include, but shall not 
be limited to... 29.427 However, the practice of the ICTR, until the present time is not 
promising in terms of employing the mentioned interpretation and application of the 
international humanitarian law rules. 
In addition to the all requirements of violations of the laws or customs of war, and 
of Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocol II, the ad hoc tribunals have to deal with 
the specific elements of each acts enumerated in Common Article 3, Article 4 of the 
Additional Protocol II, or in any other international humanitarian law instrument containing 
acts that are considered as a part of violations of the laws or customs of war, not to violate 
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. Like the grave breaches system, main charges 
under this category of war crimes include murder, torture, cruel treatment, rape and any 
other forms of sexual violence etc. as far as the practice of the ad hoc tribunals is 
concerned. 428 
4.4. CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of war crimes and the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and their contribution to 
international humanitarian law and their impact on the ICC Statute, because of the artificial 
distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts and the laws 
applicable to them, can be examined by way of dividing the concept into two principal 
categories: "The Grave Breaches System" and "Violations of the Laws or Customs of 
War". 
Under Article 2 of its Statute, the ICTY has jurisdiction over the grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocol I to thereto. The distinguishing 
feature of the grave breaches system from other violations of the laws or customs of war is 
that it imposes an obligation on States parties to the Conventions and to the Additional 
Protocol I to prosecute or extradite persons responsible for violations of the system, in 
427 Art. 4 of the ICTR Statute.; In a sense. Article 4 of the ICTR Statute can "be seen as a "catch-all" 
provision that allows for the prosecution of individuals who might not be successfully convicted under the 
more rigorous requirements of Article 2's "genocide" definition or Article 3' "crimes against humanity" 
definition" (footnotes omitted). (Wang, M., M., "The International Tribunal for Rwanda: Opportunities for 
Clarification, Opportunities for Impact", (1995) 27 Col. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. p. 223). 
"28For the explanation and discussion, and the importance of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in relation 
to the elements of the offences, see supra pp. 168-205. 
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other words, the concept of universal jurisdiction is accepted for the grave breaches system. 
For the enforcement of international humanitarian law norms, the grave breaches system 
was the major achievement of the international community after the Second World War as 
far as national criminal jurisdiction systems and the principle of sovereignty of States are 
concerned. However, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC Statute proved that 
all serious violations of international humanitarian law whether committed in international 
or non-international armed conflicts can be prosecuted and punished in international level 
as well as national level. 
Since the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols are now being applied 
for the first time in international level by the ad hoc tribunals, the interpretation and 
application of these instruments have a significant place in the development of international 
humanitarian law. In terms of subject-matter jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals, the 
contribution of the practice of the International Tribunals to international humanitarian law 
and their impact on the ICC can be examined in two ways: (a) making clear the conditions 
for the applicability of different category of crimes (in this context, war crimes: the grave 
breaches system and violations of the laws or customs of war); (b) determining the scope of 
international crimes and providing definitions of such crimes by means of examining 
specific elements of each offences. 
With regard to the grave breaches system, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the 
Tadic Jurisdiction Decision indicated the conditions for the applicability of the system as 
follows: (a) General Conditions: (i) the existence of an armed conflict and (ii) the link 
(nexus) between the acts of the accused and the armed conflict; (b) Specific Conditions: (i) 
the existence of an international armed conflict and (ii) the acts must be committed against 
persons or property protected by the Conventions and the Additional Protocol I. The view 
taken by the Appeals Chamber created a guideline for the following cases of the Tribunal 
such as the Tadic Case (Final Judgement), Celebici Camp Case, Aleksovski Case, and 
possibly will have a big impact on the ICC since the ICC Statute includes the grave 
breaches system. 
However, the approach taken by the International Tribunal that the international 
character of an armed conflict is a pre-requisite condition for the applicability of the grave 
breaches system, which derives from the artificial distinction between international and non- 
international armed conflicts, should not be perceived as in compliance with the 
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development of international and of human rights law as far as the protection of innocent 
civilians in a wartime situation is concerned. This is because, firstly, the nature of armed 
conflicts has increasingly changed from international to internal or internationalised one and 
the laws of war codified in the Geneva Conventions has become irrelevant and insufficient. 
Secondly, the grave breaches system must be applicable to all conflicts irrespective of the 
character of the armed conflict and for its applicability the element of internationality must 
not be a pre-condition for international tribunals or the ICC on the ground that the grave 
breaches system was introduced into international humanitarian law in order to provide the 
enforcement of the system by States parties to the Conventions and to the Additional 
Protocol I by way of adopting the concept of universal jurisdiction. Thirdly, there is a clear 
controversy in the practice of the ICTY, that is to say, while the Tribunal interprets and 
applies its jurisdiction over violations of the laws or customs of war, it has taken a very 
important view that the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable to all conflicts 
regardless of their nature, it does not mention the customary nature of the grave breaches 
system. There is no doubt that the grave breaches system forms a part of fundamental 
norms of international humanitarian law which has reached the customary international law 
status and must be applicable to all conflicts. Fourthly, the international community has 
been witnessing the criminalisation of internal atrocities which creates the same effect with 
the grave breaches system on the premise that once the international community recognises 
the criminalisation of internal conflicts and the individual criminal responsibility for that it 
should be considered as giving a right to every State to prosecute or extradite responsible 
persons. Lastly, the substantive contents of the grave breaches system and of Common 
Article 3 are similar to each other and both of them guarantees minimum human rights 
standards in armed conflicts for innocent persons and those persons are protected against 
horrendous crimes of concern to the international community such as murder, torture, 
inhuman or cruel treatment, rape and any other forms of sexual violence. 
In the same vein, the International Tribunal to apply the grave breaches system 
examined the concept of protected persons or property in connection with the requirement 
of the internationality of the armed conflict. From the perspectives of international 
humanitarian and of human rights law, the opinion of the Tribunal can be criticised as 
follows: Firstly, there should not be connection between the nature of the armed conflict 
and the concept of protected persons or property. If the concept of protected persons or 
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property as a condition to apply the grave breaches system is examined in conjunction with 
the nature of armed conflicts, as the Appeals Chamber on Jurisdiction Decision, the Trials 
Chamber's on the Tadic and Aleksovski Judgements, and even in the appeal stage of the 
Tadic Judgement were done, in other words, its application is depended upon the existence 
of an international armed conflict, how can it be explained that for the applicability of the 
grave breaches system, two different elements are required? In this sense, the wording of 
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute, which replaces the notion of protected persons by a specific 
designation of civilians, should have guided the International Tribunal in a way that the 
grave breaches system is applicable to all conflicts whenever they are committed against 
civilians. Secondly, the notion of protected persons must not be interpreted by way of using 
the concept of nationality that derives from the domestic legislation on citizenship on the 
ground that it is not sufficient to provide a guideline for the protection of innocent lives, in 
particular, in the cases of internal or internationalised armed conflicts. The concept of 
"community" should be considered as more convenient for the interpretation and 
application of the notion of protected persons. The Appeals Chamber's ruling, in relation to 
this specific point, in the appeal stage of the Tadic Judgement can be seen closer to this 
view and should be welcomed by the international community. 
One of the other major contributions of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals to 
international humanitarian law and its impact on the ICC lies on the determination of the 
scope of the grave breaches system and the definitions of crimes by virtue of examination of 
the specific elements of each offence. This significance is equally valid for the concept of 
violations of the laws or customs of war, as far as it is related to the criminal acts, such as 
wilful killing or murder, torture, inhuman or cruel treatment, rape or any other forms of 
sexual violence etc. In this context, some significant points of the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals can be indicated as follows: The acceptance of recklessness which is not clear in 
the Conventions as sufficient to establish individual criminal responsibility for crimes in 
particular for wilful killing or murder; regarding the definition of torture made in the 1984 
Torture Convention as representing customary international law and extensive examination 
of the elements of torture in a manner that is in compliance with the development of 
international humanitarian and of human rights law; the treatment of rape and other forms 
of sexual violence as torture under the grave breaches system and serious violations of 
Common Article 3, first ever definition of the crime of rape and sexual violence in 
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international level constituting a significant impact on the ICC Statute that for the first time 
in international law provides detailed provisions on sexual crimes which are explicitly 
included to the grave breaches system and to serious violations of Common Article 3; first 
ever definitions of inhuman treatment and of cruel treatment and setting up the 
framework for these offences, the introduction of the concept of "inhuman conditions" as a 
part of inhuman treatment and its definition in international humanitarian law; the definition 
of wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health in a way of solving the 
vagueness problem inherent in this offence; making clear the notion of military necessity 
and its requirements being military objective and proportionality; providing a guidance with 
regard to other crimes such as deportation or transfers of civilians, unlawful confinement of 
civilians, taking of civilians as hostages etc. In relation to the substantive content of crimes, 
there cannot be any doubt that the practice of the ad hoc tribunals will create an immense 
precedential value for the ICC. 
Lastly, the major contribution of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals to international 
humanitarian and human rights law can be examined in the interpretation and application of 
the concept of violations of the laws or customs of war. The recognition of crimes 
committed in internal armed conflicts as international crimes and of individual criminal 
responsibility for these offences were able to be practised by the ad hoc tribunals for the 
first time in international humanitarian law. This should be perceived as a turning point in 
the history of international humanitarian law since providing protection for civilians who 
are in internal armed conflicts, in international level. On this ground it can be concluded 
that in terms of the enforcement of the grave breaches system and of other violations of 
international humanitarian law such as serious violations of Common Article 3 there is no 
more difference as far as the jurisdiction of international criminal institutions and national 
courts are concerned. In other words, serious violations of international humanitarian law 
as with the grave breaches system can be prosecuted and punished in national and 
international levels due to being regarded as reached the status of customary international 
law and erga omnes obligation on States. In particular, the inclusion of serious violations of 
Common Article 3 and some provisions of the Additional Protocol II into the ICC Statute 
should be seen as one of the most important impact of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals 
on the ICC Statute. In the same vein, the recognition of the applicability of some Hague 
principles governing international armed conflicts warfare methods for internal armed 
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conflicts in the ICC Statute reflects the significance of the International Tribunals' 
interpretation and application of the norms of international humanitarian law. Even more, it 
should be noted that the way adopted by the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the concept of 
violations of the laws or customs of war is more convenient with the customary 
international law rules and with the practice of the international community than the way 
adopted in the ICC Statute since indicating the applicability of customary international law 
rules containing fundamental or minimum guarantees for civilians in all types of armed 
conflicts and providing the applicability of some principles of Hague principles governing 
the means of warfare, such as the ban on the use of poisonous gas, which can be interpreted 




THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The crime of genocide' is universally prohibited by the conventional and customary rules of 
international law, "whether committed in time of peace or in time of war". 2 
The conventional base of the crime of genocide is the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which was adopted by the UN General Assembly 
in 1948.3 The adoption of the ICC Statute should also be considered as constituting another 
treaty base for this crime since giving jurisdiction to the ICC over the crime of genocide to 
try and punish responsible individuals in this regard. " 
'The term "genocide" was, for the first time in international law, coined by Raphael Lemkin who combined 
the Greek word genos (race, tribe) with the Latin word cide (to kill). (Lemkin, R, Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe, (1944), p. 79). According to Lemkin genocide means "the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic 
group. ... genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when 
accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan 
of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the 
aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the 
political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence 
of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives 
of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as entity and 
the actions involved are directed against the individuals, not in their individual capacity but as members of 
the national group". (p. 79). 
Undoubtedly, the work of Lemkin guided the international community to adopt the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 (hereinafter the Genocide Convention or the 
Convention). Even before the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the impact of the Lemkin's approach 
to the crime of genocide can be examined in the UN General Assembly Resolution (96) (1) of 11 December 
1946. By this, the UN General Assembly regards "that genocide is a crime under international law which 
the civilized world condemns - and for the commision of which principals and accomplices, whether 
private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, 
political or any other grounds - are punishable". 
In this context, also see Lemkin, R, "Genocide as a Crime under International Law", (1947) 41 AJIL p. 
145. 
2Art. 1 of the Genocide Convention. 
3The Genocide Convention, 78 U. N. T. S. 277 opened for signature on 8 December 1948 and entered into 
force on 12 January 1951. 
4Art. 6 of the ICC Statute (known as Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which was adopted 
by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, UN. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9,17 July 1998). 
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Additionally, there cannot be any doubt that the rules governing the crime of 
genocide are part of customary rules of international law which have reached the level of 
jus cogens, s and the consequential obligation on States to prevent and punish the crime of 
genocide is erga omnes in nature. 6 
Despite is its extensive prohibition under the conventional and customary rules of 
international law, until the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR, it was not possible to 
enforce these rules at the international level because of the principle of sovereignty of 
States and of non-existence of an international criminal tribunal or court. 7 The 
establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR and their practice demonstrate its enforceability at 
the international level. The international community has been witnessing charges of 
genocide and the punishment of individuals responsible for this heinous crime in a way of 
refuting the criticism that genocide has not taken real attention to prevent and punish the 
responsible persons and finding States responsible under the Genocide Convention. In fact, 
it is true that a number of genocidal events have not been dealt with in accordance with the 
provisions of the Genocide Convention such as the Russian, Cambodian, Bangladesh, 
Afghanistan cases occurred in the twentieth century. However, the latest developments in 
international humanitarian law should be seen as promising that human rights violations will 
not be tolerated any more by the international community. The establishment of the ICTY, 
the ICTR and the ICC constitutes clear evidence of this fact. 
The ICJ in itsAdvisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide Case (1951, ICJ Rep. p. 
15) indicated that: "The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to 
condemn and punish Genocide as `a crime under international law' ... involving a denial of the right of 
existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great 
losses to humanity, and which is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations 
(Resolution (96) (I) of the General Assembly, December 11th 1946). The first consequence arising from 
this conception is that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by 
civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation. A second consequence is 
the universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the cooperation required `in order to 
liberate mankind from such an odious scourge' (Preamble to the Convention)". (emphasis added, p. 23). 
67bid.; and also see Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v. Spain), (1970) ICJ Rep. p. 3, at paras. 33-34.; 
This fact was recently reaffirmed by the ICJ in the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. 
Yugoslavia, (11 July 1996), (1996) 1CJ Rep. p. 595 par. 31. 
For the jus cogens and erga omnes nature of the rules governing genocide, also see Final Report of the 
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN. Doc. 
S/1994/674-27 May 1994, par. 88.; Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), UN. Doc. S/1994/1405- 9 December 1994, (for Rwanda), par. 152. 
'For a detailed work of explaining the ineffectiveness of the Genocide Convention in this sense, see 
Starkuran, P., "Genocide and International Law: Is There a Cause ofAction? ", (1984) 8 ASILS Int'l L. J. 
p. 1. 
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As far as the crime of genocide is concerned, the practice of the ICTY and the 
ICTR, both of which have jurisdiction over genocide, creates a historical opportunity in 
interpreting and applying the provisions of the Genocide Convention, in other words, in 
clarifying the elements and substantive content of the crime of genocide which is too vague 
in the Convention. In this sense, their practice provides the first ever application of the 
Convention in international law. Undoubtedly, the view taken by the ad hoc tribunals, in 
this context, will guide the ICC when it becomes in operation. 
5.2. THE CONCEPT OF GENOCIDE 
Articles 2 and 4 of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes respectively states: 
"1. The International Tribunal [for Rwanda] shall have the power to prosecute persons 
committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the 
other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article. 
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) killing members of the group; 
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
3. The following acts shall be punishable: 
(a) genocide; 
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) attempt to commit genocide; 
(e) complicity in genocide". 
As indicated by the Secretary-General, the legal base for the inclusion of genocide 
in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals was the 1948 Genocide Conventions and related 
provisions of the Convention (Articles 2 and 3) were employed verbatim in the Statutes of 
'Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN. 
Doc. 5125704 & Add. 1 (1993), par. 45. 
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the ICTY and the ICTR As well-known from history, the adoption of the Genocide 
Convention was one of the major results of the Second World War in which the 
international community had seen the extermination of Jews, Poles, Gypsies and other 
social groups such as homosexuals, mentally ill persons by Nazi Germany. The response of 
the Allied Powers to this humanitarian tragedy was the adoption of the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg to try and punish the major Nazi criminals responsible for commission of the 
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 9 The Nuremberg Charter did 
not include any provision giving power to the Tribunal to prosecute and punish responsible 
persons for the crime of genocide, but the acts could constitute this crime were tried in 
connection with either the concept of crimes against humanity or war crimes. '0 
5.2.1. Distinguishing the Crime of Genocide from Crimes Against Humanity 
As a result of the practice of the Nuremberg Tribunal and also the application of the notion 
of genocide in various domestic criminal cases in which genocide was considered as falling 
within the definition of crimes against humanity, " some scholars regarded the crime of 
genocide as a "second category of crimes against humanity recognized in the Nuremberg 
Charter as constituting of the persecution of individuals on political, racial or religious 
grounds". 12 This view cannot be considered as in compliance with the development of 
international humanitarian law and has no basis in international law for the following 
reasons: 
Firstly, the drafters of the Genocide Convention did not have any intention to codify 
the Nuremberg Charter and the Judgement of the International Military Tribunal at 
'See Art. 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. 
1°Lippman, M., "The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Forty- 
Five Years Later", (1994) 8 Temple Int'l & Comp. L. J. pp. 5-6. Although in the indictment the term 
"genocide" was explicitly used in the Judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal, it was not deployed at all.; 
Kunz, J., "The United Nations Convention on Genocide", (1949) 43 AJIL p. 739. 
"In this sense, the practice of the Israeli District Court of Jerusalem in the Eichmann Case has a significant 
place in international humanitarian law. In this case, the crime of genocide was regarded as "the gravest 
type of "crimes against humanity"". See Lippman, p. 9. 
'2Morris, V., and Scharf, M., P., The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Vol. I, Irvington-on- 
Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, (1998), p. 165.; Morris, V., and Scharf, M., P., An Insider's 
Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia A Documentary History and 
Analysis, Vol. 1, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, (1995), (hereinafter An 
Insider's Guide), p. 85. 
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Nuremberg. This was because the Convention employed the view that there was no need 
for the requirement of nexus between the acts and armed conflict which indicated one of 
the major difference from the Nuremberg Tribunal's practice in which the existence of an 
armed conflict was regarded as a precondition for the applicability of crimes against 
humanity, and during the drafting period of the Convention proposals referring to the 
Nuremberg practice and crimes against humanity in the Genocide Convention were 
rejected. 13 
Secondly, although the concept of crimes against humanity may be seen as the 
inspiration or source of the crime of genocide, in particular, as deriving from one sub- 
category of offence, persecution, of crimes against humanity, the concept of genocide 
cannot be considered as the same with this offence. This is because genocide as an 
international crime has been codified and has developed, and what needs to be shown to 
make its requirements applicable are totally different from the conditions for the 
applicability of crimes against humanity. As will be discussed later in this Chapter, the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals has clarified the requirements of the applicability of each 
category of crimes, war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, even more the 
substantive content and specific offences included in these categories, in more detail day 
after day. In this context, as far as the crime of genocide is concerned one of the chief 
distinguishing features of this crime from other crimes, especially from crimes against 
humanity, is that the mental element of genocide, that is to say, there must be an "intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such". " This is 
not the case for the concept of crimes against humanity whose application does not require 
such an intent. 15 In order to be an act considered as constituting a crime against humanity, 
it has to be "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
"Ratner, S., It, and Abrams, J., S., Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law 
Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1997), p. 27.; For the drafting history of Article 
1 of the Genocide Convention in which the crime of genocide is regarded as, "whether committed in time 
of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law", see Lippman, pp. 19-20. 
"Art. 2 of the Genocide Convention. 
"Related provisions of the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes are significantly different from each other and 
their applications need the existence of different elements in terms of crimes against humanity. See Arts. 3 
and 5 of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes respectively. For the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and their 
contribution to international humanitarian law and possible impact on the ICC with regard to crimes 
against humanity, see Chap. 6, pp. 280-299. 
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civilian population, with knowledge of the attack", 16 and there is no need for the presence 
of intent required for the crime of genocide. Only for one sub-category of crimes against 
humanity, persecution, there must be an intent which is inherited in this offence and it can 
be identified as "discriminatory intent", " not a "genocidal intent". In fact this notion was 
one of the major issue in the Jelisic Case before the ICTY in which Goran Jelisic was 
acquitted of genocide and found guilty of crimes against humanity on the basis that the 
accused acted "with discriminatory intent" against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. 
This was not enough to prove genocidal intent, but still counted as a key element in proving 
persecution, defined as a crime against humanity". " On this ground, the approach taken by 
the ICTY should be seen as a clear evidence proving the difference between genocide and 
crimes against humanity, in particular, persecution, and should be welcomed by the 
international community since making clear that genocide cannot be accepted as a part of 
crimes against humanity or just a form of persecution. Otherwise, all concepts of 
international humanitarian law are damaged and other problems created. For example, how 
it can be explained that all international humanitarian law instruments include the crime of 
genocide as an independent crime? 19 If it was not the case, genocide should have been 
governed as a sub-category offence of crimes against humanity such as persecution, the 
crime of apartheid. 20 This way of understanding of genocide for the above mentioned 
reasons has no ground in international humanitarian law. 
5.2.2. The Definition of Genocide 
16 Art. 7 (1) of the ICC Statute. In fact, this provision should be seen as a combination of Articles 3 and 5 of 
the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes and should be regarded as reflecting customary international law in this 
regard. For its discussion, see Chap. 6, pp. 284-291. 
"Art. 7 (1) (h) of the ICC Statute.; Art. 5 (h) of the ICTY Statute.; In the ICTR Statute the wording of the 
provision indicates the necessity of the presence of this intent for the applicability of all sub-categories of 
offences constituting crimes against humanity. See Art. 3 of the ICTR Statute. 
"Tribunal Update No. 148, written by Mirko Klarin, available on the website: <http: //www. iwpr. net>.; 
Press Release, "Goran Jelisic Acquitted of Genocide and Found Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity and 
Violations of the Laws or Customs of War", Doc. No. JIJP. I. S. /441-E, The Hague, (19 October 1999).; For 
the examination of the conditions of crimes against humanity and of genocide by the ICTY, and justication 
of the Jelisic's intent, see The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Judgement, Case No. IT-95-10-T. (14 
December 1999), paras. 50-58,59-108. 
"Art. 3 of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 5 of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 17 of the ILC's Draft Code.; Art. 6 of the 
ICC Statute. 
20For a detailed regulation of the offences constituting crimes against humanity, see Art. 7 (1) of the ICC 
Statute, in particular, Art. 7 (1) (h) (j) of the ICC Statute. 
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With regard to the concept of genocide, one of the other important issue is the definition of 
genocide. Article 2 of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as: "... any of the 
following acts [indicated in the Article through (a)-(e)] committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such". 2' After the adoption 
of the Genocide Convention, the crime of genocide has been considered as the most 
horrendous crime and the term "genocide" has been misused and abused to cover all 
different aspects of life or to label all massive killings of civilians as genocide. 22 However, 
this way of understanding and using of the concept ignores the necessary elements of 
genocide, in particular, the element of intent to destroy the group. 23 The main reasons for 
such an outcome were the non-existence of an international criminal tribunal or court and 
of an authoritative interpretation of the Genocide Convention. These deficiencies of 
international humanitarian law and the perception of the Genocide Convention as limiting 
the protected groups to national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, and not including 
political, economic or social groups, caused the presence of definition of genocide in 
various ways. These definitions were used specifically to cover some events occurred 
throughout the twentieth century. Some of these definitions include all different human 
groups regardless of whether they are national, ethnical, racial, religious, political, 
economic or social groups. 24 The aim of this understanding of genocide was to consider 
massive killings carried out, in particular, on political grounds such as in Stalin's Soviet 
2'Articles. 3 and 5 of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes respectively and Article 6 of the ICC Statute include 
the same definition. 
22Kuper, L., "Theoretical Issues Relating to Genocide: Uses and Abuses", in George J. Andreopoulos 
(ed. ), Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
(1994), pp. 35-36.; Fein, H., "Genocide, Terror, Life Integrity, and War Crimes: The Case for 
Discrimination", in Andreopoulos (ed. ), p. 95. For example, even birth control clinics were labelled as the 
place in where the crime of genocide was committed on the ground that it creates an act constituting 
genocide under Article 2 (d) of the Convention, which indicates one category of acts of genocide as the 
"imposi[tion of] measures intended to prevent births within the group". (Kuper, p. 35). 
'Ibid. pp. 35-36. 
24Drots defines genocide as "the deliberate destruction of physical life of individual human beings by reason 
of their membership of any human collectivity as such". (Drots, P., N., The Crime of State, Genocide, Vol. 
H, Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, (1959), p. 125). 
Fein defines genocide as a "sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity 
directly ... or 
indirectly, through interdiction of the biological ... and social reproduction of group members ". (Fein, p. 97.; and also see Fein, H., Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, London: Sage Publications, 
(1993), p. 24). 
Ratner and Abrams comment on the definition of genocide in relation to the regulation of the Genocide 
Convention as follows: "... only when the legal definition of genocide expands to encompass the mass 
destruction of any human collective based on any integral element of human identity will it fully address 
the most heinous international offence". (Ratner and Abrams, p. 43). 
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Union, 25 Indonesian human rights violations in East Timor26 and the Khmer Rouge regime 
in Cambodia' as constituting genocide. 29 Some other definitions concentrated on the 
perpetrator of genocide, which was considered as a policy employed by States. 29 In 
addition to these definitions of genocide, some scholars tried to describe the concept from a 
humanistic point of view under which all mass killings of human beings can be regarded as 
constituting genocide. 30 In consequence, even mass killings occurred as a result of 
ecological destruction were considered as genocide, ecological genocide. 3' The bombings 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by nuclear weapons were named as genocide in the course of 
war. 32 
It is possible to extend the definition and use of the concept of genocide to different 
aspects of life like the notion of cultural genocide. 33 However, from the view of 
international humanitarian law, these attempts should be assessed as not in compliance with 
the structure and logic of this branch of international law on the ground that all different 
types of definitions of genocide lead the international community to different conclusions 
uFor a bibliographical work on the former Russian Case, see Mace, J., E., "Genocide in the U. S. S. R", in 
Israel W. Charny (ed. ), Genocide A Critical Bibliographic Review, London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 
(1988), p. 116. 
For the explanation and assessment of the East Timor Case, see Dunn, J., "East Timor: A Case of 
Cultural Genocide", in Andreopoulos, G., J., (ed. ), p. 171. 
27For the Cambodian Case, see Kiernan, B., "The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses", in 
Andreopoulos, G., J., (ed. ), p. 191.; For a bibliographical work on the Cambodian Case, see Hawk, D., 
"The Cambodian Genocide", in Charny, I., W., (ed. ), p. 137.; Burgler, R., A., "The Case of Cambodia: The 
Khmer Rouge's Reign of Terror", in Albert J. Jongman (ed. ), Contemporary Genocides: Causes, Cases, 
Consequences, Leiden: Projecten Interdisciplinair Onderzoek naar de Oorzaken van 
Mensenrechtenschendingen (PIOOM) (Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human 
Rights Violations), (1996), p. 59.; For efforts to bring responsible persons for violations of international 
humanitarian and of human rights law by the Khmer Rouge regime to justice and possible accountability 
mechanisms for that, see Rajagopal, B., "The Pragmatics of Prosecuting the Khmer Rouge", (1998) 1 
YIHL p. 189.; Marks, S., P., "Forgetting "The Policies and Practices of the Past": Impunity in 
Cambodia". (1994) 17 Flet. F. W. Aff. pp. 17-43. 
'Ratner and Abrams, p. 43.; see supra notes 26-28. 
'Horowitz defines genocide as "a structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state 
bureaucratic apparatus". (Horowitz, I., L., Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power, New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Books, (1980), p. 17). 
Chalk describes genocide as follows: "Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or 
other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the 
perpetrator". (Chalk, F., "Redefining Genocide", in Andreopoulos, G., J., (ed. ), p. 52. 
30For example, Charny defines genocide as follows: "Genocide in the generic sense is the mass killing of 
substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military action against the military forces 
of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims". 
(Charny, I., W., "Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide", in Andreopoulos, G., J., (ed. ), p. 75). 
311bid. pp. 65-66. 
32Kuper, L., "Other Selected Cases of Genocide and General Massacres: Types of Genocide", in Charity, 
I., W., (ed. ), p. 158. 
33Charny, "Toward a Generic Definition... ", pp. 84-85. 
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which cannot be explained and supported in international law. Moreover, all international 
humanitarian law instruments should be taken into consideration while justifying whether 
any specific event amounts to genocide. If this way of understanding is employed to cases, 
completely different results are achieved. Different category of crimes and their substantive 
elements should guide international lawyers. For example, the bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki cannot be labelled as genocide since the element of intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such is lacking. Who can argue that 
these cities were bombed with such intent? However, the other category of international 
crimes like war crimes34 would be more suitable to justify such bombings than the concept 
of genocide. Under the notion of war crimes, not only the killing of civilians but also the 
use of atomic bombs as a weapon in a war time situation can be judged in terms of whether 
the employment of such weapons is allowed by international humanitarian law. 
In sum, it can be concluded that the concept of genocide should not be mixed with 
other category of international crimes, in particular with crimes against humanity and that 
all mass killings of human beings should not be labelled as genocide. All international 
humanitarian law instruments should be taken into account to assess one specific case 
whether it constitutes war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity. Otherwise, how 
can it be explained that other categories of international crimes are needed if it is possible 
to label all humanitarian tragedy as genocide? Even moreover, the concept should not be 
used as a means of drawing the attention of the international community to the events 
which are not regarded as genocide in international law. As indicated earlier, non-existence 
of an international criminal tribunal or court and of an authoritative interpretation of the 
Genocide Convention caused these unacceptable results. However, today, the international 
community has two ad hoc tribunals operating, and one ICC hopefully will be functioning 
soon. In this sense, there cannot be any doubt that the practice of the ad hoc tribunals will 
provide a very useful interpretation and application of the Genocide Convention and will 
prevent the misunderstandings, misuse or abuse of the concept of genocide. 
5.3. THE PRACTICE OF THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND THEIR 
CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON THE ICC 
'Fein, "Genocide, Terror,... ", p. 105.; Fein, H., "Discriminating Genocide from War Crimes: Vietnam and 
Afghanistan Reexamined". (1993) 22 Denv. J. Int. '1 L. & Pol'y p. 36. 
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The international community has been witnessing the first ever interpretation and 
application of the Genocide Convention at the international level" by means of the practice 
of the ad hoc tribunals and of the practice of domestic criminal courts in national level36. 
The significance of the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR can be examined in two ways: 
Firstly, they interpret and apply the elements of the crime of genocide in relation to the 
events occurred in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. Secondly, they clarify the 
substantive content of the crime of genocide. 
5.3.1. The Elements of the Crime of Genocide 
As has already been mentioned above, the Genocide Convention in its Article 2 defines 
genocide as "any of the following acts [indicated through (a)-(e)] committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such". In 
accordance with this definition, to consider an act as constituting the crime of genocide, 
33'I'he Akayesu Judgement of the ICTR constitutes a historical turning point in the history of international 
humanitarian law since being the first interpretation and application of the Genocide Convention by an 
international tribunal. (The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, Case No: ICTR-96-4-T, 2 
September 1998).; See Press Release, "First-Ever Judgements on Crime of Genocide Due 2 September", 
UN. Doc. AFR/93 1J2894, (31 August 1998).; Press Release, "Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal 
Pronounces Guilty Verdict in Historic Genocide Trial", UN. Doc. AFR/94 L/2895, (2 September 1998).; 
Press Release, "Secretary-General Welcomes Rwanda Tribunal's Genocide Judgement as Landmark in 
International Criminal Law", UN. Doc. SGISM/6687 L12896, (2 September 1998).; Mutiso, C., "War 
Criminal Behaviour, Rwanda's genocidal leaders are being brought to justice by a groundbreaking 
international tribunal", Time, (14 September 1998), p. 40. 
The Kayishema and Ruzindana Case including the application of the Genocide Convention followed the 
Akayesu Judgement, and the ICTR delivered its Judgement on this case on 21 May 1999. (The Prosecutor 
v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Judgement, Case No: ICTR- 95-1-T, 21 May 1999). 
The recent Judgement in relation to the crime of genocide was again rendered by the ICTR in the 
Rutaganda Case on 6 December 1999. (The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, 
Judgement, Case No: ICTR-96-3-T, 6 December 1999).; In this context also see, ICTR Press Release, 
"Rutaganda Convicted of Genocide and Sentenced to Life Imprisonment", Doc. No. ICTR/INFO9-2-216en, 
Arusha, (6 December 1999). 
The German practice is impressive in relation to the charges of genocide which occurred in the 
Yugoslavian conflict. See Public Prosecutor v. Djajic, No. 20/96, Supreme Court of Bavaria, 3d Strafsenat, 
(23 May 1997), in Case Note with Commentary by Safferling, C., J., M., (1998) 92 AJIL p. 528. In this 
case, the defendant acquitted of genocide on the basis of lack of necessary mental element, mens rea, of 
genocide. (p. 529).; Public Prosecutor v. Nikola Jorgic, The District Court of Dusseldorf, (26 September 
1997). In this case, Jorgic was found guilty of genocide. This Judgement was the first national criminal 
court decision on genocide occurred in the Former Yugoslavia. In this sense, for the German practice, also 
see Fischer, H., "Some Aspects of German State Practice Concerning IHL", (1998) 1 YIHL p. 380, in 
particular, pp. 384-385. 
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there must be three elements in presence. These are: The Victimised Group, the Intent and 
the Identifiable Act. 
5.3.1.1. The Victimised Group 
According to the Genocide Convention and the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the first 
element of the crime of genocide is that the acts must be committed against an identifiable 
group, namely a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. 37 The requirement of the 
existence of an identifiable group should also be seen as a part of the specific intent of 
genocide. This is because, victims are chosen on the basis of being a member of national, 
ethnic, racial or religious group, not because of his or her individual identity. In a sense, the 
victim of "the crime of genocide is the group itself and not only the individual". 38 In other 
words, the actus reus (physical element) of the crime may be limited to one human being, 
but the mens rea (mental element) of genocide must target the protected group itself. 39 As 
clearly understood from the texts of the Genocide Convention and from the ICTY and the 
ICTR Statutes, the groups protected by these instruments are restricted and only included 
national, ethnic, racial and religious groups, 40 and there are no definitions of these concepts 
neither in the Genocide Convention nor in the commentary to the Genocide Convention, as 
the same for the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. " Even in the ILC's Draft Code and in the 
ICC Statute, 42 the international community did not define these notions which have 
unresolved issues inherited in them. On this ground, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in 
"Art. 2 of the Genocide Convention.; Art. 2 (2) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 4 (2) of the ICTY Statute. 
Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.3.1.316-317.; Commentary on the crime of genocide 
for the ILC Draft Code explains this fact as follows: "... the intention must be to destroy a group and not 
merely one or more individuals who are coincidentally members of a particular group. The prohibited act 
must be committed against an individual because of his membership in a particular group and as an 
incremental step in the overall objective of destroying the group. It is the membership of the individual in a 
particular group rather than the identity of the individual that is the decisive criterion in determining the 
immediate victims of the crime of genocide. The group itself is the ultimate target or intended victim of this 
type of massive criminal conduct. The action taken against the individual members of the group is the 
means used to achieve the ultimate criminal objective with respect to the group". (note omitted). 
(International Law Commission Report, 1996, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, available on the web: http: //www. un. org/law/ilc/reports/1996/chapO2. htm, p. 32., hereinafter page 
numbers are referred according to the web pages). 
39Bassiouni, C., International Criminal Law: A Draft International Criminal Code, Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff and Noordoff, (1980), p. 73. 
40Webb, p. 391. 
41Ratner and Abrams, p. 31. 
42See Art. 17 of the ILC Draft Code and Commentary on the crime of genocide, pp. 30-33.; Art. 6 of the 
ICC Statute. 
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relation to the requirement of the existence of a protected group to apply the crime of 
genocide to the Rwandan and Yugoslavian cases will have a significant impact in 
international humanitarian law. 
The ICTR in the Akayesu Judgement defines a national group; a "group is defined 
as a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on common 
citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties"; 43 an ethnic group as "a group 
whose members share a common language or culture"; 44 a racial group as "is based on the 
hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of 
linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors" ; `s and a religious group as "is one whose 
members share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship". 46 
When these definitions are strictly applied to the Rwandan case, it is clear that none 
of them can provide a legal base for the application of the crime of genocide on the premise 
that there are three different groups, the Hutus, the Tutsis and the Twas, those of who 
share the same nationality, the same culture, the same language, the same territory, believe 
in the same myths in Rwanda. 47 In light of these facts, the International Tribunal faced with 
the problem of whether the Tutsi population can be regarded as a protected group against 
genocide and of whether the groups enumerated in its Statute are limited or not. In this 
context, the ICTR examined "the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention, 
which ... was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group ". 
48 
According to the Tribunal, to determine the stability and permanence of a group, the 
criterion was to become a member of the group by birth, "in a continuous and often 
irremediable manner", in contrary to "the more "mobile" groups which one joins through 
individual voluntary commitment, such as political and economic groups". 49 In accordance 
with this criterion, the ICTR considered the Tutsis as an ethnic group falling within the 
meaning of the Genocide Convention and of its Statute on the ground that the Tutsi 
membership derives from birth and a child automatically gains his or her father's ethnic 
origin and moreover that the existence of identification cards indicating the ethnicity of 
'Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.3.1.298-299. 
441bid. paras. 6.3.1.300-301. 
451bid paras. 6.3.1.302-303.; Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, par. 98. 
Trial Chamber, Akayesu Judgement, paras. 6.3.1.304-305.; Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana 
Case, Judgement, par. 98. 
Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 5.1.322-323.; Trial Chamber, Kayishema and 
Ruzindana Case, Judgement, par. 34. 
"Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.3.1.306-307. (emphasis added). 
49lbid. paras. 6.3.1.296-297. 
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bearer as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa at the time of the conflict were sufficient to prove the 
existence of customary rules governing the determination of ethnic group in Rwanda. 5° 
In fact, the way adopted by the ICTR regarding the Tutsis as an ethnic group was 
nothing else than the recognition of socially imposed categorisation based on economic 
class differences between the Hutus and the Tutsis as a means of ethnic identification. 5, The 
definition provided in the Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement also shows this, and solves 
the problem of definition of ethnic group which remained disputed after the Akayesu 
Judgement. According to the Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, "[a]n ethnic group is 
one whose members share a common language and culture; or, a group which distinguishes 
itself, as such (self identification); or, a group identified as such by others, including 
perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others)". 52 In terms of indicating the subjective 
nature of the concept and the importance of communities' belief to consider a group as an 
ethical group, this definition can be regarded as in compliance with the development of 
international humanitarian law on the ground that this way of interpretation and application 
is too important in the cases of where a group cannot be categorised as a national, racial or 
religious group, as seen in the Rwanda conflict, and that provides protection for the victims 
under the Genocide Convention.  
On the other hand, as far as the practice of the ICTY is in question, there should not 
be any problem with regard to the requirement of victimised group. This is because, 
Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention 
either as an ethnic or religious group or possibly more as a national group. Although it can 
be argued that all these three groups share the same Slavic origin, they have completely 
different religious, national and cultural characteristics, which are stable and permanent in 
nature and should be sufficient to protect any of these groups against the crime of 
genocide. " When the Yugoslavian case is compared with the Rwandan one, it is very clear 
"Ibid. paras. 7.8.156-157,5.1.324-325.; Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, 
paras. 523-524. 
S'Amann, D., M., "Case Note, Prosecutor v. Akayesu", (1999) 93 AJIL p. 198.; For the explanation of 
events in a historical context and the question of ethnicity by the ICTR, see Akayesu Judgement, paras. 
2.139-205,3.207-241.; Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, paras. 31-54., in particular, paras. 34- 
35. 
52Tria1 Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, par. 98. 
53 In the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, in some cases it is possible to see some documents indicating the 
subjective nature of the notion of ethnic group. For example, see Jelisic and Cesic Case, Prosecutor's Pre 
Trial Brief, Case No. IT-95-10-PT, 19 November 1998, par. 4.7.; The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson 
Nderubumve Rutaganda, Prosecution's Final Trial Brief, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T., paras. 298-302. 
54Wceb, pp. 399-400. 
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that the definition of genocide in the Convention and in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals 
can be applied to the Yugoslavian conflict easier than the Rwanda case. 
In international humanitarian law, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in relation to 
the interpretation and application of the concept of protected group within the meaning of 
the Genocide Convention has a historic significance on the premise that the practice of the 
ICTR proved that the protected groups are not limited to national, ethnic, racial or 
religious groups, and that any groups, as long as they are stable and permanent, can be 
under the protection of the Genocide Convention. This way of employment of the concept 
is also consistent with the view expressed by Lemkin and by the international community 
(thorough the General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) of 11 December 1946) even before the 
adoption of the Genocide Convention, " and consistent with the major objective, purpose 
or spirit of the Convention in specific, consistent with the purpose of international 
humanitarian law in general. 
However, the interpretation of the protected group in a way of explicitly excluding 
political and economic groups due to being labelled as "mobile" groups, not stable and not 
permanent, can be criticised on the following grounds: The Convention was drafted in the 
1940's conditions as a result of the Nazi horrors in the Second World War, and does not fit 
the necessities of the international community in the late twentieth century. Political, 
economic and social groups have become more important than national, ethnic, racial or 
religious groups, thus, the interpretation or definition of the Convention should include 
these groups as well. '6 In fact, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals had created a big 
opportunity to interpret the protected group in a way of including political and economic 
groups for the international community. When the drafting history of the Genocide 
Convention and the factors are examined not to include political and economic groups into 
the definition of genocide, it is obviously seen that the general tendency of the international 
community was in the direction of the inclusion of political groups to the Convention, but it 
was not become possible because of the Soviet Union's blocs? and of non-stability and 
"See supra note 1. 
Ratner and Abrams, p. 43. 
"Remarks by Cheri[Bassiouni on "Genocide: The Convention, Domestic Laws, and State Responsibility", 
(1989) ASIL Proceedings p. 315.; Kunz, p. 743.; Finch, p. 734.; For the drafting history of the Convention, 
see Lippman, pp. 27-30.; This was one of the main reasons for the USA not to ratify the Genocide 
Convention for many years, until the late 1980's. In this context, see LeBlanc, L., J., "The United Nations 
Genocide Convention and Political Groups: Should the United States Propose an Amendment", (1988) 13 
Yale L. J. Int. 1 L. p. 268. 
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temporary characters of these groups. " However, today, the world has significantly 
changed: The Soviet Union was replaced by new States and the Cold War seems to be 
over. Political, economic or social groups have become too important in the modern life. If 
the International Tribunal had taken these facts into its consideration it would have been 
possible to interpret the definition of genocide to cover such groups provided that they are 
considered as stable and permanent in each specific case. This would have created an 
invaluable impact in international humanitarian law. On the other hand, even if the Tribunal 
had reached such a conclusion it would not have lead the international community to 
consider any mass killings as constituting the crime of genocide. 59 In this sense, it would be 
difficult to share the opinion that the Genocide Convention was not applicable to the events 
occurred throughout the twentieth century like the Cambodian case due to exclusion of 
political groups in its definition. 60 The means of international humanitarian law should be, 
all together, taken into account and it should not be forgotten that any individual 
responsible for violations of humanitarian law can be prosecuted and punished by these 
means. If political, economic or social groups cannot be protected by the Genocide 
Convention, the offence of persecution under crimes against humanity can provide 
protection for mentioned groups. 61 For this reason, non-prosecution and punishment of 
responsible persons involved in mass killings of human being cannot be only depended upon 
the deficiency of the definition of genocide in the Convention. Instead, the problem lies on 
the enforcement of the norms of international humanitarian law. This is because, the 
concept of crimes against humanity, as the same with genocide, enjoys the customary law 
status, even more jus cogens status, and States' obligation to prosecute or punish 
responsible individuals is erga omnes in nature. Additionally, if all mass killings based on 
any collectivity of human beings are considered as genocide, there would not be any need 
for the norms governing the offences regarded as crimes against humanity in a sense. 
In the light of this explanation, it can be concluded that the approach taken by the 
ICTR in its Judgements are, mutadis mutandis, in compliance with the drafting history of 
the Genocide Convention and with the development of international humanitarian law. The 
view of the ICTR can only be criticised with regard to the expressly exclusion of political 
seLeBlanc, pp. 274-275.; Lippman, pp. 27-28. 
59 This would be the misuse or abuse of the concept of genocide, see supra pp. 235-238. 
60Ratner and Abrams, p. 43. 
61Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court, Making the Right Choices - Part I, Al Index: 
IOR 40/01/97, January 1997, p. 24.; Commentary on the crime of genocide in the ILC Draft Code, p. 32. 
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and economic groups. In this context, the right opinion should have been that if any 
political, economic or social group is considered as a stable and permanent, which can be 
justified in light of the evidence of each specific case by an international tribunal or court, 
they must enjoy the protection of the Genocide Convention within the meaning of group 
protected by this Convention. 
5.3.1.2. The Intent 
Under Articles 2 (2) and 4 (2) of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes respectively, as with 
Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, to regard an act constituting genocide, there must be 
a specific intent which means that the act must be committed "with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, [a protected group], as such". This is the requirement that distinguishes 
the crime of genocide from other categories of crimes, namely from war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in general, and from murder in particular. As long as this intent is in 
presence, single killing can constitute genocide. On the other hand, killing of a thousand 
individual without such intent does not constitute genocide, but homicide. 62 
Although the requirement of intent is the central element of the crime of genocide it 
is not possible to see its definitive interpretation either in the language or in the drafting 
history of the Convention. 63 This was one of the main reasons for confusing the concept 
with other crimes and for efforts to define the crime of genocide. 64 The lack of definition of 
the intent and of its interpretation has created some issues which has to be solved in 
international law. In this sense, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals has a significant role to 
play in making clear the problems occurred in relation to the intent requirement of 
genocide. 
The first issue lies on in the interpretation of the relationship between "intent to 
destroy" and "in whole or in part" a protected group. 65 As can be easily inferred from the 
62Ratner and Abrams, p. 33.; Roberge, M-C., "Jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda over Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide", (1997) 37 Int'l Rev. Red Cross, p. 
662.; The difference between the crime of genocide and homicide was indicated by the General Assembly 
on 11 December 1948 as follows: "[g]enocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, 
as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings". 
63Ratner and Abrams, p. 33. 
See supra pp. 233-238. 
"This was one of the main issue for the ratification of the Genocide Convention in the United States. The 
Senate and scholars in America have discussed the requirement of intent for many years and its 
consequence the ratification of the Convention took more than 30 years. In this context, see LeBlanc, L., J., 
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phrase "intent to destroy" a protected group, to occur the crime of genocide, there must be 
an act which can be considered as causing the destruction of a group concerned. But what 
constitutes the destruction of a group? The ICTR in the Akayesu Judgement held that one 
of the acts enumerated in Article 2 (2) (a-e)66would be considered as providing means in 
destructing the group protected by the Genocide Convention. 67 As will be discussed in 
relation to the substantive content of the crime of genocide later, the acts which constitute 
destruction of the group are not limited to the killing of individual members of the group, 
for example rape or any other forms of sexual violence can also have the same affect. 68 The 
other significant point is that the intent to destroy the protected group must be "in whole or 
in part". The phrase "in whole" does not mean that extermination of the entire group is 
required. 69 The destruction of the group in part is sufficient to trigger the provisions of the 
Genocide Convention and of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. The notion of "in part" 
was explained in the Kayishema and Ruzindana Case by the ICTR as follows: ". j it] 
requires the intention to destroy a considerable number of individuals who are part of the 
group. Individuals must be targeted due to their membership of the group to satisfy this 
definition". 70 
In the light of the view taken by the ICTR, it can be concluded that there must be an 
intention to destroy the whole or a considerable number of individuals who are part of the 
group. One consequence of this is that genocidal intent ceases to be the principal factor 
since the numerical factor is equally significant. For this reason, the requirement of intent 
should be examined in two different levels: First of all, it should be established for the entire 
case, for example in the former Yugoslavia or in Rwanda, that whether the acts were 
"The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention: The Proposed U. S. Understanding", (1984) 78 
AJII. p. 369, in particular, pp. 373-380.; For the U. S. ratification and its criticism, see Remarks by Jordan 
Paust on "Genocide: The Convention, Domestic Laws, and State Responsibility", (1989) ASIL 
Proceedings, pp. 314-321.; Remarks by Steven Lubet on "Prospects for Implementation of the Genocide 
Convention under United States Law", (1989) ASIL Proceedings pp. 323-326. 
For the acts and the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in this regard, see infra pp. 253-260. 
67 Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.3.1.315. 
68Ibid paras. 7.8.214-215. In the Kayishema and Ruzindana Case it was reaffirmed. Trial Chamber, 
Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, par. 95. Recently, the ICTR again confirmed this fact in the 
Rutaganda Judgement. Trial Chamber, Rutaganda Case, Judgement, par. 2.2 (under the heading of 
Genocide in the Applicable Law Part of the Judgement). 
'Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.3.1.268-269. 
10 Trial Chamber, Kayishema andRuzindana Case, Judgement, par. 97. At this point, the problem of how it 
can be justified that a considerable number of individuals of the group intended to be destroyed arises. The 
ICTR made clearer this fact by indicating that "a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the 
group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group such as its leadership. ... both proportionate scale 
and total number are relevant". (par. 96).; and also see Final Report, par. 94. 
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committed with such intent. In this level, the number of victims may play a central role. 
Secondly, the existence of genocidal intent should be attributed to individuals to establish 
criminal responsibility for the commission of genocide. In this stage, the numerical points of 
the atrocity have nothing to do, and one single killing can constitute genocide. This way of 
understanding can be found in the practice of the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the issue 
of proof of the requisite intent of genocide. 
The second major problem in the crime of genocide with regard to the intent 
requirement of the offence lies on in the evidentiary matters, in other words, how to prove 
the existence of such intent. Indeed, this is the most difficult part of genocide to find an 
individual criminally responsible for the acts considered as constituting genocide. " 
However, the way adopted by the ICTY and the ICTR guides the international community, 
and their practice demonstrates that the establishment of the specific intent requirement of 
genocide is not as difficult as the international community used to think. In this sense, best 
examples can be found in the ICTR practice. The ICTR, first of all, examines whether the 
events occurred in Rwanda and in the specific region, depending on the indictments, for 
instance in the Akayesu Case the Taba commune, in the Kayishema and Ruzindana Case 
the Kibuye Prefecture, constitute genocide or not. In this context, the Tribunal examines 
the requirements of genocide in general. To find out that the specific intent of genocide is 
present, the ICTR has to depend upon the testimonies of witnesses proving that mass 
killings around the country and the place in question took place72 and the UN Reports 
documenting the massacres which took place in Rwanda. 73 In the light of this evidence, the 
International Tribunal concluded that the acts of violence occurred in Rwanda in the period 
of conflict were committed with the intent to destroy the Tutsi population. 74 In the 
Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, this approach was even made more clearer. As is well- 
known, the crime of genocide, due to its nature, is almost impossible "to be committed 
"Morris and Scharf, p. 170.; Ratner and Abrams, p. 34. 
'? 'trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 5.1.297-311.; The Tribunal has also given a special 
attention to the witnesses who testified with regard to events occurred in the Taba commune. The following 
quotation from the Akayesu Judgement proves the existence of specific intent requirement of genocide in 
Rwanda: "Witness 00 testified that... all the Tutsi should be killed so that someday a child could be born 
who would have to ask what a Tutsi had looked like. She also quoted this speaker as saying "I will have 
peace when there will be no longer a Tutsi in Rwanda". Witness V testified that Tutsi were thrown into the 
Nyabarongo river, which flows towards the Nile, and told to "meet their parents in Abyssinia", signifying 
that the Tutsi came from Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and that they "should go back to where they came from"". 
(paras. 5.1.318-319). 
"Ibid. paras. 5.1.312-313. 
"Ibid. paras. 5.1.320-321. 
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without some direct or indirect involvement on the part of the State given the magnitude of 
this crime". 75 Of course, it is rarely possible to find an official document outlining the 
State's plan or policy to commit genocide against a protected group, but the existence of 
such a plan or policy can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. The International 
Tribunal, in the Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement has taken into account the following 
evidence as constituting sufficient indicators to reach the conclusions that such a plan or 
policy of genocide was in place in Rwanda and that "such a plan would be strong evidence 
of the specific intent requirement for the crime of genocide": 76 "execution lists", " "the 
spreading of extremist ideology through the Rwandan media which facilitated the campaign 
of incitement to exterminate the Tutsi population' '79 "the use of the civil defence 
programme and the distribution of weapons to the civilian population'79 and "the 
"screening" carried out at many roadblocks which were erected with great speed after the 
downing of the President's plane". 80 
Having established the general genocidal intent, the ICTR dealt with the 
imputability of this intent to individual perpetrators of this crime. In the Akayesu 
Judgement, after indicating the difficulty of the determination of specific intent, if there is 
no confession from the accused, the International Tribunal held that such an intent "could 
be inferred from a certain number of presumptions of fact. The Chamber considers that it is 
possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act charged from the general 
context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against that same 
group, whether these acts were committed by the same offender or by others. Other 
factors, such as the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a 
country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on 
account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other 
groups, can enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a particular act". " 
"Morris and Scharf, p. 168. 
''Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, paras. 275-276,289-291. In specific, for the 
examination of genocide and of conclusion in relation to the Kibuye Prefecture by the ICTR, see paras. 
292-312. 
'7"execution lists, which targeted the Tutsi elite, government ministers, leading businessmen, professors 
and high profile Hutus, who may have favoured the implementation of the Arusha Accords". (Ibid. paras. 
275,277-278). 
l8Ibid. paras. 275,279-282. 
"Ibid paras. 275,283-286. 
80Ibid. paras. 275,287-288. 
$'Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.3.1.320-321. To support its view, the ICTR, in par. 
6.3.1.324, also referred to the practice of the ICTY. "This intent derives from the combined effect of 
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Similarly, in the Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, the Tribunal followed the same 
approach, and even examined in more detail the intent of the responsible individuals in this 
regard. To find out Kayishema's and Ruzindana's genocidal intent, the Chamber relied 
upon the following circumstances: the number of victims, 82 methodology-persistent pattern 
of conduct83 and their utterances. 84 
The approach taken by the ICTR in its practice shows that the imputability of the 
intent requirement of genocide to individuals is possible not only for high-ranking 
individuals who are associated with the organisation or the regime whose genocidal intent 
was already set out due to being easier to prove the existence of the required intent, but 
also for low-ranking individuals. In this context, some scholars indicated that for low- 
ranking individuals, for example a soldier or a militia member, could not be charged with 
genocide, but only with homicide because of the difficulty of imputing intent from 
circumstantial evidence. 85 As has already been indicated above, the practice of the ICTR 
can completely refute this idea and such an opinion should be seen as not consistent with 
the concept of genocide at all. It is well-established principle that even single killing is 
carried out with a specific intent, it constitutes genocide. Genocide is not the crime for 
high-ranking individuals, but for all individuals regardless of in which position they are. 
In this context, there is no doubt that the practice of the ICTR will first of all guide 
the ICTY and the ICC in terms of setting up the guideline on how to determine whether the 
required intent of genocide can be established in a specific case. Until the present time, the 
ICTY has not delivered any judgement finding a person guilty of genocide. "' However, 
speeches or projects laying the groundwork for and justifying the acts, from the massive scale of their 
destructive effect and from their specific nature, which aims at undermining what is considered to be the 
foundation of the group". (Karadzic and Mladic Case, Decision of Trial Chamber 1- Review of Indictment 
Pursuant to Rule 61, (11 July 1996), par. 95). 
'Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, paras. 531-533. 
H31bid paras. 534-537.; for Ruzindana, paras. 543-544. 
841bid. paras. 538-539.; for Ruzindana, par. 542. 
"Wang, M., M., "The International Tribunal for Rwanda: Opportunities for Clarification, Opportunities 
for Impact", (1995) 27 Colum. Hum Rts. L. Rev. p. 206. 
86Only in one case, the Jelisic Case, the ICTY found the accused not guilty of genocide on the ground that 
the genocidal intent of Jelisic was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Trial Chamber, Jelisic Case, 
Judgement, par. 108). The way adopted by the ICTY to establish the specific intent requirement of 
genocide is also similar to the ICTR's approach. The way adopted by the ICTY in relation the examination 
of genocidal intent can be briefly indicated as follows: 
"According to the Trial Chamber, in order to establish Jelisic's intent, the Prosecutor had to prove that, 
either, 1) Jelisic was an executioner, a participant to a "global" genocidal project, or that, 2) he himself 
committed genocide. However the Trial Chamber considered that neither had been proven. 
With regard to the first option, the Trial Chamber was not satisfied that a global genocide, that is a 
genocide in the whole Brcko region, had been demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. It nevertheless 
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there is a great deal of evidence which can be used to prove the presence of specific intent 
to regard criminal acts as constituting the crime of genocide in the Yugoslavian conflict. "' 
The first ever use of the notion of "ethnic cleansing" in the international arena should also 
be considered as implying the existence of genocidal intent in the Yugoslavian conflict. " 
Lastly, in this context, it should be noted that the specific intent requirement of 
genocide must not be confused with the discriminatory intent of crimes against humanity 
which is regulated as a precondition for all category offences of crimes against humanity in 
the ICTR Statute, while the ICTY and the ICC Statutes give place for this element just for 
the offence of persecution. " This was one of the main issue in the Kayishema and 
underlined that this finding in no way negated that such a genocide might have taken place in this region, 
but only that it had not been established to the satisfaction of the court. 
With regard to the second option, the Trial Chamber found that Jelisic's declarations and actions could not 
be interpreted as an expression of the specific genocidal intent in Article 4 of the Statute. According to the 
Chamber, Jelisic's behaviour, "in addition to being clearly odious and discriminatory, was opportunistic 
and inconsistent". However, "the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that the acts of Goran Jeltsic are not the 
expression of a person with the conscious intention to destroy a group as such. " (Press Release, "Loran 
Jelisic Sentenced to 40 Years Inprisonment for Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes", Doc. No. 
JL/P. I. S. /454-e, The Hague, 14 December 1999, emphasis in original). And also see "Jelisic Case 
Summary of the Judgement", Text Read by the Presiding Judge during the Judgement Hearing on 14 
December 1999, (14 December 1999). 
In addition to this Case, there are some Rule 61 decisions indicating the opinion of the ICTY with regard to 
the crime of genocide. In this sense, see Decision of Trial Chamber I-Review of Indictment Pursuant to 
Rule 61 in the Karadzic and Mladic Cases, (IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61,11 July 1996).; Decision of 
Trial Chamber I-Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 in the Nikolic Case, (YT-95-2-R61,20 October 
1995). 
871n this context, for a general information about the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, see the 
reports indicated in Chap. 1 notes 30-38.; Final Report, paras. 87-101.; Application of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina [to the ICJ], the Genocide Case, (20 March 1993), in Francis A. Boyle, The 
Bosnian People Charge Genocide, Amherst, Massachusetts: Aletheia Press, (1996), in particular, see par. 
87B of the Application setting out evidence and statements implicating the FRY's Government's 
involvement in genocide. For the utterances of soldiers that can be considered as proving the presence of 
the requirement of intent of genocide, see paras. 32,37,54,83 of the Application.; "A Cry from the 
Grave", (Documentary on BBC2,27 November 1999,10.20pm-00.10am). This documentary explains the 
genocide committed by the Bosnian Serbs against the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica between 9-15 July 
1995, and should be taken into account by the ICTY as evidence to prove the responsibilities of Radovan 
Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Radislav Krstic for the commission of genocide in this specific part of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. As this documentary clearly indicates, the international community in the Yugoslavian 
conflict has not only witnessed the war in the heart of Europe almost at the dawn of new millennium, but 
also witnessed the hunting down of civilian people by the Bosnian Serb Army in the hills and of roads of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It clearly shows that there was a plan or policy to exterminate or destroy any other 
group, other than Serbian origin, and was carried out by the Bosnian Serb Army and by Serbian 
paramilitary groups. 
88Webb, J., "Genocide Treaty - Ethnic Cleansing - Substantive and Procedural Hurdles in the Application 
of the Genocide Convention to Alleged Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia", (1993) 23 GA. J. Int'l & Comp. 
L. pp. 400-401.; For an opinion on how to determine whether there exists the specific intent requirement of 
genocide, see Petrovic, D., "Ethnic Cleansing - An Attempt at Methodology", (1994) 5 EJIL pp. 357-358.; 
For the connection between the concept of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the practice of the ICTY in 
Rule 61 decisions, see Karadzic and Mladic Cases, paras. 64,94.; Nikolic Case, par. 34. 
. For 
its explanation and discussion, see Chap. 6 pp. 288-291. 
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Ruzindana Case before the ICTR. In this case, the Tribunal indicated that in some instances 
the discriminatory grounds for genocide and crimes against humanity can coincide and 
overlap on the ground that "[t]he definition of the crime of genocide was based upon that 
of crimes against humanity, that is, a combination of "extermination and persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds" and it was intended to cover "the intentional 
destruction of groups in whole or in substantial part" ... 
The crime of genocide is a type of 
crime against humanity" 90 In light of this understanding, the majority of the Tribunal' held 
that the crime of genocide, and murder and extermination -two specific categories of 
offences under the concept of crimes against humanity- overlap and in fact they were the 
same offences in this particular case, therefore, "extermination and murder [were] 
subsumed fully by ... genocide", 
in other words, the accused were found guilty of genocide, 
but not guilty of extermination and murder under crimes against humanity. 92 The legal basis 
to reach such a conclusion were that in the particular case the required elements of crimes 
against humanity, the acts and the required elements of genocide, in particular genocidal 
intent to destroy or exterminate the Tutsi population, were the same for the same sets of 
facts and that the protected social interest, protection of Tutsi civilians was the same. 93 
The view taken by the ICTR in the Kayishema and Ruzindana Case cannot be 
considered as reflecting customary international law and its understanding, interpretation 
and application of the concept of genocide, especially the required intent for the crime, 
should be seen as damaging the whole concept of international humanitarian law for the 
following reasons: 
Firstly, as indicated earlier, the concepts of crimes against humanity and of genocide 
are totally different and independent categories of international crimes, 94 which have 
different elements, protect different interests and most importantly it is necessary under 
international criminal law that to record a conviction for the same sets of acts, which 
constitute different offences, to describe what the legal base was for the conviction and 
what the responsible individuals did. 95 
'Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, par. 89, (emphasis in original). 
"Judge Khan was dissident on this point. See Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tafazzal Hossain 
Khan Regarding the Verdicts under the Charges of Crimes Against Humanity/Murder and Crimes Against 
Humanity/Extermination, (Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, Case No. ICTR- 
95-1-T, 21 May 1999). 
Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, paras. 647-649. 
931bld. par. 646. For its discussion by the ICTR in more detail, see paras. 625-644. 
94For reasons, see supra pp. 233-235. 
"Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.1.211. 
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Secondly, the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals or of the ICC do not set out any 
hierarchy between the norms governing war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity. 96 On this ground it is not possible to apply the rules of international humanitarian 
law, as the ICTR did in the Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, in a way of finding an accused 
guilty of genocide, but not guilty of crimes against humanity or of war crimes despite of the 
presence of their requirements satisfied. 
Thirdly, holding an individual criminally responsible for the same set of acts for 
example, for both crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide, does not mean that 
the individual will be punished twice for the same acts. It is well-established under the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals that the concept of concurrent sentence prevents the 
accused from being punished twice and provides an acceptable solution to this issue. The 
place to deal with the consequence of concurrence is the penalty stage of final Judgements, 
by sentencing the individual concurrently for the cumulative charges rather than the 
verdict. 97 
Lastly, the practice of the ICTY in the Jelisic Case in which the accused was 
acquitted of genocide, but found guilty of crimes against humanity, persecution, on the 
premise that the genocidal intent of the accused was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
while his discriminatory intent for persecution, a category of crimes against humanity, was 
proven, " should be noted in order to indicate the fact that the concepts of crimes against 
humanity and of genocide have different purposes that their elements, in particular the 
96Ibid. paras. 6.1.214-215. 
"See Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Khan, par. 6.; This issue was first time arisen before the 
ICTY in the Tadic Case, and in its decision the Trial Chamber held that "[i]n any event, since this is a 
matter that will only be relevant insofar as it might affect penalty, it can best be dealt with if and when 
matters of penalty fall for consideration. What can, however, be said with certainty is that penalty cannot be 
made to depend upon whether offences arising from the same conduct are allged cumulatively or in the 
alternative. What is to be punished by penalty is proven criminal conduct and that will not depend upon 
technicalities of pleading". (Tadic Case, Decision on Defence Motion on Form of the Indictment, Case No. 
IT-94-1-T, 14 November 1995, p. 10). In the Tadic Case, Tadic was found guilty of crimes against 
humanity and of war crimes -violations of the laws or customs of war- for the same act of beating and 
sentenced to imprisonment 7 and 6 years respectively for these acts. The Tribunal stated that these 
sentences will be served concurrently. (Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Sentencing Judgement, Case No. IT-94- 
1-T, 14 July 1997, paras. 74-75 ). The same approach was again deployed by the ICTY in the Celebici 
Camp Case, see Celebici Camp Case, Judgement, (Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim 
Delic and Fsad Lanzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, see Sentencing Part of the Judgement, in 
particular, par. 1204).; The ICTR in the Akayesu Judgement also referred to the practice of the ICTY and 
indicated the possibility of enforcement of concurrent sentence. (Trial Chamber, Akayesu Judgement, 
paras. 6.1.200-203). This also creates a controversy between the practice of the different Chambers of the 
ICTR. Hopefully, it will be solved in the appeal stage of the Kayishema and Ruzindana Case. The sharing 
of the same Appeals Chamber by the ICTY and the ICTR will also help to overcome this issue. 
"See supra notes 18,86. 
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intent requirement of genocide, do not coincide or overlap. In this sense, the significance of 
the Jelisic Case lies in indicating the difference between the genocidal intent and 
discriminatory intent of crimes against humanity for the offence of persecution. 
5.3.1.3 The Act 
The third element of the crime of genocide is that there must be an act constituting this 
crime. The acts regarded as constituting genocide are indicated in Article 2 (a-e) of the 
Genocide Convention and verbatim taken its place in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. " 
These acts vary from killing members of the group to forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group1°° and are exhaustive, not illustrative in nature. 101 
What acts constitute the crime of genocide will be discussed in more detail, below 
under the heading of "the Substantive Content of the Crime of Genocide". 
5.3.2. The Substantive Content of the Crime of Genocide 
In international humanitarian and criminal law, the following acts are regarded as 
constituting the crime of genocide when "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; 
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) 
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group". 102 
As clearly understood from this regulation, some of the acts are very clear and easy 
to apply to specific events while the others are vague in nature like causing serious bodily 
or mental harm to members of the group. 103 In this sense, the significance of the practice of 
the ad hoc tribunals can be examined in the interpretation and application of the acts and in 
"Arts. 2 (2) (a-c) and 4 (2) (a-c) of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes respectively. 
10°Ibid. 
1°'Art. 17 of the ILC Draft Code.; Art. 6 of the ICC Statute.; Ratner and Abrams, p. 28. 
1°2Art. 2 of the Genocide Convention.; Art. 2 (2) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 4 (2) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 
17 of the ILC Draft Code.; Art. 6 of the ICC Statute. 
103Roberge, pp. 663-664.; Ratner and Abrams, p. 28. 
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the determination of the scope of the each category of act, in other words, which types of 
offences fall within the meaning of these acts. 
In addition to the importance of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in relation to 
the acts of genocide, the establishment of individual criminal responsibility should also be 
indicated and discussed under this subtitle since the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR 
give a place to a special provision governing the individual criminal responsibility with 
regard to the crime of genocide, apart from the general regulation of individual 
responsibility. '" 
5.3.2.1. The Acts Constituting Genocide 
As has already been indicated above, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals has a significant 
place in terms of providing the first ever interpretation and application of the concept of 
genocide in international humanitarian law and there is no doubt that their practice will 
guide the international community and the ICC in this regard. This is also valid in relation 
to the acts constituting genocide. 
5.3.2.1.1. Killing Members of the Group 
This is one of the most obvious act constituting the crime of genocide and the international 
community witnessed the commission of genocide in a way of killing members of the group 
in the Yugoslavian and Rwandan conflicts. '05 
In practice, the ICTR in the Akayesu Judgement concentrated on the term "killing" 
in the English version and indicated its difference from the French version "meurtre" as 
killing can include "both intentional and unintentional homicides". 106 The International 
Tribunal did not accept the English version of the term "killing" as authoritative since the 
crime of genocide includes unlawful and intentional killings, but not unintentional one. 107 
104&e Art. 2 (3) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 4 (3) of the ICTY Statute. For general regulations of individual 
criminal responsibility, see Arts. 6 and 7 of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes, respectively. For the practice 
of the ad hoc tribunals in relation to the principle of individual criminal responsibility and their 
contribution to international humanitarian law and possible impact on the ICC, see supra Chap. 3. 
1°5 There is a great deal of evidence and reports indicating the killing of innocent civilians in these two 
conflicts. See supra Chap. 1, notes 30-38,51,53-55.; and also see Application of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina [to the ICJ], paras. 34-44,44A-44N. 
"Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.3.1.274-275. 
10'Ibid. paras. 6.3.1.276-277. 
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However, as long as the crime of genocide is concerned the view deployed by the ICTR in 
the Akayesu Case has no importance on the ground that the crime of genocide requires a 
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the protected group and as a matter of the 
practical view, there cannot be found any difference between the term "killing" in the 
English version and "meurtre" in the French version. In fact, in the following case, the 
Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, the International Tribunal indicated this fact. "' 
5.3.2.1.2. Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members of the Group 
Under Articles 2 (2) (b) and 4 (2) (b) of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes, respectively, the 
International Tribunals have power to prosecute and punish responsible persons with the 
acts considered as "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" under 
the crime of genocide. However, there is no definition of the phrases "serious bodily or 
mental harm" in the Genocide Convention, as with the provisions of the Statutes of the ad 
hoc tribunals, and also the drafting history of the Convention does not provide any more 
than indicating the use of drugs or narcotics is prohibited and can constitute mental harm 
which is punishable under this category act of genocide. 109 
On this ground, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals has a significant role to play in 
terms of providing the first ever definition of this concept and of providing guidance for the 
international community and the ICC with regard to determining the substantive content of 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, in other words, indicating 
which types of offences or acts constitute the crime of genocide under this subparagraph 
act of genocide. 
In practice, the ICTR, in the Akayesu Judgement, firstly clarified the issue that 
whether to constitute an act causing serious bodily or mental harm needs to be permanent 
108Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, paras. 101-104. The ICTR cited the 
commentary on the crime of genocide in relation to the ILC Draft Code as follows: "[The acts] are by their 
very nature conscious, intentional or volitional acts which an individual could not usually commit without 
knowing that certain consequences were likely to result. They are not the type of acts that would normally 
occur by accident or even as a result of mere negligence... the definition of this crime requires a particular 
state of mind or a specific intent with respect to the overall consequences of the prohibited act". (par. 103). 
109'The ILC Draft Code and the ICC Statute do not provide any definitions for this offence either.; For the 
drafting history of the Genocide Convention in relation to this act, see Lippman, pp. 31-32.; Ratner and 
Abrams, p. 28. 
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or not, "o and the International Tribunal decided that "[c]ausing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group does not necessarily mean that the harm is permanent and 
irremediable". "' Furthermore, according to the Akayesu Judgement, serious bodily or 
mental harm cannot be limited to the "acts of torture, be they bodily or mental, inhumane or 
degrading treatment, persecution". 112 Indeed, in the Legal Findings Part of the Judgement, 
the Tribunal, for the first time in international law, explicitly ruled that "rape and sexual 
violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the victims and 
are even, ... one of the worst ways of 
inflict harm on the victim as he or she suffers both 
bodily and mental harm", and thus, they constitute the crime of genocide. 113 In the 
Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, the ICTR confirmed the interpretation, application and 
findings of the Akayesu Judgement"' and even more provided a definition for the notion of 
causing serious bodily harm as follows: "[it] could be construed to mean harm that 
seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the 
external, internal organs or senses". "s 
. In 
international humanitarian law, the most significant part of the practice of the 
ICTR lies on the recognition of rape and sexual violence as a means of committing 
genocide. This is the first time in international law sexual crimes considered as constituting 
acts which fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention and they have the same 
effects with other acts in terms of destroying the protected groups. 116 The view taken by 
1OThis was one of the main issue in the US understanding of the Genocide Convention and according to 
the US understanding of the terms "mental harm" meant "permanent impairment of mental faculties". See 
Bryant, B., "The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention", (1975) 16 Harv. Int. '1 L. J. pp. 693- 
696.; This way of interpretation is completely against the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. See infra note 
113. 
"'Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.3.1.279. 
12Ibid par. 6.3.1.283. 
"'Ibid paras. 7.8.214-215.; For the definition of rape and sexual violence, the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals in this regard, and its importance in international humanitarian law, see supra Chap. 4., pp. 178- 
185. 
114Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, par. 108.; The Rutaganda Judgement 
followed this approach. See Trial Chamber, Rutaganda Case, Judgement, par. 2.2. (under the heading of 
genocide in the Applicable Law Part of the Judgement). 
11s'Tria1 Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, par. 109.; For the concept of serious 
mental harm, see paras. 110-113. 
16The related part of the Akayesu Judgement that has historical importance in international humanitarian 
law can be cited as follows: "... rape and sexual violence ... constitute genocide in the same way as any other 
act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular 
group, targeted as such. ... the acts of rape and sexual violence ... were committed solely against 
Tutsi 
women, many of whom were subjected to the worst public humiliation, mutilated, and raped several times. 
... 
These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their 
communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi 
women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a 
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the ICTR should be considered as a creating historical precedence in international 
humanitarian law on the basis of providing the interpretation and application of the 
Genocide Convention in accordance with the events occurred around the world, in this 
sense the commission of rape and sexual violence in a massive scale during the course of 
armed conflicts, and with the modern concept of international humanitarian law. This is one 
of the main reasons why the international community has welcomed the Akayesu 
Judgement. 1 17 
There cannot be any doubt that the approach taken by the ICTR will firstly guide 
the ICTY in regard to the inclusion of rape and sexual violence into the concept of causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group since these offences were 
committed in a systematic and planned manner in the Yugoslav conflict1' and then the ICC 
in its future work. 
Lastly, it should be indicated that although there is no application, at the moment, 
of the siege of towns, destruction of national symbols such as cultural and religious 
monuments as a means constituting the act considered as causing serious bodily or mental 
harm in the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, they can be taken into account as a means of 
genocide. 119 Of course, this way of understanding should not be perceived as the concept of 
"cultural genocide"120 is under the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals, but, at least, in a 
wartime situation, it should be considered as constituting the evidence of proving specific 
whole". (paras. 7.8.214-215). "Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Mutsi group 
- destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself". (paras. 7.8.216-217). 117See supra note 35.; and also see Askin, K., D., "Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the 
Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status", (1999) 93 AJIL pp. 107-108.; Cisse, C., "The End of a 
Culture of Impunity in Rwanda? ", (1998) 1 YIHL p. 171.; McDonald, A., "The Year in Review", (1998) 1 
YIHL p. 127. 
"'See Final Report, paras. 236-253.; Application of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina [to the ICJ], 
paras. 45-68,68A-68F.; Allen, B., Rape Warfare The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, 
London, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, (1996).; Stiglmayer, A., (ed. ), Mass Rape, The War 
Against Women in Bosnia Herzegovina, Lincoln, London: University of Nebraska Press, (1994). 
19Petrovic, pp. 356-357. 
12°The ILC Commentary on the crime of genocide explains this concept as follows: "... the destruction in 
question is the material destruction of a group either by physical or by biological means, not the destruction 
of the national, linguistic, religious, cultural or other identity of a particular group. ... It 
is true that the 
1947 draft Convention prepared by the Secretary-General and the 1948 draft prepared by the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Genocide contained provisions on "cultural genocide" covering any deliberate act committed 
with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a group, such as prohibiting the use of 
language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools or the printing and circulation of publications in 
the language of the group or destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical 
monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group. However, the text of 
the Convention ... did not include the concept of "cultural genocide"... ". (pp. 32-33). 
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intent of the crime of genocide, and possibly as constituting mental harm to the members of 
the group. 
5.3.2.1.3. Deliberately Inflicting on the Group Conditions of Life Calculated to Bring 
about its Physical Destruction in Whole or in Part 
According to Article 2 (2) (c) and 4 (2) (c) of the Statutes of the ICTR and the ICTY, the 
crime of genocide can be committed by acts of "deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part". Like 
the acts causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, the definition and 
exact scope of these acts are not clear enough. 121 In this sense, the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals plays a crucial role for interpreting and applying the provisions of their Statutes in 
this respect. 
In the ICTR practice, this concept was defined as "the methods of destruction by 
which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, 
ultimately, seek their physical destruction"" and "subjecting a group of people a 
subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical 
services below minimum requirement" were indicated as some examples of means of 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part. 123 
With regard to the scope of the acts constituting "deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part", the destruction of villages, shelling of cities in which there is no military objective or 
its destruction does not provide any military advantage, establishments of concentration 
camps, attacking on international relief convoys which prevents the protected group from 
reaching food, medicine or shelter, forcible deportation or displacement of innocent 
civilians under inhuman conditions can also be included. '24 
12'Roberge, p. 664.; Ratner and Abrams, p. 28.; For the drafting history of the Genocide Convention in this 
regard, see Lippman, pp. 32-34. 
"Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.3.1.285. 
1231bid. paras. 6.3.1.286-287.; The Kayishema and Ruzindana Case followed the approach taken by the 
ICTR in the Akayesu Judgement. (Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, paras. 114- 
116).; The Rutaganda Judgement again confirmed this view. (Trial Chamber, Rutaganda Judgement, par. 
2.2. under the heading of genocide in the Applicable Law Part of the Judgement). 
'24How these acts can constitute the crime of genocide in the case of Yugoslav conflict, see Application of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina [to the ICJ], paras. 69-82. 
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5.3.2.1.4. Imposing Measures Intended to Prevent Births Within the Group 
The acts considered as imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group can 
be prosecuted and punished under Articles 2 (2) (d) and 4 (2) (d) of the Statutes of the 
ICTR and the ICTY, respectively. Like the previous two categories of acts of genocide, the 
exact scope of these acts are not clear enough. When the drafting history of Article 2 (d) of 
the Genocide Convention is examined, it can be clearly seen that the main reason for the 
inclusion of such a provision into the Convention was to protect the human groups from 
being destroyed by this way. The drafting history of the Convention in this particular 
respect indicates that Article 2 (d) of the Convention can be interpreted as including 
castration, sterilization, compulsory abortion and the segregation of the sexes. 125 As will be 
indicated below, the scope of this category of acts are much wider than the view expressed 
during the course of the adoption of the Genocide Convention. The practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals creates a significant opportunity to the international community with regard to 
determining the scope of what types of acts can constitute genocide in the meaning of 
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. 
In practice, the ICTR in the Akayesu Case held that "sexual mutiliation, the practice 
of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages" 
could constitute the crime of genocide. 126 The real significance of the practice of the ICTR 
lies in the inclusion of rape as constituting the crime of genocide under the heading of 
measures intended to prevent births within the group while the crime of rape may result in a 
birth. 'n Furthermore, the practice of the ICTR noted that measures intended to prevent 
births within the group might not be only physical, but could also be mental. 129 
'uLippman, p. 34. 
'uTrial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.3.1.289.; The other cases followed this approach. 
Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, par. 117. Rutaganda Judgement, par. 2.2. under the heading 
of genocide in the Applicable Law Part of the Judgement. 
127Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.3.1.289. From the Judgement of the ICTR, the legal 
base for such an interpretation can be cited as follows: "In patriarchal societies, where membership of a 
group is determined by the identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within 
a group is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group, with the intent to have her give birth to 
a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's group". (par. 6.3.1.289). 
12$Tria1 Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.3.1.290-291.; Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, 
Judgement, par. 117.; Rutaganda Case, Judgement, par. 2.2. under the heading of genocide in the 
Applicable Law Part of the Judgement.; The Trial Chamber in the Akayesu Judgement explained by way of 
giving an example of rape how to be mental imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group 
as follows: "... rape can be a measure intended to prevent births when the person raped refuses subsequently 
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The approach taken by the ICTR creates a precedential value for the ICTY and the 
ICC. As similar to the Rwandan case, the international community has witnessed the 
widespread and planned rape of Bosnian Muslim women. The perpetrators of this horrible 
crime must be brought to justice before the ICTY. There cannot be any doubt that the 
crime of rape can be tried as an act constituting the crime of genocide under the category of 
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, as the ICTR practice 
proved. This is particularly important for the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict on the 
ground that the offence of rape, in the culture of this society, is "perceived as staining its 
victims, making single women unmarriageable and married women subject to rejection by 
their husbands"'2' that can be interpreted as a means of imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group and, thus, as constituting the crime of genocide. 130 
5.3.2.1.5. Forcibly Transferring Children of the Group to Another Group 
The last category of act constituting genocide is the forcible transfer of children from one 
group to another and the ICTR and the ICTY have jurisdiction over such acts. 13' Although 
there is no indication that this offence was committed in the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
conflicts, the ICTR interpreted this provision as follows: "... the objective is not only to 
sanction a direct act of forcible physical transfer, but also to sanction acts of threats or 
trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer of children from one group to another". 132 
The interpretation and application of this notion in a way of including mental aspects of 
transferring children of the group to another group should be regarded as a significant point 
in terms of making clear its substantive content in international humanitarian law. 
to procreate, in the same way that members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, not to 
procreate". (paras. 6.3.1.290-291). 
Morris, V., and Scharf, M., P., An Insider's Guide, pp. 86-87.; For a brief explanation of this culture and 
the perception of rape in this society, see Zalihic-Kaurin, A., "The Muslim Women", in Alexandra 
Stiglmayer (ed. ), Mass Rape; The War Against Women in Bosnia Herzegovina, Lincoln, London: 
University of Nebraska Press, (1994), pp. 170-173. 
1°Morris and Scharf, An Insider's Guide, p. 87.; Application of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
[to the ICJ], par. 83. 
"'Art. 2 (e) of the Genocide Convention.; Art. 2 (2) (e) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 4 (2) (e) of the ICTY 
Statute.; For the drafting history of the Genocide Convention in this regard, see Lippman, pp. 35-36. 
'32Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.3.1.293.; Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, 
par. 118.; Rutaganda Case, Judgement, par. 2.2. under the heading of genocide in the Applicable Law Part 
of the Judgement. 
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5.3.2.2. Individual Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Genocide 
The regulations of the Genocide Convention provides both States' responsibility and 
individual criminal responsibility in relation to the crime of genocide. Although the notion 
of State responsibility for the crime of genocide is not a part of this study it should be 
briefly indicated that under Article 9 of the Convention the ICJ has jurisdiction over 
disputes with regard to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, and 
its jurisdiction includes the disputes relating to the responsibility of States which may arise 
out of breaches of Articles 2 (the acts constituting genocide) and 3 (the punishable acts) of 
the Genocide Convention. 133 In terms of individual criminal responsibility, the crime of 
genocide has specific provisions providing responsibility not only for the perpetrators of 
genocide but also for all those who played an essential role for the occurrence of this 
horrible crime. In this sense, Article 3 of the Genocide Convention states: "[t]he following 
acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in 
genocide". This Article has verbatim taken its place in the Statutes of the ad hoc 
tribunals. 134 However, the ILC Draft Code and the ICC Statute do not specify the 
punishable acts under the definition of genocide, instead they include one Article dealing 
with individual criminal responsibility which is applicable to all crimes, the crime of 
aggression, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. 135 The way adopted, in 
particular in the ICC Statute, can be, at first glance, considered as "a positive innovation 
and an advancement over the Statutes of the ICTR/ICTY" since providing a basis for 
individual criminal responsibility for some additional acts of the crime of genocide like 
133In this context, the Application of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the ICJ has a significant 
place since being the first in international law. See supra notes 6,87.; Apart from the Genocide Case, the 
only case dealing with genocide and State responsibility the case which has brought by Pakistan against 
India before the ICJ in 1973. It was related to preventing India from extraditing 195 Pakistani nationals to 
Bangladesh. All States concerned reached an agreement and the case was not concluded by the ICJ. In this 
sense, see Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India), 1973 ICJ Rep. 347.; Levie, H., S., "Legal 
Aspects of the Continued Detention of the Pakistani Prisoners of War by India", (1973) 67 AJIL p. 512.; 
Levie, H., S., "The Indo- Pakistani Agreement ofAugust 28,1973", (1974) 68 AJIL p. 95.; Paust, J., J., and 
Blaustein, A., P., "War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh Experience", (1978) 11 
Van. J. Trans. 'l L. p. 1, in particular pp. 34-38. 
134 Art. 2 (3) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 4 (3) of the ICTY Statute. 
'35Art. 2 of the ILC Draft Code.; Art. 25 of the ICC Statute. In this Article, the ICC Statute in paragraph 3 
(e) just refers to the one category of punishable act in relation to the crime of genocide that is the directly 
and publicly incitement of other to commit genocide. 
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"soliciting or inducing the crime". 136 However, this view does not have any legal ground in 
international humanitarian law since the Statutes of the ICTR and the ICTY, as in 
compliance with the Genocide Convention, cover all aspects of individual criminal 
responsibility and also includes some punishable acts even if the crime itself does not occur, 
as a result of the preventive nature of the Convention. The examples of soliciting or 
inducing the crime are already punishable acts which qualify different forms of complicity in 
genocide under the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR. 
Given this ground, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the 
establishment of individual criminal responsibility has a unique place in international 
humanitarian law for the following reasons: Firstly, there is no definition and application of 
the punishable acts, and the international community will witness the first ever 
interpretation and application of these concepts. Secondly, as will be indicated below, the 
specific regulation of the punishable acts of the crime of genocide provides individual 
criminal responsibility that cannot be provided under the general regulation of individual 
criminal responsibility, as the ICC Statute provides. In this sense, it is necessary to 
separately examine the concept of individual criminal responsibility with regard to the crime 
of genocide. 137 
5.3.2.2.1. Genocide 
Any individual who commits one of the enumerated acts indicated in Articles 2 (2) and 4 
(2) of the Statutes of the ICTR and the ICTY, respectively, with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group incurs individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of genocide. 138 
5.3.2.2.2. Conspiracy to Commit Genocide 
Under the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the crime of genocide is the only crime giving 
power to the ICTR and the ICTY to hold an individual criminally responsible for 
136Sarooshi, D., "The Statute of the International Criminal Court", (1999) 48 ICLQ p. 397. 
"'For the concept of individual criminal responsibility and the practice of the ad hoc tribunals; their 
contribution to international humanitarian law and their impact on the ICC, see supra Chap. 3. 
138Art. 2 (3) (a) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 4 (3) (a) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 3 (a) of the Genocide 
Convention. 
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conspiracy to commit genocide. 139 There is no definition of conspiracy either in the 
Genocide Convention'40 or in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. Unfortunately, until the 
present time, there is no judgement rendered by the ICTR and the ICTY explaining the 
concept of conspiracy to commit genocide. 141 
In light of the drafting history of the Genocide Convention, the notion of conspiracy 
can be defined as an agreement made between two or more persons to commit genocide or 
any other offence, 142 and to hold an individual criminally responsible for the offence of 
conspiracy to commit genocide, the mere agreement should be seen sufficient 141 
irrespective of the occurrence of genocide. This way of the understanding of the concept 
should be regarded as consistent with the spirit and purpose of the Convention and even 
more consistent with the name of the Genocide Convention itself -Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide-. As clearly inferred from the full 
name of the Convention, its purpose is not only to provide punishment of individuals for 
the crime of genocide but also try to prevent its occurrence. Moreover, the approach taken 
by the ICTR in relation to attempt to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide and complicity in genocide supports such a way of interpretation and 
application of the concept of conspiracy to commit genocide. "" 
However, the latest development in international humanitarian law, the adoption of 
the ICC Statute, departs from the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes in terms of not including 
any provision providing individual criminal responsibility for the offence of conspiracy to 
commit genocide. 'ds The inclusion of the notion of "common purpose" in Article 25 (3) (d) 
cannot be interpreted as providing a legal base for holding individuals criminally responsible 
for the offence of conspiracy to commit genocide on the ground that the establishment of 
'39Art. 2 (3) (b) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 4 (3) (b) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 3 (b) of the Genocide 
Convention. 
10For the drafting history of the Genocide Convention in this respect, see Lippman, pp. 39-41. 
"'The ICTR found Jean Kambanda guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide in light of his guilty plea in 
relation to the crime of genocide, but did not examine the notion of conspiracy to commit genocide. See 
Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, 4 September 1998, par. 
40 (2). The significance of this Judgement lies on the establishment of individual criminal responsibility for 
the offence of conspiracy to commit genocide and the acknowledgement of the events by Kambanda -by his 
guilty plea- can be used as evidence in the following cases of the ICTR in proving the existence of genocide 
in Rwanda and setting up the responsibility for conspiracy to commit genocide since he was the Prime 
Minister of Rwanda at that time. 
'42Lippman, pp. 39-40. 
113Ibid. 
144See infra pp. 264-270. 
'"See Art. 25 of the ICC Statute. 
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individual responsibility under that notion depends on the occurrence of an unlawful act. 146 
In this sense, the approach taken by the international community in the adoption of the ICC 
Statute can be assessed as a major step backward due to the non-inclusion of a provision 
providing punishment of the offence of conspiracy to commit genocide. This criticism is 
also valid for the crime of aggression over which the ICC has jurisdiction. 147 As similar to 
the crime of genocide, the means to prevent the occurrence of the crime of aggression is 
significant and the concept of conspiracy to aggression qualifies one of the best available 
means to the international community. Unfortunately, the ICC Statute ignores this fact too. 
For the aforementioned reasons, the right approach might have been the inclusion of a 
provision stating individual criminal responsibility for conspiracy to commit genocide and 
to aggression in Article 25 of the ICC Statute. It should also be noted that this way of 
regulation is also in compliance with the customary rules of international humanitarian law 
since the concept of conspiracy was taken its place in the Nuremberg Tribunal Charter and 
in the practice of Second World War war crimes trials. 149 
5.3.2.2.3. Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide 
The notion of direct and public incitement to commit genocide constitutes a punishable act 
under the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals in accordance with the regulation of the 
Genocide Convention. 149 However, there is no definition of this offence in these 
Article 25 (3) (d) of the ICC Statute states: "3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that 
person:... 
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of 
persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such 
activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime". 
For an excellent interpretation and application of the notion of "common purpose" and the establishment of 
individual criminal responsibility in this regard, see Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgement, 
Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, paras. 185-234. 
147Art. 5 of the ICC Statute. 
"Article 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal in its last paragraph states: "Leaders, organizers, 
instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy 
to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of 
such plan".; For a brief explanation on the concept of "criminal conspiracies" and the practice of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, see Morris and Scharf, pp. 270-272. 
''Art. 3 (c) of the Genocide Convention.; Art. 2 (3) (c) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 4 (3) (c) of the ICTY 
Statute.; For the drafting history of the Genocide Convention in this respect, see Lippman, pp. 43-46. 
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international humanitarian law instruments. For the first time in international law, the 
practice of the ICTR provides a detailed examination of this concept. 
In the Akayesu Case, the ICTR, first of all, examined the meaning of the three 
terms: incitement, direct and public under both common law and civil law systems, '5° and 
then defined the offence of direct and public incitement to commit genocide as "directly 
provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit genocide, whether through speeches, shouting or 
threats uttered in public places or at public gatherings, or through the sale or dissemination, 
offer for sale or display of written material or printed matter[ials] in public places or at 
public gatherings, or through the public display of placards or posters, or through any other 
means of audiovisual communication". 15' From this definition, it can be easily inferred that 
for an act to be considered as an offence of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide, there must be two elements: (a) the existence of incitement (or of provocation) 
to commit genocide; (b) this incitement must be direct and public. In terms of indicating 
how an act can be justified as direct and public, the definition made by the International 
Tribunal creates a guidance for the international community. 
The mental requirement (mens rea) of this crime is "the intent to directly prompt or 
provoke another to commit genocide", in other words, "the person who is inciting to 
commit genocide must have himself the specific intent to commit genocide, namely, to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such" 1S2 The 
issue on this point before the ICTR was that whether the crime of direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide was punishable even if the incitement was not successful. 
The International Tribunal in this respect decided that "genocide clearly falls within the 
category of crimes so serious that direct and public incitement to commit such a crime must 
be punished as such, even where such incitement failed to produce the result expected by 
the perpetrator". '53 
The view taken by the International Tribunal should be welcomed by international 
lawyers and by the international community. It is also in compliance with the spirit and 
purpose of the Genocide Convention. This is because, the Genocide Convention does not 
1S0'Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.3.3.32-41. 
'511bid. paras. 42-43. 
IS2Ibid. paras. 6.3.3.44-45. 
153Ibia paras. 6.3.3.48-49.; In the Rutaganda Judgement, this ruling was again confirmed. Trial Chamber, 
Rutaganda Case. Judgement, par. 2.2. under the heading of genocide in the Applicable Law Part of the 
Judgement. 
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only aim to punish individuals for the crime of genocide, but also to prevent it. The name of 
the Convention is self-explanatory itself. For these reasons, the crimes of genocide and of 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide are completely different in terms of 
establishing individual criminal responsibility. As rightly decided by the International 
Tribunal, an individual who directly and publicly incites other person or persons to commit 
genocide incurs individual criminal responsibility irrespective of the crime of genocide is 
occurred. The understanding of the concept in this way is so significant to prevent the 
occurrence of the crime of genocide which costs lots of innocent lives. Because of this 
reason, possibly, the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide has explicitly 
taken its place in the ICC Statute although it does not employ a specific Article for the 
punishable acts of genocide. 154 There cannot be any doubt that the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals creates a precedential value with regard to indicating the elements of the offence 
of direct and public incitement to commit genocide and creating a guidance on the issue 
that how can a specific act be considered as constituting this offence for the following cases 
of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC when it becomes in operation. 
5.3.2.2.4. Attempts to Commit Genocide 
One of the other acts punishable under the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, as with the 
Genocide Convention, is to attempt to commit genocide. 'ss Although there is no final 
judgement finding an accused guilty of attempting to commit genocide in the practice of the 
ICTR and the ICTY, in the Rutaganda Judgement, the ICTR while dealing with the 
concept of individual criminal responsibility briefly indicated the difference between attempt 
to commit genocide and attempt to commit any other crimes as follows: "the Chamber 
notes that Article 2 (3) of the Statute, on the crime of genocide, provides for prosecution 
for attempted genocide, among other acts. However, attempt is by definition an inchoate 
crime, inherent in the criminal conduct per se irrespective of its result. Consequently, the 
Chamber holds that an [a]ccused may incur individual criminal responsibility for inchoate 
offences under Article 2 (3) of the Statute and that, conversely, a person engaging in any 
154See Art. 25 (3) (e) of the ICC Statute. 
issue 3 (d) of the Genocide Convention.; Art. 2 (3)(d) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 4 (3) (d) of the ICTY 
Statute. 
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form of participation in other crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, ... would 
incur criminal responsibility only if the offence were consummated". 156 
The view taken by the ICTR clearly distinguishes the concept of attempt to commit 
genocide from other crimes in this regard. However, the ICC Statute ignores this fact and 
regulates the concept of attempt for all crimes as a general principle of criminal law. '" The 
way adopted in the ICC Statute should be considered as against the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals and as not consistent with the purpose and the nature of the Genocide Convention 
on the basis of not serving for the preventive aspects of the Convention. In particular, the 
regulation of the ICC Statute with regard to the case of "a person who abandons the effort 
to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable 
for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person 
completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose""' cannot be supported in 
international humanitarian law for the aforementioned reasons. Such a situation should not 
be an obstacle to the establishment of individual criminal responsibility, but may be taken 
into consideration as a mitigating factor in sentencing procedure as far as the crime of 
genocide is concerned. 
5.3.2.2.5. Complicity in Genocide 
The last category of act punishable in relation to the crime of genocide under the Statutes 
of the ad hoc tribunals, as with the Genocide Convention, is complicity in genocide. '59 As 
similar to the other punishable acts of genocide, there is no definition of the offence of 
complicity in genocide either in the Convention160 or in the Statutes of the ICTY and the 
ICTR. For this reason, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals has a significant place in 
156Trial Chamber, Rutaganda Case, Judgement, par. 2.2. under the heading of genocide in the Applicable 
Law Part of the Judgement. 
Article 25 (3) (f) of the ICC Statute provides: "3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that 
person:.... 
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a 
substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's 
intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the 
completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that 
crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose". 
15$Ibid. 
159Art 3 (e) of the Genocide Convention.; Art. 2 (3) (e) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 4 (3) (e) of the ICTY 
Statute. 
"For the drafting history of the Genocide Convention in this respect, see Lippman, pp. 47-49. 
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international humanitarian law with regard to making clear the definition and elements of 
the crime of complicity in genocide. 
For the first time in international humanitarian law, the ICTR in the Akayesu Case 
examined the concept of complicity in genocide in detail. In its decision, the International 
Tribunal defined the notion of complicity and accomplice in this regard for all crimes as 
follows: "... complicity is ... a 
form of criminal participation by all criminal law systems.... 
the accomplice to an offence may be defined as someone who associates himself in an 
offence committed by another, complicity necessarily implies the existence of a principal 
offence". 161 To find an individual criminally responsible for the offence of complicity in 
genocide, someone else has to commit the crime of genocide, but it does not mean that the 
principal perpetrator or perpetrators of the crime of genocide had to be prosecuted and 
punished in order for finding the individual criminally responsible as an accomplice to the 
genocide. 162 As a result of this, an individual cannot be found guilty of both crimes, the 
commission of the crime of genocide and complicity in genocide, in terms of the same 
act. 163 
According to the Tribunal, the physical elements (actus reus) of complicity in 
genocide can mostly be in three different forms of accomplice participation, namely, 
"complicity by instigation, complicity by aiding [or] abetting, and complicity by procuring 
means". 1TM In this context, the general regulation of individual criminal responsibility in 
Articles 6 (1) and 7 (1) of the ICTY Statutes, respectively, under which any individual can 
be found guilty on the basis of participation to the crimes; war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide, should be noted due to complicity in genocide can be a form of this 
regulation as well. 16' However, the establishment of individual criminal responsibility for 
complicity in genocide under the provision of the Genocide Convention, as with Articles 2 
(3) (e) of the ICTR and 4 (3) (e) of the ICTY Statutes, and under the general regulation of 
16'Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 6.3.2.327. 
'62lbid. paras. 6.3.2.328-335. 
1631bid. par. 6.3.2.337. 
1641bid. paras. 6.3.2.338-339.; For a detailed explanation of this element by the Tribunal in light of the 
Rwandan Penal Code, see paras. 6.3.2.340-347. 
'65Article 7 (1) of the ICTY Statute (Article 6 (1) of the ICTR Statute is the same) states: "A person who 
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or 
execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for 
the crime". 
For the concept of individual criminal responsibility in international humanitarian law, the practice of the 
ad hoc tribunals and their contribution to international humanitarian law and their impact on the ICC, see 
supra Chap. 3. 
268 
individual criminal responsibility in Articles 6 (1) of the ICTR and 7 (1) of the ICTY 
Statutes is quite different from each other. The first main difference can be examined in the 
requirement of mental element of complicity in genocide. Under Articles 6 (1) and 7 (1) of 
the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes, to hold an individual criminally responsible for complicity 
in genocide in a way of aiding, abetting, planning, preparing or executing genocide, it has 
to be proven that the individual acted with specific genocidal intent, that is to say, with the 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such, 
while it is not necessary to establish the responsibility of individual as an accomplice to the 
crime of genocide'TM under Articles 2 (3) (e) of the ICTR and 4 (3) (e) of the ICTY 
Statutes. This is because, as rightly held by the International Tribunal, the mental element 
(mens rea) of the offence of complicity in genocide does not necessarily require the 
existence of the specific intent of genocide, the presence of knowledge of genocidal plan is 
sufficient to establish individual criminal responsibility. 167 The second main difference can 
be examined in the form of physical element (actus reus) of complicity in genocide. Under 
Articles 6 (1) and 7 (1) of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes, the establishment of individual 
criminal responsibility for complicity in genocide in a way of aiding, abetting does not 
necessarily require the occurrence of a positive act, it may be in the form of failing to act or 
refraining from action, whereas complicity in genocide under Articles 2 (3) (e) and 4 (3) (e) 
of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes requires the existence of a positive act. 168 
From the perspective of international humanitarian law, the significance of the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the concept of complicity in genocide lies in 
the interpretation and application of the notion for the first time in international law by an 
international tribunal. The approach taken by the International Tribunal in relation to the 
elements of the offence of complicity in genocide and its distinguishment from the general 
regulation of individual criminal responsibility, in Articles 6 (1) and 7 (1) of the ICTR and 
'66Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.3.2.18-19. 
167Ibid. paras. 6.3.2.5-15. The related conclusion of the ICTR can be quoted as follows: "In conclusion, the 
Chamber is of the opinion that an accused is liable as an accomplice to genocide if he knowingly aided or 
abetted or instigated one or more persons to in the commission of genocide, while knowing that such a 
person or persons were committing genocide, even though the accused himself did not have the specific 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such". (paras. 
6.3.2.14-15). 
'"Ibid paras. 6.3.2.20-21. Even the presence of individual may be sufficient to establish individual 
criminal responsibility under Articles 6 (1) and 7 (1) of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes. To indicate this 
fact, the ICTR in the Akayesu Judgement (in par. 6.3.2.22) refers to the Tadic Judgement. For a detailed 
examination of this concept, see supra Chap. 3. 
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the ICTY Statutes, should be regarded as a major contribution to international 
humanitarian law. Moreover, it should be seen as an advancement over the ICC Statute in 
which the punishable acts of genocide, apart from the crime of direct and public incitement 
to commit genocide, is not taken its place in a way of specific regulation under the 
definition of genocide. 169 The way adopted in the ICC Statute, regulating the concept of 
individual criminal responsibility as a general matter, does not cover the distinguishing 
features of complicity in genocide under the Genocide Convention and the Statutes of the 
ad hoc tribunals, as has already been indicated above. For this reason, it can be considered 
as a step backward from the regulation of the Genocide Convention and from the practice 
of the ad hoc tribunals. 
5.4. CONCLUSIONS 
The crime of genocide is universally prohibited by the conventional and customary rules of 
international law irrespective of committed in time of peace or in time of war. Moreover, 
the rules governing the crime of genocide enjoy the status of jus cogens and the 
consequential obligation on States to prevent and punish the crime of genocide is erga 
omnes in nature. 
However, despite of its extensive prohibition, until the practice of the ICTR and the 
ICTY, it was not possible to enforce the rules governing the crime of genocide, in other 
words, the Genocide Convention in international humanitarian law, and this situation 
created many issues in relation to the concept of genocide. In this context, one of the main 
issue was that the recognition of the crime of genocide as a second category of crimes 
against humanity as consisting of the persecution of individuals on political, racial or 
religious grounds. As the practice of the ICTR and the ICTY shows, such an understanding 
has no basis in international humanitarian law on the ground that these two categories of 
international crimes have developed independently from each other and have different 
elements in order to be applicable to any specific event. The other major issue was the 
definition of genocide which was defined under Article 2 of the Genocide Convention as: 
"... any of the following acts [indicated in the Article through (a)-(e)] committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such". Under 
169See Arts. 6 and 25 of the ICC Statute 
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this guideline, the international community has witnessed the misuse and abuse of the 
concept of genocide in a way of labelling different aspects of life such as birth control 
clinics, ecological disasters, or labelling all massive killings of civilians as genocide such as 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by nuclear weapons. Non-existence of an 
international criminal tribunal or court and of an authoritative interpretation of the 
Genocide Convention caused these unacceptable perception of the notion of genocide. 
However, today, the international community has two ad hoc tribunals operating and one 
ICC, hopefully, will be functioning soon all of those have jurisdiction over the crime of 
genocide. In this sense, there cannot be any doubt that the practice of the ad hoc tribunals 
provides very useful interpretation and application of the crime of genocide and prevent the 
misuse or abuse of the concept of genocide. 
The importance of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals can be examined in two 
ways: Firstly, they interpret and apply the elements of the crime of genocide. Secondly, 
they clarify the substantive content of the crime of genocide. 
For the first time in international law, the requirements of genocide were interpreted 
and applied by the ad hoc tribunals. In this context, the Judgements of Akayesu, Kayishema 
and Ruzindana, Kambanda, Rutaganda rendered by the ICTR on the one hand, the Jelisic 
Judgement delivered by the ICTY on the other hand are crucial in terms of providing 
guidance on the elements of genocide. 
As has been indicated by the International Tribunal, the first requirement of the 
crime of genocide is that the acts must be committed against an identifiable group, namely, 
a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. In a sense, the victim of genocide is the group 
itself rather than the individual since victims are chosen on the basis of being a member of 
one of these groups instead of his or her individual identity. The wordings of the 
international humanitarian law instruments, the Genocide Convention, the Statutes of the 
ICTY and the ICTR, the ILC Draft Code, the ICC Statute, seem to be limiting the 
protected groups to national, ethnic, racial and religious groups, and do not provide any 
definition of these groups. This situation was a big opportunity for the international 
community since the ad hoc tribunals could provide definitions of these notions in 
accordance with the necessities of the Yugoslav and Rwandan conflicts. In fact, the ICTR 
in the Akayesu, Kayishema and Ruzindana, and Rutaganda Judgements defined the 
concepts of national, ethnic, racial and religious groups. In this context, the practice of the 
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ad hoc tribunals in relation to the interpretation and application of the notion of victimised 
or protected group within the meaning of the Genocide Convention has a historic 
significance on the premise that the practice of the ICTR proved that the protected groups 
are not limited to national, ethnic, racial or religious groups, and that any groups, as long as 
they are stable and permanent, can be under the protection of the Genocide Convention. 
The approach taken by the International Tribunal reflects the interpretation and application 
of the rules of international humanitarian law in a manner which is consistent with the 
development of international law. However, the interpretation of the protected group in a 
way of expressly excluding political and economic groups due to being labelled as "mobile" 
groups, not stable and not permanent, can be criticised. Although these groups can be 
protected as constituting of the offence of persecution under the concept of crimes against 
humanity, the right opinion of the International Tribunal should have been that if any 
political, economic or social group is considered as a stable and permanent group, which 
can be justified in light each specific case by an international tribunal or court, they must 
enjoy the protection of the Genocide Convention within the meaning of group protected by 
this Convention. 
The second requirement of the crime of genocide is the presence of a specific intent 
which means that to regard an act constituting genocide, it must be committed with the 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such. 
This is the main requirement of genocide that distinguishes it from war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The major contributions of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals to 
international humanitarian law and the possible impact on the ICC with regard to the 
specific intent of genocide can be witnessed in the following points: the interpretation of the 
relationship between "intent to destroy" and "in whole or in part" a protected group, in this 
sense, the clarification of what acts constitute a destruction of a group; establishing a 
guideline on how to determine whether the required intent of genocide can be found in a 
specific case and how to impute the intent to individual perpetrators of this crime, in other 
words, solving the evidentiary matters; making clear the distinction between the specific 
intent requirement of genocide, "genocidal intent", and the "discriminatory intent" of 
persecution under crimes against humanity; making clear the independence of the crime of 
genocide from crimes against humanity, and indicating that murder, extermination-two 
categories of crimes against humanity- cannot be subsumed by genocide. 
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The third requirement of the crime of genocide is that there must be an act 
constituting this offence. The acts regarded as constituting genocide are indicated in Article 
2 (a-e) of the Genocide Convention and verbatim taken its place in the Statutes of the ad 
hoc tribunals and of the ICC. 
The second major contribution of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals to 
international humanitarian law and possible impact on the ICC can be examined in relation 
to the interpretation and application of the substantive content of the crime of genocide. 
The offences which give rise to the crime of genocide are regulated in an exhaustive way, 
not illustrative in nature, and enumerated in the international humanitarian law instruments 
as follows: (a) killing members of the group, (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group, (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, (d) imposing measures intended 
to prevent births within the group, (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group. As clearly inferred from this regulation, some of the acts are very clear and easy to 
apply to specific cases whereas the others are vague in nature like causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group. In this sense, the significance of the practice of the 
ad hoc tribunals lies in the interpretation and application of the acts and in the 
determination of the scope of the each category of act, in other words, which types of 
offences fall within the meaning of these acts since there is no definition of such acts in the 
international humanitarian law instruments. In particular, the recognition of rape and sexual 
violence as constituting the crime of genocide under the categories of "causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group" and of "imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group", for the first time in international law, by the International 
Tribunal creates a historical precedence in international humanitarian law and undoubtedly, 
will have a significant impact on the ICC when it becomes in operation. 
The other major contribution of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals to international 
humanitarian law can be seen in the examination of the establishment of individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of genocide. As with the Genocide Convention, under the 
Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the punishable acts of genocide are regulated as 
independent from the general regulation of individual criminal responsibility. The 
punishable acts of genocide are: (a) genocide), (b) conspiracy to commit genocide, (c) 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, (d) attempt to commit genocide, (e) 
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complicity in genocide. The approach taken by the International Tribunal in this regard has 
an important place in international humanitarian law on the premise that the first ever 
interpretation and application of these concepts are provided in international law. The view 
adopted by the International Tribunal also indicates how important the regulation of the 
punishable acts of genocide under a specific provision is. This is so significant since 
providing individual criminal responsibility for the acts which cannot be provided under the 
general regulation of individual criminal responsibility. For example, the concept of 
conspiracy to commit genocide can be punishable under the specific regulation of the 
Genocide Convention and the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals regardless of the occurrence 
of the crime of genocide. This way of understanding, interpretation and application of the 
norms governing the crime of genocide is in compliance with the spirit and purpose of the 
Convention and even more takes into account the preventive nature of the Convention. 
Similarly, the notion of complicity in genocide under the specific regulation of the 
international humanitarian law instruments has its own distinguishing features which cannot 
be provided by means of a general regulation of individual criminal responsibility. The 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals obviously proves this fact. However, the ICC Statute in this 
respect departs from the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and from their practice due to 
regulating the concept of individual criminal responsibility by virtue of employing one 
Article for all international crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction. It does not include a 
specific provision indicating punishable acts of genocide, apart from the crime of direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide. The way adopted in the ICC Statute ignores the 
preventive nature of the Genocide Convention which is also significant for the crime of 
aggression. This is because, these two international crimes cost lots of innocent lives. The 
effort to prevent the occurrence of these horrendous crimes is as important as to punish the 
responsible persons for such crimes. Due to ignoring this fact, the ICC Statute should be 
seen as a major step backward from the regulations of the Genocide Convention and of the 
Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and its consequence most importantly from the practice of 
the ad hoc tribunals. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
As a category of international crimes, crimes against humanity are universally prohibited by 
the customary rules of international humanitarian law. Unlike other international crimes, 
namely, war crimes and the crime of genocide, the concept of crimes against humanity had 
no conventional base in international humanitarian law until the adoption of the ICC 
Statute, which is the only international treaty setting up the conditions and the substantive 
content of crimes against humanity in detail. ' 
As will be indicated in this Chapter, the notion of crimes against humanity was one 
of the most important outcomes of the Second World War. This is because the concept and 
the individual criminal responsibility in this regard were, for the first time, introduced and 
enforced by the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. 2 Since the 
Second World War, the concept of crimes against humanity has evolved and become an 
independent category of international crimes. In this sense, the most significant 
developments are the adoption of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals (the ICTY and the 
ICTR) and of the ICC those of which give power to these international criminal institutions 
to try and punish individuals responsible for crimes against humanity. 3 
In international humanitarian law, today, it is well-settled that the norms governing 
crimes against humanity have reached the level ofjus cogens and States' duty to prosecute, 
punish or extradite the individuals responsible for crimes against humanity is an obligatio 
erga omnes in nature. ' Despite of this nature of rules on crimes against humanity, there are 
'Art. 7 of the ICC Statute (known as Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which was adopted 
by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, UN. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9,17 July 1998). 
2See infra pp. 277-279. 
3Art. 5 of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 3 of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 7 of the ICC Statute. 
4See supra Chap. 3, pp. 88-89.; And also see Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), (hereinafter Final Report), par. 73.; The latest 
practice of the international community in terms of confirming that the norms of international 
humanitarian law prohibiting crimes against humanity enjoy the status of peremptory norms of 
international humanitarian law or of jus cogens can be examined in the Judgement of Kupreskic and 
Others Case rendered by the ICTY on 14 January 2000. (Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic and 
Others, Judgement, Case No. IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, par. 520), (hereinafter Kupreskic and Others 
Case, Judgement). 
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important issues in relation to the definition of crimes against humanity, its elements and 
substantive content, which derives from the inconsistency of the regulations of the 
international humanitarian law instruments and of the practice of the international 
community. It can be examined in the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR under which the 
applicability of crimes against humanity is subject to different elements for each Statute. ' 
However, there cannot be any doubt that the practice of the International Tribunals 
plays a central role in solving these issues inherited in the concept of crimes against 
humanity and will create a precedential value for the ICC in its future work. 
6.2. THE CONCEPT OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute6 states: 
"The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the 
following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in 








(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) other inhumane acts. " 
As has clearly been indicated by the Secretary-General, the legal basis for the 
inclusion of crimes against humanity in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals were the 
5See infra pp. 280-292. 
6 The ICTR Statute has different regulation in relation to the conditions for the applicability of the concept 
of crimes against humanity although it enumerates the same acts constituting crimes against humanity as 
the ICTY Statute. Article 3 of the ICTR Statute states: "The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have 
the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or 
religious grounds" (emphasis added). 
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Nuremberg Charter, Judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the CCL No. 10 for 
Germany. ' 
The notion of crimes against humanity has, for the first time in international law, 
taken its place in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal' since the categories of war crimes 
and crimes against peace were not sufficient to cover some offences which either occurred 
in peace time or committed against the States' own citizens, such as "atrocities committed 
by the Nazis against German Jews, Catholics, Gypsies and others". 9 At the time of the 
adoption of the Nuremberg Charter it was argued that the regulation of crimes against 
humanity was not ex post facto law since it constituted a part of customary international 
law. In this context, the legal grounds were Hague Conventions of 1899 (II) and of 1907 
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, both of which refer to the "laws 
of humanity" in their preambles, 1° the Joint Declaration of May 28, (1915) made by France, 
Great Britain and Russia condemning the Ottoman Empire for committing crimes that was 
labelled as "crimes against humanity and civilization" against its own citizens, Armenians, " 
7Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN. 
Doc. 5/25704 & Add. 1, (1993), (hereinafter Secretary-General's Report), par. 47. 
8Bassiouni, M., C., Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, Dordrecht, Boston, London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1992), pp. 1,32,147. 
Article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter regulates the concept of crimes against humanity as follows: "... 
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any 
civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. " 
9Sunga, L., S., Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights Violations, 
Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1992), pp. 44,46-47. 
101he related part of the preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention can be quoted as follows: "Until a more 
complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare 
that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain 
under the protection and the rule of the principles of law of nations, as they result from the usages 
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience". 
(emphasis added). The text is available in D. Schindler and J. Toman (eds. ), The Laws of Armed Conflicts 
A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Document, Geneva: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 
(1981), pp. 57-92. 
This regulation in international law is known as "Martens Clause" and its customary nature was confirmed 
by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Case (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, (8 July 1996), (1996) ICJ Rep. p. 226, at p. 259, par. 84) and by the ICTY in the Judgement of 
the Kupreskic and Others Case (par. 525).; For the concept of Martens Clause, see Miyazaki, S., "The 
Martens Clause and International Humanitarian Law", in C. Swinarski (ed. ), Studies and Essays on 
International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet, Geneva, The Hague: 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1984), pp. 433-444. 
11Schwelb, E., "Crimes Against Humanity", (1946) 23 BYIL p. 181.; Bassiouni, pp. 168-169.; The 
literature is contradictory in relation to the alleged crimes committed by the Ottoman Empire against its 
own Armenian population in the First World War. In this context, for extensive studies or work on the 
justification and explanation of the Armenian Case, see Gunn, K., Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence 
Exposed, London: K. Rustem and Brothers, (1985).; Gurun, K., Ermeni Dosyasi, Ankara: Turk Tarih 
Kurumu Yayinlari, (1993).; Koymen, A., Ermeni Soykirim Iddialari ve Arsivlerdeki Gercekler, Ankara: 
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and the 1919 Report of the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and 
on Enforcement of Penalties for Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, which 
provides individual criminal responsibility for the acts regarded as "crimes against 
civilization and humanity". 12 However, none of these international law instruments regarded 
the concept of crimes against humanity as a legally independent category of international 
crimes. This raises the question of the legality of the Nuremberg Charter, did it create a 
new law or it merely reflected the customary rules of international humanitarian law. 13 The 
approach of the Nuremberg Tribunal itself was equivocal since the Tribunal did not 
interpret the notion of crimes against humanity as a separate category of crime. Rather it 
looked for a connection with war crimes or crimes against peace in order for an offence to 
be punishable under the concept of crimes against humanity. 14 In a sense, the Nuremberg 
Tribunal treated the concept "as secondary or ancillary to crimes against peace or war 
crimes". 13 
The regulation of the Nuremberg Charter was followed, with some significant 
differences, by the Tokyo Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East16 
and by the CCL No. 10 for Germany. " The most significant difference between the 
(1990).; Suslu, A., Ermeniler ve 1915 Tehcir Olayi, Van: Van Yuzuncu Yil Universitesi Rektorlugu 
Yayinlari, (1990).; Onur, H., Ermeniler, Istanbul: Kitabevi, (1999). 
'The text of the 1919 Report of the Commission is available in B. B. Ferencz, An International Criminal 
Court A Step Toward World Peace -A Documentary History and Analysis, London, Rome, New York: 
Oceana Publications Inc., (1980), pp. 169-192. The related part of the Report can be cited as follows: "All 
persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of 
rank, including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or 
the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution". (Ferencz, p. 177). 
"Robinson, D., "Defining "CrimesAgainst Humanity" at the Rome Conference", (1999) 93 AJIL p. 44. 
'4Sunga, p. 46. 
"Morris, V., and Scharf, M., P., The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Vol. I., Irvington-on- 
Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, (1998), p. 162.; Morris, V., and Scharf, M., P., An Insider's 
Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia A Documentary History and 
Analysis, Vol. I., Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, (1995), (hereinafter An 
Insider's Guide), p. 76.; For general observations on crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg 
Judgement, see Schwelb, pp. 205-212, in particular, p. 206. 
16Article 5 (c) of the Tokyo Charter states: "Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or 
during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in execution of or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated". The text of the Tokyo Charter is available in Morris and Scharf, Vol. II., pp. 485-489.; 
For the differences between the Nuremberg Charter and the Tokyo Charter, see Schwelb, pp. 215-216. 
"Article II (1) (c) of the CCL No. 10 states: "Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offences, including 
but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated". For the 
differences between the Nuremberg Charter and the CCL No. 10, see Schwclb, pp. 217-219. In this context 
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Charters of the Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribunals and the CCL No. 10 was that the CCL 
No. 10 did not require the existence of any connection or link with other crimes, namely, 
war crimes or crimes against peace for the applicability of the concept of crimes against 
humanity. ' In addition to these international humanitarian law instruments, Principles of 
International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the 
Judgement of the Tribunal, which was adopted by the International Law Commission of the 
United Nations in 195019 and the 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind20 should be indicated in terms of including regulations for the concept 
of crimes against humanity. 
In light of these international humanitarian law instruments, the notion of crimes 
against humanity has evolved by means of some practice of the national courts. 2' The 
adoption of the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes under which the International Tribunals have 
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity by the Security Council in 1993 and 1994 
respectively followed the Second World War war crimes trials and the practice of the 
national courts. ' The latest developments in international humanitarian law, the 1996 
also see Roberge, M-C., "Jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda over 
Crimes against Humanity and Genocide", (1997) 37 Int. 'l Rev. Red Cross p. 655. 
'slbid The Einsatzgruppen Case is indicated by scholars to indicate this significant point that the concept 
of crimes against humanity covers atrocities committed in time of peace. In this sense, see Roberge, pp. 
655-656.; Morris and Scharf, An Insider's Guide, pp. 75-76. 
19Principle VI (c) regulates crimes against humanity. The texts of the UN General Assembly Resolution 95 
(I) of 11 December 1946, affirming the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and of the Principles Of International Law are available in Schindler and Toman 
(eds. ), pp. 833,835-836. 
2°The 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind was adopted by the 
International Law Commission. The text of the 1954 Draft Code is available in D. H. N. Johnson, "The 
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind', (1955) 4 ICLQ pp. 466-468.; One of 
the most significant points of this Draft Code is that "inhuman acts" (the terms, crimes against humanity 
were replaced by this phrase), which are regulated in Article 2 (11) of the 1954 Draft. Code, do not need to 
be committed in connection with crimes against peace or war crimes. For the analysis of the 1954 Draft 
Code, see Johnson, pp. 445-466, in particular, p. 465. 
21The Eichmann Case is the most important one in which the accused was found guilty of crimes against 
humanity by the Israeli national court. (Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, (1961) 
36 ILR p. 5, and (1962) 36 ILR p. 277. For the analysis of this case, see Fawcett, J., E., S., "The Eichmann 
Case". (1962) 38 BYIL, pp. 181-215. The significance of the Eichmann Case lies on the ruling that no link 
or connection is necessary between crimes against humanity and other crimes either war crimes or crimes 
against peace. 
The Cases of Demjanjuk v. Petrovski (recognising the principle of universality for crimes against humanity, 
Barbie (establishing a new element, that is to say, the requirement of State policy for crimes against 
humanity) and of Touvier followed the Eichmann practice in international humanitarian law. In this 
context, for the importance of the practice of national courts in accordance with these and other national 
court decisions, see Ratner, S., It, and Abrams, J., S., Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1997), pp. 47,51-53.; and 
also see Roberge, pp. 656-658. 
DArt. 5 of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 3 of the ICTR Statute. 
279 
TLC's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind23 and the adoption 
of the ICC Statute, 24 should also be indicated as evidence of reflecting the current 
customary status of international law in relation to the concept of crimes against humanity. 
As has clearly been understood from the development of the concept of crimes 
against humanity, despite the fact that the notion has reached the level ofjus cogens norms 
status of international humanitarian law until the adoption of the ICC Statute, there was not 
a clear substantive and uniform definition of crimes against humanity in the field of 
international law. All the aforementioned international law instruments required different 
elements for the applicability of crimes against humanity. As will be discussed below, even 
the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR require different elements in this sense for an act to 
be considered as constituting a crime against humanity. However, whatever these 
differences are, the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR undoubtedly plays a crucial role in 
solving the problems inherited in this concept and will create a precedential value in terms 
of interpreting and applying the requirements and substantive content of crimes against 
humanity for the ICC in its future work. 
6.3. THE PRACTICE OF THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND THEIR 
CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON THE ICC 
As with war crimes and the crime of genocide, the significance of the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals with regard to the concept of crimes against humanity can be examined in two 
ways: Firstly, they interpret and apply the conditions for the applicability of crimes against 
humanity in relation to the events occurred in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. 
Secondly, they clarify the substantive content of crimes against humanity. 
6.3.1. The Conditions for the Applicability of the Concept of Crimes Against 
Humanity 
'See Art. 18 of the ILC Draft Code. 
24See Art. 7 of the ICC Statute. Although there are significant differences between the ICC Statute and the 
Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, it should not be wrong to say that the ICC Statute is a combination of the 
related provisions of the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes as far as the conditions for the applicability of crimes 
against humanity are concerned. These differences will be discussed in accordance with the practice of the 
ad hoc tribunals in detail below. 
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As will be discussed below, the conditions set out in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals 
with regard to crimes against humanity are quite different from each other and some of 
them, in fact, are not required under customary international humanitarian law. For these 
reasons, the most important aspects of the concept need to be discussed in accordance with 
the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR and also with the latest international humanitarian 
law instruments such as the 1996 ILC Draft Code and the ICC Statute. In this context, the 
following issues will be examined: The existence of an armed conflict; the requirement of 
attack being directed against any civilian population; the requirement of discriminatory 
intent; the requirement of mens rea (mental element); and the acts. 
6.3.1.1. The Existence of an Armed Conflict25 
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute explicitly requires the existence of an armed conflict, whether 
international or internal in nature, to regard an act constituting a crime against humanity, 
unlike the ICTR Statute does not include such a requirement for this category of 
international crime. 26 
In the practice of the ICTY, the issue whether the existence of an armed conflict is a 
necessary element of crimes against humanity under customary international humanitarian 
law, was dealt with for the first time by the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber of the 
International Tribunal in the Tadic Case as an interlocutory decision which is known as the 
Tadic Jurisdiction Decision. 27 In this case, the Defence argued that for the applicability of 
crimes against humanity, the existence of an armed conflict of an international character is 
required, and the application of the concept to internal armed conflicts by way of Article 5 
of the Statute violates the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege) since it has no 
legal ground in customary international law. 28 
For how to decide whether there exists an armed conflict either international or internal in character, the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals and their contribution to international humanitarian law and possible 
impact on the ICC, see supra Chap. 4, pp. 136-140. 
26See Art. 3 of the ICTR Statute. 
Z'Trial Chamber, Tadic Case. Jurisdiction Decision, Case No. IT-94-1-T, (10 August 1995), paras. 75-83.; 
Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
(Jurisdiction Decision), Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, (2 October 1995), paras. 138-142. 
'Defence Motions, (23 June 1995), paras. 11.1-11.6.; In this context, for the Prosecution Service's 
argument that "[t]he ICTY has the power to prosecute the accused under Article 5 of the ICTY Statute 
insofar as crimes against humanity do not require a nexus with an armed conflict, whether international or 
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In the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals 
Chamber held that under customary international law, crimes against humanity did not 
require a connection to armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and 
that in fact under Article 5 of the ICTY Statute the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal 
was limited by means of the inclusion of nexus with armed conflict that made the concept 
narrower than under customary international law. 29 As a result of this ruling, the 
International Tribunal decided that Article 5 of the Statute did not violate the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege at all. 30 Moreover, the Chambers decided that customary 
international law did not require any nexus between crimes against humanity and crimes 
against peace or war crimes. 31 
In the Judgement of the Tadic Case, the Trial Chamber firstly confirmed the 
findings of the Appeals Chamber in the Jurisdiction Decision, 32 then clarified the 
requirement of the existence of an armed conflict for the purpose of the International 
Tribunal. In this context, the Chamber interpreted the condition that crimes against 
humanity be committed in an armed conflict to mean that "the act occurred in the course or 
duration of an armed conflict". 33 The Tribunal clarified its understanding by way of 
introducing two caveats which were "that the act be linked geographically as well as 
temporally with the armed conflicts34 and "the act must not be unrelated to the armed 
conflict, must not be done for purely personal motives of the perpetrator". 35 
internal in character", see Prosecutor's Response to the Defence's Motions Filed on 23 June 1995, (7 July 
1995), pp. 53-59. 
"Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 82-83.; Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, 
Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 141-142. The related part of the decision of the Appeals Chamber can be 
quoted as follows: "It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity 
do not require a connection to international armed conflict. Indeed, as the Prosecutor points out, customary 
international law may not require a connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. 
Thus, by requiring that crimes against humanity be committed in either internal or international armed 
conflict, the Security Council may have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary under 
customary international law.... " (par. 141). 
3°Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, par. 83.; Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction 
Decision, par. 141. 
31. Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 79-81.; Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, 
Jurisdiction Decision, par. 140.; For the importance of the examination of the position under customary 
international law although the nexus is required by Article 5 of the ICTY Statute by the Trial andAppeals 
Chambers in the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, see infra p. 283. 
Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-T, (7 May 1997), par. 627. 
"Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 633. 
; 'Ibid. 
"Ibid. par. 634 (emphasis in original). 
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The view adopted by the Trial Chamber in the Tadic Judgement was followed, with 
one exception, by the International Tribunal in the Kupreskic and Others Case. 3' ' The 
exception was in the Tadic Judgement's finding that crimes against humanity cannot be 
committed for purely personal motives or reasons. 37 This issue will be discussed later under 
the requirement of mens rea for crimes against humanity. 
From the point of international humanitarian law, the importance of the practice of 
the ICTY lies in the rulings that under customary international law, crimes against humanity 
do not need to have any connection to armed conflicts whether international or internal in 
character, and that they do not need to have any nexus to other crimes, either crimes 
against peace or war crimes. These two facets of crimes against humanity are crucial in 
terms of indicating the independence of crimes against humanity from other international 
crimes and of providing protection for civilians in the cases of human rights violations 
occurring in time of peace. The way adopted by the ICTY is also in compliance with the 
latest international humanitarian law instruments: neither the 1996 ILC Draft Code38 nor 
the ICC Statute39 require the existence of an armed conflict and nexus to other crimes for 
the applicability of crimes against humanity to specific events. Lastly, it should also be 
noted the practice of the International Tribunal is also in compliance with the writings of 
international lawyers in this regard. 40 
Trial Chamber, Kupreskic and Others Case, Judgement, paras. 545-546. 
"The main reason to reach such a conclusion in the Kupreskic and Others Case was the ruling of the 
Appeals Chamber which reversed the Tadic Judgement in this regard. See Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. 
Dusko Tadic, Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, (15 July 1999), paras. 238-272. 
Article 18 of the ILC Draft Code defines crimes against humanity as " any of the following acts, 
[enumerated in Article 18 (a-k)] when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated 
or directed by a Government or by any organization or group". 
"Article 7 (1) of the ICC Statute defines crimes against humanity as "any of the following acts 
[enumerated in Article 7 (1) (a-k)] when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack". 
'Some scholars interpreted the terms "when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal 
in character" in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute as it was "a consequence of the limited jurisdiction of the 
International Tribunal rather than a limitation on crimes against humanity as a matter of international 
law". (Morris and Scharf, An Insider's Guide, pp. 82-83).; Ratner and Abrams, p. 57.; Bassiouni, p. 191.; 
Cassese, A., "The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections", (1999) 10 
EJIL p. 1S0.; Murphy, S., D., "Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia", (1999) 93 AJIL p. 70.; Wang, M., M., "The International Tribunal for Rwanda: 
Opportunities for Clarification, Opportunities for Impact", (1995) 27 Col. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. p. 217.; 
Reydants, L., "Universal Jurisdiction over Atrocities in Rwanda: Theory and Practice". (1996) 4 Eur. J. 
Cr, Cr. L. & Cr. J. p. 29.; Turns, D., "War Crimes Without War? - The Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law to Atrocities in Non International Armed Conflicts", (1995) 7 Afr. J. Int. '1 Comp. L. 
pp. 812-813.; However, it is still possible to see the idea that the concept of crimes against humanity is only 
applicable to international armed conflicts under customary international law. In this sense, see Shraga, D., 
and Zacklin, R, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda", (1996) 7 EJIL p. 509. 
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6.3.1.2. The Requirement of Attack Being Directed Against any Civilian Population 
Under both the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, an act to be considered as constituting 
a crime against humanity, it must be "directed against any civilian population'. " As will be 
discussed in accordance with the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, this requirement includes 
several elements which need to be separately examined, because of their importance in 
international humanitarian law: 
(i) The Notion of "Civilian" 
The meaning or scope of the notion of "civilian" was first examined by the ICTY in the 
Tadic Judgement and it was interpreted in a broad manner in light of the different sources 
of international humanitarian law ranging from Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions to the decision of the French Cour de Cassation in the Barbie Case. "' 
According to the definition of the International Tribunal, "the presence of those actively 
involved in the conflict should not prevent the characterization of a population as civilian 
and those actively involved in a resistance movement can qualify as victims of crimes 
against humanity". 43 
The approach taken by the international Tribunal in the Tadic Judgement has 
created a precedential value for the following cases of the ICTY44 and for the ICTR as 
well. 4s 
4'Art. 5 of the ICTY Statute.; Article 3 of the ICTR Statute explains this element in a more clearer manner 
as "... crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population... ". 
Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 639-643. 
131bid. par. 643. To reach such a conclusion, the Tribunal in par. 643 also referred to the finding of the 
ICTY in the Vukovar Hospital Case. In this case, the Tribunal decided that: "... Although according to the 
terms of Article 5 of the Statute of this Tribunal, the combatants in the traditional sense of the term cannot 
be victims of a crime against humanity, this does not apply to individuals who, at one particular point in 
time, carried out acts of resistance". (The Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic and Veselin 
Sljivancanin, Vukovar Hospital Case, Decision of Trial Chamber I- Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 
61, Case No. IT-95-13-R61, (3 April 1996), par. 29). 
"Trial Chamber, Kupreskic and Others Case, Judgement, paras. 547-549. 
The practice of the ICTR, in this regard, is in compliance with the ICTY's approach. In the Akayesu 
Judgement, the Rwandan Tribunal even made more clearer the issue that who are included in the notion of 
"civilian" as follows: "Members of the civilian population are people who are not taking any active part in 
the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who laid down their arms and those persons placed 
horse de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause. Where there are certain individuals 
within the civilian population who do not come within the definition of civilians, this does not deprive the 
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(ii) The Notion of "Population" 
The International Tribunal, in the Tadic Judgement, explained the requirement of 
"population" as intending "to imply crimes of a collective nature and thus exclude single or 
isolated acts". 46 In a sense, as similar to the crime of genocide, in fact, the victim is not the 
individual himself because of his individual attributes, instead, the victim is the targeted 
civilian population and individual is chosen or victimised on the basis of his membership to 
this particular civilian population. " For this reason, this element has a very close link with 
the other requirement of crimes against humanity, that is to say, being a widespread or 
systematic attack or act. 48 
(iii) The Notion of "Widespread or Systematic Attack" 
Although this element has explicitly taken its place in the ICTR Statute, the ICTY Statute 
does not expressly require such an element in order to that a crime falls within the meaning 
of crimes against humanity. 49 However, the Secretary-General's Report (commentary to 
the ICTY Statute) deploys the terms "widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population" to explain the concept of crimes against humanity. " 
Given this ground, both ad hoc tribunals looked for the presence of the widespread 
or systematic attack or acts as a condition for the applicability of crimes against humanity 
to the Yugoslavian and Rwandan situations. In the Akayesu Judgement, the ICTR defined 
the concept of "widespread" as "massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out 
collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims! '51 
and defined the notion of "systematic" as "thoroughly organised and following a regular 
population of its civilian character". (Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, (2 September 1998), paras. 6.4.88-89).; Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Clement 
Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Judgement, Case No. ICTR. 95-1-T, (21 May 1999), paras. 127-128.; 
Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Judgement, Case No. 
ICTR-96-3-T, (6 December 1999), see paragraph 2.3. (crimes against humanity) of the Part 2 (the 
Applicable Law) of the Judgement. 
'eTrial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 644. 
"Ibid 
48Ibid 
49See Arts. 3 and 5 of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes, respectively. 
50Secretary-General 's Report, par. 48. 
51Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.4.84-85. 
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pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private resources". 52 
The view taken by the ICTR is also consistent with the practice of the ICTY which has also 
adopted similar definitions for these concepts in the Tadic Judgement. 53 
In relation to the element of "widespread or systematic attack", the issue of whether 
these two concepts must be present at the same time (conjunctive) or whether either of 
them is sufficient (disjunctive) was clarified by the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, both of 
the International Tribunals decided that either one of these concepts is enough for the 
applicability of crimes against humanity, in other words, these requirements are alternative 
rather than cumulative. 54 
The main reason for the necessity of the widespread or systematic occurrence of 
acts as a main element of crimes against humanity is to exclude isolated or random acts 
from this category of international crime. At this point, one issue whether a single act by a 
perpetrator can constitute a crime against humanity or not arises. The opinion of the ICTY 
was affirmative on this issue and decided that a single act could constitute a crime against 
humanity. " 
(iv) The Policy Element 
This is one of the requirements of crimes against humanity, but neither the ICTY Statute 
nor the ICTR Statute includes such a provision in this regard. However, in international 
law, the existence of a policy element has been discussed among the scholars some of 
52Ibid.; In this context, for the practice of the ICTR, see Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, 
Judgement, par. 123. 
5'"... the requirement that the acts must be directed against a civilian "population", ... either a 
finding of 
widespreadness, which refers to the number of victims, or systematicity, indicating that a pattern or 
methodical plan is evident, fulfils this requirement". (Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 648). 
'Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 647-648.; Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, par. 
6.4.83.; Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, par. 123. 
""Clearly, a single act by a perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility and an individual perpetrator need 
not commit numerous offences to be held liable. Although it is correct that isolated, random acts should not 
be included in the definition of crimes against humanity that is the purpose of requiring that the acts be 
directed against a civilian population and thus "[e]ven an isolated act can constitute a crime against 
humanity if it is the product of a political system based on terror or persecution. "" (footnote omitted, 
emphasis in original, Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 649). To reach this conclusion, the 
ICTY, in par. 649 of its decision, referred to the Rule 61 Decision in the Vukovar Hospital Case that had 
already indicated this fact in par. 30 of its ruling.; In this context, also see Trial Chamber, Kupreskic and 
Others Case, Judgement, par. 550. 
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whom named this requirement as "State action or policyiS6 and considered it as a sine qua 
non element of crimes against humanity; 17 and some of whom criticised the policy element 
on the basis of such a requirement was not even required for the crime of genocides' 
As has been indicated above, although the policy element was not expressly 
mentioned in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, in practice both the ICTY and the ICTR 
have looked for the presence of this element. In this context, the International Tribunals 
indicated that "the concept of crimes against humanity necessarily implies a policy element" 
despite the fact that there were some doubts about whether it was strictly required in 
international humanitarian law. 59 According to the Tribunals, "such a policy need not be 
formalized and can be deduced from the way in which the acts occur. Notably, if the acts 
occur on a widespread or systematic basis that demonstrates a policy to commit those acts, 
whether formalized or not". 60 This point so significant in terms of setting up a guidance on 
how to decide whether such a policy exists in a particular situation or not. In addition to 
these findings, the International Tribunals also noted that such a policy needs not to be the 
policy of a State on the ground that crimes against humanity, in accordance with the 
development of customary international law, can be committed by forces which have de 
facto control over a territory. 61 
From the point of view of international humanitarian law, the approach taken by the 
ICTY and the ICTR in relation to the requirement of attacks or acts being directed against 
any civilian population should be considered as in compliance with the customary rules of 
international law since the latest international humanitarian law instruments, as evidence of 
current customary rules in this regard, consist of similar provisions. These are the 1996 ILC 
Draft Code62 and the ICC Statute in which the notion of "[a]ttack directed against any 
civilian population" is described as "a course of conduct involving the multiple commission 
5%assiouni, pp. 236-262.; Ratner and Abrams, pp. 64-67.; Morris and Scharf, An Insider's Guide, pp. 79- 
80. 
"Bassiouni, pp. 236,247. 
-"Von Sternberg, M., R., "A Comparison of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: 
Universal Jurisdiction and the "Elementary Dictates of Humanity"", (1996) 22 Brook. J. Int. 'I L. p. 139. 
"Trial Chamber, Kupreskic and Others Case, Judgement, par. 551.; Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, 
Judgement, par. 653.; Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, par. 124. 
6°Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 653.; Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, 
Judgement, par. 124. 
"Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 654-655.; Trial Chamber, Kupreskic and Others Case, 
Judgement, paras. 552-555.; Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, paras. 125-126. 
'2Article 18 of the 1996 ILC Draft Code defines crimes against humanity as "any of the following acts, 
[enumerated in Article 18 (a-k)] when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated 
or directed by a Government or by any organization or group ". (emphasis added). 
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of acts.. against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack". 63 In this context, there cannot be any doubt 
that the practice of the ad hoc tribunals will create a precedential value for the ICC in its 
future work in terms of providing a clear guidance on the definition and scope of the 
notions of "civilian", "population", widespread or systematic attack" and "policy element", 
all of those are explicitly required as conditions of crimes against humanity in Article 7 (1- 
2) of the ICC Statute. ` It should also be noted that this requirement of crimes against 
humanity now has been interpreted and applied by the ad hoc tribunals. In particular, the 
views taken by the ICTY and the ICTR with regard to the policy element, although it is not 
required by the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, and also the disjunctive nature of the 
requirement of being widespread or systematic attack" are merely two examples proving 
this. This is also significant to show that the International Tribunals have been interpreting 
and applying the customary rules of international humanitarian law, not their Statutes in the 
literal meaning. 
6.3.1.3. The Requirement of Discriminatory Intent 
Although the Statute of the ICTR explicitly requires a discriminatory intent for all crimes 
against humanity by way of referring to "the following crimes when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, 
ethnic, racial or religious grounds... ", 66 the ICTY Statute does not include such a 
requirement for all crimes against humanity. 67 
The ICTR, in accordance with its Statute to regard an act constituting crimes 
against humanity, has looked for the presence of discriminatory grounds which are 
indicated as "national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds", and decided that the 
attacks or acts must be committed on one of these discriminatory grounds. 69 
63 Art. 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute, (emphasis added). 
64Sarooshi, D., "The Statute of the International Criminal Court", (1999) 48 ICLQ p. 398. 
65F'or the negotiation process of the disjunctive approach in the Rome Conference to adopt the ICC Statute, 
see Arsanjani, M., It, "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court', (1999) 93 AJIL pp. 30-3 1. 
"Art. 3 of the ICTR Statute (emphasis added). 
67Art. 5 of the ICTY Statute. 
'Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.4.90-91.; Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana 
Case, Judgement, paras. 130-132.; Trial Chamber, Rutaganda Case, Judgement, see paragraph 2.3. 
(crimes Against Humanity) of Part 2 (The Applicable Law) of the Judgement. 
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On the other hand, despite the fact that the ICTY Statute did not require a 
discriminatory intent as a condition for all crimes against humanity, the International 
Tribunal in the Tadic Judgement decided that the existence of discriminatory intent was a 
necessary element for all crimes against humanity, not only for persecution types crimes. 
This was based on the Report of the Secretary-General 9 and on the statements referring to 
acts taken on a discriminatory basis made by some States in the Security Council, in the 
course of adopting the Statute. 70 Before reaching this conclusion, the International Tribunal 
examined customary international law and found that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters 
and CCL No. 10 did not contain discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity, but 
only for persecution. Nonetheless the Tribunal felt itself bound by Secretary-General's 
Report and also with the ICTR Statute. " The approach of the ICTY can be heavily 
criticised on the ground that it was required to apply customary rules of international 
humanitarian law. In this sense, if the regulations of the Statute and its commentary (the 
Secretary-General's Report) do not reflect customary international law, the ad hoc 
tribunals should not be bound by these instruments. This is because the Security Council 
does not have a legal power to create offences or elements for international crimes. This 
criticism is also valid for the way adopted in the ICTR Statuten 
Fortunately, the decision of the Trial Chamber that all crimes against humanity 
required a discriminatory intent was appealed by the Prosecution Service of the ICTY 
which argued that the Chamber erred in its findings and that the requirement of a 
discriminatory intent was only for persecution type crimes, not for all crimes against 
humanity. ' Having examined the text of Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, 74 customary 
international law, " the Report of the Secretary General76 and the statements made by some 
The Report of the Secretary-General defines crimes against humanity as "... inhumane acts of a very 
serious nature, such as wilful killing, torture or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds ". (par. 48, 
emphasis added). 
'OTrial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 652. 
'Ibid. paras. 650-652. 
In this context, see supra Chap. 4, pp. 221-222.; In this regard for the criticism of the Tadic Judgement, 
see McDonald, A, "The Year in Review", (1998) 1 YIHL p. 141.; Meron, T., "War Crimes Law Comes of 
Age" in T. Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1998), pp. 299-300.; 
For the criticism of the regulation of the ICTR Statute, see Meron, T., "International Criminalization of 
Internal Atrocities", (1995) 89 AJIL p. 557.; Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court 
Making the Right Choices, Part I, AI Index: IOR 40/01/97, January 1997, p. 40. 
73Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 273., and also for the Prosecution Service's argument in 
brief see paras. 274-277. 
741bid. paras. 282-286. 
"Ibid. paras. 287-292. 
289 
States in the Security Council, " the Appeals Chamber reversed the ruling of the Trial 
Chamber in the Tadic Judgement and concluded that the notion of discriminatory intent 
was not required for all crimes against humanity and such an intent was "an indispensable 
legal ingredient of the offence only with regard to those crimes for which this is expressly 
required, that is, for Article 5 (h), concerning various types of persecution". 78 
From the aspects of international humanitarian law, the view taken by the Appeals 
Chamber should be regarded as a major contribution to international law on the ground that 
it does not limit the scope of crimes against humanity by way of requiring all of them be 
committed on discriminatory grounds such as national, ethnic, racial or religious. As is 
well-known one of the main purposes of international humanitarian law is to protect 
innocent lives. As long as the other requirements of crimes against humanity are fulfilled 
responsible individuals should be brought to justice regardless of their discriminatory 
motives, which can only be for persecution types of crimes against humanity, in fact, this 
element is inherited in this offence.? In this context, it should also be noted that there may 
occur widespread or systematic attacks against any civilian population which may not be 
covered by the listed discriminatory grounds of the ICTR Statute, for example the 
extermination of physically or mentally ill persons, homosexuals etc. as being witnessed in 
the Second World War Nazi Germany. 80 For this reason, in addition to the non-requirement 
of the discriminatory ground for all crimes against humanity, it should not be limited or 
listed even for the persecution types of crimes against humanity. 8' Lastly, it should also be 
indicated that the decision of the Appeals Chamber is consistent with the latest international 
humanitarian law instruments, namely with the 1996 ILC Draft Code and the ICC Statute 
both of them require the discriminatory intent for only persecution, not for all crimes 
against humanity. i2 On this ground, it should not be wrong to conclude that at least the 
practice of the ICTY in relation to this specific point has become in compliance with the 
761bid. paras. 293-297. 
"Ibid. paras. 298-304. 
"Ibid. par. 305. 
For the crime of persecution, its elements and the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in this regard, see infra 
pp. 295-298. 
'0In fact, the Appeals Chamber refers to this situation as one of legal basis for its Judgement in par. 285. 
"The ICC Statute takes this fact into account in its enumeration of persecution as a crime against humanity 
in Article 7 (1) (h) which refers to "[p]ersecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, 
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender ... or other grounds that are universally recognised as 
impermissible under international law, ... ". (emphasis added). '2See Art. 18 (e) of the 1996 Draft Code and Art. 7 (1) (h) of the ICC Statute. 
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current customary international law rules as a result of the ruling of the Appeals Chamber 
in the Tadic Judgement. 
6.3.1.4. The Requirement of Mens Rea (Mental Element) 
Neither the ICTY Statute nor the ICTR Statute provides such a requirement for crimes 
against humanity. 33 However, this is the one of the main elements of crimes against 
humanity that makes an ordinary crime an international one in nature. Because of this 
significance the ad hoc tribunals had to examine the presence of mens rea (mental element) 
of crimes against humanity. 
In the Tadic Judgement, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, firstly, decided that the 
required mens rea for crimes against humanity was "to commit the underlying offence the 
perpetrator must know of the broader context in which his act occurs". 84 The International 
Tribunal, secondly, held that "the act must not be taken for purely personal reasons 
unrelated to the armed conflict"-$' This approach was also followed by the ICTR in the 
Judgement of Kayishema and Ruzindana Case. 36 
However, the ruling of the Trial Chamber that crimes against humanity cannot be 
committed for purely personal reasons or motives in the Tadic Judgement was appealed by 
the Prosecution Service of the ICTY which argued that the Trial Chamber erred in its 
findings in this regard and that crimes against humanity could be committed for purely 
personal reasons. 87 Having examined Article 5 of the Statute, "' the object and purpose of 
the Statute89 and the case law as evidence of customary international law, 90 the Appeals 
Chamber concluded that "the requirement that an act must not have been carried out for the 
purely personal motives of the perpetrator does not form part of the prerequisites necessary 
83See Arts. 5 and 3 of the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes, respectively. 
"Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 656. 
3"Jbid The concluding part of the Trial Chamber's Decision in this respect can be quoted as follows: "Thus 
if the perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or constructive, that these acts were occurring on a 
widespread or systematic basis and does not commit his act for purely personal motives completely 
unrelated to the attack on the civilian population, that is sufficient to hold him liable for crimes against 
humanity. Therefore the perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the civilian population, know that 
his act fits in with the attack and the act must not be taken for purely personal reasons unrelated to the 
armed conflict". (par. 659). 
"Trial Chamber, Kay! shema andRuzindana Case, Judgement, paras. 133-134. 
87Appeals Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 240-243. 
881bid. paras. 248-252. 
89Ibid paras. 253-254. 
901bid. paras. 255-270. 
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conduct to fall within the definition of a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the 
Tribunal's Statute" 91 
The way adopted by the Appeals Chamber in relation to this specific aspect of the 
mens rea requirement of crimes against humanity in the Tadic Judgement has already taken 
its place in the practice of the ICTY. 92 In this context, there cannot be any doubt that the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals should be considered as a major contribution to 
international humanitarian law in making clear the mental element requirement of crimes 
against humanity, and most importantly, it will create a precedential value for the ICC in its 
future work since the ICC Statute expressly deploys the terms "with knowledge of the 
attack" in its definition of crimes against humanity. 93 In this regard, it should also be noted 
that the International Tribunals, in particular the ICTY, how have perfectly interpreted and 
applied the mens rea requirement of crimes against humanity, in accordance with the 
regulation of the ICC Statute as evidence of current customary international law, despite of 
its exclusion in their Statutes. 
6.3.1.5. The Acts 
The last requirement of crimes against humanity is that there must be an act constituting a 
crime against humanity. These acts are enumerated, in the same way, in Articles 3 and 5 of 
the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes, respectively. Which acts constitute crimes against 
humanity and the practice of the ad hoc tribunals and their impact on the ICC will be 
examined below. 
6.3.2. The Substantive Content of Crimes Against Humanity 
The Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals enumerate the offences constituting crimes against 
humanity as follows: "(a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) 
911bid. par. 272. 
92After the Appeals Chamber's Decision, in the ICTY practice, the first and the latest case concerning 
crimes against humanity is the Judgement of Kupreskic and Others Case rendered by the ICTY on 14 
January 2000. See Trial Chamber, Kupreskic and Others Case, Judgement, par. 558. 
93Art. 7 (1) of the ICC Statute. 
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imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious 
94 grounds; (i) other inhumane acts". 
As with war crimes and the crime of genocide, the ICTY and the ICTR, in addition 
to the requirements of crimes against humanity, have to examine the elements of each crime 
not to violate the principle of legality or nullum crimen sine lege. 
As has been clearly inferred from the regulations of the Statutes of the ICTY and 
the ICTR, some of these offences are very clear and easy to apply to specific events like 
murder while the others are vague in nature such as "other inhumane acts". For this reason, 
the practice of the ad hoc tribunals has a significant place in international humanitarian law 
in terms of interpreting and applying the elements of crimes and of determining the scope of 
some crimes in a sense that which types of acts fall within the meaning of some categories 
of offences, in particular, the crime of persecution and other inhumane acts should be noted 
in this respect. In this context, there cannot be any doubt that the ICC will be guided by the 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the interpretation and application of the 
substantive content of crimes against humanity in its future work. 
6.3.2.1. Murder 
When the prerequisite elements of crimes against humanity are met the crime of murder's 
falls within the meaning of this category of international crime. 96 
6.3.2.2. Extermination 
The difference between murder and extermination lies on the scale of the offence and 
"extermination can be said to be murder on a massive scale". 97 Under Articles 3 (b) and 5 
"Art. 3 of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 5 of the ICTY Statute. The related Article of the ICC Statute enumerates 
more acts constituting crimes against humanity than the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and also provides 
definitions of these acts. For example, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, enforced disappearance of persons 
and the crime of apartheid can be indicated in this regard. See Art. 7 of the ICC Statute. 
For the elements of murder, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, their contribution to international 
humanitarian law and possible impact on the ICC in this regard, see supra Chap. 4, pp. 168-172. 
ZArt. 3 (a) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 5 (a) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 7 (1) (a) of the ICC Statute.; In this 
context, see Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.4.98-105.; Trial Chamber, Kayishema and 
Ruzindana Case, Judgement, paras. 136-140.; Trial Chamber, Kupreskic and Others Case, Judgement, 
paras. 560-561. 
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(b) of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes, respectively, extermination constitutes a crime 
against humanity provided that the prerequisite elements of crimes against humanity are in 
presence. 98 
6.3.2.3. Enslavement 
As long as the elements of crimes against humanity are met the crime of enslavement falls 
within the category of this international crime. 99 When the practice of the ad hoc tribunals 
is examined in this respect, it can be seen that there is no final judgement dealing with the 
crime of enslavement until the present time. '°° 
6.3.2.4. Deportation 
According to the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, deportation'" can constitute a crime 
against humanity when its prerequisite elements are met. 102 
91Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, par. 142., and also see paras. 143-147.; 
Trial Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.4.106-110. 
"Article 7 (1) (b) of the ICC Statute also includes extermination as a crime against humanity and in Article 
7 (2) (b) defines it in an illustrative way as follows: " "[e]xtermination" includes the intentional infliction 
of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the 
destruction of part of a population". 
"Art. 3 (c) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 5 (c) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 7 (1) (c) of the ICC Statute. Article 7 
(2) (c) of the ICC Statute defines enslavement as "the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the 
right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in 
persons, in particular women and children". 
0°However, there are indictments charging the accuseds with enslavement of women in connection with 
sexual crimes. In this sense, see The Prosecutor v. Dragon Gagovic, Gojko Jankovic, Janko Janjic, 
Radomir Kovac, Zoran Vukovic, Dragan Zelenovic, Dragoljub Kunarac and Radovan Stankovic, 
Indictment, also known as Foca Indictment, (26 June 1996), paras. 10.8,12.6.; Prosecutor v. Dragoljub 
Kunarac, Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-96-23-I, (13 July 1998), paras. 9.3,10.4. 
'°'For the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, their contribution to international humanitarian law and their 
impact on the ICC in this regard, see supra Chap. 4, pp. 197-201. 
102Art. 3 (d) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 5 (d) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 7 (1) (d) of the ICC Statute.; 
Unfortunately, there is no final judgement treating deportation as a crime against humanity, but there are 
indictments in this respect. In particular, the indictment charging Slobodan Milosevic and other high 
ranking officials of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the forced deportation of approximately 
740.000 Kosovo Albanian civilians should be noted. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, 
Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic and Vlajko Stojilkovic, Indictment, (22 May 1999), par. 100.; 
Prosecutor v. Milan Simic and Others, Initial Indictment, Case No. IT-95-9, (21 July 1995), par. 20.; 
Prosecutor v. Milan Simic and Others, First Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-95-9, (25 August 1998), 
par. 31.; Prosecutor v. Milan Simic and Others, Second Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-95-9, (11 
December 1998), par. 39.; Prosecutor v. Milan Kovacevic, Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-97-24-I, (23 
June 1998), par. 53. 
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6.3.2.5. Imprisonment 
The act of imprisonment is the other category of offence which constitutes a crime against 
humanity under the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. 103 Unfortunately, there is no final 
judgement dealing with this offence as a crime against humanity at the present time. '°' 
6.3.2.6. Torture 
According to the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the crime of torture" constitutes a crime 
against humanity if the prerequisite elements of this category of international crime are 
met. 106 
6.3.2.7. Rape 
The crime of rape107 is also a punishable act which can be treated as constituting crimes 
against humanity provided that the elements of crimes against humanity are in presence in a 
specific situation. 'os 
6.3.2.8. Persecutions on Political, Racial and Religious Grounds 
The crime of persecution is one of the offences constituting crimes against humanity on 
which the ICTY and the ICTR have power to try and punish responsible individuals for this 
crime when the requirements of crimes against humanity are met. 'o9 
109Art. 3 (e) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 5 (e) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 7 (1) (e) of the ICC Statute. 
1°4However, it is possible to find indictments charging accuseds with this offence as a crime against 
humanity. In this sense, see Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Amended Indictment, (30 
September 1998), paras. 49,54. 
105For the elements of torture, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, their contribution to international 
humanitarian law and their impact on the ICC in this regard, see supra Chap. 4. pp. 172-184. 
106Art. 3 (f) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 5 (f) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 7 (1) (f) of the ICC Statute.; Trial 
Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.4.111-116. 
107For the elements of rape, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, their contribution to international 
humanitarian law and their impact on the ICC in this regard, see supra Chap. 4. pp. 178-184. 
108Art. 3 (g) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 5 (g) of the ICTY Statute.; Art. 7 (1) (g) of the ICC Statute.; Trial 
Chamber, Akayesu Case, Judgement, paras. 6.4.117-122. 
109Art. 3 (h) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 5 (h) of the ICTY Statute. 
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The ICTY first dealt with the crime of persecution in the Tadic Judgement. "' 
According to the Trial Chamber's decision in the Tadic Judgement, persecution is a form of 
discrimination that is intended to be and results in an infringement of an individual's 
fundamental rights. Additionally, this discrimination must be on specific grounds, namely, 
race, religion or politics. "' Furthermore, "the crime of persecution encompasses a variety 
of acts, including, inter alia, those of a physical, economic or judicial nature, that violate an 
individual's right to the equal enjoyment of his basic rights". ' 12 In light of this explanation, 
the elements of the crime of persecution are indicated as follows: (a) the existence of a 
persecutory act or omission which can be either enumerated elsewhere in the ICTY Statute 
or not enumerated elsewhere in the Statute; 113 (b) the existence of discriminatory basis that 
can be political, racial or religious. 114 
In the Judgement of the Kupreskic and Others Case, the International Tribunal 
further elaborated the elements of persecution and provided a clear definition of the crime 
of persecution, first time in international law by an international criminal institution, on the 
ground that the Tadic Judgement was very broad and it was needed to be more clarified. ' is 
For this reason, the Tribunal defined persecution as "the gross or blatant denial, on 
discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or 
treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5 ". 116 
In accordance with this definition, the International Tribunal indicated the elements of 
persecution as follows: "(a) those elements required for all crimes against humanity under 
the Statute; (b) a gross or blatant denial of a fundamental right reaching the same level of 
gravity as the other acts prohibited under Article 5; (c) discriminatory grounds". "' As has 
been clearly understood from the definition and elements of persecution, the actus reus 
(physical element, persecutory act or omission) of the offence can be in different forms 
10Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, paras. 694-713. 
"'Ibid par. 697. 
1121bid. par. 710.; In paragraph 704 of the Tadic Judgement, the Trial Chamber indicates this fact as 
follows: "... the crime of persecution encompasses acts of varying severity, from killing to a limitation on 
the type of professions open to the targeted group". 
'1 31bid. paras. 698-710. 
"4Ibid. paras. 711-713.; Although the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals regulate the concept of 
discriminatory basis in a conjunctive way (political, racial and religious) the International Tribunal 
interpreted it in a disjunctive manner which is consistent with the customary rules of international 
humanitarian law (paras. 712-713) and also consistent with the latest international humanitarian law 
instruments. (See Art. 18 (e) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code.; Art. 7 (1) (h) of the ICC Statute). 
"'Trial Chamber, Kupreskic and Others Case, Judgement, paras. 616,618. 
161bid. par. 621. (emphasis in original). 
"'Ibid. par. 627. 
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which cannot be even expressly prohibited either in Article 5 or elsewhere in the ICTY 
Statute. "3 Although the actus reus of persecution can be the same as other categories of 
crimes against humanity or as war crimes, the distinguishing feature of this crime is the 
mental requirement (mens rea) of the offence, that is to say, it must be committed on 
discriminatory grounds which may be political, racial or religious. 119 As has been indicated 
by the International Tribunal, "the mens rea requirement for persecution is higher than for 
ordinary crimes against humanity, although lower than for genocide". 120 Having set out 
these facts, the ICTY in the Kupreskic and Others Case also indicated the relationship 
between the crime of genocide and persecution. According to the Tribunal, "[p]ersecution 
is only one step away from genocide" and the main difference can be examined in the mens 
rea requirements of each crime as follows: "[i]n the crime of genocide the criminal intent is 
to destroy the group or its members; in the crime of persecution the criminal intent is 
instead to forcibly discriminate against a group or members thereof by grossly and 
systematically violating their fundamental human rights". 121 
From the aspects of international humanitarian law, the importance of the practice 
of the International Tribunal in relation to the crime of persecution can be seen in the 
following points: By means of the practice, the international community has witnessed the 
first ever definition of the crime of persecution. Its elements, substantive content were 
clarified. The similarities and differences between the crime of genocide and persecution 
were outlined and a guideline was created in terms of distinguishing the mess rea 
requirements of the crime of genocide and persecution. This last point is so significant in 
international humanitarian law on the premise that most of atrocities or offences occurred 
in the different parts of the world can easily qualify the crime of persecution, not the crime 
of genocide, on the basis of collectivity of human beings which may be based on economic, 
political, social, cultural. racial, gender, national, religious or any other grounds. '22 This 
wide coverage of persecution does not leave any room for responsible individuals to go 
unpunished in the cases of human rights atrocities, that cannot be regarded as constituting 
genocide, occurred either in time of peace or in time of war. It should also be noted that the 
"'For the distinguished features of the actus reus requirement of persecution, see Ibid. par. 615. 
1191bid. par. 607. 
120Ibid. par. 636.; This fact was also indicated in the Jelisic Case. For the Jelisic Case and how to assess 
the existence of a discriminatory ground, see supra Chap. 5, pp. 235,249-250, notes 18,86. 
'21Trial Chamber, Kupreskic and Others Case, Judgement, paras. 636,751. 
'fArticle 7 (1) (h) of the ICC Statute includes these discriminatory grounds which are much more than the 
corresponding provisions of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. 
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crime of persecution provides protection for any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, social, economic or cultural basis. The significance of this point lies on the 
extension of the protected groups which cannot be protected under the crime of genocide. 
In terms of indicating that any identifiable group is under the protection of international 
humanitarian law is crucial to refute the criticisms in relation to the crime of genocide that 
economic, political or social groups are not protected by international humanitarian law 
instruments. 123 
Lastly, it should be indicated that the practice of the International Tribunal in the 
Kupreskic and Others Case with regard to the definition and application of the crime of 
persecution is much more in compliance with customary international law than the the ICC 
Statute which defines persecution in a very broad manner and introduces a condition of 
being connected with any other crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC to be applicable to 
any specific event. 124 However, whatever the differences between the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals and the regulation of the ICC Statute are there cannot be any doubt that the ICC 
will be, in a significant level, guided in its future work by the approach taken by the ad hoc 
tribunals in relation to the crime of persecution. 
6.3.2.9. Other Inhumane Acts 
The last category of crimes against humanity is called "other inhumane acts" under the 
Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR. 125 As has been clearly understood from the regulations 
of the Statutes, the deployment of the terms without its definition "other inhumane acts" 
makes the substantive content of crimes against humanity illustrative rather than exhaustive. 
On this ground, the ICTY and the ICTR had to define this concept not to violate 
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. In the Tadic Case, the International Tribunal 
depended upon the definition made in Article 18 (k) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code which 
'23In this context, see supra Chap. 5, pp. 240-245. 
124Article 7 (2) (g) of the ICC Statute defines persecution as "the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity". 
Article 7 (1) (h) of the ICC Statute also states: "[p]ersecution against any identifiable group or collectivity 
on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender ... or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to In this 
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court". (emphasis added). 
In fact, this reality was indicated by the ICTY in the Judgement of Kupreskic and Others Case. (see paras. 
579-581,617). 
WArt. 3 (I) of the ICTR Statute.; Art. 5 (1) of the ICTY Statute. 
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states: `other inhumane acts which severely damage physical or mental integrity, health or 
human dignity, such as mutilation and severe bodily harm". 126 In light of this guidance, the 
Tribunal regarded the acts of cruel treatment such as beatings, acts of violence and forced 
removals of civilians from their homes as equivalent to other inhumane acts under the 
category of crimes against humanity. 127 In the following cases, the ICTR and the ICTY 
have already taken into account the definition provided in Article 7 (1) (k) of the ICC 
Statute128 as a legal base for the application of the concept in specific cases. '' Even the 
scope of other inhumane acts was made more clearer by means of providing examples 
which may fall within this subheading of crimes against humanity. Amongst them, serious 
forms of cruel, degrading or humiliating treatment of persons, forcible transfer of group of 
civilians, enforced prostitution, enforced disappearance of persons can be mentioned. 130 
In international humanitarian law, the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR in relation 
to the concept of other inhumane acts should be regarded as in compliance with the 
customary rules of international law and it will have a precedential value for the ICC when 
it becomes in operation in terms of providing a guideline on which types of acts may fall 
within the meaning of other inhumane acts. 131 
6.4. CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of crimes against humanity is universally prohibited by the customary rules of 
international humanitarian law irrespective of committed in time of peace or in time of war. 
Its prohibition, as different from war crimes and the crime of genocide, does not have a 
conventional base with the exception of the regulation of the ICC Statute. Although the 
concept has, for the first time in positive international law, taken its place in the Nuremberg 
Charter to cover some acts which may not be regarded as either war crimes or crimes 
'26Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Judgement, par. 729. 
'27Ibid. paras. 730,764-765. 
'23Article 7 (1) (k) of the ICC Statute states: "Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health". 
'"Trial Chamber, Kayishema and Ruzindana Case, Judgement, par. 150.; Trial Chamber, Kupreskic and 
Others Case, Judgement, par. 565. 
130'Trial Chamber, Kupreskic and Others Case, Judgement, par. 566. 
131 In this context, it should be noted that some examples indicated by the ad hoc tribunals as constituting 
other inhuman acts have already taken their place in the ICC Statute as independent categories of offences 
constituting crimes against humanity such as enforced prostitution (Art. 7 (1) (g)) and enforced 
disappearance of persons (Art. & (1) (i)). 
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against peace, it has evolved and become an independent category of international crimes. 
Moreover, today, it is well-settled that the norms governing crimes against humanity enjoy 
the status of jus cogens and in consequence, States are obliged to prosecute, punish or 
extradite the individuals responsible for crimes against humanity. However, apart from the 
practice of the International Military Tribunals after the Second World War and of some 
domestic applications, the concept of crimes against humanity had not been applied at the 
international level. The establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR by the Security Council in 
1993 and 1994 respectively, both of which have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity 
has provided an opportunity for the interpretation and application of the norms governing 
crimes against humanity. This was so important on the ground that the elements and 
substantive content of crimes against humanity were not clear enough in international 
humanitarian law. For this reason, the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR has a significant 
place in international law. 
As with war crimes and the crime of genocide, the importance of the practice of the 
ad hoc tribunals with regard to crimes against humanity can be examined in two ways: 
Firstly, they interpret and apply the requirements or elements of crimes against humanity. 
Secondly, they clarify the substantive content of this category of international crime, in 
other words, they examine the specific elements of each crime regarded as constituting a 
crime against humanity. 
As has been indicated by the International Tribunal, the first requirement of crimes 
against humanity is the existence of an armed conflict, whether international or internal, 
according to the Statute of the ICTY. However, the ICTR Statute does not require such an 
element for the applicability of crimes against humanity. Despite of the regulation of its 
Statute, the ICTY in the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, Tadic Judgement and the Kupreskic 
and Others Case Judgement decided that under customary international law, crimes against 
humanity do not need to have any connection to armed conflicts, whether international or 
internal, and that they do not need to have any nexus to other crimes, either crimes against 
peace or war crimes. These two facets of crimes against humanity are significant in terms of 
indicating the independence of the concept from other crimes and of providing protection 
for civilians in the cases of human rights violations occurring in time of peace. The 
approach taken by the International Tribunal should be regarded as solving one of the most 
important issues, that is to say, whether the presence of an armed conflict is a prerequisite 
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condition for the applicability of crimes against humanity or not. The ruling of the Tribunal 
is also in compliance with the latest international humanitarian law instruments such as the 
1996 ILC Draft Code and the ICC Statute. 
The second requirement of crimes against humanity is that there must be an attack 
or act directed against any civilian population. This requirement inherits several elements in 
it, namely, "civilian population", "widespread or systematic attack", and the "policy 
element". In this regard, the contribution of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in the Cases 
of Tactic, Akayesu, Kayishema and Ruzindana, Rutaganda, Kupreskic and Others to 
international humanitarian law can be indicated as follows: the broad definition of "civilian" 
and "population"; the interpretation of widespread or systematic attacks in a way of 
disjunctive rather than conjunctive; indicating the possibility of one single act can constitute 
a crime against humanity; the examination of policy element despite of its non-inclusion in 
the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals; creating a guideline on how to decide whether such a 
policy requirement exists in a specific case. There cannot be any doubt that the practice of 
the ICTY and the ICTR will create a precedential value in these aspects for the ICC in its 
future work since the ICC Statute expressly requires all these elements. In this context, it 
should also be noted how this requirement of crimes against humanity has been truly 
interpreted and applied by the ad hoc tribunals in light of the customary rules of 
international humanitarian law, rather than their Statutes in the literal meaning. 
The third requirement of crimes against humanity is that crimes must be committed 
on discriminatory basis: namely, national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds under 
the Statute of the ICTR. In accordance with its Statute, the ICTR has looked for the 
presence of this element in the Judgements of Akayesu, Kayishema and Ruzindana, and 
Rutaganda Cases. On the other hand, despite the fact that the ICTY Statute does not 
contain the existence of discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity, the ICTY in 
the Tadic Judgement decided that the presence of discriminatory intent was a condition for 
all crimes against humanity, not only for the crime of persecution, in contrary to the 
customary rules of international humanitarian law. Fortunately, the decision of the Trial 
Chamber in the Tadic Judgement was appealed by the Prosecution Service of the ICTY and 
it was reversed. According to the Appeals Chamber, the notion of discriminatory intent was 
not required for all crimes against humanity and it was only necessary for the persecution 
types of crimes. In this context, the ruling of the Appeals Chamber should be regarded as a 
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major contribution to international humanitarian law on the premise that the view of the 
Appeals Chamber does not limit the scope of crimes against humanity by way of requiring 
all of them be committed on discriminatory grounds. This is so significant in terms of 
providing protection for civilians whose fundamental human rights may be violated in a 
widespread or systematic manner in time of peace and their status may not fall one of the 
grounds as indicated in the ICTR Statute. The approach taken by the Appeals Chamber in 
the Tadic Judgement is also consistent with the regulations of the 1996 ILC Draft Code 
and of the ICC Statute. 
The fourth requirement of crimes against humanity is the existence of mens rea 
(mental element) which means the accused must have the knowledge of the context within 
which his/her actions are taken. Although this element transforms an ordinary crime into an 
international one it is not expressly included in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. 
However, the International Tribunals have examined the mens rea requirement of crimes 
against humanity because of its significance. The main importance of the practice of the ad 
hoc tribunals can be seen in the clarification or interpretation of this requirement. In this 
context, the ruling of the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Judgement should also be 
indicated in terms of reversing the decision of the Trial Chamber that crimes against 
humanity cannot be committed for purely personal reasons or motives. In this sense, there 
should not be any doubt that the practice of the ad hoc tribunals will have a clear impact on 
the ICC since the ICC Statute explicitly includes this element by deploying the terms "with 
knowledge of the attack" in its definition of crimes against humanity. 
The last requirement of crimes against humanity is that there must be an act 
constituting this category of international crime. The acts regarded as constituting crimes 
against humanity are enumerated in Articles 3 and 5 of the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes, 
respectively. 
The second major contribution of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals to 
international humanitarian law and possible impact on the ICC can be examined in relation 
to the interpretation and application of the substantive content of crimes against humanity. 
In this context, the significance of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals lies on the 
interpretation and application of the elements of murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds and of other inhumane acts. In particular, the view taken by the International 
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Tribunals -especially in the Judgement of Kupreskic and Others Case- with regard to the 
crime of persecution and of other inhumane acts should be indicated as follows: the first 
ever definition of the crime of persecution by an international criminal institution; the 
clarification of its elements and substantive content; the explanation of similarities and 
differences between the crime of genocide and persecution; distinguishing the mens rea 
requirement of persecution from the intent (mens rea) requirement of genocide; the 
definition of the category of "other inhumane acts" as a crime against humanity; the 
creation of a guideline on which types of acts can fall within the meaning of "other 
inhumane acts". As has been clearly inferred from these significant aspects of international 
humanitarian law, the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR will, undoubtedly, create a 
precedential value for the ICC in its future work. In this regard, lastly, it should also be 
noted that in some points the practice of the International Tribunals, as has been seen in the 
Judgement of Kupreskic and Others Case with regard to the definition and application of 
the crime of persecution, should be considered as much more in compliance with the 
customary rules of international humanitarian law than the ICC Statute which defines the 
crime of persecution in a very broad manner and introduces a condition of being connected 




The international community has witnessed many human rights violations which 
have also constituted violations of international humanitarian law throughout the twentieth 
century. After the Second World War the nature of armed conflicts and the method of 
warfare have changed remarkably; armed conflicts mainly become internal or 
internationalised in characer, and civilians and civilian objects are often targeted. Two of 
the worst violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law occurred in the 
territories of the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda in the last decade of the twentieth 
century. There cannot be any doubt that the situations in the former Yugoslavia and in 
Rwanda constituted threats to international peace and security. The large scale of killings, 
rape and other forms of sexual violence, "ethnic cleansing", genocide and other types of 
crimes committed in these two regions of the world impelled the international community 
to bring those responsible of such crimes to justice. To achieve this purpose and to 
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, the only way was to 
establish an international criminal tribunal by means of a Security Council Resolution which 
was in compliance with the urgency of the events occurred in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. On this background, the UN Security Council established the ICTY and the ICTR 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter "to do justice, to deter further crimes, and to 
contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace". ' 
In contrast to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR were 
established neither by the victors as a "victor's court or justice" nor by the parties involved 
in the conflict, but rather by the UN Security Council on behalf of the entire international 
community in order to protect international peace and security. For this reason, the 
establishment of these International Tribunals was innovative in character, and their 
establishment should be seen as a contemporary example of the application of international 
humanitarian law for enforcing individual responsibility when the violations of international 
humanitarian law and of human rights law occurred. 2 
'See Chap. 1, note 109. 
2See Chap. 1, note 110. 
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The response of the international community to the situations of former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda by means of establishing ad hoc tribunals pave of the way for the 
establishment of an international criminal court. The concept of creating an international 
criminal court to prosecute and punish individuals who are responsible for violations of 
international humanitarian law has been discussed by the international community for 
almost 100 years and its establishment became possible just before the new millennium 
through the adoption of the Statute of the ICC in the UN Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court held in Rome, 
Italy, between 15 June - 17 July 1998. This was one of the major achievements of the 
international community in the twentieth century. In this context, it should be noted that 
whatever the contribution of the ad hoc tribunals to international humanitarian law is, the 
real contribution can be seen in leading to the establishment of the ICC. If the ad hoc 
tribunals had not been established by the Security Council the international community 
would have been discussing the possibility of the establishment of an international criminal 
organisation, perhaps, for another 100 years. 
Having indicated the significance of the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, 
some of the general conclusions drawn from this work will be summarised below. As has 
been indicated in the introductory remarks, the purpose of this study was to try to examine 
the international humanitarian law rules and their application by the ad hoc tribunals in 
relation to the substantive law of the ICTY and the ICTR, and their contribution to 
international humanitarian law and their potential impact on the ICC. 
1. Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law: 
One of the main purposes of international humanitarian law is to enforce individual 
criminal responsibility through either domestic courts or international criminal institutions. 
At the international level, until the recent time, the most authoritative precedents with 
regard to the implementation of the concept of individual criminal responsibility was the 
practice of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and at Tokyo and Subsequent 
Proceedings that the international community witnessed after the Second World War. 
However, the practice of these institutions were strongly criticised on the basis of their not 
constituting real precedents in international law. In this sense, the establishment of the 
ICTY and the ICTR by the Security Council on behalf of the international community and 
their practice in relation to interpreting and applying the principle of individual criminal 
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responsibility have a significant place in the development of international humanitarian law 
in terms of proving the enforceability of individual criminal responsibility at the 
international level for the crimes which are all concern to the international community. The 
adoption of the ICC Statute by a large number of States followed this and indicated that the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility and its implementation was one of the most 
important desire of the international community to achieve universal justice for human 
beings. 
In light of the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR, the contribution of the ad hoc 
tribunals to international humanitarian law and impact on the ICC can be examined in the 
following aspects of individual criminal responsibility: 
(a) As is well known from the customary and conventional law rules of international 
humanitarian law, the notion of individual criminal responsibility is just not only for the 
persons who directly committed the crime (as principal), but also for the persons who 
facilitated the commission of the offence in a way of planning, instigating, ordering, or 
otherwise aiding, abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime (as 
participant). The real problem in international law lies in establishing individual criminal 
responsibility in relation to the degree of participation necessary to result in criminal 
culpability. At this point, the Nuremberg and the post-Second World War war crimes trials 
failed to reach a specific criterion. For this reason, the application of the concept of 
individual criminal responsibility by the ad hoc tribunals holds an important place for 
interpreting and drawing the line for the scope of individual responsibility and also for 
setting up general criteria making clear the degree of participation to be considered as 
individually criminally responsible in international humanitarian law. This general criteria, 
which fulfils one major gap in international humanitarian law, can be drawn in light of the 
practice of the ICTY in the Tadic and Furundzija Cases as follows: An individual is 
criminally responsible for any conduct when it is determined that he/she intentionally or 
knowingly participated in the commission of an illegal act that violates international 
humanitarian law and his/her participation substantially affected the commission of that 
illegal act through supporting the actual commission before, during, or after the incident. 
There cannot be any doubt that the approach taken by the International Tribunal has a 
306 
precedential value for the ICC since the ICC Statute regulates the concept of individual 
criminal responsibility in a similar way in Article 25.3 
(b) The enforcement of individual criminal responsibility for State officials either as 
Head of State or Government or government senior officials and non recognition of the 
notion of sovereign immunity and its consequence impunity as a defence has a significant 
place in international law in terms of implementing the principles of international 
humanitarian law. 4 
(c) The concept of superior responsibility, its legal status and elements were, for the 
first time in international law, examined in detail in the Celebici Camp Case by the ICTY. 
In this context, the real contribution of the ad hoc tribunals to international humanitarian 
law and possible impact on the ICC can be found in the examination of the elements of the 
concept of superior responsibility by way of making clear its conditions and providing 
precedents for future cases of the ICTY and the ICTR on the ground that the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility of superiors for failure to take necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent or repress the unlawful conduct of their subordinates has evolved after 
the post-Second World War war crimes trials in which a clear principle was not be able to 
set up in this regard. ' 
(d) The existence of a superior order does not constitute a complete defence 
rendering subordinates not criminally accountable, and even may not constitute a mitigating 
factor in punishment since its application relies on some additional special circumstances 
such as combination of a superior order with duress. This was one of the main issues of 
international humanitarian law which is clarified by the Trial and Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY in the Erdemovic Case. 6 
2. War Crimes: 
3See Chap. 3, section 3.3.1. Individual Criminal Responsibility Under Article 7 (1) of the ICTY Statute and 
Article 6 (1) of the ICTR Statute. 
4In this sense, see Kambanda and Akayesu Judgements of the ICTR in Chap. 3, section 3.3.2. Individual 
Criminal Responsibility Under Article 7 (2) of the ICTY Statute and Article 6 (2) of the ICTR Statute. 
5For the criticism of the view taken by the ICTY in the Celebici Camp Case in relation to interpretation of 
the mental element of superior responsibility, and the reasons why this concept should be named as 
"objective responsibility", see supra pp. 112-113,115-119.; In this context, see Chap. 3, section 3.3.3. 
Individual Criminal Responsibility Under Article 7 (3) of the ICTY Statute and Article 6 (3) of the ICTR 
Statute. 
6See Chap. 3, section 3.3.4. Individual Criminal Responsibility Under Article 7 (4) of the ICTY Statute and 
Article 6 (4) of the ICTR Statute. 
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The concept of war crimes and the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, their 
contribution to international humanitarian law and impact on the ICC, because of the 
artificial distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts and the 
laws applicable to them, can be examined by way of dividing the concept into two principal 
categories: "The Grave Breaches System" and "Violations of the Laws or Customs of 
War". 
2.1. The Grave Breaches System: 
Under Article 2 of the ICTY Statute, the ICTY has jurisdiction over the grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocol Ito thereto. 
The ICTR Statute does not include such a provision on the premise that the conflict in 
Rwanda is considered as internal in character. 
The significance of the practice of the International Tribunal with regard to grave 
breaches can be examined in the following aspects of international humanitarian law: 
(a) For the first time in international law, the Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols to thereto have been interpreted and applied by the ICTY. 
(b) The conditions for the applicability of the grave breaches system are clarified: 
These are: General Conditions: (i) the existence of an armed conflict and (ii) the link 
(nexus) between the acts of the accused and the armed conflict. Specific Conditions: (i) the 
existence of an international armed conflict and (ii) the acts must be committed against 
persons or property protected by the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol. The 
main decisions rendered by the ICTY in this regard can be indicated as follows: Tadic 
Jurisdiction Decision (in the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber levels); Tadic Case, 
Celebici Camp Case, Aleksovski Case Final Judgements (in the Trial Chamber); Tadic 
Case, Judgement (in the Appeals Chamber). 
(c) The substantive content of the grave breaches system, in other words, the scope 
of international crimes and their elements are examined in detail. In most cases definitions 
of offences are provided by means of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. In this sense, the 
view taken by the International Tribunal with regard to the crimes such as wilful killing or 
murder, torture, inhuman or cruel treatment, rape or any other forms of sexual violence, 
first ever definition of rape and sexual violence and its treatment as constituting a form of 
torture etc. should be noted. There cannot be any doubt that the approach taken by the 
International Tribunals in this respect will create a precedential value for the ICC in its 
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future work on the basis that the ICC Statute grants power to the ICC over the grave 
breaches of the Geneva Convention. ' 
2.2. Violations of the Laws or Customs of War: 
One of the major contribution of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals is the 
interpretation and application of the concept of violations of the laws or customs of war. In 
particular, the following points need to be indicated: 
(a) The recognition of crimes committed in internal armed conflicts as international 
crimes and of individual criminal responsibility for these offences are able to be practised by 
the ad hoc tribunals for the first time in international humanitarian law. This should be 
perceived as a turning point in the history of international humanitarian law since providing 
protection for civilians who are in internal armed conflicts at the international level. 
(b) The conditions for the applicability of violations of the laws or customs of war 
are examined in detail. 
(c) The substantive content of the violations of the laws or customs of war is 
clarified, and crimes under this sub-category of war crimes are examined. 
The approach taken by the ICTY and the ICTR in relation to this concept 
undoubtedly constitutes a precedential value for the ICC when it comes in operation since 
the ICC Statute include similar or even more detailed provisions in this regard. 8 
However, the view taken by the ICTY, that the international character of an armed 
conflict is a pre-requisite for the applicability of the grave breaches system (which derives 
from the artificial distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts), 
should not be perceived as in compliance with the development of international and of 
human rights law as far as the protection of innocent civilians in a wartime situation is 
concerned. This criticism is also valid in relation to the approach taken by the ICTY with 
regard to the concept of protected persons or property. This is because the nature of armed 
conflicts must not preclude the protection of innocent lives in cases of armed conflicts 
either international or internal in character. 9 
3. The Crime of Genocide: 
7See Chap. 4, section 4.2. The Grave Breaches System. 
8See Chap. 4, section 4.3. Violations of the Laws or Customs of War. °See Chap. 4, sections 4.2.1.1.2.1.1. The Nature of Armed Conflicts Must not Have Any Significance in 
International Humanitarian Law, and 4.2.1.1.2.2. The Concept of Protected Persons or Property. 
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The crime of genocide is universally prohibited by conventional and customary rules 
of international law irrespective of committed in time of peace or in time of war. Despite is 
its extensive prohibition, until the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR it was not possible to 
enforce the rules governing the crime of genocide, in other words, the Genocide 
Convention in international humanitarian law. 
In the light of this, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals has a crucial importance in 
terms of providing the first ever interpretation and application of the crime of genocide at 
the international level, and undoubtedly constitutes a precedential value for the ICC in its 
future work since the ICC has jurisdiction over this horrendous international crime. The 
significant aspects of the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in light of the Judgements of the 
Akayesu, Kayishema and Ruzindana, Rutaganda and Jelisic Cases can be summarised as 
follows: 
(a) It is proven that the crime of genocide is not a second category of crimes against 
humanity as consisting of the persecution of individuals on political, racial or religious 
grounds. 10 
(b) The definition of genocide is provided by means of interpreting and applying the 
rules governing this crime in a manner which prevents the misuse or abuse of the concept of 
genocide. " 
(c) The requirements of genocide, for the first time in international law, are 
interpreted and applied. In this context, the elements of "the victimised group or protected 
group", "the intent" and "the acts" constituting genocide are applied in accordance with the 
development of international humanitarian and human rights law. 12 
(d) The substantive content of the crime of genocide is interpreted and applied. The 
international community witnessed the applications of the concepts of killing members of 
the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and 
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group into a specific event. In this 
regard, the recognition of rape and sexual violence as constituting the crime of genocide 
under the categories of "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" 
10See Chap. 5, section 5.2.1. Distinguishing the Crime of Genocide from Crimes Against Humanity. 
"See Chap. 5, section 5.2.1. The Definition of Genocide. 
12See Chap. 5, section 5.3.1. The Elements of the Crime of Genocide. 
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and of "imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group" by the International 
Tribunal should be noted as creating a historical precedence in international humanitarian 
law. " 
(e) The establishment of individual criminal responsibility for the crime of genocide, 
as different from the general regulation of individual criminal responsibility, is examined in 
detail by the ICTR. In this context, the punishable acts of genocide, which are (i) genocide, 
(ii) conspiracy to commit genocide, (iii) direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
(iv) attempt to commit genocide, and (v) complicity in genocide are interpreted and 
applied. As the practice of the ad hoc tribunals demonstrates, specific regulation of 
individual criminal responsibility for the crime of genocide has a significant place in 
international humanitarian law on the basis of the preventive nature of this type of 
regulation. For this reason, the view adopted in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals in this 
respect should be seen as an advancement over the view adopted in the ICC Statute since it 
does not include a specific provision indicating punishable acts of genocide, apart from the 
crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. 14 
4. Crimes Against Humanity: 
Crimes against humanity are universally prohibited by the customary rules of 
international humanitarian law whether committed in time of peace or in time of war. 
Although the concept of crimes against humanity has, for the first time in positive 
international law, taken its place in the Nuremberg Charter to cover some acts which may 
not be regarded as either war crimes or crimes against peace, it has evolved and become an 
independent category of international crimes. 
On the basis of this ground, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals has a significant role 
to clarify the notion of crimes against humanity. The contribution of the practice of the 
ICTY and the ICTR to international humanitarian law and their impact on the ICC in this 
respect, in light of the Judgements of the Tadic Case (Jurisdiction Decision, Judgements 
rendered by the Trial and Appeals Chamber of the ICTY), Kupreskic and Others, Akayesu, 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Rutaganda Cases, can be indicated as follows: 
(a) The elements of crimes against humanity are examined in detail by the ad hoc 
tribunals. In this context, it is proven that the existence of an armed conflict, whether 
international or internal, is not a pre-requisite condition for the applicability of crimes 
13See Chap. 5, section 5.3.2. The Substantive Content of the Crime of Genocide. 14See Chap. 5, section 5.3.2.2. Individual Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Genocide. 
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against humanity. The requirement that there must be an attack or act directed against any 
civilian population and its content are clarified. The concepts of "civilian population", 
"widespread or systematic attack", the "policy element" are interpreted and applied in 
accordance with the customary rules of international humanitarian law. The mental element 
of crimes against humanity, that is to say, the accused must have the knowledge of the 
context within which his/her actions are taken is clarified in international law. It is well- 
settled by the practice of the ICTY that the discriminatory basis on national, political, 
ethnic, racial or religious grounds is not required for all crimes against humanity, but only 
for the persecution types of crimes. " 
(b) The substantive content of crimes against humanity is interpreted and applied in 
detail by the ad hoc tribunals. In other words, the elements of murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds, and of other inhumane acts are clarified in international humanitarian 
law. In this sense, in particular, the Judgement of Kupreskic and Others Case should be 
noted in terms of providing the first ever definition of persecution by an international 
criminal institution, and of interpreting and applying its elements and substantive content in 
compliance with the customary rules of international humanitarian law. 
(c) The similarities and differences between the crime of genocide and persecution 
and the mens rea requirements of these offences, in other words, genocidal intent and 
discriminatory intent are clarified by means of the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR. 16 
In general, as this study demonstrates, the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR in 
relation to their substantive law contributes to international humanitarian law and creates an 
immense precedential value for the ICC in its future work. However, it should be noted that 
the ICTY and the ICTR have been functioning under very difficult circumstances and their 
success extensively depends upon the co-operation of States with them. This is the only 
way to bring major responsible individuals like Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and 
Slobodan Milosevic to justice. Although it is clear that all responsible individuals will not be 
able to brought before the ICTY and the ICTR, it should not be forgotten that the one of 
15See Chap. 6, section 6.3.1. The Conditions for the Applicability of the Concept of Crimes Against 
Humanity. 
16See Chap. 6, section 6.3.2. The Substantive Content of Crimes Against Humanity. 
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the real achievements of the ad hoc tribunals lies on giving signals to possible perpetrators 
of international crimes will not go unpunished. " 
As far as international humanitarian law is concerned, it should be noted that 
"[i]nternational humanitarian law has developed faster since the beginning of the atrocities 
in the former Yugoslavia than in the four-and-a-half decades since the Nuremberg Tribunals 
and the adoption of the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War of 
August 12,1949". 1* The establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR and their practice are the 
main reasons for such a conclusion. The establishment of the ICC also indicates this. The 
international community has started the new millennium with two ad hoc tribunals currently 
functioning and the ICC hopefully will be operating soon. 19 Even if to make the ICC 
functioning takes a long time, the international community has the guideline in terms of 
implementing the rules of international humanitarian law through legislation in accordance 
with the ICC Statute at the national level. 
Lastly, in this context, it should also be noted that the Cold-War is over, and the 
world has been changing in a significant level. The new world order hopefully will not 
tolerate any more violations of international humanitarian and of human rights law either 
committed in international or internal armed conflicts; either committed in time of peace or 
in time of war. The establishment of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC in the last decade of 
the twentieth century should be seen as examples of this trend. There are likely to be more 
"humanitarian interventions" in order to restore or maintain international peace and security 
throughout the twenty-first century. The international community as a whole (as being 
witnessed in the Gulf War) or NATO as an international organisation (as being witnessed in 
the Kosovo conflict) can play the central role in making possible "humanitarian 
interventions" to prevent violations of international humanitarian and of human rights law 
occurring different parts of the world. In consequence of this, responsible individuals for 
such violations can be easily brought to justice (before the ICC). This way of understanding 
should lead us to the conclusion that there is only one world for all human beings and the 
17For example, as of 4 February 2000, the ICTY have publicly indicted only 93 individuals. For the latest 
information in this regard, see Press Release, Fact Sheet, UN. Doc. PIS/FS-62, (4 February 2000). 
1°See Chap. 3, note 21. 
t9However, the ratification status of the ICC Statute indicates that it will take a long time to see the ICC 
operating. As of 7 February 2000, only six States (Fiji, Ghana, Italy, San Marino, Senegal and Trinidad 
and Tobago) ratified the ICC Statute. According to Article 126, the ICC Statute will enter into force on the 
first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
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ICC, with the exception of the principle of complementarity, is the "World Court" to 
punish individuals who are violating the world order. This must be the main target to be 
achieved by the international community in the twenty-first century. However, while this 
work was in process, the Chechnya conflict was ongoing, and the silence of the 
international community in relation to this massive human rights and humanitarian law 
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